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Introduction
Who but archive rats would fail 
to realise that parties and leaders 
must be tested by their deeds primarily 
and not simply by their declarations?
—Joseph Stalin
This study deals with political transition, continuity and change. More specifically, it 
scrutinises politics and society in three Central European countries—Poland, Czecho­
slovakia, and Hungary—which in 1989, that ‘year of the avalanche’, abandoned political 
systems based on communist party hegemony and planned economic activity for liberal 
pluralism and market-mode transfer.
Many scholars and decision-makers opine that historical precedents combined with 
current economic statistics give more than enough reason to regard the prospects for 
democracy in Central Europe as very bleak indeed. Conditions for making Eastern Europe 
safe for democracy have been called no better after the fall of communism than they were at 
the end of the First World War—as one observer put it: ‘if economic prosperity, presumably 
assuredbya market economy, is essential for democracy, the prospects are grim.’1 Whether 
one agrees with that or not, it appears clear that the nature and strength of anti-democratic 
dispositions in the area is an enticing and important research topic.
This book is in some respects part of the flourishing ‘transitology’ industry, which deals 
with the modalities of the collapse of Real Existing Socialism and with the problems of 
creating new mechanisms. But it also goes beyond that. Despite the enormous efforts and 
resources devoted to the study of communism and the Socialist Bloc, few Western observers 
had anticipated what eventually happened in 1989-90. Adam Przeworski has asserted that the 
collapse of communism indeed signifies a ‘dismal failure of political science.’2 Neither was 
the nature of Eastern European communism fully understood, nor the fact taken in that ‘ [t]he 
conflicts that preceded communism have not been abolished during the four decades of state 
socialism. On the contrary, they continued to exist underneath the bogus veneer of Marxist- 
Leninist propaganda.’3 And if the communist take-over did not mean a clean break with the 
past, what does that imply about post-communism?
The introduction of communism nevertheless constituted a major challenge to the semi- 
or underdeveloped societies of Eastern Europe, which until 1945 had been characterised by
1 Fischer-Galati (1992), 15.
2 This debate was initiated by Lucian W. Pye’s March 1990 article on ‘Political Science and the 
Crisis of Authoritarianism’. Theodore Draper, in but one further indictment of the profession 
of social science claimed (in The New York Review of Books, June 11, 1992) that not a single 
American Sovietologist did predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. Berglund and Dellenbrant 
(1994b), 12, however, mention Richard Pipes, Andrei Amalrik, Francois Fejtd and Ewa 
Kulesza-Mietkowski among the handful of authors who foresaw the breakdown of the Soviet 
empire.
3 Tismaneanu (1993), 2.
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hierarchical authoritarian modes of government, charismatic leaders, and state-centred 
political and economic systems tending towards stagnation. Communism, through its 
modernising ambitions, blocked some aspects of the pre-1945 political cultures, but 
reinforced others. The new power elite was as authoritarian in its attitudes as the former 
ruling strata, believed in etatism—i.e. the primacy of the state in political, social and 
economic development—and understood redistribution by the state in a bureaucratic manner 
without reference to society.4
This study is one more of political continuity than one of political change. Two problems 
in particular need to be clarified. One is the legacy of the political and cultural past and its 
influence on the present, the tentative assumption being that political-cultural patterns, once 
established, possess considerable autonomy and influence over the development of attitudes 
and institutions. The second concerns empirical findings about Central European political 
cultures in the post-communist period, and contrasting them with features of earlier periods. 
We are thus concerned with ‘political culture’: admittedly a ticklish concept—not a theory in 
itself, but only referring to a set of variables which can be applied in the construction of 
theories.5
The hypothesis underlying this book is indeed one of an ‘augmented’ or ‘grand 
continuity’. In the first place, this refers to the ‘accident-proneness’ of the Central and Eastern 
European countries throughout the 20th century. Political life in the area has been 
characterised by unstable institutions, foreign intervention, centrifugality and wild swings 
between the extremes of the ideological spectrum, and by a general lack of moderation.
The hypothesis of a grand continuity has a sub-plot concerning the communist rulers: the 
assumption that they, in the final analysis, were less revolutionary than they themselves—and 
certainly many outside observers, too—would have liked to think. This study aims to display 
the extent to which they adapted their policies and ideologies to the social order they were 
faced with. Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue-, the 
communist world view was a less than consistent mix of Marxist social science, revolutionary 
radicalism, economic utopianism, authoritarianism, nationalism and Soviet intervention. It 
was also—and this should not be forgotten—to some extent a product of and designed to 
create mass-level support.
On the other hand, all was not continuity. The violent processes of social engineering— 
or, more bluntly: genocide and ethnic cleansing—during the 1940’s changed the ethnic 
composition in the region almost beyond recognition. During the following decades, the 
socio-economic structure was irreversibly altered as the communists vigorously pushed 
through their modernisation project. The policies of class war, crash industrialisation, 
collectivisation of agriculture, urbanisation and mass enrolment in education did make the 
Eastern and Central European societies more modern, creating sociostructural features that 
made them more susceptible to liberalist ideas of secularism, tolerance and participatory 
pluralism. The great paradox appears to be that the communist regimes in some respects 
became victims of their own successes, and in realising this gradually turned away from 
modernisation towards traditionalism. This process reinforced continuity in sociopolitical 
structures, by gradually bringing elements of the communist nomenklatura closer and even 
into the right-wing tradition or political culture.
* * *
This being fundamentally a comparative study, the analysis of the countries in the chosen set 
will be made in parallel, both thematically and chronologically. With the relationship be-
4 Schopflin (1993b), 19.
5Cf. Almond (1980), 26.
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tween continuity and change being the main point of interest, it is only logical that the study 
basically is organised according to a chronological principle. Each epoch is discussed with 
reference to its contribution to the understanding of the transition from communism.
Traditional qualitative social science methodology dominates in this book, but is supple­
mented and reinforced by the use of quantitative data. The sources for both qualitative and 
quantitative data are mostly secondary, with the effect that much attention must be devoted to 
systematic criticism of sources. In fact, criticism of the sources is itself part of the method.
One important primary source of quantitative data are the 1972 and 1983 editions and 
supplementing databases of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. These 
supply information on, i.a., political stability, social structure and economic developments 
during the era of communist hegemony. Another principal source of primary quantitative 
data is the set of East/West surveys conducted in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 
1990-91 under the auspices of the Times Mirror Centre for the People & the Press6, which 
is complemented by some country-specific survey data. These survey data track both wider 
attitudes and party-political affiliations at approximately the time of the founding elections 
of 1989-91. The results are then analysed with a comparative method and contrasted with 
action on the elite level.
Chapter 2 is devoted to a discussion of theoretical issues. The choice of country sample, 
which indeed encompasses only some former members of the defunct Socialist Bloc, will be 
elucidated. We will also look into the history, content and nature of the ideologies of the 
radical left and right from the late 19th century onwards, and attempt to find a ‘radical 
nexus’ uniting the extremes of the political spectrum. More specifically, we will look for the 
roots of the post-communist right not only in the pre-war semi-fascist and fascist movements, 
but also in the communist regimes and their attitudes towards the national and religious 
heritage. This approach comes close to the one frequently used in studies of Russia, where the 
embryo of the post-communist radical right is often seen in the nationalist wing of the CPSU. 
Consequently, the definition here of the ‘political right’ is broader than the one usually 
applied in a conventional Western context.
The analysis of the pre-communist and communist eras will mainly take place on the elite 
and the macro level. The reason is mainly practical: the absence of reliable and comprehensive 
survey-type data and of valid ecological electoral data. The chapters dealing with these 
periods will thus combine a largely chronological narrative with content analysis and 
examinations of socio-economic and demographic data. This method, while the only one 
available, has its obvious shortcomings. Yet in societies ruled by authoritarian means by a 
fairly narrow political and technocratic elite, intra-elite conflicts are both highly relevant 
from a power-politics perspective, and can be assumed to provide reliable indications of mass­
level attitudes.
The history and theory of nationalism and xenophobia within the conservative, radical­
right and communist framework is deliberated at length throughout the book. It is almost 
trite to note that Central Europe was a hotbed of inter-communal strife during the first half 
of the 20th century. Our hypothesis, however, goes beyond that. We will argue that 
nationalism played a major political role also during the era of communist domination: 
occasionally taking the form of anti-regime or anti-Soviet outbursts, at other times being 
exploited by the communists themselves in order to enhance popularity and legitimacy.
The focal point of the macro-structural analysis in this book is the general topic of 
modernisation, state-building and nation-building. One of our presumptions is that not only 
state-building in Central Europe, but nation-building as well was incomplete at the time of
6 Data from the surveys have been provided by kind courtesy of Professor Russell Dalton, Politics 
and Society Dept., University of California, Irvine, CA.
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the communist ascent to power. The communists’ promise to speed up state- and nation­
building was an important source of popular support. Socialism and membership in the 
powerful Socialist Bloc was also portrayed as vital for the defence against revanchism, propa­
gated with powerful anti-Western and anti-cosmopolitan allusions. The attempts at 
accelerated nation-building also served as legitimisation for the repression of national and 
ethnic minorities and provided the thinnest of disguises for the xenophobic campaigns that 
the regimes or factions within them repeatedly orchestrated. Yet even if the communist 
governments fanned nationalism from above, they suppressed similar expressions from 
below, branding them as counter-revolutionary, bourgeois or even fascist.7
Chapter 3 deals with the period up until the end of the Second World War, and en­
compasses a fairly detailed comparative political history of Central Europe during the 1920’s 
and 1930’s. Obviously, the main question posed in the chapter is why democracy in inter-war 
Eastern and Central Europe collapsed, giving way to authoritarianism. The inter-war crisis 
of democracy will be analysed using a range of macro-oriented structural theories, with the 
hypothesis that weak democratic institutions fell prey to a combination of internal and exter­
nal pressures.
The following two chapters, 4 and 5, cover the period of established communist 
hegemony. Chapter 4 recounts the communist take-over and the formative years until the 
death of Stalin, while Chapter 5 runs up until the break-down phase of 1989-90. This 
apportion is not founded on, nor should it indicate, an assumption of discontinuity. It need, 
however, hardly be pointed out that the communist ascent to power was a watershed in the 
political history of Eastern Europe, while Stalin’s passing away led to huge political 
commotion in Eastern and Central Europe, causing a decrease in direct Soviet control and 
the gradual and reluctant acceptance in Moscow of the theory of national roads to socialism. 
In Chapter 5, particular attention is devoted to the major crises that shook communist 
Central Europe as a result of the dismantling of Stalinism in 1953-56, during the Prague 
Spring of 1968, and in conjunction with the Polish ‘long summer of discontent’ in 1980-81. 
Both chapters will also deal with the economic and social transformation processes instigated 
by the communists and their structural effects.
The final part of this book focuses on the evolution and programmatic approaches of the 
post-transition political forces, and correlates them with the attitude profiles of their 
supporters and the public at large. These findings will in turn be compared with the pre­
transition and pre-communist socio-political structures, in order to find indications of 
continuity and change. It should hardly come as a surprise that the political parties emerging 
onto the scene as communism went down the drain were at a loss for ideological points of 
reference. Some chose to attach themselves to ready-made Western models, others to the 
parties of the pre-communist era; a few even rejected traditional concepts of politics 
altogether, striving for some sort of anti-political ‘Third Way’ between—or above— 
communism and full-blown capitalism. In any case, the voters of the founding elections of 
1990-91 were faced with almost blind choices between largely unproven entities. The 
discussion of post-transition politics starts already in Chapter 5 with an inquiry into the anti- 
systemic opposition during the periods of crisis. This theme is then developed in Chapter 6. 
The discussion initially moves on the elite level, discussing the electoral themes and results; 
analysing the major radical and conservative parties; and scrutinising the potential for 
popular support in generic radicalism and traditionalism. The results are then related to the 
meso- and mass-levels by reference to the survey data sources mentioned above.
7Hockenos (1993), 15.
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The Framework 
for Analysis
A good war makes
sacred every cause
— Nietzsche
A Note on ‘Central Europe’
‘Central Europe’ is an ambiguous term. In fact, even defining the term, excluding some and 
including other countries and nations, amounts to something of a verdict; at least a Western 
audience would probably regard it as a value statement with relatively favourable 
connotations, whereas ‘Eastern Europe’ mostly carries negative ones. ‘Central Europe’ cer­
tainly appears to be a club that most formerly communist-ruled countries would like to join. 
For one, just as many regionalist movements in the traditional West champion the cause of 
European integration, Central European trans-regional co-operation is often a way of 
compensating for flawed relationships with more immediate neighbours; the archetypal case 
is the ancient strife between Czechs and Slovaks. And, although possibly so to a lesser extent 
than in the 1970’s and 1980’s, many champions of Central Europe mix their arrogance 
towards ‘Asiatic’ Russia with resentment against the ‘noveau-riche’, uncultured, amoral West.
Not surprisingly, the intrinsically problematic concepts of ‘Central Europe’ and—even 
more so—Mitteleuropa have inspired a whole industry of hand-wringing essay-writing. 
Common to famed authors such as Czeslaw Milosz, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Gyorgy 
Konrad, Timothy Garton Ash and Milan Kundera—to name but a few—is an air of time­
warped Angst.
For three decades after 1945, nobody spoke of Central Europe in the present sense: the 
thing was one with Nineveh and Tyre. In German-speaking lands, the very word 
Mitteleuropa seemed to have died with Adolf Hitler, surviving only as a ghostly 
Mitropa on the dining cars of the Deutsche Reichsbahn. [. ..] In Prague and Budapest, 
the idea of a Central Europe continued to be cherished between consenting adults in 
private, but from the public sphere it vanished as completely as it had in ‘the West’. 
The post-Yalta order dictated a strict and single dichotomy by subsuming under the 
label Eastern Europe all those parts of historic Central, East Central and South­
eastern Europe that after 1945 came under Soviet domination.1
Cartographers claim that the geographical centre of Europe is situated somewhere north of 
Vilnius in the Lithuanian countryside. This is not of much help to the historian or political 
scientist: Central Europe can surely not be defined as an area within a given radius, say 1,000
1 Garton Ash (1989), 161.
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or 1,500 kilometres, from this particular point. Neither is Central Europe a topographically 
distinct mass of land, such as the Balkan, Iberian or Scandinavian peninsulas, the British Isles, 
or the Black or Baltic Sea littorals.
‘Central Europe’ is rather a statement of culture, history, economy and politics. In its 
largest extent, late twentieth-century ‘Central Europe’ could thus, for a start, be defined as the 
area between the traditional market-economies of the West and Russia proper; that is, as a 
negation: ‘the East of the West or the West of the East’.2 Thus defined, Central Europe 
encompasses an area between the Baltic, Black, Aegean and Adriatic seas; the odd dozen states 
from Estonia (or maybe Finland) in the North; Poland or the former GDR in the West; 
Bulgaria in the South; and the Ukraine or possibly some or all of the Caucasian statelets in the 
East. Even Austria and possibly Turkey could arguably be included.
Yet it is, in particular, the Soviet domination and Leninist ideology shared by the rulers of 
all these countries for decades after the Second World War that has encouraged treating the 
area as a composite whole. What had previously been the ‘successor states’ of the Austrian, 
German, Russian and Ottoman Empires, were now—with some exceptions—the states that 
‘went communist’ under Moscow’s guidance.3 Czeslaw Milosz is (or at least was) a vocal 
proponent of this view:
There is probably a basic division between the two halves of Europe in the difference 
between memory and lack of memory. For Western Europeans, the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop pact is no more than a vague recollection of a misty past. For us—I say us, 
for I myself experienced the consequences of the agreement between the 
superpowers—that division of Europe has been a palpable reality, as it has been for all 
those who were born after the war. Therefore I would risk a very simple definition. I 
would define Central Europe as all the countries that in August 1939 were the real or 
hypothetical objects of a trade between the Soviet Union and Germany.4
In common usage, however, the countries which fall under that definition do not add up to 
‘Central’, but to ‘Eastern’ Europe.
Some exclusions and clarifications are obviously necessary. First, one may exclude the 
states that have earlier been included in the Soviet Union. The justification is that they, by and 
large, have had a socio-political development that differs in qualitative terms from the 
independent states of the Soviet Bloc. This would remove the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 
and even the Baltic republics, from the sample. Though Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (like 
Western Ukraine and Moldova) were part of the USSR only from 1940/1944, the Soviet 
system of government war rigorously implemented after annexation, and these territories 
retained no or almost no traces of the pre-war system of government.5
Similarly, Austria and Finland can be excluded, on the grounds that they (at least after the 
mid 1950’s) were not subject to anything like total Soviet dominance. The same, albeit with a 
slightly different justification, goes for the former Yugoslavia and for Albania. The German 
Democratic Republic is a special case too. The East German population does indeed share 
many experiences with fellow post-socialist neighbours to the East and South, but the GDR 
was always a case of its own: a state with weak legitimacy due to its suspected temporary 
nature. Even more importantly, the GDR no longer even exists as a sovereign state, submerged 
as it now is into the FRG body politic.
This leaves six countries: Poland, Hungary, both halves of the defunct Czechoslovak 
federation, Bulgaria and Romania. The two latter may now be excluded on the grounds that
2Rupnik (1989), 4.
3 Swain and Swain (1993), 2-3.
4 Milosz (1989), 28.
5Cf. Berglund and Dellenbrant (1994), 238 pp.
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their political and economic development has differed quantitatively—and one may also say 
qualitatively—from the anterior quartet.
In The Uses of Adversity, Timothy Garton Ash combines Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and the GDR to an ‘East Central Europe’, a term which ‘combines the criteria of post- 
1945 Eastern Europe and pre-1914 Central Europe’.6 Post-1945 ‘Eastern Europe’ would 
consist of the non-Soviet member states of the Warsaw Pact (and Comecon). He admits that 
the term ‘Central Europe’ (here in its pre-1914 version) is ‘problematic’, but may be taken as 
to mean ‘those countries that, while subsumed in one of the three great multinational empires 
(Austro-Hungarian, Prussian-German, or Russian), nonetheless preserved major elements of 
Western traditions: for example Western Christianity, the rule of law, some separation of 
powers, a measure of constitutional government, and something that could be called civil 
society.’ This admittedly ex post definition would exclude the the three Baltic republics, the 
Western Ukraine and Belarus by the first criteria and Bulgaria by the second. Garton Ash 
calls Romania a borderline case, but ‘at present’ (i.e., in 1989) too ‘eccentric’. The judgement 
remains reasonable.
Vladimir Tismaneanu has also pointed to the fact that institutions in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland since the nineteenth century were ‘founded upon a Western concept of 
law and individual rights’, whereas in south-eastern Europe ‘civil society was underdeveloped 
and extremely fragile’. He also stresses the cleavage that erupted in the region in 1989, 
between countries where democracy was more of an ideal than a procedural reality and 
communist parties survived the first revolutionary shock, and the ones—i.e. the ‘East Central 
European’ ones—where democratic reconstruction held sway.7 Judy Batt has argued that 
‘even before Soviet control over Eastern Europe ended in 1989, it was clear that Eastern 
Europe as a concept was no longer adequate to describe events in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria’, and in her study East Central Europe 
from Reform to Transformation consequently chooses to deal only with Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, ‘which have much in common as a result of their geographical location, level 
of socio-economic development and recent political history.’ This is not a post-communist 
era observation, but one made already in the 1950’s. In 1981, Karl Deutsch noted that 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR profoundly belong to the Western tradition, 
whereas the Balkan states—those which went communist as well as Greece which did not— 
have been marked by centuries of Turkish rule and their resistance to it.8
Batt further, quite properly, defends her sample with the fact that it ‘to this extent makes 
sense to treat them together, and it makes possible fruitful comparisons that serve to highlight 
not only the similarities but also the important differences in the pattern of their politics and 
economics in their transition from Soviet-style socialism. The other countries of Eastern 
Europe, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, share to some extent the problems of the three 
“Northern Tier” countries [...] but they also have many historical, cultural and other 
peculiarities which warrant separate treatment’. She predicts that future historians of Eastern 
Europe are bound to be concerned with how Central Europe and the Balkans ‘emerged from 
the years of Soviet control in a very different shape and with very different prospects for the 
new era of political pluralism.’9 This study is, as the Introduction made clear, an attempt 
precisely at that.
Thus, ‘Central Europe’ would then include the former European socialist states that were 
neither part of the Soviet Union nor situated in the Balkans. The qualifying prefix ‘East’ is by 
and large superfluous in this context. As someone has pointed out, the Second World War did
6 Garton Ash (1989), 225.
7 Tismaneanu (1993,2-3).
’Deutsch (1981), 58.
9 Batt (1991), Introduction.
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not only result in the East advancing to the Elbe—so did the West. At least for now, Germany 
and rump Austria, which once together formed the core of Imperial-age ‘Central Europe’, 
are definitely Western, not Central European.
This sample left is a practical one, differing from the programmatic exhortations of a 
common Mitteleuropean cause that often hark back to the schmaltzy romancing of the 
common Habsburg-era heritage. That far-flung empire, it should also be noted, stretched 
from present-day Austria and northern Italy—neither of which area did experience the 
Leninist version of socialism—to Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and parts of present-day Serbia, 
Romania and the Ukraine. At the same time, the Habsburgian definition of Mitteleuropa 
excludes the large tracts of Poland that were gobbled by Prussia-Germany or Russia in the 
partitions of the eighteenth century. Moreover, in the Double Monarchy Slovenia, Bohemia, 
Moravia, Silesia and Galicia were ‘Cisleithanian’ and ruled from Vienna, while Slovakia, 
Croatia, Slavonia and Transylvania belonged to the Hungarian or ‘Transleithanian’ part of 
the twin-state empire.10
In any case, the ‘Central Europe’ of 1914, or even of 1939, obviously no longer exists in 
political, cultural or even ethnic terms. The multinational empires gave way to Wilsonian 
nation-states after the First World War, and during and after the Second they were routinely 
cleansed of many, if not all, of their ethnic minorities: the Jewish communities were severely 
decimated throughout the region; most German-speakers expelled from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia; and Poland’s borders redrawn in a fashion that left 
most of the substantial Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian minorities on Soviet 
territory. A case in point is Bratislava (Pressburg in German, Pozsony in Hungarian), the 
population of which at the turn of the century was fairly evenly divided between Germans, 
Hungarians, Jews and Slovaks, but today is almost exclusively Slovak. Between 1919 and 
1948, the traditional Mitteleuropean mix of peoples and ideas was separated into its 
constituent parts, and for some 40 years after the end of the Second World War severe 
restrictions on travel even within the borders of each given country prohibited a resurgence 
of the Central European melting pot.
One may point out that in pre-1914 Central Europe, social cleavages also, to a large 
extent, tended to follow ethnic lines; the aristocracy and bourgeoisie in Austria-Hungary was 
almost exclusively recruited from the ‘historic nations’, i.e. Germans, Hungarians, 
Bohemians and to some extent Poles, while the ‘subaltern nationalities’, Slovaks, Slovenes, 
Romanians, Ukrainians, Croats, Serbs, were relegated to lower social strata, the peasantry and 
later the proletariat.11 Obviously, the imperial era carries different connotations in, say, rural 
Slovakia than in metropolitan Budapest.
The concept, and the dream of a resurrection, of Mitteleuropa indeed carries some 
thoroughly anti-modern connotations. Garton Ash writes:
There can be a ‘return to Central Europe’ in a negative as well as in a positive sense.
The dream of emancipatory modernisation, by no means only the property of 
communists in 1945, may yet end in a reality, all too familiar from Central European 
history, of growing relative backwardness vis-a-vis Western, modern, Europe. It may 
end in a new version of Giselher Wirsing’s Zwischeneuropa or the intermediate zone 
identified by Hungarian writers and historians, its economies exporting tin saucepans, 
bottled fruit, cheap shoes, and cheap labour, importing German tourists and Japanese
10 The river Leitha served as the border between Austria and Hungary. 
"Schopflin (1993), Ch. 1; also Hammarlund (1994).
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capital. A zone, that is, of weak states, national prejudice, inequality, poverty and 
SchlammasseL12
This view has gained ground in the post-communist societies, and the ideological concept of 
‘Central Europe’ may now well be seen as somewhat passe. It was an element of the coy 
emancipatory strategy of the opposition during the communist era, a substitute for 
advocating a truly Western model of market economy, pluralism and rule of law; post­
transition, public demand for this concept of ‘West Light’ is limited.
Finally, at least in Poland, the concept of Central Europe—not to mention ‘Eastern 
Europe’—has never really been in fashion, to say the least. Most Polish intellectuals have 
always preferred to consider their nation and culture as part and parcel simply of ‘Europe’, 
and consider Mitteleuropa as smacking of German or Germanic hegemony and pomposity 
(formerly Austrian Galicia is a marked exception; many cafes in Cracow still brandish 
portraits of Emperor Franz Josef). Much the same goes for Hungary, where the concept of 
‘Europe’ carries emotional overtones inspired by tales depicting how heroic Magyars saved 
the West for Christianity by beating back invaders from the eastern steppes. Indeed, historic 
Hungary and historic Poland bordered on the Ottoman and Muscovite lands, and saw 
themselves (and were seen by others) as the bulwark of Western Christianity, the Antemurale 
Christianitatis. To this day, most Poles consider the puszcza borderland east of the city of 
Bialystok as the przedmurze—bastion—of the Catholic world and thus of the West.
The four countries remaining after this process of gradual elimination admittedly do not 
constitute a perfect or even very harmonious sample. Even the ‘Northern Tier’ has, 
throughout history, been divided between different zones of socio-economic development. 
Since the middle ages Bohemia has been on the fringes of, and periodically even within, the 
wealthy European city-belt stretching from the Low Countries along the Rhine valley to 
northern Italy. States within this belt were (and are) characterised by strong commercial city 
networks and weak political centres, as opposed to the surrounding empire states 
characterised by strong political centres and weak commercial city networks. (Bohemia was, 
of course, very much in the imperial centre in the years when the Emperor resided in Prague).
Hungary including Slovakia, and Poland, on the other hand, have at best been part of the 
semi-periphery, and their eastern regions have by and large been relegated to the outright 
periphery of the European economic system. Although the distance to the core narrowed after 
these territories became part of Christian European civilisation in the 10th century, it again 
begin to widen in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Proto-industrialisation then took off 
in the core while the periphery in East Central Europe retained its agrarian character. It has 
indeed been argued that the social and economic division of the European continent into 
advanced and backward areas has its roots in the different modes of adaptation to the 
commercial revolution of the early modern era. This, Wallerstein claims, caused ‘the slight 
edge of the fifteenth century to become the great disparity of the seventeenth and the 
monumental difference of the nineteenth.’13
Indeed, well into the 20th century, Polish and Hungarian peasants retained their 
traditional ethos and conservative outlook and remained the dominant social group in 
numerical terms. As the peasantry refused to turn en masse into capitalist farmers, it was 
almost impossible to create a modern, capitalist society based on exchange and the rational 
division of labour. Modernisation has thus been the major recurrent theme in Eastern and 
Central European politics, especially as the region has been characterised by institutional 
developments that have preceded socio-economic realities: ‘advanced forms of political
12 Garton Ash (1989), 271.
13 Wallerstein (1974), 99.
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organisation appeared or operated in conditions that were not always ripe for them’.14 
Communism may in fact be interpreted as yet another attempt to come to terms with that 
dichotomy.
An additional feature of the ‘Northern Tier’, as opposed to the Balkan region, may be 
found in the pattern of transition after the collapse of communism. Political power was 
swiftly grabbed by unambiguous opposition forces, which rapidly annihilated their 
communist competitors in the first free or semi-free elections. Bulgaria and Romania, in 
contrast, discarded communism only after it had been made clear that Moscow would pursue 
a hands-off policy, and the former ruling parties and establishments in those two countries 
were able to maintain a firm grip on power; in the Romanian case it is doubtful whether the 
transition meant much more than the discarding of Ceausescu, his entourage and the most 
blatant elements of the _tatist-nationalist ideology.
This is one reason why the Northern Tier is also a region where prospects for pluralistic 
democracy to many observers seem markedly better than in the Balkans, or, for that matter, in 
the three Baltic republics. There are others. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia all at least 
experimented with parliamentary democracy in the inter-war period, and during the era of 
communist party domination, they continued to show some degree of political pluralism, e.g. 
manifested by the existence of so-called ‘allied parties’ in Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
Moreover, these countries are undoubtedly in a more advanced stage of nation-building than 
other post-communist European states, save Russia proper. Except for a lingering 
irredentism in Hungary, territorial questions are not at present high on the political agenda, 
and they also lack most of the marked minority, ethnic and even legitimacy problems of the 
majority of the Balkan nations, the Baltic republics and, in particular, the other successor 
states of the USSR.
Slovakia admittedly stands out as something of an odd man in the ‘Northern Tier’ 
sample. On historical, political and socio-economic grounds it would be entirely justifiable, 
in this context, to treat Slovakia as much as a Balkan as a Central European nation. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion here of Slovakia may be defended by reference to its more than 70 
years of political union with the Czech lands. Indeed, understanding Slovak, as well as Czech, 
politics is hardly possible without taking into account the history of both halves of the 
erstwhile federation. In any case, Slovakia is an interesting comparative reference to what is 
now the Czech republic, and vice versa.
Last but not least, one may point to the fact that the governments of Poland, the Czech and 
Slovak republics, and Hungary perceive their countries as forming a group. After the events 
of 1989-90, they were quick to set up a co-operation forum, the ‘Visegrad Group’, which 
soon developed into the Central European Free Trade Agreement.15 While the relations 
between some Visegrad countries have been frosty at times—the Czechs living up to their 
traditions of trying to distance themselves from the Poles, and Hungarian-Slovak relations 
occasionally at sub-zero temperatures—the Visegrad co-operation still manifests a sense of 
common interests and an effort to differentiate from the Balkan relatives.
14 Wandycz (1992), 5-7.
15 In December 1992, the economics ministers of the four countries met in Cracow to sign an 
agreement that provided for the reduction of customs duties over a three-stage, eight-year 
period beginning 1 March 1993.
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The Role of Legacy and Political Culture
Almond and Powell have defined ‘political culture’ as ‘the set of attitudes, beliefs, and 
feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time.’16 The notion is, however, not 
unproblematic. It does provide a valuable theoretical framework for analysing survey-type 
and other empirical data, making it possible to derive from recorded political attitudes 
central elements in a polity’s political culture, but the concept has also been criticised as being 
a ‘catch-all term’ or a ‘blurred conception’.17 Almond has himself explicitly warned that 
‘political culture is not a theory; it refers to a set of variables which may be used in the 
construction of theories.’18
It was argued early on that the political transition to pluralism is more challenging in 
Eastern Europe than it earlier was in Southern Europe. One important reason for this would 
be the lack of experience of formalised political competition and pluralist democracy— 
‘adversial but loyal’—at the time of the collapse of communist hegemony. It has been 
maintained that this problem goes beyond weak institutional and legal structures to the very 
social structure and, indeed, to political culture. This goes to the very nature of a democratic 
society:
Because democracy is not only a means to intermediate diversity but also depends on it, 
certain prerequisites must first be met: it can be observed that modern democracy only 
exists in conjunction with civil society, i.e. a sphere of autonomy, situated between the 
citizens and the state and comprised of a range of associations, organisations, parties, 
movements, and the like. Self-constitution and self-modernisation are essential and 
generating elements.19
The observation is certainly valid, although it may mislead one to assume that a ‘civil society’ 
exists when democracy is established, and that it does not exist (at least to a sufficient extent) 
where democracy fails to emerge. To end up with that conclusion would obviously constitute 
a tautological fallacy. And in Popperian terms, of course, a ‘civil society’ is an element of true 
democracy itself.20
In the following pages, ‘civil society’ will primarily refer to the scope of autonomous 
spheres of social power to interact and debate, and, in a wider sense, to the level of political 
maturity among citizens. The more civil society develops, the theory goes, the more ‘rational’ 
will be the electoral and other choices made by the masses, enabling alliances to emerge 
between groups of citizens and organised political actors. The development of a civil society, 
in turn, is furthered by higher levels of education, increased urbanisation and division of 
labour, more political participation; all of which are supposed to weaken more archaic 
political structures and affiliations based on feudalism, kinship and clientilism. The strength 
of civil society, thus defined, is easily tracked by quantitative indicators, such as the degree of 
literacy or urbanisation, the volume and sophistication of industry, the extension of the 
telecommunications network, mail volume, the number of private cars, newspaper, television 
and radio penetration, or the number of students, libraries and voluntary associations.
Yet these same indicators are difficult to connect causally to political developments. One 
difficulty lies in aggregation. While it is often argued, and rightly so, that a well-educated
16 Almond and Powell (1978).
17 Dittmer (1977).
18 Almond (1980), 26.
19 Cf. Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 2; Beyme (1992), 271.
20 Popper (1966).
12 Shaking Hands with the Past
citizenry as a whole is more likely to support democratic structures and processes than a less 
educated one, it is doubtful whether that is the case for individuals or for particular strata.
Another problem is making the civil society-democracy relationship operational. What 
level of civil society is needed for democratic institutions to be viable? How is that measured? 
And is democracy automatically introduced and sustained once the necessary level is reached? 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan are currently as wealthy and in many aspects more 
modern societies than Great Britain, yet their democratic institutions are clearly much 
weaker. In fact, England developed much of her parliamentary institutions and processes, and 
established the principle of rule of law, while still a pre-capitalist, feudal society. Wilhelmine 
Germany and the Habsburg Dual Monarchy in its final years are examples of law-based states 
with very sophisticated networks of autonomous social organisation, yet they cannot by any 
stretch of the imagination be defined as pluralist democracies. India has after independence 
entertained a political system where the principles of parliamentarism and the rule of law 
have generally been respected, despite strong features of clientilistic or even feudal modes of 
social organisation. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, two of the highest per capita income 
economies in the world, are still ruled as family concerns with only the faintest elements of 
broad popular representation.
If ‘political culture’ is an important determining factor for the political system—as 
intuitively is the case—it indeed appears to be more a question of traditions than of tangible 
indicators of modernity.
Nevertheless, modernisation theory provides a sound structural clarification of 
democratic transformation. Its central argument is, to put it briefly, that prospects for the 
introduction of democracy increase as elements of the Western or modern ‘world culture’ 
(i.e. advanced modes of societal organisation and communication) begin to replace more 
archaic national cultures.21 The question is thus not so much one of material wealth— 
although that has an indirect effect—as of ‘mentality’. The result of the last phases of the 
industrial-era modernisation process, if the core of Western Europe is taken as the norm, 
would be:
(1) State consolidation and stabilisation of national conflicts;
(2) The development of a capitalist market economy and industrial society;
(3) Democratisation and secularisation;
(4) The building of the welfare state; and
(5) The initiation of a transition to supranational integration and to a post-industrial 
society22
One school within modernisation theory indeed postulates the gradual convergence of all 
developed industrial societies towards ‘secularisation’. It has three central features: 
democratic political institutions; a free market economy; and liberal religious, social and 
sexual norms.23 Social modernisation (which, it should be pointed out, goes far beyond 
economic modernisation), would thus almost automatically contribute to the acceptance of 
democratic values and thus consolidate the democratic order.24
For the formerly communist-ruled societies this seems to hold out rather bleak prospects. 
The development of a bourgeois political culture took decades or even centuries in Western 
Europe, and it is a tall task for the post-communist societies to ‘catch up’ within any short 
period of time. Ralf Dahrendorf, for one, has observed that whereas a Rechtsstaat may be 
introduced in six months, and a market economy and its institutions can be built in six years,
21 Cf. Pye (1990).
22 Cf. Markus (1993), 1167.
23 Fuchs and Roller (1994), 1.
24 Cf. Fuchs and Roller (1994), 1-3.
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the emergence of a civil political culture is likely to take sixty years.25 It is thus conceivable 
that some post-communist countries manage a rather swift transformation of their economies 
to a more advanced and ‘modern’, market-mode type, while their political systems and 
societal value structures do not develop to liberalism and secularism at anything like an 
equivalent pace. During the past decades, some countries in South-East Asia certainly have 
exemplified this type of partial modernisation.
Indeed, the task of simultaneously democratising the polity and marketising the economy 
may simply be overwhelming. One possible intermediate-term outcome is the establishment 
of a sustained and stable pluralist and democratic system; another the introduction of a non- 
democratic authoritarian regime (though not likely one of the already tried-out state-socialist 
sort); a third an ‘anarchisation’ where institutions lose most of their binding powers on 
society’s members.26 1920’s and 1930’s Germany and Italy are often pointed at as examples of 
non-sustained democratic systems collapsing under the combined pressures of political and 
economic transformation, as are, of course, the countries in Eastern and Central Europe 
themselves between the World Wars.27
The argument that modernisation almost automatically generates democracy boils down 
to the hypothesis that an advanced and diverse social and economic structure generates liberal, 
secularised values, i.e. a ‘liberal political culture’. This postulates that the values of liberal 
democracy justify the structures of liberal democracy, and that the emergence of a normative 
order of democratic values is reinforced by the institutionalisation of these values. Members 
of a community would feel bound by the structurally relevant values which are implicit or 
codified in the constitution. Ultimately, respect for the democratic process and the 
democratic structure would transcend all issue-oriented conflicts. No relevant political forces 
contemplate resorting to resolve conflicts in their favour outside the broadly defined 
democratic framework, even if they in theory would have the means to do so.
According to this line of thinking, ‘the political culture of a democracy thus consists of 
implemented and institutionalised values’,28 and the consolidation of democracy only 
constitutes the institutionalisation of an already prevalent normative order. Consequently, if 
democratic values are not sufficiently dominant within the polity, the imposition of 
democratic structures from above is bound to fail. Moreover, the success of a process of 
democratic consolidation depends on the performance of the democratic structures—in the 
final analysis, whether the democratic system can generate outcomes which strengthen the 
confidence and support for it among the members of the polity. This is intuitively true, but 
also seems a rather pedestrian observation built on a dangerously circular argumentation.
It appears necessary to move to a somewhat lower level of abstraction. In that case, the 
identification of which attributes of the political culture are conducive to democratic 
development in Central Europe emerges as a core problem. The communist period clearly 
brought along structures which make the transition processes qualitatively different from 
previous ones in, say, Southern Europe or Latin America; not least the extremely limited 
extent of private ownership and entrepreneurship, and the lack of a capitalist superstructure.
25Markus (1993), 1167.
26 Ekiert (1991), 297-8.
27 There appears to be a rather strong correlation between short-term economic performance 
and political pluralism: crises of legitimacy for weakly rooted democratic regimes are much 
more likely to erupt during economic stagnation and hardship. Przeworski points out that in 
South America between 1946 and 1988, a regime, democratic or authoritarian, that experienced 
positive growth rates in a given year had a 91.6 per cent chance of surviving in power through the 
next 12 months. After a year of negative growth the survival rate was 81.8 per cent, and after two 
consecutive years barely 67 per cent. Przeworski (1991), 24; 32.
28 Cf. Fuchs and Roller (1994).
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An even more important difference lies in the socio-economic structure. The Latin 
American and Southern European dictatorships were societies with wide income disparities, 
and to a large extent instituted exactly to preserve a pre- or proto-capitalist class structure. 
Communism, on the other hand, aimed to modernise society—not in order to further 
democratic prospects, but to strengthen its own class base of support—and the regimes were 
without doubt successful in this. They may not have created workers’ paradises, but certainly 
societies with large industrial working classes.
In fact, while Marx assumed that capitalism precedes socialism, the experience of the 
twentieth century is rather that administrative centralism in the form of nomenklatura 
socialism has been a, or the, preferred mode of late modernisation, from Russia to China to 
Africa. This was, of course, a result of post-1917 Leninist pragmatism culminating in the 
Soviet collectivisation campaigns, in Mao’s Great Leap Forward or in the gigantomaniac 
projects implemented throughout Eastern Europe. Dahrendorf has in fact challenged Marx’s 
logic and argued that market-oriented economies and incentives rather than planning and 
force represent an advanced stage of modern development. As for Central Europe, he has even 
argued that socialism came at too late a stage of social development to produce any take-off 
effect; rather, being a result of the Soviet Union’s hegemonic aspirations, ‘stunting the 
hopeful saplings of the process of modernisation’29—that is, social modernisation and 
secularisation.
In any case, the low degree of differentiation and social complexity of the communist 
societies—particularly the absence of a strong and stable middle class and the often dominant 
role of the state as employer—complicates the creation of both pluralistic interest structures 
and coalitions between social groups and political parties. The rapid economic transition 
processes after the collapse of communism also increase social mobility, both upwards and 
downwards, which reduces not only party loyalty but societal stability in general. All in all, 
the flattened class structure generated by the communist systems appears to be a major 
obstacle for the transition to pluralist democracy. Voting and attitudes may thus, at least in 
the first stage of transformation, be determined not by interests, but by cultural politics.30
The Nature of Authoritarianism
‘Authoritarianism’ can be described as a negation of democracy, so before discussing 
authoritarianism it may be useful to determine what constitutes democracy.
Democracy can take a range of institutional forms: Athens at 400 B.C. or eighteenth­
century United States were a very different political systems, and both in turn shared few 
characteristics with twentieth-century Switzerland. Yet all three are frequently and 
reasonably characterised as democracies.
Karl Popper equated democracy with an ‘open society’, which encompasses not only free 
elections and other democratic procedures, but also a ‘civic society’: free interaction and 
debate between autonomous spheres in society, such as interest organisations, trade unions, a 
diverse media, universities, and individuals.31 More narrowly, Robert Dahl has qualified 
democracy with the existence of contestation open to participation. The two central 
dimensions—public contestation (liberalisation), and the right to participate 
(inclusiveness)—creates four different types of political system. There are closed hegemonies, 
with neither an institutionalised multi-party system nor free elections; and inclusive 
hegemonies with multi-party systems but no free elections (the emphasis here lies on the word
29 Dahrendorf (1990).
30 Cf. Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 12 pp.
31 Popper (1966).
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‘free’). The third alternative is competitive oligarchy, which allows free elections but permits 
only one party to compete; and the fourth polyarchy, which permits both free elections and 
institutionalised multi-party systems.
Figure 2.1: Dahl’s Liberalisation—Contestation Matrix 32
Liberalisation
One-Party System Multi-Party System
Free contestation
Against Free 
Elections
Closed 
Hegemony
Inclusive 
Hegemony
For Free 
Elections
Competitive 
Oligarchy
Polyarchy
‘Polyarchy’, the term Dahl uses as synonymous with ‘liberal democracy’, has additional 
characteristics: (1) pluralism, meaning that several political and social strata co-exist to 
alleviate conflicts of interest; (2) the existence of several organised political parties which 
compete and (can) alternate in power; and (3) the rule of law within a Rechtsstaat that 
guarantees fundamental individual and social rights within the social and political arenas.33 
One may note that of these criteria, the communist systems did not, by definition, fulfil the 
first two, and the third only in a limited sense.
Democracy implies a permanent division of power: ‘a system of processing conflicts in 
which outcomes depend on what participants do but no single force controls what occurs.’34 
It requires constant competition between parties, interests, opinions and values, organised by 
rules—which may be changed according to rules—and which washes out periodic winners 
and losers. Conflicts of interest are only temporarily suspended, rather than resolved 
definitely; losers always have a chance of overturning outcomes in the future. In functional 
terms, democracy is ‘a system in which parties lose elections’, government pro tempore.
In an authoritarian system, on the other hand, some force has the power to prevent any 
outcome from happening, not only ex ante, but even ex post. In a somewhat bizarre example 
of this, Stalin, when enraged at what he saw as interference by Lenin’s widow Krupskaya, 
threatened to instate a new widow—something he certainly would have been capable of. 
Whether actions of this type occur in a legal or extra-legal framework is irrelevant. In a 
dictatorial system there is no clear-cut distinction between policy and law. This principle is a 
very cornerstone of orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory, going under the label of die primacy 
of politics and by definition ruling out the rule of law. Right-wing ideologies, too—what 
may loosely be called generic fascism—often stress the importance of an institution, normally 
the supreme leader, with the power to singularly make and overturn any decision.
Just as democracies are not alike, there is a wide range of styles of dictatorship or 
hegemony, as indicated already by the Dahl matrix. Juan Linz’s typology essentially lists three 
dimensions in authoritarian rule:
(1) the level of ideologisation
(2) the degree of political mobilisation
32 Dahl (1975).
33 The theory of polyarchy is elaborated in Dahl (1971).
^Przeworski (1990), 10-12; readers are referred to this excellent scholarly work (especially the 
first two chapters) for a thorough walk trough the theoretical landscape of democracy.
16 Shaking Hands with the Past
(3) the type of political power structure35
These three dimensions are continuous. Mobilisation may range from low to high levels. 
Ideologisation can vary between the end-points of ideology and secularity. The power 
structure can be anything between monism or political pluralism, i.e. stretch from one-man 
or one-party rule in the one end to a system incorporating organised political interests with 
autonomy in the other. An authoritarian system may be characterised by a high or a low 
degree of ideologisation, and by a high or low degree of mobilisation. The type of power 
structure, however, cannot be pluralistic in any genuine sense of the word; the system is by 
definition either monist or characterised by controlled pluralism.
A number of permutations can thus be envisaged. Examples of systems with extreme 
degrees of ideologisation and mobilisation combined with a highly centralised power 
structure are, i.a., Nazi Germany, Stalinist USSR, China during the Cultural Revolution, or 
North Korea for as long as that state has been in existence. A country such as Tanzania was, 
until the late 1970’s, highly ideologised, yet the ruling regime did not carry mobilisation to 
any extreme. Iraq during the 1980’s was much more mobilised than ideologised; the same to 
some extent goes for that country’s then adversary Iran. As examples of non-ideological and 
non-mobilising authoritarian regimes, one may point to most (but not all) Latin American 
military dictatorships, which ruled with reference to a loosely defined ‘national interest’. 
Much the same could probably be said about the governments in Poland and Hungary before 
the Second World War; this will be investigated in detail in Chapter 3.
Totalitarianism is a variant of authoritarianism. The difference is largely a quantitative 
one: while totalitarian regimes attempt to control all facets of social life, authoritarian ones 
allow some conflicts and accommodate and co-opt conflicting interests in order to preserve 
the power, authority and prestige of the ruling elite.36 Common to totalitarian regimes is the 
use of a single state ideology for extreme mobilisation. They also tend to be monist: 
dependent on extremely centralised decision-making, normally in the form of a single leader 
in whom the power is vested to conclusively interpret the ideology.
The communist societies of Eastern Europe were, at face value, almost until the very end 
characterised by a high degree of both ideologisation and mobilisation. The political power 
structure was either monist or tightly controlled pluralist (e.g. with fronts and allied parties, 
formally independent but in fact subordinated to the ruling party). Jan-Ake Dellenbrant, 
however, points out that ‘when analysing communist and post-communist societies, one 
encounters the problem that the official ideology has been downgraded to an official 
rhetoric, while political decisions in practice have been based on pragmatic values, such as the 
national interest or the interests of the ruling party.’37
Neither was the monism-pluralism dimension all that clear-cut. Until August 1991, the 
USSR was formally a one-party state where any organised political dissent was prohibited; this 
followed from the sanctified dogmas of (1) the primacy of the Communist Party, and of (2) 
democratic centralism. Yet in practice, conflicts—ideological, programmatic and personal— 
raged within the Communist Party. Literature, both legal and underground, provided a 
forum for oblique but often harsh critique of government policies; either truly anti-systemic 
or generated by dissenting factions within the establishment. The observation is even more 
true for non-Soviet Eastern Europe. Apart from intra-party debate and the influence of
35 Linz (1975), 175-411.
36 This distinction is made by Linz (1975) and by Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956).
37 Dellenbrant (1991), 74 The hypocrisy, double standards and cynicism of public discourse in 
communist societies, The Big Lie’, has been a long-running theme in dissident and Western 
literature. Recent good reads on the subject are, i.a., Brzezinski (1989), Garton Ash (1989) and 
(1990), particularly p. 131-156, Narkiewicz (1990), and Kapuscinski (1993), the latter particu­
larly strong on anecdotal evidence of the national confusion within the USSR.
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technocratic sector interests one has to take into account the real, if often marginal, non- o r 
anti-systemic opposition provided for many years by forces as diverse as the Catholic and 
Evangelical Churches, the human-rights movements, students and intellectuals, proto-unions, 
not to mention spontaneous demonstrations and strikes.
It has actually been contended that the totalitarian model of communism was more 
ideological than the societies it depicted.38 Already in the 1950’s, this argument goes, 
ideology lost its role as the main cement holding together the communist-ruled societies, 
having been replaced by the exploitation of nationalism, promises of material welfare, the 
securing of social order, status and hierarchy, or other more or less petite bourgeois values. 
Nevertheless, many Western observers at the time underestimated the possibility of conflict 
within socialist societies because they, by and large, continued to be seen as based on strict 
dogma, repression and utopian goals.
Even so, it is beyond dispute that the communists attempted to rule society by 
authoritarian means. Although the formal state ideology exhorted the democratic character 
of government—as demonstrated by the fact the republics were customarily prefixed 
‘Democratic’, ‘People’s Democratic’, or ‘People’s Democratic Socialist’—participation was 
restricted and democracy was projected into the future. In the present, the communists 
identified threats to the true classless post-capitalist democracy they envisaged to be building, 
and saw that as a justification for the temporary use of authoritarian means; the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, as Lenin dubbed it. Obviously, the intensity and vigour of authoritarianism 
varied strongly over time and between countries, but there was never any question that the 
communist ideology would not legitimise use of repression to secure the position of 
communist dominance.
Theories of Transition
When political systems change, three factors interplay: (1) a crisis of legitimacy in the old 
system; (2) the attractiveness of the alternative system; and (3) a catalytic event.39. There is an 
element of randomness: political systems are often rejected without the new alternative even 
having been formulated. The Swedish political scientist Herbert Tingsten noted that it was 
not the obvious superiority of constitutional democracy that led to the overthrow of 
monarchies in Europe; more important was he notorious incompetence of kings such as 
George VI or Louis XVI.40 There is indeed no consensus among scholars on what factors are 
dominant in setting a democratic transition in motion, apart from them all being 
manifestations of a crisis in the system of authoritarian rule. Still, one can observe a few 
distinct types.
The classic recipe is an internal upheaval, a revolution or coup d’etat that results in the 
establishment of the first elements of liberal democracy; the United States and France in the 
late eighteenth century, and Russia in February 1917 are examples of this. Another possibility 
is that an invasion, intervention, conquest or military defeat leads a foreign power to 
introduce or restore democracy. This was the case in some Western and Southern European 
countries and in Japan after the Second World War, and has later been repeated in Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean and Central America, usually as a result of actions of 
some European power or the United States. It need hardly be mentioned that wars lost to 
democracies do not necessarily lead to the establishment of a democratic system.
38 Przeworski (1990), introduction. 
^Langby (1984), 158.
40 Tingsten (1945).
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Democracy can also be introduced incrementally over a longer period of time as a result 
of a severe crisis within an authoritarian political system. This crisis may be one of legitimacy 
or succession, of a decline in the repressive potential or in economic performance. Usually, it 
seems, a combination of many factors is at work, yet breakdown through internal crisis seems 
to follow a certain pattern: first the ruling regime is split into hard-liners and reformers— 
factions stressing, respectively, increased repression or temporary slack as a means to 
overcome the crisis. This struggle may end in many ways: in a full restoration of autocracy as 
in Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Poland in 1981 (or even lead to the 
establishment of a fundamentally new dictatorship, as in Iran in 1979 or in some of the 
former Soviet republics after 1991); in a temporary or permanent softening of the 
dictatorship; or in reformers at some point emerging as turncoat radicals ready to overthrow 
the authoritarian system they previously supported.
This incremental pattern of democratic transition seems to have dominated when Latin 
American and Southern European countries started discarding authoritarianism in the 
1950’s. The transitions in Eastern Europe are also often held as examples of this scenario, 
although externalities in the form of a breakdown in Soviet aspirations and capabilities 
clearly played an important, even decisive role at the beginning of the process.41
The modes of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy has been the subject of vast 
amounts of research ever since the 1950’s. The empirical studies were initially focused on 
Latin America and Southern Europe, i.e. on regions were the prospects for the establishment 
of democratic rule seemed most encouraging—as indeed proved to be the case in countries 
such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. The political 
transitions in the defeated nations of Germany, Italy and Japan obviously also have been the 
subjects of much scholarly interest.
The same cannot be said about Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Before the mid- 
1980’s, few analysts, even those who personally held strongly anti-communist views, seriously 
thought that European communism was reversible within a foreseeable future. Even less 
attention was devoted to the modalities of a possible transition process. Almost everyone 
believed that an upheaval of this magnitude, if at all possible, had to be more violent and 
protracted than actually turned out to be the case.
For this reason, the theoretical work available for systematic analysis of the modalities of 
transition from communism still heavily relies on experiences from Southern Europe and 
Latin America. Consequently, a salient feature of classic theories of transition is that they deal 
exclusively with capitalist societies with highly different social structure. Nevertheless, 
Dellenbrant argues that the standard theories of democratic transition can be applied to the 
communist case. He also concludes that these theories ‘show a large degree of similarity 
among scholars, with the possible exception of the explanation of causes.’42
The standard work on transitions to democracy remains the four-volume Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule; Prospects for Democracy,43 Its key conclusions are that there seems to 
be little, if any, correlation between socio-economic development and political structure; i.e., 
a certain socio-economic structure may generate and coexist with a multitude of political
41 Of course, some would argue that the political upheavals in the USSR totally determined the 
transformations in Eastern Europe, if one assumes that those countries were ‘colonies’, sub­
ordinated to the USSR. For many reasons this author does not subscribe to that rather simplistic 
view, as it does not explain at all what comes after communism and Soviet domination, nor does 
acknowledge the fact that the Eastern European countries, at least after the 1950’s, clearly 
enjoyed a largish degree of autonomy in fields not directly linked with Soviet vital security and 
economic interests.
42 Dellenbrant (1994), 73 pp, 75.
45 Edited by O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986/1987).
The Framework for Analysis 19
systems: there is an element of randomness. Another deduction is that autocracy rarely is 
substituted with democratic rule in a ‘Big Bang’ pattern. Instead one tends to find ‘transition 
processes’, a period in time during which autocracy is crumbling, but democratic rule is not 
fully in place.
After an authoritarian breakdown, several outcomes are possible.44
(1) The structure of conflicts of interest in society may be of such a nature—for example, 
concerning race, religion or language—that no democratic institutions can resolve them. 
Political forces end up fighting for a new dictatorship;
(2) The structure of conflicts is such that democratic institutions cannot last, but political 
forces support democracy as a transitional solution, well knowing that they will attempt to 
overthrow it at some later date;
(3) The structure of conflicts is such that at least some democratic institutions, once 
adopted, can last, but important political forces disagree on particular institutional 
frameworks—for example concerning federalism vs. unitarianism, or with parts of a state or 
federation attempting to secede altogether. A temporary solution to these problems may 
evolve into a convention, but can also end in open conflict leading to civil war or a new 
dictatorship;
(4) Conflicting political forces agree on a democratic framework that cannot last, even 
though the structure of conflicts per se would permit the establishment of durable democratic 
institutions. For instance, forces behind an authoritarian regime may prefer democracy with 
guarantees for their interests over a continuation of the dictatorship, but have the force to 
uphold dictatorship if these guarantees are not given by the democratic opposition. Once 
democratic institutions are established, however, these may threaten to erode the repressive 
powers of the military, leading to a reversion to authoritarianism
(5) The structure of conflicts is such that democratic institutions will survive if adopted, 
and indeed do so.
As modern examples of (1), one may note Iran and Nigeria; of (2), the southern cone Latin 
American countries where to the urban bourgeoisie cyclically has shifted support between 
democracy and authoritarianism45; and of (3), possibly, Yugoslavia both in the 1920’s and 
after 1989. Przeworski cites Poland in the late 1980’s as a paradigmatic example of the 
seemingly perverse case (4).
Once firmly—and one should stress that word—established, democratic systems are 
rarely overturned by internal forces. Elisabeth Langby, a Swedish political scientist, in fact 
argues that only two such cases are known in history: Athens in the 4th to 3rd Century B.C., 
and Uruguay in the 1960’s. In both instances, she argues, the collapse of democracy had the 
same reason: chronic public over-consumption.46
Let it, however, suffice here to note that democracies last when they evoke self-interested 
spontaneous compliance from all the major political forces. To evoke such compliance, 
democracy must be ‘fair and effective’, i.e. simultaneously offer all these forces a chance to 
compete within the institutional framework and generate substantive outcomes. If some 
social or interest group or groups consistently emerge as losers, those who can expect to suffer 
worsening conditions under democratic institutions are likely to turn against them. History 
shows that when internal or external strains become distended—during wars, insurrections, 
profound economic transformation—democratic institutions are less likely to be ‘fair and 
effective’ enough, which may lead some politically important force to opt for
44 Przeworski (1990), 51 pp.
45This analysis is was made by O’Donnell (1978).
46 Langby (1984); she mentions one possible third case, Chile in 1973, which also long suffered 
from chronic over-consumption, but concludes that external factors—i.e. US involvement— 
played a crucial role in the military take-over.
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authoritarianism instead. On the other hand, authoritarianism will give way to democracy 
only when the institutional framework guarantees that a competitive process does generate 
outcomes that are not highly unattractive to one or several resourceful interest groups. 
Institutions that fulfil this prerequisite tend to be the result of negotiations, either within the 
anti-authoritarian opposition or between this and forces within the regime.47 This 
argumentation, too, unfortunately is disturbingly circular. As relevant variables as hard to 
quantify and use in analysis, it is easy to end up with the conclusion that structural factors are 
favourable for democracy where democracy is introduced and sustained, and that, 
consequently, structural factors are unfavourable in societies where authoritarianism prevails.
In any case, the task of sustaining democratic rule is a tough one—in fact, it would seem 
more of a surprise that authoritarian systems fail than that democratic ones do: at least in the 
sceptic’s dog-eat-dog world it should be easier to replace consensual rule and tolerance by 
coercive rule and repression than the other way around. Why would any group accept a 
decision it has the interest and the force to overrule and overturn? Yet, in many nations in 
Western Europe and North America, democracy has survived extended periods of economic 
hardship and aggravated societal conflicts of interest. This fact, counter-intuitive at least to 
the cynical observer, has forced scholars to introduce purely normative values into the 
equation. Parties to the political process are presumed to have an irrationally large tolerance 
of negative outcomes, and agree to restrain their use of power and influence in order to 
preserve fairness and effectiveness. A counter-argument to that would be that democracy is 
assumed to in the long run generate better outcomes for society as a whole than 
authoritarianism, and that this supposedly plays into actors’ calculations. At least in Eastern 
Europe, the relative economic success of their Western neighbours certainly contributed 
strongly to the appeal of democracy as an alternative to state socialism. Another possible 
argument is that democratic values—tolerance, social peace, the absence of randomness—are 
positioned higher on the value hierarchy among members of stable democratic societies than 
are material issues.
Whether democracies are supported by normative values or by a strategic pursuit of 
interests is at the moment hardly resolvable by reference to empirical evidence. Yet Robert 
Axelrod has, in a seminal work, explained how co-operation and social restraint can evolve 
and consolidate through the interplay of purely self-interested individuals or groups, without 
any altruism or external rules of the game being introduced.48 In order for spontaneous co­
operation to evolve, however, the game must be iterated so that rules are sufficiently 
established through mechanisms of defection and revenge. Democracy thus needs time to 
prove its worth and to allow for rules of strategic co-operation to evolve. Axelrod thus 
logically confirms the hypothesis that democratic institutions and a pluralist, tolerant 
political culture are mutually reinforcing.
Explaining Democratic Survival; A Macro Structural Theory 49
In the past few decades, much academic interest has been focused on finding macro-structural 
factors which may help to explain democratic survival and demise. Modernisation theory was 
touched upon above and found useful but needing complimentary theoretical tools. On a 
somewhat lower level of abstraction, explanations generated with the aid of modernisation 
theory may be supported by theories arguing that the accumulation of crises within a short
47 This chain of arguments is from Przeworski (1990), x; also 66 pp.
^Axelrod (1990).
49 This sub-chapter draws heavily on the analysis in Aarebrot and Berglund (1995).
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time span may in itself negatively affect the chances of survival of a democratic regime.50 A 
well-known and important example of such an ‘agglutination’ theory is Giovanni Sartori's 
distinction between moderate and extreme pluralism.
The analysis starts off from the observation that some democracies—e.g. the British, US 
and Scandinavian—have been stable, while others—i.a. the French Third and Fourth re­
publics and Weimar Germany—have been unstable. The hypothesis is that party system 
dynamics help explain the different outcomes. In short, under conditions of moderate plu­
ralism, the voter preference curve is bell-shaped and political parties will attempt to position 
themselves in the middle of the political spectrum. Ideological differences tend to fade as 
centripetal forces affect the party system. The end result may even be a stable system with only 
two marginally differentiated parties.
The dynamics of an extreme pluralist political system, on the other hand, is centrifugal. 
The voter preference curve is flat or even inverted with peaks at the opposite ends of the 
political spectrum. Parties thus have little incentive to move into the middle ground. Govern­
ment coalitions are difficult to form and sustain, which in turn leads to weaknesses in the 
decision-making process. The French Third Republic is often identified as a victim of the 
immobilism created by extreme pluralism, as is the Weimar Republic, where the average life 
span of the coalition governments was only eight and a half months and the one that lasted 
longest, the 1928-30 Grand Coalition, was followed by the virtual suspension of the consti­
tution in favour of extra-parliamentary presidential cabinets.51
Sartori identifies a number of factors that differentiate the moderate pluralism of stable 
democracies and the extreme pluralism of unstable democracies52:
First, the timing of the franchise, i.e. the extension of the suffrage, and the timing of propor­
tional representation, strongly affect the number of parties in the political system. A rapid 
process of democratisation encourages a large number of political entrepreneurs attempting 
to gain parliamentary representation. If mandates are distributed according to proportional 
representation, this lowers the threshold of parliamentary representation and serves as yet 
another incentive for hopeful entrepreneurs. Thus, the sooner proportional representation is 
introduced, especially if it is not preceded by a period of majority representation, the more 
likely is it to contribute to extreme multi-partism. On the other hand, a system of propor­
tional representation can be modified to prevent fragmentation, e.g. by a threshold rule of a 
German or Swedish type, or by applying proportionality only in multiple-member 
constituencies, not on all polled votes.
Apart from the electoral system, Sartori also points to the number of cleavages, and the 
structure of cleavages as important factors influencing the party structure. Not surprisingly, 
his observation is that the more conflict dimensions are prevalent in a society, and the more 
complex they are, the likelier is it that a large number of political parties will be able to find 
a niche for themselves. Last but not least, the degree of political organisation influences the 
party structure: the more poorly organised the political parties are, the more room there
50 One example of structural theories of democratic survival is O’Donnell’s dissection of 
Argentinean political life between 1956 and 1976. It demonstrates how the dictatorship­
democracy cycle was determined by swings between balance-of-payments crises and the need to 
expand domestic consumption. In the first case the urban and rural bourgeoisie allied in 
support of authoritarianism in order to ensure a cut in public consumption; in the second, the 
urban bourgeoisie combined with the urban working masses to force an overvaluation of the 
currency, with (populist) democracy as a result. This iterated democracy-dictatorship transition 
pattern is, however, a special, even unique example. Cf. O’Donnell (1978).
51 Bullock (1993), 71.
52 Sartori (1966) and (1976).
22 Shaking Hands with the Past
would seem to be for additional political parties. A low level of mass mobilisation serves as a 
yet another incentive for hopeful political entrepreneurs.
The other way around, a slow process of democratisation makes for moderate multi­
partism. A system of majority representation serves as a barrier against extreme multi­
partism; and the longer it is retained, the more likely it is that the party system will become 
moderate. The fewer cleavages there are in a society and the simpler its cleavage structure 
remains, the less room there is for the extreme kind of multi-party politics. Finally, the better 
organised the established political parties are, the less room there is for new political entre­
preneurs to succeed. A high level of mass mobilisation serves as a deterrent against fragmenta­
tion of the party system.
The Sartori framework goes a long way to explain the difficulties for democracy in inter­
war Central Europe. As is clear from the above, not only did the constitutions have few 
safeguards against extreme multi-partism; the structure of social conflicts was unfavourable. 
National, ethnic and religious antagonism are ones that are relatively difficult to resolve 
within a democratic framework, and exactly these conflict dimensions were both heated and 
on top of the political agenda. As regards the level of political organisation, it can at best be 
described as intermediate to low.
Sartori's analysis creates concern about the ‘Weimarisation’ of new states in general, and 
about the survival of democracy in the post-communist states of Europe in particular. This 
fear, common to much of the European political science community, stands in stark contrast 
to the Anglo-Saxon developmental optimism expressed, i.a., by Almond and Verba or by 
Huntington.53
With his seminal conceptual map of Europe, Stein Rokkan attempted to integrate crises 
in state- and nation-building processes with conditions for democratic survival, such as the 
extension of citizenship rights and the establishment of stable political cleavages in parlia­
ments and amongst the voting population. 54 Many commentators on the situation after the 
break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union tend to juxtapose ‘state’ and ‘nation’, but Rok- 
kan’s analytical scheme goes beyond this. It points to the fact that in solving crises of state- and 
nation-building, regimes may break down, but they may also be consolidated. If this were not 
the case, it would be hard to understand the political contrasts between structurally similar 
pairs such as Bosnia and Switzerland or the Netherlands and Northern Ireland.
Rokkan's conceptual map is mainly concerned with Western and Central European 
states55, but attempts have been made to expand the analysis beyond the fault-line of the for­
mer Iron Curtain. Frank Aarebrot and Sten Berglund have devised a classification of Euro­
pean countries based on two main determining factors; Religious Heritage (in a broad sense) 
and the influence of ‘External Empires’ as opposed to ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern Defence’ 
Empires.56
The starting-point is Rokkan’s conceptual map of Europe, which also identifies two main 
dimensions:
(1) an East-West axis, based on the strength of city networks and political centre forma­
tion; and
(2) a North-South axis, based on the integration of state and church—strong in the 
Protestant North and weak in the Catholic South.
The core of the East-West dimension is a symmetrical triad of states. The city-belt states, 
on an axis running from Flanders along the Rhine valley to Venice, are characterised by
53 Cf. Almond and Verba (1980), Almond and Powell (1978), Powell (1982), Huntington 
(1968).
54 Elaborated in Rokkan (1975); Rokkan and Urwin (1983).
55 Rokkan (1975), 578-79.
56 Aarebrot and Berglund (1995).
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strong commercial city networks and weak political centres. The city-belt is bordered on 
both sides by Eastern and Western empire states, in turn characterised by strong political 
centres and weak commercial city networks. Western empire states are Britain, France, Spain 
and Denmark, all examples of strong and early state formations and the masters of vast over­
seas empires.
Unfortunately, the concept of empire states does not function as elegantly to the east of the 
city-belt. First, city states and city-belts have played an important role within the Eastern 
imperial territories—the Hanseatic league, the river trading routes in Russia and along the 
Danube, and the German trading towns in the Balkans, to mention some examples. Secondly, 
Aarebrot and Berglund argue that strong political centres were lacking as these territorial 
units were primarily integrated as early landlocked empires, and that state-building as such 
was secondary to empire formation. A territorial classification of empires must therefore 
account for imperial aspirations and confrontation as a primary criterion. Prussia-Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, were defence empires, built up militarily over the 
centuries to defend Europe against incursions from the East. The Russian and Ottoman em­
pires, on the other, were basically external with aspirations to expand into Europe.
Rokkan’s symmetrical conceptual map has Western and Eastern Periphery states at the 
rim; these are characterised by weak political centres and late statehood. But in Aarebrot’s and 
Berglund’s framework the concept of Eastern periphery states is meaningless, since Europe's 
Eastern border is represented by the external empires of Russia and Turkey. Instead they 
employ the term ‘devolved states’ to the territories that gained statehood when the empires 
were dismantled between 1878 and 1919. There are two types of Eastern devolved states: 
those devolved from the defence empire states (Germany and Austria-Hungary), after the 
First World War, and those devolved from the external historical empires (Russia and Tur­
key) after the Balkan wars and the First World War.
The North-South axis in Rokkan’s framework is determined by the religious status of the 
European territories as they emerged after the 1648 peace treaties of Westphalia and Osna- 
bruck. Rokkan’s three-way classification of countries as Protestant; mixed or secularised 
Catholic; and counter-reformatory, is, however, too limited for an all-European framework. 
Orthodox as well as Moslem areas can be included in a revised version, while retaining the 
crucial distinction—the degree of secularisation of the political system, i.e. integration or 
lack thereof between state and church. This creates a fourfold classification of countries.
Protestant countries, in particular Lutheran Evangelical, represent total integration and 
subordination of religious leadership to the state. In the mixed Protestant-Catholic coun­
tries, as well as in the substantially secularised Catholic and Orthodox countries, the state’s 
autonomy from religion has given it an upper hand, though church interests remain with a 
potential for independent influence on the citizens. In the counter-reformation Catholic 
countries, as well as in the non-secularised Orthodox countries, a potential for dualism 
remains between religious and secular authority. (It should be noted here that this potential is 
higher in the counter-reformation countries. In the non-secularised Orthodox countries this 
potential for direct independent church opposition to the state is weaker, but it is enhanced by 
traditional ties often of a clientilistic nature.) The last category incorporates the Moslem 
areas, where secularisation is directly at odds with religion. The possibility of coexistence 
between secularised political forces and fundamentalist Moslems within the same regime is 
very much in doubt. Conflicts will tend to have regime consequences.
Common for countries and areas appearing in italics in Figure 2.2 is that democratic 
regimes established there in the early 1920s did not survive the inter-war period intact; in 
countries and areas appearing in regular, on the other hand, democracy proved resilient. Now 
an interesting pattern emerges. Moving diagonally from the south-east to the north-west on 
the conceptual map, chances of democratic survival improve. The structure of the conceptual
24 Shaking Hands with the Past
map seems to indicate that the two macro dimensions of the framework have an impact on 
democratic survival.
Figure 2.2: Democratic Survival: A Conceptual Map
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It is, however, clear that the forms of transition to authoritarianism varied considerably. In 
order to clarify the pattern of democratic breakdown and survival, Aarebrot and Berglund 
make a distinction between European states with a historical tradition of state building on the 
one hand, and states which primarily had remained empires at the outset of the First World 
War on the other. While Rokkan's original conceptual map almost exclusively included 
states from the former category, Aarebrot’s and Berglund’s framework consists of five 
groupings: (1) the states exposed to state building, including the Western periphery states; (2) 
the Western empire states; (3) the city belt states; (4) the Eastern defence empire states; and (5) 
the states devolved from the Eastern defence empire states after 1918. This classification
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incidentally is similar to the five time-zones of nation state-building in Europe that Ernest 
Gellner57 has found (see below) but goes beyond his almost purely historical-chronological 
method.
While it is true that the Eastern defence empire states long retained a strong element of 
imperial identity, Sweden and Prussia-Germany, and at least the German and Magyar core 
nationalities of the Habsburg empire, experienced considerable state- and nation-building 
prior to the First World War. On the other hand, the external Russian and Ottoman histori­
cal empires experienced much more limited attempts at state-building efforts on the part of 
their rulers, and the states that devolved from these empires also lacked state-building tra­
ditions. This leads to a further dichotomised the East-West dimension. One category of 
states, ‘The Charlemagne Heritage’, has a shared experience of Roman law, feudalism, state­
building and relatively early national revival. The Western empires, the city-belt and the 
territories of the Eastern defence empires are here lumped into one. The other group of 
states, ‘The External Challengers’, consists of countries that do not share these traditions and 
have belonged to the Russian or Ottoman empires. They feature various degrees of Byzantine 
heritage and a lack of a strong feudal tradition which has enabled ancient local authority 
relationships such as kinship and clientilism to survive better than in the rest of Europe. This 
tendency is admittedly stronger in the South than in the North.
The North-South dimension may also be dichotomised according to the strength and 
autonomy of political authority vs. religious leadership, indicating the potential for le­
gitimising counter-movements threatening the regime. The first group includes (a) the 
Protestant states and (b) the substantially secularised states, the second group (a) the pre­
dominantly Catholic states of the counter-reformation, and (b) the non-secularised Orthodox 
states and the Moslem countries and areas. These two dichotomies create an even clearer and 
more comprehensive pattern than Rokkan’s original conceptual map:
With the exception of Eire, all countries that were still democratically ruled at the 
outbreak of the Second World War are found in the top left-hand cell. Common for them is 
that they share the ‘Charlemagne Heritage ’ and are characterised either by an integration of 
church and state or by secularisation, state domination over the church. The only other ex­
ception from the elegant scheme is that Germany, though a solidly Protestant/secularised 
state, had gone fascist. The common factors conducive to democratic survival in the inter-war 
period seem to be closely associated with state building and state autonomy.
Aarebrot and Berglund nevertheless stress that ‘successful completion of state building 
and clear autonomy from religious authority were not sufficient to make a state safe for de­
mocracy in the inter-war period. The survival of democracy also requires that the elites of all 
or most relevant cleavages be integrated into governance or into a position of strong influ­
ence upon the government.’ The deviations in the two exceptional cases, Germany and Eire, 
where democracy, respectively, should and should not have survived according to their model 
are thus explained by a third factor, the integration of cleavages through meso-level co­
optation.
In the deviant German case, co-optation failed: the compromise between the major par­
ties of the Weimar coalition (the Social Democrats, the Catholic Zentrum and the Demo­
cratic Party) excluded significant forces—the communists as well as the nationalist, 
conservative, rural and Eastern political segment—from the regime compromise, although 
not from competitive electoral politics.
The Irish Republic in turn demonstrates a case where elite co-optation turned out to 
strengthen democracy. There a major force, the strongly nationalist Fianna Fail refused to 
accept the non-secession of Ulster and opposed the Irish state as it was constituted. It was
57 Gellner (1993).
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excluded in the initial formation of the democratic regime, but eventually came to power 
within the framework of the constitution. However, the Nationalists benefited from the 
existence of the Ulster issue, which contrary to the German grievances could not be expected 
to be resolved by unilateral action. Thus a rather peculiar combination emerged: a ruling 
party which obtained electoral strength by advocating a raison d'etat that was definitely not 
part of the constitutional compromise and an opposition deeply committed to that very 
compromise.
Figure 2.3: Democratic Survival: A Classification of European Countries in the Inter-War 
Period (Short-lived and semi-independent state formations parenthesised)
Source: Aarebrot and Berglund (1995)
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State and Church i Norway
Integrated ; Finland
i Great Britain
i The Netherlands
and = Switzerland
; Germany
Secular Catholic or i France Russia (USSR)
Orthodox Countries : Belgium (Ukraine)
Dominant State : Czechoslovakia
Catholic Counter­ Eire Lithuania
Reformation Countries, Poland
Orthodox and Moslem Spain Romania
Countries Portugal Bulgaria
Continued Dualism Austria Yugoslavia/Serbia
between State and Hungary Greece
Ecclesia Italy
('Croatia) Albania
(Slovakia) Turkey
The use of co-optation as an explanation for non-conformity is obviously problematic, and 
smell of ad hoc rationalisation. While religious heritage and former affiliation to Western vs. 
Eastern state formations are objective macro-level determinants, co-opting depends on dif­
fuse, micro-level elite decisions and action. Elite support or opposition is, however, un­
doubtedly a very important factor for a beleaguered or not yet firmly instituted democratic
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order. What the examples of inter-war Germany and Eire show is that support is not always 
voluntary (as when the Fianna Fail bowed to political realities and settled for the second-best 
option knowing that the best—a united Ireland—was unattainable)—and can be well-nigh 
impossible, given particular grievances or ideologies of relevant political forces. The survival 
of a democratic system thus depends both on the structure of conflicts as perceived by elites, 
and on an element of luck, i.e. how these elites see their chances of attaining goals within the 
particular democratic order that emerges.
Aarebrot and Berglund argue that ‘where the state building was weak and the legacy of 
empire strong, or where secular nation building was still impaired by deeply rooted religious 
sentiments, or where significant segments representing major cleavages were not co-opted 
into a constitutional compromise, the chances for democratic survival in inter-war Europe 
were slim indeed’. For the current situation, their model offers some paradoxical 
predictions. The best prospects for democratic survival seem to be found where there is a 
strong tradition of statehood and where society has been secularised. But these very criteria 
were on top of the agenda set by the communist regimes which emerged after the Second 
World War.
If that is correct, democratic survival in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
seems to depend upon the extent to which the once ruling communists were actually 
successful in promoting their self-proclaimed goals. Elite co-optation, the third factor, would 
be more dependent upon the political cultures that are emerging after the fall of 
communism. This, too, has paradoxical effects: clientilism, kinship and corruption are hard 
to reconcile with democracy, but may nevertheless fulfil a purpose in the progression towards 
a functioning democratic system.
The Agenda of the Central European Right
The standard, colloquial Western political denominations do not fully apply in the post­
communist societies. In Western political discourse, ‘the left’ is normally perceived as 
constituted of advocates of societal change. In communist and post-communist societies, this 
would mean the forces sponsoring a diminishing of state economic dominance and increased 
political and societal pluralism. That in turn implies increased inequality at least in economic 
terms, which is quite the opposite of what the traditional political left in the West would 
normally argue. Indeed, survey-type data show that, in early 1991, voter left-right self­
placement in the Ukraine and Russia actually was opposite to traditional Western 
conceptions: ‘left’ meant reform, free market and democracy, and ‘right’ meant status quo 
and communism.58
It is almost trite to note that substantial segments both of the electorate and the political 
elites have made a reappraisal of their relative positions within the political spectrum. Any 
combinations of conservatism, liberalism and radicalism in the fields of economics, social 
issues and foreign policy seem possible in Eastern and Central Europe. After 1989, former 
sympathisers of rigid, etatist communism became a core constituency of extreme right-wing 
or outright fascist movements in Russia and in Eastern Europe. Indeed, in practically all 
former communist countries, seemingly odd alliances between red and brown have emerged. 
This raises interesting questions about continuity and change. As many of the post-communist 
movements hail back to the pre-communist era, and nevertheless generate the support of 
former communist activists and supporters, may it indeed be the case that right-wing 
traditions existed submerged within the communist establishment?
58 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 10-11.
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Table 2.1: Two Strains of Conservatism 59
Traditionalism Modernism
Particularism Universalism
Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft
Collectivism Individualism
Estate Hierarchy Performance
Culture Economy
Emotion Rationality
(Ethnocentric) Solidarity Competition
Discipline Autonomy
Clericalism Secularity
Homogenisation Pluralisation
State Market
Central distribution Laissez-faire
Anti-communist right-wingers and retro-communists are united by their preferences for 
authoritarian solutions, a strong state, centralised decision-making in the economy, control of 
the media, and potent internal security structures. Indeed, the chief political fault-line in the 
post-communist societies runs between sponsors of tolerance, pluralism and free markets, and 
advocates of more authoritarian rule.
It need be noted that conservatism has a different ideological content in Eastern Europe 
than in the West. It is important to differentiate between the different traditions of 
conservatism that are operating, and also to attempt to distinguish these from the radical 
right wing.
As attempts to create a more dynamic and modern conservatism in Eastern and Central 
Europe after 1945 were effectively blocked by the communist interlude, the conservatism 
which re-emerged as a relevant political force in the 1980’s tended to hail back to the 
traditional, authoritarian ethos and policies that were dominant in the inter-war political 
systems, when conservatives generally dismissed liberal democracy and were deeply suspicious 
of the modernist core values of today’s Western conservative mainstream. Traditional, old- 
fashioned conservatives worry that market forces would wipe out cherished tradition and 
social order; a paradoxical notion indeed given the huge social transformation during the 
decades of state socialism.
In the pluralist democracies of Western Europe and North America, mainstream 
conservatism has undergone fundamental changes since the late nineteenth century, and 
particularly since the 1940’s. The ideals of individual initiative, free enterprise and limited 
government have largely replaced the former core values of hierarchy, religion, and national 
traditions and culture—i.e., in fact incorporated the central tenets of classical liberalism. In 
Eastern Europe, however, the modernised strain of conservatism has shallow roots. After the 
end of communist rule, it has proven to be a political force of importance only in a few 
countries, particularly in the Czech Republic and to some extent in Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Estonia.
’’Markus (1993), 1177.
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The modernisation of conservatism, essentially the adoption of liberalism, constitutes a 
radical break with traditionalism. The new core values are in many instances even diametrical 
to the former.
In addition to the two main strains of conservative thought mentioned above, one may 
differentiate a third right-wing tradition: the radical or revolutionary. It shares many core 
values with traditional conservatism, but is at the same time energised by a desire to 
fundamentally change the existing power structure and social order.
The importance of socio-economic modernisation and secularisation for liberal 
democracy has been emphasised above. Yet modernisation is a painful process, which tends to 
generate anti-democratic, anti-liberal backlashes of varying intensity and duration. The 
critique of modernisation tends to take two major forms. One is the radical leftist variety, 
with its foundation in anti-capitalist utopian ideas of radically increased egalitarianism and 
mass participation. In the post-communist societies it has lost much of its appeal due to the 
failed experiment with revolutionary socialism. The other line of critique, which currently 
appears more politically viable, is backward-looking and preservatist, viewing ‘existing 
political and cultural developments as corrupt, and seeking] to revitalise traditional, albeit 
declining, national traditions and social structures’.60 It emphasises:
the prior existence of the good integrated society which once characterised their 
nation. [...] The past history of each nation becomes the source of the myth of the 
golden past with which the present may be unfavourably compared. [...] European 
conservative thought, particularly before World War II, has looked back nostalgically 
to an image of a highly cohesive, stable, and cultured pre-industrial society 
characterised by an alliance of the throne and altar, state and church, in which peoples’ 
positions were defined by an interrelated complex of roles, and where the state, church 
and aristocracy fulfilled the values of noblesse oblige and took responsibility for the 
welfare of the average person. [. . .] [T]here is a core myth rooted in the shared history 
of medieval Catholic Europe.61
Nationalism is thus a core element of traditionalist, backlash conservatism.
Backlashes to ‘changes in values, in concepts of rectitude, as well as in the status of 
different activities and roles’ have occurred both in North America and in Western Europe 
throughout the twentieth century.62 Backlash politics ‘may be defined as the efforts of groups 
who sense a diminishing of their importance, influence, and power, or who feel threatened 
economically or politically, to reverse them or stem the direction of change through political 
means.’ As the reaction of these groups is triggered by a process of decline, backlash politics 
‘is often extreme in its tactics and policies and has frequently incorporated theories of 
ongoing conspiracies by alien forces to undermine national traditions and strength.’ As a 
consequence, extremist movements tend to gain support during periods of economic 
depression or severe social turmoil, when previously established forces come under attack.63
Gino Germani has even proposed that ‘the structural tension inherent in all modern 
society between growing secularisation and the necessity of maintaining a minimal 
prescriptive central nucleus sufficient for integration, constitutes a general causal factor for 
all authoritarian trends.’64 Conflicts between more and less modern sectors are inimical to all 
post-agrarian societies undergoing rapid change, particularly on the elite level but also
60 Lipset (1981), 451.
61 Lipset (1981), 453-4.
62 Lipset (1981), 451.
63 Lipset (1981), 455.
64 Germani (1978), 7, quoted in Lipset (1981), 451.
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among lower strata.65 A conflict structure of that character was, of course, present already 
during the communist era and particularly during its period of terminal decline. The ability 
of the communist systems to force through their social aims—the shift from agrarian to 
industrial societies—created new and more complicated structures in which the effectiveness 
of the authoritarian methods previously used diminished. Simultaneously, the increasing 
inability to deliver material welfare created counteracting pressures to even speed up and 
intensify the modernisation processes.
In communist-ruled Eastern Europe, the combination of neo-Stalinist repression and 
ethnocentric chauvinism presented one authoritarian solution to the problem, which was 
implemented not wholly without success. The revitalisation of archaic ideals and the espousal 
of national values among factions of the then ruling establishments can indeed be interpreted 
as attempts to counteract the forces of change brought on by the systems’ own successes as well 
as by their deficiencies.
A particular feature of the post-communist traditionalist backlash is the ambiguity of the 
social forces and experiences it is reacting against. It is equally opposed to the capitalist ethos 
and to the communist ideology. At times the two are even equated, seen as different aspects of 
essentially the same thing: the imposition of ‘alien’ Western norms by foreign elements: the 
classic, confused theory of a Jewish, Jesuit, Masonic, plutocratic and Bolshevik conspiracy, 
linking Wall Street and the Kremlin.
The picture is even more complicated. Although traditionalist conservative forces 
generally idolise the pre-communist and even the pre-industrial era, they are also attracted by 
some elements of the social system of the communist period, if not by the ideology that was 
purported to drive it. The systematisation of the traditionalist-modernist dichotomy above 
points at elements of underlying affinity between traditionalist conservatism and the form of 
communism that was practised in the Soviet Bloc. This is particularly true for the dimensions 
of state-market, homogenisation-pluralisation, distribution, collectivism-individualism and 
discipline-autonomy.66 The Leninist dictum of the primacy of politics is indeed embraced 
also by traditionalist conservatives, who tend to argue that the emancipation of society, 
economy and culture should and can only be accomplished through politics. This line of 
critique of capitalist, cosmopolitan, urban (and implicitly Western and Jewish) values has 
proven particularly strong in post-transition Russia, where communist rule blocked the 
development of a civic nationalism at an even earlier stage than in Central and Eastern 
Europe.67
Eastern European traditional conservatism ‘calls upon a conservatism with its roots in 
rural, peasant cultures, traditions that emphasise pre-war traditions of nation, family, 
religion, and strong national states. It is a conservatism distrustful of modernity and the 
secular values of post-war Western Europe.’68
Yet the visceral wish to return to the pre-communist period is hardly compatible with the 
enormous, patently irreversible social changes that occurred during the period of communist 
rule. The communist social revolution ‘included the end of rural overpopulation and low 
rural output; the corresponding rise of urbanisation, the growth of an urban proletariat, and 
the spread of industrial working methods; the generation of a near-universal demand for 
modern citizenship and democratic rights; the widespread acceptance of Western 
consumerist aspirations; and the disappearance of the pre-war elites.’69 The socio-economic
65 Lipset (1981), 452.
66Markus (1993), 1168.
67 Cf. Parland (1994).
Hockenos (1993), 10.
69Schdpflin (1991), 66; the direct reference is to Hungarian communism, but the observation is 
relevant for the entire Socialist Bloc.
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changes over the five post-war decades thus severely eroded the natural constituency for 
traditionalist conservatism. As it tries to ignore the enormous changes in social structure, 
values and popular attitudes, the conservative-populist right wing is forced to refer to its 
mission as that of the voice of the nation, and has to analyse society through affective, 
traditional means rather than modern, rational ones.70 This is the main reason why 
nationalism is the core issue on the traditionalist agenda.
Traditionalist conservatives tend to see the nation not as a civic community, but as a 
folkish one. In the West, the concept of the nation has tended to be defined according to the 
traditions of the French Revolution, i.e. that it encompasses a body of citizens living in a 
territorial state and sharing its sovereignty.71 The underlying principle of this ‘civic’ 
definition is citizenship, regardless of race, religion, language or ethnicity. In contrast, the 
starting-point for the ethnic definition of the nation is rights and obligations acquired by 
birth. The ethnic nation is a community bound by history, customs, language and race—not 
citizenship or territory. For ethnic nationalists, the nation is a social unit with a mythical 
destiny towards which it progresses along a ‘natural path’. The concept of the nation is 
intertwined with that of the state, the incarnation of national will: all members of the nation 
should live within the borders of one state and, preferably, all inhabitants of the state should 
belong to the same ethnic nation.
The fact that the ethnic rather than the civic definition is prevalent among conservatives in 
Eastern Europe goes a long way to explain the fact that the traditionalist right is suspicious of 
the free market. First, a free market means less centralisation and a weaker state, and thus 
impedes the state’s ability to protect the nation and further its interests. Second, capitalism 
and its culture of industrialisation endangers the folkish community which thrives in a rural 
lifestyle. Only a strong, resourceful and interventionist state is able to shore up family 
economic security in the name of traditional values. The populist streak of nationalist 
conservatism is also laden with an egalitarianist streak: the process of wealth-creation should 
benefit the whole nation, not just a certain strata, and of course much less foreigners and other 
‘aliens’.72
The Essence of the Radical Right
Right-wing radical movements of the inter-war era shared many of the core values of 
traditionalist conservatism, and have often been seen as only a more militant incarnation of 
the same backlash phenomenon. When Hitler was sentenced to prison for his activities 
during the 1923 Munich Putsch attempts, the court explained its lenient sentence by the fact 
that the insurgents had only ‘attempted a revolution against the revolution’, i.e. used leftist 
methods to further what basically were conservative aims. Yet this was a misrepresentation: 
the National Socialists and other similar groups were certainly motivated by their hate of the 
organised revolutionary labour movement and the parliamentary order of the Weimar 
Republic, but they had equal contempt for the hierarchical, aristocratic order of the Imperial 
age.
The German Nazis, like fascists all over Europe at the time, copied both their 
organisational matrix and much of the rhetoric style from the radical left. In essence, radicals 
on the left and on the right advocated the use of similar methods to reach different solutions 
to same sorts of problems. In some cases, even the proposed solutions were similar (if for
70Schopflin (1991), 66.
71 Some Western states, i.a. Germany, still apply the ius sanguinis principle, defining the right to 
citizenship primarily in terms of ethnicity.
72 Hockenos (1993), 13.
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different reasons), i.a. the destruction of finance capitalism and the establishment of a 
homogenous society through the eradication of class/race differences.
The radicalisation of traditionalist conservatism was the incarnation of a particularly 
violent backlash triggered by the new forms of social organisations that emerged in Germany 
and to its east around the turn of the century. Technical and economical modernisation came 
later to Central Europe than to Britain, the Low Countries and France, but instead it was 
much faster and more radical. The middle strata were squeezed between the anonymous 
capitalist structures and the well-organised industrial proletariat, both of which appeared as 
incarnations of the same alienating modernity. The emergence of joint stock companies, 
trusts, department stores, industrial mass production and rationalisation, big business and big 
labour created enormous economic pressure among urban artisans, shop-keepers and petty 
officials of the old middle class, as well as among the independent peasantry. The bouts of 
inflation in the 1920’s and 1930’s only increased discontent with die perceived failings of 
parliamentary democracy.
To the east of the Rhine, the modernisation of the modes of production and transaction 
was not paralleled by a secularisation of corresponding magnitude. Even among the classes 
which profited from modernisation, the process was widely criticised for destroying ancient 
social mores, creating a reality without poetic beauty, and leading to the functionalisation of 
the human being into an unconscious cog in the social machine. The conservative reaction 
against modernity was motivated not by scepticism, but rather by pessimism, romanticism 
and nostalgia, and it demonstrated a readiness to violent anti-revolutionary protest.73 Yet 
many of these same anti-revolutionary, feudalistic old-world power structures intuitively 
acknowledged the necessity of modernisation. Indeed, the concept of central state planning 
was first put into full effect in Germany, when the Hindenburg-Ludendorff General Staff— 
a force in the employ of social reaction if anything—mobilised the entire economy behind 
the total war effort.74 Lenin, for one, saw it as a particularly enticing experiment, which he 
realised could serve as a model for the organisation of labour in the transition period from 
capitalism to full-blown, classless communism.
Already during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, a wave of developmental 
pessimism and anti-civilisationism had swept the continent, engendered by Oswald Spengler 
and other admonishers of Western decline. The process of decay they identified in Western 
civilisation was perceived as a direct result of rationality and liberalism.
HUFVUDSTADSBLADET ARCHIVES
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Knut Hamsun, D. H. Lawrence, Jacob Burckhardt and Vladimir Solovzhov were among 
the prominent literary figures who voiced scepticism of modernisation and romanticised the 
past archaic order. Fin-de-siecle disillusionment was particularly strong in France and Italy 
during the 1890’s, when a range of influential authors ‘with extraordinary clarity made it 
clear that doctrines of absolute authority, discipline, tradition, contempt for the spirit of 
freedom, the embracement of the moral rectitude of war and slavery made it possible to take a 
proud and uncompromising stance, and at the same come much closer to the views of simple 
people than sentimental liberalism and humanism could.’ 75 As Nietzsche pointed out, the 
cult of emotions replaced the earlier cult of rationality. It did not take long before the 
scepticism with modernity inspired radical anti-democratic, social Darwinist and biological- 
racist thinking—and ultimately created movements demanding that such programmes be put 
into force.
Just as the First World War energised the working class parties’ hyper-modernist 
programmes, it also radicalised anti-modern sentiments. Particularly in the vanquished states, 
it led to a shattering of what belief there had existed in continuing progress and prosperity. 
This developmental pessimism manifested itself in a powerful literary and aesthetic 
movement espousing truly anachronistic anti-rationality, even irrationality. In Italy, Julius 
Evola hailed the crucial importance of an aristocratic elite of heroic political fighters, while 
German philosophers such as Ernst Jiinger, Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt eloquently 
dismissed freedom, equality and democracy for unity, leadership, loyalty and hierarchy.
Obviously, it was partly a reaction of the Frontkampfer generation directly against 1919. 
That year not only proven much of the suffering to have been in vain, but also represented a 
return to civilian normality which was difficult to bear for many—Adolf Hitler was but one 
of the de-mobilsed soldiers who sorely missed the camaraderie and sense of purpose in the 
trenches. The fundamental target of the martial estheticists was, however, the whole legacy of 
1789. By emphasising struggle, not progress and rationality, as the binding force of society, 
they attempted to reconnect an increasingly bourgeoisie social structure to an archaic, pre­
class social order. Evola became the chief ideologue of Italian Fascism, and Heidegger and 
Schmitt developed into devout Nazis. Jiinger notably did not: he dismissed Hitler as a fake 
and a closet modernist, and even moved on the fringes of the aristocratic circles which in 
1944 made an attempt on the Fuhrer’s life.
One can indeed see Jiinger’s point. Political fascism may be an expression of the broad 
critique of rationality, industrialisation and emancipation, but it is also anti-intellectual and 
plebeian. Inter-war political fascism was even egalitarian, if only within the boundaries it set 
up along racial, religious or ethnic lines. Despite its critique of the giant anonymous 
structures which crush ancient social structures and customs, and its praise of rural 
romanticism and the individual’s mythical tie to the soil, political fascism was de facto pro- 
technological and tended to advocate social mobility: ‘it gave people modern assignments in 
the suggestive masquerade of the past’.76 Both Hitler and Mussolini were indeed great 
admirers of technological progress: not only in the form of new wonder weapons, but also of 
the automobile, highways, the aeroplane and the city as an organism. To this day, the Duce is 
remembered for ‘making the trains run on time’; if anything, a praise of his Fordist 
ambitions and accomplishments.
The question of the nature of fascism has elicited a broad range of responses. 
Contemporary Marxists generally saw it as ‘the open terrorist dictatorship of the most 
reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital’,77 i.e. as the most 
advanced, and logically ultimate, stage of capitalism. Non-communist scholars have taken a
75 Fest (1993), 139.
76 Fest (1993), 149.
Togliatti, Lectures on Fascism, London 1976, 1; quoted in Bosworth (1994), 20-21.
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somewhat different approach. For two decades after 1945, fascism and Naziism were treated 
by mainstream Western political analysis as one incarnation of the broader current of 
totalitarianism, one further example of which was communism. Among the most influential 
texts in this vein was Carl Friedrich’s and Zbigniev Brzezinski’s 1956 treatise Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Autocracy.™
The model underlying that book was a theory of the features inherent to totalitarian state. 
They are (1) a pervasive and chiliastic ideology; (2) a mass party dominated by the charisma of 
one man in turn defended by a coterie of ruthless and passionate true believers; (3) mass 
‘scientific’ terror maximised in its effect by often being arbitrary in its direction; (4) a near 
monopoly both of mass communication and of any weapons in the army or elsewhere in 
society, (5) a rigid state control of the economy, indicating their fundamentally anti-capitalist 
nature; and (6) a ‘natural bent’ to engage in ‘world conquest’.79
The authoritative Western texts on totalitarianism from the 1950’s were obviously 
influenced by the political climate dominating in the United States at the time. They are 
coloured by the atmosphere of the early Cold War, when Americans preferred to see the 
struggle against the USSR and what was perceived as a homogenous movement of World 
Communism as a direct continuation of the battle against fascism. Despite this, some 
conclusions still appear valid and prescient.
Yet even fascism is not a clear-cut, and even less a coherent, ideological mind-set. One of 
the defining features of right-wing ideologies is indeed that they are internally incoherent, 
hodgepodges of incongruity. Even the very term ‘fascism’ is fuzzy, ‘a collage of different 
philosophical and political ideas, a beehive of contradictions’.80 The Italian version is a good 
example: it was republican, yet kept the monarchy in place and established the first ever 
concordat with the Church; it proposed absolute state control, yet allowed the markets to 
operate freely; it boasted of bringing about revolutionary change, yet it was financed by the 
most conservative landowners who expected from it counter-revolution.
Apart from the internal contradictions within the national varieties, fascism has developed 
into a catch-all designation—in some cases even a pejorative—for a broad family of right­
wing radical ideologies, parties and movements: from the strongly Catholic Spanish 
Falangists and Slovak Hlinka party to the anti-Christian and pagan German National 
Socialists; from the imperialist Italian Fascists to the separatist Croatian Ustasha-, from 
highly organised cadre parties to loose street gangs of skinhead hooligans. Usage of the term 
has even degenerated to a mantra for the left: during the 1920’s and 30’s, communists 
attacked social democrats as ‘social fascists’, while Stalinists and neo-Stalinists in post-1989 
Eastern Europe have been branded as ‘Red Fascists’. In fact, even totalitarianism is not a 
feature common to all fascist movements: Italy, the country where the term originated, is 
notably omitted from Hannah Arendt’s seminal 1951 study Origins of Totalitarianism.
Umberto Eco notes that the perception of similarity between fascist movements is often 
the result of‘illusory transitivity’, as illustrated by the following sequence:81
1 
ab c
2 
bed
3 
cde
4 
def
The first group is illustrated by features a, b, and c, the second by features b, c, and d; and so 
on. Group two is similar to group one in that it has two features in common, and for the same
78 Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956).
79 Bosworth (1993), 22.
“Eco (1995).
81 Eco (1995); the argument is followed at some length below.
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reasons group three is similar to group two and to group four. Group three is also somewhat 
similar to group one; they have feature c in common. Group four shares features with to 
groups three and two, but has no features in common with group one. Yet owing to the 
uninterrupted series of decreasing similarities a ‘family resemblance’ remains between one 
and four. One may thus, Eco argues, add to or remove from a regime or movement some 
features, and it will still be recognisably fascist. Despite its fuzziness, the term has a meaning.
To make sense of all the differences in essence and style, he identifies some features of 
generic ‘Eternal Fascism’, or, as he calls it, ‘Ur-Fascism’. As Eco notes, ‘these features cannot 
be organised into a system; many of them contradict each other, and are also typical of other 
kinds of despotism or fanaticism. But it is enough that one of them be present to allow fascism 
to coagulate around it.’ This is of course not a systematic argument, but highly illustrative for 
the present purposes.
The first feature of generic fascism is the cult of tradition. This normally materialises in 
the form of a cult of the nation’s distant, heroic past, often as revealed by long-forgotten 
‘documents’ and archaeological ‘finds’ in conjuncture with elements selectively borrowed 
from the great thinkers of mankind. This makes fascism syncretistic: it attempts to combine 
different or even contradictory beliefs or practices. Evola merged the Holy Grail with The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and alchemy with the Holy Roman and Germanic Empire. In 
a similar vein, Russian ultra-nationalists have argued that the Russians are a mythical race of 
superhumans with reference to the Book of Vlas, a forgery depicting the arrival of the Russian 
nation as the first Aryan people in Europe, and combined it with that other infamous forgery,
Protocols, to ‘prove’ Russia’s eternal holy mission. In line with classic fascist tradition, 
the Russian ultra-right also has a foible for the occult.82
The cult of tradition obviously implies a rejection of modernism. Although fascists 
commonly worship technology—something that sets them apart from other traditionalists, 
who normally see it as the antithesis of spirituality—the praise of modernism takes place only 
on the surface of an ideology based on Blut und Boden. Eco notes: ‘The rejection of the 
modern world was disguised as a rebuttal of capitalistic way of life, but it mainly concerned 
the rejection of the spirit of 1789 (and of 1776, of course). The Enlightenment, the Age of 
Reason, is seen as the beginning of modern depravity. In this sense too, Ur-Fascism can be 
defined as irrationalism.'
This irrationalism is also derived from the cult of action for action’s sake. It in turn 
promotes a distrust of intellectualism, reflection and critical analysis—and ultimately of 
science, as scientific progress is based on continuous disagreement. In the fascist world view, 
disagreement is treason. Disagreement is also a sign of diversity; Ur-Fascism seeks consensus 
by exploiting the fear of difference. For that reason, it is also racist by definition.
Historically fascist movements have appealed to a frustrated middle class threatened by 
economic crisis, politically humiliated or fearful of advancing lower strata. Eco assesses that 
today’s fascist movements will target the old proletariat that has joined and come to dominate 
the bourgeois ranks. The fascist message to groups who feel threatened and fear losing their 
social identity is that their nationality is their privilege. What defines the nation is foreigners, 
and particularly foreign enemies. Enemies are created through an obsession with plots. The 
preferred object of xenophobia has been the Jews, as they at the same time are found both on 
the inside and on the outside. By a continuously shifting rhetorical focus, fascists portray the 
nation’s enemies as simultaneously strong and weak, creating the vision of mortal danger, yet 
promising ultimate and inevitable victory.
In fascist thinking, life is permanent warfare and life acquires its meaning through 
constant struggle. Everybody is educated to become a hero and, if necessary, is asked to redeem
82 Cf. Laqueur (1995), 149-154.
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him- or herself by dying for the cause. This also implies elitism and contempt for the weak. 
However, as fascist movements aim to generate mass support, the whole people has to be 
defined as the elite among nations. Elitism and contempt for underlings is transferred to the 
party itself, which is organised in a pyramidal, strictly hierarchical fashion. In the absence of 
actual war, machismo—the disdain for women and intolerance of non-conformist sexual 
practices—serves as ersatz heroism.
Ur-Fascism is also characterised by a selective populism. As the people is construed as an 
organic entity with a common will, somebody has to interpret that will: the Leader. And 
because the people have lost all power of delegation, they cannot act expressively as 
individuals, but are only called to theatrically play the role of the People—be it at public 
festivities, parades, or speeches from atop the Lenin mausoleum or the balcony of the Reich 
Chancellery. Mussolini and Gustave LeBon, the father of crowd theory, were mutual 
admirers and corresponded regularly; The Duce re-read LeBon’s books every year, while 
LeBon praised Mussolini’s iron will, his traits as a leader, and his understanding of the psyche 
of the mass.83 From this qualitative populism stems the contempt for parliamentary 
institutions and practices. ‘Wherever a politician casts doubts on the legitimacy of a 
parliament because it no longer represents the Voice of the People, we can smell Ur- 
Fascism’. Fascism also speaks Newspeak, using an elementary syntax and an impoverished 
vocabulary so as to limit the tools for critical and complex reasoning.
Eco’s definition of ‘Ur-fascism’ is vague, but can hardly be anything else. Indeed, the 
whole point is that the ideologies of all right-wing radical movements are diffuse 
amalgamations intending to legitimise the use of limitless power by a determined minority. 
It borrows some of its social and cultural values from traditionalist conservatism, and others 
(as well as the methods) from revolutionary Marxism (or from Jacobitism). The fluid nature 
of right-wing radicalism points to the fact that it synthesises, in a genuinely Hegelian sense, 
revolution and reaction. It thus completely misses the point to ask whether Adolf Hitler, 
Benito Mussolini, Ante Pavelic or Dome Sztojay—or, for that matter, any latter-day Eastern 
European populist politician—really were revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries.
Many of the features mentioned by Eco are indeed common to all dictatorial regimes, and 
particularly those with totalitarian ambitions. This raises the interesting and controversial 
question of the possible nexus between fascism and communism. The task of the present study 
is to find elements of continuity between pre-war right-wing movements and those of the 
present, with the underlying hypothesis that the legacy has been carried over by the system of 
Real Existing Socialism. The discussion above presented a set of features prevalent in fascism 
and in traditional conservatism; the ensuing task should be to examine if any of them can be 
observed also in communist ideology. Nationalism, the focal point of both the radical and the 
traditional right, is the logical starting-point for that.
The Roots and Ideology of Nationalism
Nations are, in Benedict Andersons’s now famous phrase, ‘imagined communities’. They 
exist in the human mind rather than in some ‘objective’ external world, and the account they 
give of their own origins is often largely fictitious. Yet that does not necessarily matter, as the 
sense of belonging to a distinct cultural tradition or a cultural identity can be subjectively real 
to the extent that it becomes an objective socio-political fact. A ‘nation’ is a amorphous and 
dynamically changing social entity, influenced and in some instances even created by social
83 Cf. Bryson (1993), 260; as yet another indication of the radical nexus, Mussolini was not the 
only prominent admirer of LeBon: Hitler too had read his La Psychologic des foules (Paris 1895), 
while Lenin is said to have always had that book on his desk. Cf. Pipes (1995), 270.
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engineering and myth-making. Thus, ‘nationalism’ precedes nations—‘nations do not make 
states and nationalisms but the other way around’. Massimo d’Azeglio admitted after the 
creation of the Italian kingdom: ‘We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’.84
‘Nationalism’ means ‘primarily a principle which holds that the political and national 
unit should be congruent’85 A distinction between modern nationalism from other less 
demanding forms of national or group identification is that the individual’s loyalty to the 
nation supersedes all other loyalties.
Modern nationalism has its intellectual roots in the Heidelberg movement of National 
Romanticists, which equated the ‘people’ to a natural living organism that strives to develop 
its inherent possibilities. During the first decades of the nineteenth century, influential 
German philosophers such as Herder, Fichte and Hegel86 established the idea that shared 
cultural heritage, traditions and popular mores define the organic unity of the nation, the 
Volk. Herder stressed that each people could emerge from barbarity only through the culture 
of the native tongue; nation-building is dependent on the consciousness of linguistic and 
ethnic community, on historical consciousness and on a consciousness of historical mission. 
Freedom, he concluded, is just as important for a nation as a social group as for the 
individual. Yet Herder’s nationalism was not antagonistic. He stressed that every nation is 
constituted by an unique set of political and, above all, cultural experiences and traditions, 
and that all these cultures and nations are equally dear to God.
Indeed, nationalism in the early eighteenth century was almost by definition liberal as 
well as tolerant: it did not exclude or pre-empt the rights of other nations. Giuseppe Mazzini 
held nations to be ‘God-appointed instruments for the welfare of the human race’, and the 
Act of Brotherhood of Young Europe in 1834 declared that ‘Every people has its special 
mission which will co-operate towards the fulfilment of the general mission of humanity. 
Nationality is sacred’.87
As Eric Hobsbawm has noted, nationalism in the modern sense of the world is ‘no older 
than the eighteenth century, give or take the odd predecessor’.88 The equation of linguistic 
rights with political self-determination is an even more recent invention, in most of Europe 
dating back only to the second half of the nineteenth century. Since then, however, the 
nationalities question has arguably been the most powerful driving force in European 
politics.
One may debate what set the forces of nationalism and nation state-building in motion: 
the economic transformation caused by capitalist expansion, as Hobsbawm argues; 
industrialisation and proletarian urbanisation, as Ernest Gellner holds; or perhaps some 
other factors. In any case it is clear that both nationalism as ideology and the nation state as a 
mode of social organisation are incarnations of modernity.89
84 Both quotes are from Hobsbawm (1993), 44-45.
85 This definition is from Ernest Gellner’s seminal Nations and Nationalism (1983), 1.
86 Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744—1803), student of Immanuel Kant at Konigsberg, Sturm 
und Drang author and advocate of the liberation of German literature from foreign influence; 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762—1814), proponent of the self-contained and corporate Prussian 
state, author of the Addresses to the German Nation (delivered in 1808-09), first Rector of the 
Berlin University; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), contemporary of Napoleon, 
author of the Phenomenology of Mind (1807) and The Science of Logic (1812—16), developed the 
theory of dialectical movements of opposites in history.
87 From Wandycz (1992), 137.
88 Hobsbawm (1990), 3, also Ch. 1.
89 The theory of nationalism as primarily a function of modernisation appears to have become 
the paradigm after Karl Deutsch’s Nationalism and Social Communication, An Enquiry into the 
Foundations of Nationality (1953).
38 Shaking Hands with the Past
In any case, after the late eighteenth century, the common European drive to centralise 
power drove states to promote and enforce, even create, official languages for the bureaucracy 
and high culture. This was a break with the past, when the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ 
generally had weak, if any, linguistic connotations. There had also rarely been any connection 
in logical terms between the population inhabiting a territorial state on the one hand, and 
identification with a larger group on ethnic or linguistic grounds on the other.90 Especially 
in multi-lingual and multi-ethnic empires such as Austria and Russia, this centralisation 
created counter-reactions, where the urban bourgeoisie and intelligentsia started demanding 
rights for ‘national languages’ as avenues to social mobility and emancipation in the imperial 
peripheries. Their partial success was demonstrated by the elevation of the Magyar nation 
within the Habsburg empire, codified in the Compromise of 1867, and by the gradually 
increased rights during 1830-70 of Czechs, Poles, Croats, Slovenes and others to use their 
vernaculars in office and school. In Russia, nationalism showed in attempts at Russification of 
non-Russian territories such as the Caucasus, Poland, Finland and the Baltics, and in the 
vigorous resistance to it.
Although hardly anyone at that time even thought of demanding a national state for the 
Czechs, Georgians or Finns, or for other subject nationalities in the multi-national European 
empires (Poland was possibly an exception, but even that state was not at the time defined in 
linguistic terms), language policy did force states to come to terms with the new principle of 
nationality. There was a rapid codification of minor tongues, many of which lacked a 
standardised written idiom even in the mid-19th century. As linguistic emancipation was 
accepted as an important political objective by ever broader social strata within the minor 
nationalities—not least as a means for upwards social mobility—the logical conclusion was 
that it was best, possibly only, attainable within the framework of a state.
[U]nder the circumstances, all nationalism not already identified with a state necessary 
became political. For the state was the machine which had to be manipulated if a 
‘nationality’ was to turn into a ‘nation’, or even if its existing status was to be 
safeguarded against historical erosion or assimilation.91
The observation that nationalism makes states and not vice versa is indeed paramount when 
discussing the new states that were formed in Europe after the First World War. The 
Wilsonian principles eloquently granted rights of self-determination to the subject 
nationalities of the collapsing Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian and German empires, but the 
concept was less than compatible with realities on the ground, where a multitude of linguistic 
groups (and the ‘nation’ was by then defined almost exclusively in linguistic terms) lived side 
by side, in enclaves and in enclaves within enclaves, from the Baltics to the Aegean. The 
situation in Central Europe was as complicated as in the Balkans, where some half dozen 
states, formed largely on the basis of ethnicity, had broken away from the Ottoman empire 
during the decades preceding the First World War and proceeded to fight each other and 
internally.
One may even argue that the Wilsonian programme’s equation of national rights with 
the founding of nation states, and of the nation state with linguistic, ethnic and (in some 
cases) religious homogeneity, reached its logical conclusion the expulsions, population 
transfers and exchanges, ‘ethnic cleansings’, and outright genocides in Europe in the mid and 
late 20th century. The seemingly benevolent ideas of ‘one state for every nation’ and ‘only 
one state for each nation’ found their logical conclusion in the dictum of ‘only one nation in 
a state’, something that could only be attained by barbarian means. Accepting the fact that
"Hobsbawm (1990), 19.
91 Hobsbawm (1993), 94.
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most modern European nation states are outcomes of huge projects of social engineering and 
myth-making, nationalism can be seen as an incarnation of irrationality and collectivism, a 
‘backward step in the history of mankind’ as Lord Acton observed as early as in 1862.92
In a layout largely congruent with Stein Rokkan’s seminal conceptual map of Europe93, 
Ernest Gellner has defined Eastern Central Europe as one of five zones of national states 
within Europe.94 In chronological order, the first and oldest is formed by Britain, the sub­
Pyrenean states and the Netherlands. The second centres around France, where a nation state 
emerged around the time of the 1789 revolution. The third zone encompasses Central 
Europe, with Germany and Italy as the most important representatives of the new nation 
states formed in the mid-nineteenth century. Gellner identifies Eastern Central Europe as 
the fourth, while the fifth and last zone is formed by the former Soviet Union (excluding the 
three Baltic republics).
The Central European fourth zone encompasses the states formed when the Habsburg, 
Ottoman and Russian empires were broken up. These new entities were formed and 
delineated, largely by the victor states of the First World War, around one or several core 
ethnic groups within the multinational empires. These had been discriminated against by 
imperial centres with strong ambitions to assimilate subject ethnic and linguistic groups into 
the dominant cultures. As that in turn meant that political activity within these new political 
entities previously had been severely restricted, anti-democratic ideologies and movements 
took strong root immediately after independence, a process exacerbated by the complicated 
ethnic and linguistic mosaics prevalent throughout the region. Although the new states were 
formed according to the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination, they 
nevertheless encompassed significant minorities—in the case of Czechoslovakia, the 
politically dominant Czechs even constituted a minority. Thus the question of nationality 
were to be the be the basis of political action and conflicts. The building of a ‘nation’ by the 
‘state’ was to form the main project of the nationalist forces, once the opposite had been 
accomplished. Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, the first leader of newly independent, multi-ethnic 
Poland, paraphrased d’Azeglio and declared that ‘it is the state which makes the nation and 
not the nation the state’.
Most of the Versailles states came under Soviet domination after the Second World War, 
stopping short the experiment with political democracy. That experience, Gellner argues, 
has resulted in the national identity becoming a surrogate for a political or class identity. But 
as few checks and balances are in place, the strengthening of national identity has in itself 
created new political and social tensions.
Nationalism in moderate, non-chauvinistic forms can and do hold states together and 
instil in their citizens a sense of tolerance, moderation and altruism. However, its more 
extreme forms leads to superficial signs of unity but tends to develop, or even depend on, 
notions of external and internal enemies. Nationalism in all but moderate forms—i.e. when 
operating in a strong institutional framework promoting and protecting pluralism and 
tolerance—is thus likely to have a detrimental effect on democracy. First, the prevalence of 
movements primarily concerned with promoting the ‘national interest’ is likely to lead to 
attempts to exclude ‘non-national’ forces from influence in the political processes of a state, 
and as a logical consequence to calls for separatism—both of which can lead to severe crises of 
legitimacy. Moreover, the notion of an organic national unity encourages competing 
political forces to attempt to monopolise representing this ‘national interest’.
92 Quoted by livonen (1993), 234.
93 Rokkan (1975); Rokkan and Urwin (1983); see above.
94 Gellner (1993).
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Political forces do not see themselves as parties representing particular interests and 
projects. Since the nation is one body with one will, each of the political forces aspires 
to become the one and only representative of the nation, to cloak itself in the mantle of 
el movimento national. And since there are no conflicts to be resolved by competition 
under rules, democracy serves only as an opportunity to struggle for a monopoly 
representing the national interest.95
It should be noted in this context that a widely experienced sense of organic unity does not by 
definition rule out contested elections or even a competitive party system. It may simply lead 
the oppositional ‘national bloc’ to refuse any co-operation with ‘non-national’ parties.
Even in Germany, where both state- and nation-building were completed at the time of 
their take-over of power, the Nazis claimed to turn the state into a vehicle for the nation, 
which was interpreted strictly as an organic entity. This is how Reinhard Heydrich, then 
chief of the Prussian Gestapo, put it in 1935:
National Socialism does no longer take the state, but the nation as the starting-point. 
The Fiihrer gave this direction already in Mein Kampf. He defined the state as ‘a 
means to an end’, as ‘an institution for the respective People’s Community’ to ‘protect 
and further a community of physically and spiritually similar ways of life’. 
Consequently we National Socialists know only of the enemy of the people. [...] In the 
enemy of the state National Socialism sees the enemy of the people. All expressions of 
forces hostile to the state always go back to the People’s enemies, are supported and 
led by them and determined by their actions.96
The existence of a unique organic unity can be defined by reference to many a phenomenon: 
the perceived need to preserve racial homogeneity, an unique community with a holy mission 
(as prominently argued in Russia), by theocratic arguments (common in Orthodox countries, 
occasionally also in Poland), or by perceived outside conspiracies (e.g. in Serbia). There is also 
an abundance of quotes to this effect from Stalin and other prominent communist leaders, 
then of course wrapped in class analysis. In any case, the notion of organic national unity is 
clearly incompatible with a political system that allows open-ended, competitive adjudication 
of social and political conflicts. A whole and indivisible body cannot fight itself; if there is a 
fever, it is a sign of an invasion by hostile foreign viruses to be expelled or eradicated. 
Demands on unity and loyalty become total: those who do not agree with the ‘national spirit’ 
are by definition elements who do not belong.
The German National Socialists’ self-identification as the only true voice of the nation is 
a case in point. Hitler, writing to Chancellor Heinrich Bruning in December 1931, made it 
quite clear that his and his party’s ascent to power would be final and not reversible by any 
democratic mechanisms:
Herr Chancellor, the fundamental thesis of democracy runs ‘All powers issue from 
the People.’ The constitution lays down the way by which a conception, an idea, and 
therefore an organisation, must gain from the People the legitimation for the 
realisation of its aims. But in the last resort it is the People itself which determines its 
constitution. Herr Chancellor, if the German nation once empowers the National 
Socialist Movement to introduce a constitution other than that we have today, you
95Przeworski (1990), 92-93, again referring to works of Guillermo O’Donnell.
96 In a speech on The Fight against Enemies of the State’ on 15 April 1935. Quoted in Berlin 
1945, Eine Dokumentation.
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cannot stop it. [...] When a constitution proves itself to be useless for its life, the nation 
does not die—the constitution is altered.97
Germany after the First World War is in fact a prime example of nationalism turned 
inwards. Before the war, the term ‘social imperialism’ described the phenomenon of 
domestic social tensions diverted outwards into an aggressive foreign and military policy. But 
in the Weimar Republic, ‘patriotism’ became the rallying cry for those who wanted to 
overthrow a government identified with the humiliating defeat, instead of, as in the 
Wilhelmine era, an exhortation to unite in support of the government.98 Similar 
developments racked the inter-war Central European societies. Nationalists attacked the 
autocratic governments in Hungary and Poland for not being xenophobic enough. Even in 
Czechoslovakia, the politically dominant cabal of five Czech-dominated political parties in 
practise refused to admit the national minorities as equal partners into the governing of the 
state.
After 1989, nationalism and the concept of organic unity have been widely used in Eastern 
and Central Europe to purge the communist past. Anti-communists of all blends view 
communism as a totally foreign and alien imposition. The fall of the communist system can 
thus be interpreted as a triumph for the nation, which supposedly always has fought against 
foreign rule; the individual’s legacy of collaboration is simultaneously transformed into his 
or her victory as a member of the nation. This notion not only absolves the individual from 
responsibility for the period of communist hegemony, but also implicitly from future events. 
Consequently the individual is viewed not primarily as a sovereign actor with the right and 
obligation to participate in the ruling of state, but as a subject of the state, whose interests 
become synonymous with the ‘will’ of the nation, and who is obliged to subject himself to 
that higher concern.99
Yet the claim of nationalist politicians and intellectuals that the nation was the antithesis 
of communism stands on hollow ground. Not only have many of the most prominent and 
vocal nationalist-inclined leaders that emerged in Eastern and Central Europe after 1989-90 
been members or even high-ranking functionaries in the ruling communist parties. The 
communist parties themselves frequently resorted to exploiting nationalism to bolster their 
legitimacy and popular support. This nationalism was, of course, limited to the extent that it 
could not be overtly anti-Soviet, but could be—and was—directed at national minorities, 
neighbouring countries or the West, and feed on idiosyncratic myths of a glorious historical 
past.
Communism and the National Question
Classic Marxist thought strongly emphasises the fundamentally internationalist nature of the 
class struggle. The founding fathers of Marxism based their internationalism on their 
economic and class analysis, and rejected any inherent value in national self-determination. 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strongly identified the spread of civilisation and progress 
with large nations and geared their internationalism towards them. They saw the German 
nation as particularly advanced and modern, and perceived the spread of German culture as in 
line with social and economic development, and therefore as part of the progress towards 
socialism and communism. Hungarians, Poles and Italians as well were seen as 
‘representatives of the revolution’, while the South Slavs allegedly ‘represent the counter­
revolution’, as they argued had been the case for a thousand years.
97 Bullock (1993), 171, quoting Hitlers Auseinandersetzung mit Bruning (Miinchen 1932).
98 Bullock (1993), 71.
99 Hockenos (1993), 14.
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HUFVUDSTADSBLADET ARCHIVES
Proletarians of the World: Karl Marx with 
daughter Jenny
Not only did Marx and Engels dismiss out of hand as Kleinstaaterei the national 
aspirations of the smaller Central European nations, they even questioned their very right to 
exist as distinctive cultural-linguistic entities.100 In his 1852 series of articles in the New York 
Daily Tribune, Marx optimistically wrote that the spread of railroads would destroy ‘the 
granite walls behind which each province had maintained a separate nationality and a limited 
national existence.’ He described the Czechs as a nation that had been ‘dying for the last four 
hundred years’, and argued that Bohemia in the future could and should exist only as part of 
Germany.101 In his 1849 book on the 1848 Revolution, Marx asserted that ‘except for the 
Poles, the Russians, and at best the Slavs in Turkey, no Slavic people has a future, for the 
simple reason that all Slavs lack the most basic historic, geographic, political and industrial 
prerequisites for independence and vitality’, while Engels confessed that he had ‘damned little 
sympathy for [the small Slavic peoples, and remnants of peoples]’. He was equally 
contemptuous of ‘such miserably powerless so-called nations as the Danes, the Dutch, the 
Belgians, the Swiss etc.’102
It was indeed the failure of the 1848 revolutions, for which especially the smaller nations 
of the Habsburg empire had shown markedly little enthusiasm, that prompted Marx and 
Engels to ask ‘if their very existence [isn’t] already a protest against a great historical
100 Scepticism, even hostility towards small states was at the time widespread in many other quar­
ters too. John Stuart Mill (1806-73) mentioned ‘feasibility’ as one prerequisite for the establish­
ment of a nation state, and most nineteenth-century liberals did agree that a state required a 
sufficient size in order to be economically viable.
101 Quotes from Rupnik (1989), 39-40.
102 Cf. Conquest (1988), 32, quoting Karl Marx, The Revolution of 1848, London (1973), 231; 
‘Democratic Pansalavism’, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, February 1849; and Friedrich Engels, 
‘Letter to Karl Kautsky’, in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 10, New York (1973), 393.
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revolution’. The enraged Engels, who was a much more prolific writer on the national 
question than Marx, predicted that the Germans and Hungarians would ‘wipe out these petty 
hidebound nations to their very names’ and that the next world war would result in the 
annihilation not only of reactionary classes and dynasties, but of entire ‘reactionary peoples’. 
This, he added, would be ‘a step forward’.103 Particular venom was directed at the Croats, 
probably because Croat troops loyal to the Viennese Emperor had been instrumental in 
putting down the 1848 rebellions. Engels demanded a ‘war of annihilation and ruthless 
terrorism’ against the Croats and other ‘ahistoric’, ‘reactionary’ and ‘counter-revolutionary 
peoples’, and proclaimed that the South Slavs were ‘nothing more than the national refuse of 
a thousand years of immensely confused development’.104 Yet despite his admiration for large 
states and peoples, Marx had little sympathy for the Russians, whom he counted among the 
truly reactionary nations, and even less for the Czarist system, which he saw as the mortal 
enemy of revolution. During his London period, he counted among of the leading 
Russophobes of the time.105
Marx’s and Engels’s most rabid writings were later actively forgotten within the Marxist 
movement—Marx’s sharpest attacks against Czarist Russia were indeed censored in the USSR 
until 1987.106 Yet their conclusions remain highly logical within the context of Marxist 
revolutionary theory. A stringent Marxist analysis cannot but conclude that national 
aspirations are subordinate to the general class struggle within mankind, and if some 
particular ethnic or linguistic group is ahead of the others in socio-economic development, so 
much the better for the prospects for revolution.
Marxist theoreticians, including Lenin and the entire Bolshevik leadership, had never 
even contemplated the possibility that the world revolution of the proletariat would start in 
backward Russia, and even less that it would be confined there for decades. After October 
1917, the Bolsheviks took for granted that the Russian Revolution was only the beginning, 
that the revolutionary wildfire quickly would spread across Europe, engulfing the advanced 
industrial economies of Germany, Britain and France. Believing in the rapid establishment of 
an internationalist proletarian world order, Lenin did not hesitate to declare the right of all 
smaller nations in the empire to secede for the time being. This was certain to create support 
for the Bolsheviks among Russia’s many oppressed nations, which, after going socialist, were 
in any case expected to voluntarily join the world socialist state-to-be. Almost immediately, 
Russia started to dissolve at the fringes; along the Baltic coast, in Poland, the Ukraine and the 
Caucasus.
Yet events turned out disappointingly for Lenin. The Communist and Spartakist 
rebellions in Kiel, Berlin, Munich, and Hungary were quickly put down, crushing hopes of 
an immediate pan-European socialist revolution, while the breakaway parts of the Russian 
empire soon ended up under nationalist or Menshevik control. In Russia proper the civil war 
escalated with substantial foreign intervention. At that point, faced with the imminent 
collapse of the Soviet state, the Bolsheviks stood their strategy on its head. With survival being 
the main objective of the regime, it chose to seek a modus vivendi, if not an outright alliance, 
with Great Russian nationalists in order to strengthen the regime’s base of support in the 
core Russian area. It was a desperate measure prompted by harsh realities: what support the 
Bolsheviks had had among the industrial proletariat had then by and large evaporated, as 
demonstrated by the huge strikes that swept the country in early 1918 and after the civil war 
ended in 1921.
103 Almond (1994), 71.
104 Almond (1994), 71; Cf. Connor (1984).
105 Laqueur (1995), 98-99.
10SLaqueur (1995), 98.
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This meant throwing overboard a lot of ideological baggage. Instead of upholding the 
right of the Czar’s subject peoples’ to self-determination, the Bolsheviks vigorously began 
promoting the revival of the empire. Bolshevism gradually merged with the traditional 
Russian concept of the state as an incarnation of the imperial idea.107 The Bolsheviks exhorted 
‘Red Patriotism’, implying that the Soviet government was not so much fighting a civil war 
as the external enemies of international capitalism. The Bolshevik state, to a remarkable 
extent, started recruiting individuals with close ties to ultra-Slavophile organisations into 
top-level positions in the armed forces, the security apparatus and the bureaucracy.
The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922 formalised the 
reconstruction of the empire, albeit under a pseudo-federal cloak. It reincorporated the 
Ukraine and the breakaway republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russian was re­
established as the Union’s lingua franca, and power concentrated to Moscow. As a symbol of 
normalisation the rouble was reintroduced in 1923, in place of the previous coupon 
currencies. Joseph Stalin, as Commissar for Nationalities and later Secretary-General of the 
Party, was personally in charge of the centralisation and consolidation drive. It was formally 
legitimised by the 1924 theory of‘Socialism in one country’, which for all practical purposes 
abandoned the hope of world revolution at least for the immediate future. In fact Stalin’s 
theory was an obvious continuation, in the barest of disguises, of the Slavophile idea of a 
specific and unique Russian path of development.
It was remarkable that the Bolsheviks managed this turn of coats, given that a large 
portion of the highest party leadership was either Jewish or otherwise not ethnic Russian— 
drawn to the Party by frustration over the Czarist system’s chauvinist discrimination. There 
certainly was strong opposition within the party leadership to the new Russocentric National 
Bolshevik orientation. The internationalist or ‘leftist’ faction, led by Trotsky, Zinoviev and 
Kamenev, maintained that it simply was impossible to build anything even reminiscent of 
true socialism in Russia alone. The proponents of permanent revolution did not champion 
the right of Ukrainians, Georgians, Latvians, Kazakhs, or any other nationalities to secede 
from the USSR and form bourgeois states; quite the opposite. They actually demanded an even 
more vigorously export-oriented revolutionary policy. What they opposed, however, was the 
early consolidation of the Soviet state, and the government’s unholy tactical alliances with 
various dark forces from the past.
Stalin’s ultimately prevailing counter-argument was far from orthodox Marxist, yet 
highly persuasive. If the Left argued that the revolution in Russia could not survive without a 
revolution in the West, and no revolution in the West did materialise even if the Soviet 
government devoted all its resources to promote it, then the Soviet government logically 
should give up its power.108 This line of reasoning may not have convinced his many learned 
opponents in the Central Committee, but it had enormous appeal among the middle and 
lower ranks of the party and among the common masses. Instead of a permanent state of war 
with the rest of the world, it raised the prospects of a stabilisation of social life after ten years 
of war and famine, and promised the opportunity of immediately starting building socialism 
in Russia, with all its potential rewards.
Considering Stalin’s personal biography, his emergence as the standard-bearer of the neo­
nationalists was not surprising. In contrast to many other prominent Bolshevik leaders Stalin 
was no multi-lingual cosmopolitan, having made only a few short trips outside Russia. His 
longest stay abroad was in January-February 1913, when he spent some two months in
107 This argumentation closely follows Parland (1993), 54 pp, who in turn relies heavily on Car­
ter (1990), and on Russian scholars in exile, such as Mikhail Agurskii and Valerii Chalidze. Two 
recent groundbreaking studies of the early days of Bolshevik power are Pipes (1995) and Brovkin 
(1994). On Soviet and Russian nationalism, Yanov (1978) and (1987) remain indispensable.
108 Conquest (1991), 122.
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Cracow and Vienna finalising his essay on ‘The National Question and Social Democracy’. 
To Lenin’s delight (and with the very active collaboration of Bukharin, Troyanovsky and 
probably Lenin himself—Stalin read no foreign languages)109, the article dismissed the 
Austro-Marxist concept of ‘natural-cultural autonomy’. This, as formulated by the 
theoretician Otto Bauer, who—faced with the bewildering mix of nationalities in the 
Habsburg empire—had abandoned the territorial basis for nationality for a ‘personal’ 
principle. Its nucleus was that every citizen, regardless of origin or place of residence, should 
choose his own national status, and that self-governing bodies for each nation should be the 
foundation of state authority.110 The Austro-Hungarian Social Democratic Party promptly 
split into six national chapters. Nevertheless, Bauer’s formula implied that the Austro- 
Hungarian state would be kept intact even after a leftist ascent to power.
Lenin, however, saw fatal flaws in the Austro-Marxist approach. Along traditional 
Marxist lines, Lenin saw the ‘nation’ as a category marking the epoch of rising capitalism; as 
a transitional phenomenon of a bourgeois nature that was to disappear once worker rule was 
installed on a world scale. International proletarian interests were therefore the central issue 
(‘The worker has no fatherland’, as the slogan went). Yet with the national question 
becoming increasingly volatile in Imperial Russia as well, the Bolsheviks were forced either 
to exploit it or risk it blocking their grab for power. Pragmatic as always, Lenin concluded 
that the Bolsheviks, during the revolutionary phase when nations and nationalism still 
counted as powerful social and political forces, ‘require an item on our programme on the 
rights of nations to self-determination’.111 A formula was devised to gratify the national 
aspirations of minority nations within a future socialist Russia, while not at the same time 
undermining revolutionary unity.112
Stalin’s essay provided that item. It started off from a rather conventional, even Hegelian 
definition of the term ‘nation’. It is, Stalin wrote, ‘a historically evolved, stable community of 
language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of 
culture’. Incidentally, Jews were not included among the nations, but rather characterised as 
an ‘assimilated group of persons’, maintaining only ‘a certain communality of national 
character’. This was of course to change later on, when ‘Jewish’ became a nationality printed 
in Soviet internal passports. In the essay Stalin nevertheless settled for a more conventional, 
non-Zionist definition of Jewry; yet Arkady Vaksberg points to the fact that he nevertheless 
defined Jews in term of origin and blood—not by religious adherence, as was the basis for 
official discrimination of Jews (and of pogroms) in Russia at the time.113
Although acknowledging the right of every nation to determine its fate freely and live as it 
wishes, Stalin pointed out that it is not for the Social Democrats to guard national rights; 
their historic task is to organise the working class for class struggle. The Bolsheviks should— 
for tactical reasons—support the national minorities’ right to use and educate in their own 
languages, but the party itself should be a supra-national, integrated vanguard organisation 
working solely to promote the working class interest. Ever the tactician, after the outbreak of 
war in 1914 Lenin become even more favourably disposed towards national self- 
determination, autonomy and even independence.114 At the Seventh Party Conference in April
109 Vaksberg (1995), Ch. 1.
110 Stalin’s text was first published in the (legal) St. Petersburg Marxist journal Enlightenment. 
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111 Conquest (1991), 53.
112 Conquest (1991), 52.
113 Vaksberg (1995), 4-5.
114 In his The Right of Nations to Self-Determination.
46 Shaking Hands with the Past 
1917, the Bolsheviks declared as their position that all nations of Russia had the ‘right to 
secede freely’. The Party should, however, retain its unitary, supra-national organisation, and 
branches in secessionist regions were directed to work vigorously for the preserved territorial 
integrity of Russia within its imperial borders.
The 1913 article—and his background as being born a Georgian—established Stalin as 
the Bolsheviks’ premier expert on the nationalities issue, and paved the way for his 
appointment as Commissar for Nationalities in 1917. It was in that capacity that he on 15 
November 1917, together with Lenin, signed the Decree on Nationality. It largely followed 
the principles laid out by the Seventh Party Conference, granting (1) the equality and 
sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; (2) the right of free self-determination of the peoples of 
Russia, including the right to secede; (3) abolition of all privileges and disabilities based on 
nationality or religion; and (4) free development of national minorities and ethnic groups 
inhabiting Russian territory. The Party itself and the government it headed, of course, 
continued to work against secession: the primary objective of the nationalities decree was to 
rally minority nations behind the newly-established regime and to enhance the Bolsheviks’ 
reputation for the future, in case the Soviet government collapsed.115 The extent to which the 
nationalities policy was convoluted in equivocation is shown by a declaration Stalin made 
somewhat later, in May 1918, to some Moslem Bolsheviks in Central Asia:
Autonomy is a form. The whole question is what class control is contained in that 
form. The Soviet government is for autonomy, but only for an autonomy where all 
power rests in the hands of workers and peasants, where the bourgeoisie of all 
nationalities is not only deprived of power, but also of participation in the election of 
the governing organs.116
It is important to spell out Stalin’s personal views on Russia, its role and its mission at some 
length, as the USSR for some two decades, including the period when the Socialist Bloc was 
formed in Eastern Europe, was essentially run as a one-man show. The high and rising regard 
in which Stalin held Russian culture, traditions and historic mission influenced not only his 
policy of consolidation of the Soviet Union, but also pervaded Soviet foreign policy for 
decades to come.
The first demonstration was Caucasian policy, which evolved into a major controversy. 
While Lenin, along with most Georgian Bolsheviks, argued for maximum autonomist 
concessions in Georgia, Stalin always advocated the use of maximum force. Around the time 
of the speech in Central Asia mentioned above, Stalin claimed, in a speech published in 
Pravda, that nationalism never had been a real problem among the Russians: ‘as a ruling 
nation the Russian in general, and Russian communists in particular, have never felt any racial 
oppression and, by and large, have never had to cope with nationalist ambitions in their own 
environment, apart from some “great power chauvinism”; and thus they have never had to 
overcome such inclinations.’117 All this could not but contribute to Stalin’s growing 
reputation as a naturalised Russian chauvinist, both among more cosmopolitan Bolsheviks 
and in his native lands of Georgia; also Lenin accused Stalin of Russian chauvinism, in 
conjunction with his political testament.118 (Yet it is equally true that even Lenin was not 
immune to Russocentric thinking: he launched the myopically Russocentric Comintern, 
which stubbornly advocated a totally unrealistic Russian-style coup d'etat and civil war 
strategy for the Western European communist parties.)119
115 Conquest (1991), 71.
116 Quoted in Fainsod (1953), 303.
117 Deutscher (1973), 193.
118 Cf. Conquest (1991), 100-1.
119 Conquest (1994), in an appreciating review of Pipes (1995, original edition 1994).
The Framework for Analysis 47
To overly stress the chauvinist aspect is, however, a fallacy. Stalin used ideology 
instrumentally to further his own ends: his primary goal was the centralisation of state power 
into party hands, and of party power into the party secretariat he headed in Moscow.120 The 
Russification of the republican Party organisations initially had this principal aim, even 
though that policy it later also manifested of Russian chauvinism—from the mid 1930’s, the 
second party secretary in the republics of the USSR was practically always a Russian. Of 
course, most communists realised that the policy of centralisation helped consolidate the new 
regime’s authority and ability to rule as well as promised great advantages in the fields of the 
economy, the administration and defence.
Stalin and his allies in the Party supported National Bolshevism—the alliance with the 
radical Russian nationalists—in order to enhance the legitimacy and broaden the support of 
the Soviet regime, and to strengthen the power of certain factions within the Party. It would 
be incorrect to describe Stalin as a convinced National Bolshevik, as Stalinist policies in many 
instances contradicted traditional Slavophile ideals. In particular the collectivisation drive 
and crash industrialisation were certain to destroy the traditional Russian village society with 
its ancient culture.121 That policy was methodically pursued during the famine-purges 
wreaked on the Ukraine, the Volga region and the North Caucasus in the early 30’s— 
arguably with the aim of crushing the obshchinas (village communes) and thus the base for 
any future peasant revolt.122
Nevertheless, Stalin gradually took the appearance of a traditional Great Russian 
chauvinist. Isaac Deutscher has noted the paradox:
Although Stalin later, on more than one occasion, has been accused of Russian 
nationalism, he was not driven [...] by any of the common feelings or prejudices 
associated with nationalism. What he represented was only the principle of 
centralisation, common to all modern revolutions. He gave an exaggerated and brutal 
expression to that principle. But whichever his motives may have been, the practical 
effects of his actions were as if he had been driven by Russian chauvinism.123
Of course far from all Russian nationalists came to terms with Bolshevism. Even if its capacity 
to restore Russia’s unity and strength was increasingly acknowledged, the regime’s atheism, 
anti-agrarianism, and fundamentally Western ideology was difficult to accept. Indeed, many 
emigres collaborated intimately with the German Nazis to topple the Soviet government— 
some out of ideological conviction, others motivated by the logic that ‘my enemy’s enemy is 
my friend’. Some were eventually employed by the German occupation authorities; there was 
also a Russian Nazi Party (ROND) based in Germany124 and other pro- and pseudo-fascist 
emigre groupings operating out of Manchuria, the United States and Yugoslavia.
These, like other exile organisations of a conservative or monarchist persuasion, appear to 
have been heavily infiltrated by Soviet agents. After the war, many of the politically active 
exiles made a reappraisal of Stalin, and some even returned to the Soviet Union. The soldiers 
of the Vlasov turncoat army, repatriated en masse to the USSR in 1945, was another element 
which brought in right-wing radicalism to Soviet society. Far from all Vlasovites were 
personally fascists (although practically all of them were sent to labour camps as such), but a 
great many certainly were motivated by ideology. The actual political aims General Vlasov
120 Parland (1993), 58.
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are unclear, but the army’s political programme was influenced in a major way by the 
fascistoid and strongly anti-Semitic emigrant movement NTS.n5
The Stalinists’ exploitation of Russian chauvinism was paralleled in the tight grip 
Moscow took on the world communist movement from the mid-1920’s on. This total 
subservience is something of a mystery, given both the intellectual traditions of the leftist 
revolutionary movement and its traditional German orientation. Many factors seem to have 
played a part. The Russian Revolution, undoubtedly a world-class historic event, had 
bestowed upon the Bolsheviks not only enormous authority, prestige and goodwill, but also 
given them control of the full resources of a large state. As most communist parties in Eastern 
Europe were illegal, a substantial part of their leadership had to seek refuge in the USSR, 
where their loyalty to Moscow—self-perceived as internationalism—tended to be 
strengthened by a wide range of factors, from pure gratitude and identification with the 
Soviet state to terror-induced fear. When returning from exile after the war, the markedly 
Russocentric world view many of these Muscovites’ had acquired often pitted them against 
the home communists. Whatever reasons the latter had had for staying behind, it was assumed 
that they were not sufficiently appreciative of the Soviet Union’s historic leadership role. 
This may have been the case in some instances, but it has to be acknowledged that all veteran 
communists, whatever their personal biographies, tended to see the USSR and its leaders as 
supreme authorities.
When the USSR was attacked by Nazi Germany, the Soviet leadership opted to fight the 
war under the explicit banner of patriotism. Stalin entreated the ‘brothers and sisters’—not 
‘comrades’—of the people to defend the ‘Fatherland’, appealing to common pride in the 
country’s past and in the process even making a truce with the Orthodox Church. The war 
against Germany was dubbed the Great Patriotic War, a direct allusion to the Napoleonic 
invasion and Czar Alexander’s subsequent victory.126 This Russian nationalism, only thinly 
disguised at Soviet or Red patriotism, was also manifested in the distrust of minority 
nationalities, some of which were collectively deported to the east. There is no doubt that the 
Soviet leadership saw nationalism among the minority peoples—particularly the Ukrainians, 
who, as Stalin regretted to say, were to numerous to deport—as the gravest danger to victory 
in the war and its hold onto power.
After the war, the atmosphere in the Soviet Union became even more xenophobic. In a 
widely published toast speech at the 24 May 1945 celebration of the Soviet triumph over 
Germany, Stalin, using decidedly unMarxist terminology, honoured the Russian people as 
‘the most outstanding nation of all the nations who belong to the Soviet Union’, and which 
had ‘earned the recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of 
the country.’ Soon after, the policy of isolationism was stepped up with new regulations 
prohibiting practically all contact with foreigners. The Zhdanov propaganda machinery 
condemned everything Western while praising everything Russian. Russian history was 
rewritten so that the struggle of practically all non-Russian peoples against Czarism was 
branded as reactionary.127 In 1948, the media further intensified its campaign against 
‘rootless cosmopolitanism’, ‘anti-patriotic elements’, and ‘enemies within’, resulting in a 
purge of prominent Jews which also spread to the Soviet-dominated part of Eastern Europe. 
As Alan Bullock concludes: ‘Stalin succumbed to the same anti-Semitism as Hitler, 
substituting the Jewish world-conspiracy of capitalism and Zionism, with its headquarters in
125 Laqueur (1995), 107-123; also Dunlop (1983).
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New York, for Hitler’s world-conspiracy of Bolshevism, with its headquarters in the 
Kremlin.’128
Stalin’s death put an end to the worst excesses, and during the Khrushchev period, 
totalitarian National Bolshevik tendencies were by and large suppressed: in the USSR itself 
this meant a cultural thaw, and in Eastern Europe tolerance or even encouragement of 
‘national paths to socialism’. Economic and cultural co-operation with the West grew in 
importance, and a secularised, more or less Westernised urban culture began to emerge—in 
the case of Eastern Europe, to re-emerge. In Russia, however, the Thaw also created an 
opening for anti-Western Russian nationalists, who sought an alliance with unreconstructed 
National Bolsheviks. The late 1960’s saw the first open debate between Marxism and Russian 
nationalism, and it indicated that the nationalists were arguing from a position of strength 
within the state and party hierarchy.129
Although many Russian nationalists had come to appreciate the way the Soviet Union had 
turned out, some still objected to the still official Marxist-Leninist state ideology, to the 
repression of the church, and to the refusal to admit that the overthrow of the monarchy had 
broken the national tradition. The Russian ‘Party’ which voiced these criticisms was 
heterogeneous, including advocates of conservative monarchy, the re-establishment of the 
alliance between nationalism and Stalinism, and a reconciliation between the Church and the 
state.130 This was also the heyday of Fetisov’s secret society, openly racist and pro-fascist in its 
admiration of Stalin and Hitler—the dissident writer Andrei Siniavskii reported an openly 
anti-Semitic climate in the Gulag labour camp system, where prisoners were equally hateful 
of Jews and the Soviet government. The dominant issue for the non-establishment nationalists 
was the defence against Westernisation, including Jewish influence, both of which it feared 
the regime inadvertently was promoting. Yet by the early 1970’s, the perceived encirclement 
of the USSR by a coalition of the West and China encouraged the seeking of a modus vivendi 
with the regime. The specific Russian mentality was anew proposed ‘as a unifying force that 
could produce harmony, concord and consensus between the rulers and the ruled’, and allow 
Russia to isolate itself from dangerous outside influences.131
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It is in this context that the Brezhnev era should be interpreted. It was marked by a 
domestic and international entrenchment of the regime, aptly called stagnation. There were 
new attempts by the Kremlin leadership to revive elements of Stalinism: as Khrushchev’s 
indictment of the Stalin era had made the increasingly Westernised and secularised 
intelligentsia lose interest in socialism as an utopian goal for society, the logical allies in this 
were the nationalists. Despite internationalist inclinations demonstrated by the detente policy 
and persecution of nationalists such as Solzhenitsyn, Brezhnev 'attempted throughout his 
reign to balance National Bolshevism and Marxist-Leninist purism’.132 During the early 
1970’s, the position of the Russian language was elevated even beyond that of a lingua franca: 
e.g., the Ukrainian language, long under attack, ceased altogether to be used in Ukrainian 
schools, being replaced by Russian. Pan-Slavic rhetoric and anti-Western slogans also began 
to characterise the attitude towards Eastern Europe. Yet the tone had changed somewhat: 
Russian nationalists, even within the establishment, increasingly began to see the Socialist 
Bloc as a dangerous channel for Western influence into the USSR itself, as well as as an 
economic burden on the Soviet economy.
Figure 2.4: Authoritarianism and Nationalism: Left vs. Right
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Leftist nationalism is not unique to Russo-Communism in general and Stalinism in 
particular. Indeed, revolutionary Marxist parties of many shades in many countries, both in 
and out of power, have been keen to exploit nationalist sentiments. In fact, a mix of socialism 
and nationalism has been the driving force behind the vast majority of Third World 
liberation and independence movements since the 1940’s. This nationalism was initially 
directed against the Western colonial and imperialist powers, but later also served as a tool to 
counteract Soviet attempts at hegemony: this has been true for Yugoslavia, Albania, and 
particularly for China. During their four-year rule of Cambodia, the ultra-Maoist Khmers 
Rouges presented the hitherto most eccentric combination of communism and nationalism: 
attempting to build a pre-feudal communist society, while simultaneously cleansing the
132 Dunlop (1983), 265.
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country of all non-Khmer elements and trying to recreate the greatness of the ancient Angkor 
kingdom. In contrast, a number of authoritarian regimes pursuing right-wing economic and 
social policy aims have not had nationalist issues on the agenda, at least not aggressively.
The Radical Nexus
For Stalin, Hitler’s vituperative anti-communism did not constitute an obstacle for forging 
working relations with Germany. Neither was Hitler averse to set ideology aside when 
conducting Realpolitik. This pragmatism on both sides was crowned by the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop pact of August 1939. Stalin’s surprise move obviously threw the world 
communist movement into temporary disarray, as Moscow suddenly proclaimed the Nazis a 
lesser foe than the capitalist governments of the West.
However, the communist alliance with democratic parties against fascism had in fact not 
been established until the Comintern congress of August 1935, after Stalin had concluded 
that Hitler’s anti-communist and Drang nach Osten rhetoric might be serious. The 
essentially foreign-policy character of that move is demonstrated by the rapid subsequent 
signing of defence pacts between the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia.133 During the 1920’s 
and early 30’s, communist parties had consorted intimately with other anti-democratic 
groups, including fascist parties, in their attempts to paralyse European parliamentary 
institutions. The Comintern had made social democracy its main target of attack, on several 
occasions leading to direct and open fascist-communist collaboration, as during the 1931 
Prussian referendum or the 1932 transport strike. The intimate political co-operation 
between the German and USSR governments, the two post-Versailles outcasts of the 
international community, is of course also well documented. The 1922 Rapallo treaty 
established cordial and expanding trade relations between the two pariah states, and enabled 
the German army was to manufacture and test in the Soviet Union weapons systems 
prohibited under the peace treaty.
In German conservative circles, including segments of the National Socialist movement, 
the building of closer ties with the Soviet Union—or, rather, with Russia—was seen as a way 
for Germany to purge itself of Western influence: ‘the fear of an alienation of the German 
soul by the materialist, ethymologised Western world was, here, stronger than the fear of the 
threat of Communist world dominance.’134 It was a Drang nach Osten driven more by 
sympathy for Russia as a haven for eternal, traditional values than by expansionism. Even 
during the last year of the Second World War, Goebbels and other prominent Nazi leaders 
of the radical persuasion advocated a rapprochement with the Soviets, calling for a 
Communist rather than Allied victory so as to at least ensure the destruction of the capitalist 
order.
Hitler never ceased to point out that the main aim of the Nazi party was, ‘to put it briefly: 
the destruction and eradication of the Marxist world view’. To lower-echelon supporters of 
Nazi or Communist ideology, the conflict between the two belief systems became absolute 
and irreversible during the war. Yet many observers have pointed out that Nazi Germany and 
Stalinist Soviet Union, even though they ended up as mortal enemies, in many respects were 
ideologically alike and even ideologically linked. Already in the 1930’s, Herbert Tingsten, 
the liberal Swedish political scientist, made the—now almost trivial—observation that the 
extremes of the political spectrum are closer to each other than to the centre.135 Richard Pipes 
and Robert Conquest are among the recent proponents of that theory of ‘Radical Affinity’; it
133 Cf. Kissinger (1995), 335.
134 Fest (1993), 142.
135 Cf. Tingsten (1945).
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also figured prominently in writings of the conservative faction in the 1980’s German 
Historikerstreit—particularly as an interpretation of the roots of Nazi methods of mass 
mobilisation and terror.136 As Conquest writes:
Fascism in its original form can [...] be seen as in a sense a sibling of Communism: 
both are based on a dictatorship supposedly representing a transcendent mass entity, as 
against the idea of individuals with rights within a civic order.137
In spite of the virulent hostility at the overt level between the Hitlerites and the 
Stalinists, with each claiming to be the only true salvation from the horrors of each 
other, one can certainly sense an undertone of mutual understanding.138
There certainly were substantial fundamental philosophical-ideological differences. While 
Bolsheviks and other radical ‘leftists’ tend(ed) to stress rationality, rightists in general and 
National Socialists in particular would rather refer to ‘instinct’ or non-rational motives as a 
basis for political action. But even this dichotomy is not absolute, as indicated by communist 
references to ‘class instinct’ or their belief in the proletarian will’s ability to accomplish 
anything, from five-year plans fulfilled in four years to growing corn in the Arctic. As 
mentioned earlier, fascists have tended to mix mysticism, the occult and Blut und Boden with 
a fascination with technology.
One evident analogy lies in the function of ideology. Writing of Italian Syndicalists and 
nationalists at the turn of the century, Robert Paxton points to ideological parallels which 
can be applied to the broader spectrum of European left and right radicalism.
[B]oth rejected the materialism which underpinned progressive reform efforts, 
socialist as well as bourgeois; both hated democratic individualism as the dissolvent of 
any kind of community elan-, both dreamed of replacing bourgeois complacency by 
heroic grandeur; both admired producers and entrepreneurs while condemning 
financiers and speculators. They could even find common ground in a commitment to 
‘revolution’ once some dissident syndicalists were ready to alter the revolution’s goals 
from the redistribution of wealth and power to the redemption of human moral 
139 power.
A similar observation was made already by Georges Sorel, the early 20th century radical 
syndicalist who admired and was read by both Mussolini and Lenin. Sorel developed the 
concept of a ‘social myth’, which he saw neither as a ‘calculated plan of action, nor a scientific 
prediction, nor as a Utopian blueprint [. . .] but as a vision which could inspire and galvanise 
the masses into action’. For totalitarian ideologies, concepts such as ‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘class’, 
‘proletariat’, ‘Volk’, ‘the bourgeoisie’, ‘kulaks’ or ‘the Jew’ are not sociological categories, 
but mythical symbols which the masses can either identify with or reject.140
In a time of upheaval (collectivization in Russia) or anxiety (the renewal of crisis in 
Germany with the depression) these were methods of great potency, particularly in 
providing a focus for fears and hatreds. Hitler and Stalin alike depicted history as a 
struggle, the first as a struggle between races, with ‘the Jew’ doubling in the roles of
136 Analyses and bibliographies of the Historikerstreit are available in, i.a., Evans (1987) and 
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139 Paxton (1994), in a review of Zeev Sternhell, Mario Szjnaider and Maia Asheri, The Birth of 
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140 Bullock (1993), 438; Pipes (1995), 245, however, argues that the influence of Sorel over 
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both capitalist and Communist, the second as a struggle between classes, or between 
‘the Revolution’ and ‘the enemies of Soviet power’, ‘agents of foreign powers’, 
‘imperialists’ who sought to overthrow its achievements and restore the old order.141
It is debatable whether fascists were inspired directly by the Bolsheviks to use mass terror as a 
political instrument, but the methods and their ideological legitimation by broad 
categorisations certainly turned out very similar. Consider the following statement by 
Martin Ivanovich Latsis, a Latvian-born chieftain in the early Soviet Cheka, who emphasised 
that not guilt or innocence, but social background determined punishment: ‘We are not 
waging war against individuals. We are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. You do not 
have to prove that somebody has acted against the interests of Soviet power. The first thing 
you should ask a prisoner is: to what class does he belong, what is his origin, how has he been 
brought up and educated, what is his profession? These questions ought to determine the fate 
of the accused. That is the significance and essence of the Red Terror.’142 Exchange class for 
race, and it would fit well into the mouth of a Streicher, Eichmann or Himmler.
Yet the main common denominator of Stalinist communism and fascism was not the 
brutal methods both were prepared to use, but the challenging of the liberal order and status 
quo. This was the very legitimation for their exercise of power. Indeed, the central theme in 
both ideologies was all-encompassing radicalism, assuming and aiming for the total 
destruction of not only the present political and social order, but of all its moral, social and 
religious principles. Moral nihilism, the rejection of traditional morality as such, was, as 
Hugh Seton-Watson has observed, ‘not only the central feature of National Socialism, but 
also the common factor between it and Bolshevism’.143 That element also qualitatively sets 
fascism apart from traditional conservatism, which is by nature moralistic.
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Both Stalinism and fascism proudly espoused complete contempt for contemporary 
bourgeois values—be they reformist, liberal or conservative. Instead they opted for visions of 
anti- or hyper-modern models of societal organisation, which due to the common radicalism
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in practice led to very similar results. In aiming for Utopia, human suffering and sacrifice 
was seen as largely irrelevant or, in the case of Nazi ideology, even as a prerequisite for 
surviving in a Darwinian universe. Nihilism also requires a continuous mobilisation, and 
demands the subordination of the individual to a higher, almost mythical force, be it the Volk 
or a future socialist paradise.
The parallel world views are also clearly demonstrated in art: favourite themes in both 
Nazi German and Stalinist propaganda were muscular, strong-jawed males breaking their 
chains; defiant activists ready to put their life at risk; or smiling workers unselfishly toiling in 
the fields for a higher, common good. Nazis preferred straight-laced art, and unsophisticated 
middle-brow taste also prevailed in the USSR after the heady experimentation of the 20’s. 
Hyper-realism or tacky romanticism was the norm, while any forms of avant-gardism were 
strongly condemned, if with different motivations; by Stalinists on the grounds that these 
techniques lacked socialist, proletarian zeal, and by Nazi authorities for its cosmopolitanism 
nature and national indifference. Stalinist and Nazi architecture display particularly strong 
similarities: noveau baroque styles with a preference for the inhumanely monumental, even 
the grotesque.144
Behind the demagoguery, and notwithstanding the obvious competition between 
communism and Naziism, one may indeed discern both sympathy and large-scale individual 
mobility between the two camps. Hitler was robustly anti-Bolshevik and regarded the 
German communist leadership as traitors or stooges of a foreign conspiracy, but was 
appreciative of that party’s street-fighting rank and file, whom he considered easy to convert 
and excellent raw material for the brown brigades; ‘sturdy fellows’ only misled by Judeo- 
Marxists, as he repeatedly said even in later days. He strongly criticised Franco for not 
exploiting the potential of the defeated leftists:
Later on, the Reds we had beaten up became our best supporters. When the Falange 
imprisons its opponents, it’s committing the gravest of faults. Wasn’t my party, at the 
time of which I’m speaking, composed 90 per cent of left-wing elements? I needed 
men who could fight. I had no use for the sort of timid doctrinaires who whisper 
subversive plans in your ear.145
Indeed, Hitler divided his enemies into supporters of the bourgeois regime on the one hand, 
and the communists—‘enemies of the system’—on the other. The one were to be crushed, the 
other were to be converted. On countless occasions, Hitler spoke of the basic affinity between 
communists and National Socialists:
In our movement the two extremes come together: the Communists from the left and 
the officers and students from the right. These two have always been the most active 
elements, and it was the greatest crime that they used to oppose each other in street 
fights. The Communists were the idealists of socialism.146
This was possibly even more true or non-German fascism. Indeed, it ‘is remarkable how 
many communist leaders in France and Italy later became Fascist.’147 Mussolini had, of 
course, been a socialist activist before reaching the conclusion that the nation was more 
important than class and giving up pacifism for militarism. He was far from the only 
socialist, nor the first, to take this path: Pilsudski—although by no means never a fascist in a 
conventional sense—spoke for many a turn-of-the-century leftist when he declared that he got
144 Soviet Marxist and Russian Nationalist views on art are explored in depth by Parland (1993), 
143-159.
145 Quoted in Conquest (1991), 174.
146 Quoted in Conquest (1991), 174.
147 Conquest (1994).
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off the train of socialism at the station called the Nation. If the Polish leader’s change of heart 
was motivated by practical reasons, many prominent Italian Syndicalists had adopted 
militarism and nationalism, ‘finding in nationalist war the transforming myth necessary to 
regenerate their people’s heroism’.148 Mussolini could well have become an Italian Lenin: 
‘until November 1914, and in some respects until early 1920, his ideas on the nature of the 
working class, the structure and function of the party, and the strategy of the socialist 
revolution were remarkably like Lenin’s.’149 Indeed, during the 20’s both Lenin and Trotsky 
expressed support and admiration for Mussolini, whom they considered a truly revolutionary 
leader. Antonio Gramsci, the famed communist theoretician, was of course at a time a close 
comrade of the Duce. Among the many other prominent European fascists renegades from 
socialism or outright Bolshevism one may note Pierre Laval (one of the few an anti-war 
French Leninists in 1914—18), Jacques Doriot, Marcel Dear, Oswald Mosley or the Czech 
fascist leader Jin Stribrny. Erich Koch, the brutal Gauleiter in the Ukraine, was but one of 
the leading German Nazis who had earlier fought in the communist ranks.150
The French conservative historian Rene Redmond has stated unequivocally that fascism 
‘came from the left’.151 This is not to say that communism necessarily ‘caused’ fascism and 
Naziism, but right-wing anti-democratic forces in Germany, Italy and elsewhere certainly 
found a ready model to follow in the Soviet experiment. As Richard Pipes argues: ‘All the 
attributes of totalitarianism had antecedents in Lenin’s Russia [...]. Since the institutions and 
procedures were in place in the Soviet Union in the early 1920’s when Mussolini founded his 
regime and Hitler his party, the burden of proving there was no connection between 
“Fascism” and Communism rests on those who hold this opinion.’152
It is thus not surprising that the programmes of 1920’s fascist or other right-radical 
parties borrowed heavily from socialist thought and shared many short-term political aims, 
i.a. the abolition of joint-stock companies, the nationalisation of banks, the suppression of 
large department stores and expropriation of war profits. Social and economic radicalism 
was a defining feature of German fascism until the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ in 1934, when 
Hitler disposed of rivals in the party—Gregor Strasser, Ernst Rohm and others—who had 
advocated starting a ‘second revolution’ to put the remainders of capitalist society to death 
(indeed a startling parallel with the terminology used by the Stalinists in their attacks on the 
peasantry and industrialisation drive). Hitler, however, rejected (or postponed) the second 
revolution on the grounds that it would endanger his premier priority, Germany’s 
preparations for war. But then again, he did not have a past in the socialist movement, even if 
he did emerge from the vaguely radical fin-de-siecle ‘Cafe intellectual’ milieu153, and had 
been an admirer of Karl Lueger, the demagogic leader of the sham socialist Christian 
Socialist Party in pre-war Vienna. As photographs from the event show, refuting Nazi hush- 
ups, in 1919 he even attended the funeral of Kurt Eisner, the assassinated (Jewish) Bavarian 
radical socialist leader.
German right-radicals borrowed less from the left than did their counterparts in Italy or 
France. Nevertheless, some of them expressed sympathy for the Russian Bolsheviks until they 
took in White Russian propaganda that the October revolution was a Jewish invention and 
phenomenon: the Nazi Party was virulently anti-Semitic from its foundation in 1919 but 
became obsessed with Russian Bolshevism only in 1920-21—Hitler himself only turned
148 Paxton (1994).
149 Pipes (1995), 246.
150 Cf. Rothschild (1974), 96, 98; Conquest (1991), 174 pp.
151 Cf. Bosworth (1993), Ch 5.
152 Pipes (1995), 245.
153 Conquest (1994).
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anti-communist after he had read The Protocols of the Elders of ZionT ^ This brings up a 
further distinction: the rabid anti-Semitism that was such an overriding feature in Nazi 
ideology. But even this observation is blurred.
A considerable part of the early Fascist leadership in Italy was in fact Jewish (according to 
Mussolini, four of the seven founders of the Fascist Party were Jewish)155, and anti-Semitism 
was not a dominant feature of Italian Fascism until after the capitulation and German 
occupation in 1943. Even Hitler acknowledged that Jews were among the early financial 
supporters of the Nazi movement.156 At the same time, the early Bolsheviks were indifferent 
to specifically Jewish aspirations, subordinating them to internationalism and the class 
struggle, and condoning pogroms when it served their interests—even participating in such, 
as during Budenny’s retreat from Poland in 1920. The rabbi of Moscow sardonically 
commented that ‘it was the Trotskys who made the revolutions and the Bronsteins who paid 
the bills.’157 The Soviet system became strongly and openly anti-Semitic by the mid-1940’s, 
and in the early 1950’s a wholesale deportation of Soviet Jews to the Far East appears to have 
been forestalled only by Stalin’s death. Low-intensity anti-Semitism remained official policy 
until the very collapse of the USSR, demonstrated i.a. by the policy of keeping Jews out the 
security police and the highest echelons of the foreign service, restrictions on the practice of 
Jewish religious rites, or by thinly disguised campaigns against ‘profiteers’ and ‘unpatriotic 
cosmopolitan elements’.158
Officially sponsored anti-Semitism was also, as will be amply demonstrated in the 
following chapters, a recurring feature of communist rule in Eastern and Central Europe. 
One might thus even argue that anti-Semitism actually seems to have been highly prevalent in, 
if not inherent to, all European societies ruled by highly mobilising totalitarian ideologies. 
As A J. P. Taylor, for one, has noted, anti-Semitism is ‘stock-in-trade of every nationalistic 
movement’ and ‘the socialism of fools’.159
Modern Central European anti-Semites invoke their hatred of Jews in new ethnographic 
and cultural circumstances: it is, in Paul Lendvai’s now classic phrase, ‘anti-Semitism without 
Jews’.160 Indeed, current Central European anti-Semitism has less to do with actual Jews than 
with the abstract image of‘the Jew’. As the remaining Jewish communities have only minor 
or insignificant political and economic influence and power, anti-Semitism tends to fall back 
on recycled cliches of international Jewish conspiracies and plots of world domination, be 
they of the pre-war or the communist-era variety. Some are this pessimistic:
One of the chief focuses of today’s anti-Semitism is the West, with its secular 
ideologies and modern values. Anti-Semitism is implicit in ethnic nationalism, and 
nationalists use ‘the Jews’ or ‘Jewishness’ as euphemisms for the ‘imported’, foreign 
values that they oppose, from socialism to Western pop music and international law.
154 Pipes (1995), 258.
155 Pipes (1995), 113; referring to Sternhell (1994), 5.
156 Pipes (1995), 113.
15 Pipes (1995), 113; Trotsky was the nom-de-guerre of Leo Bronstein, born into a Jewish family.
158 There is a wealth of literature on Soviet anti-Semitism, both the official and unofficial vari­
ety. Of particular interest is, however, Arkady Vaksberg’s recent study (1994), which makes the 
claim that Stalin personally was a convinced anti-Semite at least since the 1910’s. The book, 
going against the grain of most previous Stalin biographers (who discover genuine anti-Semitic 
tendencies in Stalin only by the late 1940’s, if at all), uses a method of inference and is highly 
polemic, but still not unconvincing on that particular point. In any case, Vaksberg provides re­
sounding evidence of the degree to which anti-Semitic attitudes and policies permeated the 
Soviet apparat throughout the Stalin era.
159Taylor (1961), 251.
160Lendvai (1971).
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The receptivity of average people to anti-Semitism constitutes a valid litmus test for a 
society’s propensity to undemocratic right-wing ideologies. The contemporary anti- 
Semite is also the racist, the homophobe, the conservative Catholic, and the provincial 
nationalist. ‘Whenever the shadow of anti-Semitism arose in public life’, notes Adam 
Michnik, comparing France and Poland, ‘it was an unmistakable signal that people 
with anti-democratic, intolerant views were on the political offensive. Today ... when 
anti-Semitic opinions are expressed in Poland, Jews are not the issue. The question is 
whether or not there will be a Polish democracy’.161
That may be overstating the political significance of anti-Semitic agitation, but the 
observation of the link between anti-Semitism, nationalism and authoritarianism is valid. 
Many anti-Semites equate Jewish qualities and Jewish individuals with modernity, liberalism 
and supra-nationalism (cosmopolitanism, as Stalinists preferred to put it), and anti-Semitism 
thus tends to co-exist with scepticism—to say the least—of the Enlightenment and its values.
In pre-war Eastern Europe, Jews, along with Germans, represented the international, as 
opposed to the national, and were seen as proponents of foreign values endangering the native, 
agrarian-oriented nationalism of the day, be it as advocates and symbols of capitalism or of 
proletarian radicalism and solidarity across the borders. Jews were certainly over-represented 
among bankers, industrialists and in the professions in 19th and early 20th century Europe, as 
well as in the upper echelons of the communist party leaderships. Pondering the reasons for 
this is falls outside the remit of this study. However, one may argue that as Enlightenment 
brought emancipation to European Jews, they as a group both identified and became 
identified with it. Then, equality, technological progress, secularisation and internationalism 
were goals common to liberalism and socialism, the great ideological constructs sprung from 
the Enlightenment, which many conservatives and the radical right have seen and continue to 
see as a fatal mistake. The modern anti-Semitic concept of the Jew as an alien thus tends to 
apply simultaneously to the Jewish capitalist and to the Jewish communist, the two even 
frequently merging into one.
Radical Nexus:
Molotov and
Stalin meeting 
with the 
German
Ambassador to 
Moscow von der
Schulenburg 
and Foreign 
Minister von
Ribbentrop in
August 1939, 
agreeing on the 
carve-up of
Central and 
Eastern Europe
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If mobility between the two radical camps before the Second World War had mainly been 
from left to right, there was a backlash after the war. A huge number of former supporters 
and even activists of Eastern European fascist, fascistoid and right-radical movements rallied 
to and were recruited by the new communist rulers—just as the early-day Bolshevik regime 
had consistently worked to recruit supporters of Russian ultra-nationalist organisations. The 
communist message was that the ascent of communism to power itself proved that fascism was 
defeated once and for all. The pre-war and war-time right-wing authoritarian and nationalist 
legacies were squarely blamed on fascist cliques, ‘ringleaders’ of the former elites and on 
German influence, without fundamentally confronting the historical and social- 
psychological roots of indigenous fascism. ‘One only had to d eclare oneself a communist to 
be relieved of responsibility for previous actions. The regimes papered over the truth about 
collaboration and the resentment that lingered between neighbouring peoples.’162
In what was to become the German Democratic Republic, for example, the National 
Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDPD)—allied with but subordinated to the Marxist- 
Leninist Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED—was set up in April 1948, 
specifically ‘designed as an alternative for those who had sympathised with the wartime 
national socialist party (in German: the National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) and 
whom the Soviet military administration wanted to reintegrate into society provided that 
they had not belonged to the hard core of the party.’163 At the same time, the then leader of the 
communist Freie Deutsche Jugend youth organisation, Erich Honecker, welcomed former 
members of the Hitler-Jugend, provided they repented and had made a clean break with the 
164past.
In fact, after the purges of 1949-51, the proportion of former Nazi party members in the 
rolls was higher in the SED than in any party in West Germany: in 1954 106,377 members— 
at least 8 per cent of the total membership—had earlier carried NSDAP cards, in addition to 
the 224,209 S££*’ers who had previously been enrolled in the Nazi-era youth organisations. 
Many former officials of the Hitler-Jugend were in fact only just released from prison when 
they were offered employment in the Volkspolizei; the then newly established Stasi or Office 
of State Security was constantly on the lookout for people with experience of police and 
secret service work, which almost by definition meant previous employment in the S5. One 
cannot but conclude that the continuing policy of the SED was ‘to make offers of 
reintegration to the lower levels of the mass of former Nazis, as long as they recognised 
communist leadership.’165 This was only natural: only a small proportion of Germans had 
actively resisted Naziism and even fewer had remained active communists or even social 
democrats throughout the era of brown power, so any swelling at all of the SED ranks was 
dependent on turning a blind eye on prospective members’ past indiscretions.
The situation may not have been as polarised in other countries that came under Soviet 
domination, as they had not experienced a German-style Gleichschaltung. Nevertheless, all 
over Eastern and Central Europe massive recruitment drives were directed at former 
supporters of and collaborators with authoritarian parties, movements and regimes. There 
were many reasons why this policy was found convenient. First of all, professional expertise 
was in short supply, and during the period of reconstruction the communists had a substantial 
incentive to turn a blind eye in order to get the wheels turning again. The former right­
radicals were also subject to threats of being charged for collaboration, which provided for 
loyalty. And, in particular, many of them also had impressive genuine credentials as radicals 
and believers in authoritarian structures, albeit of a different colour. These individuals
162Hockenos (1993), 15-16.
10 Berglund (1994), 122.
164Rupnik (1989), 118.
165 Niethammer (1995), 94.
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constituted an important ideological transmission belt between the pre-war and post-war 
polities.

3
The Inter- War Experience 
in Central Europe
S o he says he is a patriot, 
but is he a patriot for me?
— Emperor Franz of Austria
The Problems of Modernisation and National Self-Determination
For Central and Eastern Europe, the First World War and its outcome represented a cata­
clysmic event equal to, or even surpassing, the ravages of the Second. The dozen new states 
created on the ruins of the vanquished Eastern Empires manifested the total collapse of a 
political order in place since the Napoleonic Era—in some respects even longer. Behind 
loomed the shadow of the Russian October revolution, which put not only the political but 
the entire social order into question.
The emerging political order was primarily driven by the concept of national self- 
determination. But although the nationalities question had been brewing for decades, the 
changes brought by the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain in 1919 and of Trianon 
in 1920 were unexpectedly impetuous. Indeed, the settlements primarily reflected the stra­
tegic considerations and desire for vengeance of the victor powers, spiced with the noble 
idealism of Woodrow Wilson (incidentally the only political scientist to have served as presi­
dent of the United States).
At the outbreak of the Great War, the societies in the peripheries of the Eastern Empires 
can only be described as underdeveloped. Russia essentially remained an agrarian autocracy 
until the February revolution in 1917. The Austro-Hungarian Empire with its yearning for 
order was clearly a Rechtsstaat by early 20th century standards, but in comparison with the 
developed capitalist states in the West the complexity of political transaction and the measure 
of political participation were low. Civic structures were generally weak in relation to the 
imperial centres. The war accelerated a process of modernisation and mass mobilisation 
which had already begun, and the revolutionary news from Russia increased national and class 
consciousness especially among Habsburg Slavs—but when peace came, the countries were 
still more or less backward.
In 1938, all of East Central Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bul­
garia, Yugoslavia and Albania—accounted for only 8 per cent of the industrial output of 
Europe excluding the Soviet Union; of that, Czechoslovakia alone accounted for one third. 
Agriculture, the mainstay of the economies, was lagging far behind the West in terms of 
productivity, resulting in ‘a vicious cycle of rural underdevelopment, underproductivity,
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underconsumption, underemployment, overpopulation and pervasive misery.’1 This problem 
was unrelated to whether agriculture was organised in large estates or small family farms.
Yet Eastern and Central Europe was expected to be transformed overnight into modern 
states, complete with the rule of law, effective and fair administration, and capabilities and 
willingness to participate in international interaction along the idealistic rules laid down for 
Wilson’s League of Nations. The task was daunting. The new states were faced with the 
assignment to create state structures on the basis of very limited political and administrative 
experience. They also had to secure a minimum of social and ethnic equity in what remained 
hugely disparate and diverse societies.
The democratically-inclined leaders of the new states obviously saw the problems, even if 
often through a filter of nationalist self-satisfaction. But at the same time they firmly believed 
that the introduction of Western-style political systems would almost automatically produce 
Western-style societies: stable, democratic, prosperous. This was of course the widespread 
expectation in the West, too. But in Eastern and Central Europe itself, the miscalculation was 
exacerbated by the confusion of two projects, the creation of nationhood and the creation of 
statehood. As it was, nations had first been discovered or invented, then states created by and 
for them. It soon became clear that the nationality concept was not all that clear-cut; par­
ticularly because nation and territory rarely were congruous concepts. This was when states 
were turned into vehicles for nation-building.
The Remnants of 
Three Empires: 
Most of present- 
day Central 
Europe was 
earlier part of the 
Habsburg 
Monarchy. At the 
end of the Second 
World War, 
Poland was moved 
several hundred 
kilometres to the 
west, while 
Czechoslovakia 
lost the province of 
Carpatho- 
Ruthenia, also to 
the Soviet Union. 
The only 
territorial revision 
since has been the 
break-up of the 
Czechoslovak 
federation
1 Rothschild (1974), 15.
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Indeed, if the peace settlements and the establishment of new states was intended to ease 
communal tension, defuse national conflicts and in general set the successor states on a path 
towards democracy and prosperity, this failed miserably. National self-determination was a 
straight-forward concept in theory, but its practical application on Eastern Europe as things 
stood in 1919 created an abundance of new intra-state and inter-state conflict dimensions. 
The mosaic of ethnic groupings made it patently impossible to create even remotely 
homogenous states. In Yugoslavia, no less than fourteen different languages were spoken. In 
Poland, Catholic Polish-speakers represented only two thirds of the population. In 
Czechoslovakia, the politically dominant Czechs were even in a minority; where president 
Benes envisaged an ‘Eastern Switzerland’, others saw only a mini-replica of the Habsburg 
concoction—the main difference being that the successor states lacked the Dual Monarchy’s 
supranational ideology which had, at least to some extent, helped national minorities feel 
included. And for minorities that had not been content with that prospect, the imperial policy 
of ethnic favouritism had at least been deemed more reversible than that of the successor states 
build around ethnic majorities.
The policies of ethnic integration had much to do with the absence of autonomous sub­
system structures. During the Habsburg era, the cultural and linguistic integration of Jews, 
Slavs and Romanians into the politically dominant German and Magyar communities was 
welcomed and encouraged, and imperial Germany and Russia had used similar, but stiffer 
methods to impose their hegemony over Poland. As this process encouraged both integrators 
and integratees to see political structures and conflicts in national rather than economic, 
social or class terms, genuinely autonomous structures were not easily formed. Here again, 
Bohemia and Moravia proved an exception: already by the turn of the century the Czech- 
speakers had won the struggle for hegemony in Prague, even though a lively (but largely 
segregated) German—and Germanophone Jewish—presence remained for decades.2
The ethnic brew was complemented by widespread territorial irredentism. Poland, 
which almost miraculously re-emerged as a sovereign state after a hundred and score years of 
partition, had territorial grievances with all its neighbours, some of which were settled 
successfully by force in a confusing and violent process highly reminiscent of the one which 
erupted after the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991. Bulgaria had territorial conflicts with 
Greece and Romania. In particular, the entire Hungarian polity was shell-shocked by the loss 
of no less than two thirds of the territory and three fifths of the population ruled from Buda­
pest during the Habsburg era. While rump Hungary was by and large ethnically homo­
genous, one Magyar in three was left outside the country’s borders as territories were 
transferred to her neighbours by the victors, partly on strategic grounds, partly as a result of 
the Magyars’ bad record on minority rights, partly because Hungary—as opposed to the 
Slavs in the Dual Monarchy—was considered a defeated aggressor nation. Not surprisingly, 
revanchist feelings became the determining force in Hungarian politics from the very outset 
of independence. Czechoslovakia did, however, thanks to successful lobbying among the 
Western powers, hit a territorial jackpot and walked off with an extravagant settlement. 
Consequently, that state was alone in Central Europe in being solely on the defensive when it 
came to territorial conflicts.
The imperfect application of the nationality principle guaranteed that nationalism be­
came the dominant political super-issue in inter-war Central Europe. The widespread 
irredentism both encouraged states to intervene in their neighbours’ affairs to protect 
minorities of their own nationality, and, as a counter-reaction, caused the host states to 
attempt forceful integration of their minorities or even deny their very existence. Social 
policies were strongly influenced by attempts at ethnic assimilation; economic policies
2Cf. Cohen (1981) and Kiaval (1988).
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drifted towards economic nationalism and competitive bids for autarky; while attempts at 
land reform were primarily motivated by the glory of expropriating ‘alien’ landlords. 
Moreover, resilient irredentist tension pre-empted the development of regional political and 
economic co-operation and enabled Germany and the USSR, the revisionist great powers, to 
exploit the situation for their own benefit.
Table 3.1: The Ethnic Composition of Inter-War Central Europe
Poland 1921 census 1931 census
(Nationality), % (Ethnicity), %
Polish 69.2 68.9
Ukrainian and Ruthenian 14.3 13.9
Byelorussian 3.9 3.1
‘Local’ (tutejsi) 0.2 2.2
Jewish (Hebrew & Yiddish) 7.8 8.6
Mosaic faith 10.5 9.8
German 3.9 2.3
Lithuanian 0.3 0.3
Russian 0.2 0.4
Czech 0.1 0.1
Other 0.1 0.2
TOTAL POPULATION 27,176,717 31,915,779
Czechoslovakia 1921 census 1930 census
(Mother tongue), % (Mother tongue), %
Czechoslovak 65.5 66.9
Ruthenian (Ukrainian) 3.4 3.8
German 23.4 22.3
Magyar 5.6 4.8
Polish 0.6 0.6
Jewish (Hebrew-Yiddish) 1.4 1.3
Mosaic faith 2.6 2.4
Other 0.2 0.3
TOTAL POPULATION 13,613,172 14,729,536
Hungary 1920 census 1930 census
(Language), % (Language), %
Magyar 89.5 92.1
German 6.9 5.5
Slovak 1.8 1.2
Romanian 0.3 0.2
Croatian 0.5 0.3
Serbian 0.2 0.1
Bunyevki, shokci 0.3 0.2
Other 0.5 0.4
Mosaic faith 5.9 5.1
TOTAL POPULATION 7,990,202 8,688,319
Source: Rothschild (1974)
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No significant political party in Weimar Germany accepted the loss of the Polish corridor, 
and the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy had created an ethnically almost 
homogeneously Germanic Austria which was widely considered an untenable political entity. 
All the new states in Eastern Europe, save Bulgaria and Albania, retained significant German­
speaking minorities. Even when it came to the exclusively German-speaking areas in Austria 
and Bohemia directly bordering on Germany proper, the allies had refused to apply the 
nationality principle as that would have left the Reich bigger and stronger than before the 
war. As a result, Germans constituted more than 22 per cent of Czechoslovakia’s population, 
as against some 5.5 per cent of Hungary’s, and roughly 2.3 per cent of Poland’s.3
The background of the Diaspora Germans varied strongly: from the Siebenbiirger 
Saxons settled as peasants in the Northern Carpathians since 12th Century, to Baltic nobles 
Baltics descended from the medieval German Knights; from Bohemian industrial workers 
and Silesian miners, to the expatriate Austrians and Germanised Slavs who had handled 
administration, commerce and the army in the far-flung Dual Monarchy. Some certainly felt 
like Germanophone, or bilingual, citizens of the new states; others as an ethnic group of their 
own, as culturally separate from the Reich Germans as from the majorities of the new states. 
But especially in the lands bordering directly on the Germany, the successor states had great 
difficulties in attaining the loyalty of the bulk of their German-speaking subjects. This trend 
was obviously stronger in the previously Prussian-German parts of Poland than in Bohemia- 
Moravia, which had never been part of the Reich; this is illustrated by the swell of ethnic 
German emigration from formerly Prussian Poland during the 1920’s. But after Hitler’s 
1933 take-over, support for Naziism and its concept of unified Germanity increased in all 
boundary areas. Even in Hungary, the bulk of the ethnic German Schwabs were electrified 
into professing primary loyalty to the Reich.
The Jews were the other ethnic group with a significant presence throughout the region. 
In inter-war Poland they comprised 9-10 per cent of the population, in Hungary close to 6.5 
per cent, and in Czechoslovakia 1.4 to 2.5 per cent depending on the definition used. In Po­
land, the community did include a wealthy and visible bourgeoisie and a major proportion of 
Poland’s urban professionals and artisans, but nevertheless no less than one third of the Jews 
lived on charity. Polish Jews were heavily urbanised: four fifths lived in cites as against one 
fifth of the total population. In 1931, 25.2 per cent of inhabitants of the twelve largest cities 
were Jewish; in Warsaw 38 per cent of the 1914 population was Jewish, in the booming 
textile city of Lodz 36 per cent. A large proportion of urban Jewry consisted of immigrant 
victims of pogroms and deportations from Russia proper, so-called Litwaki who often spoke 
little or no Polish and were essentially Russian in culture.4
Hungarian and Bohemian Jewry, on the other hand, was largely assimilated, relatively 
well off and concentrated to the metropolises: of Budapest’s population a quarter was Jewish, 
of Prague’s 6 per cent. During the Habsburg era, the bulk of the Jews had integrated into, 
allied with and sought the support of the dominant national groups, i.e. the Germans and the 
Magyars. Particularly Magyar nationalists then tended to view them as junior but reliable 
allies against the Slavs, needed to keep Hungarian-speakers in a majority. After the collapse of 
the Dual Monarchy, however, the situation changed radically. The Jews became the largest 
and most visible minority (in addition to the some 700,000 ethnic German Schwabs), and 
were increasingly picked out as scapegoats both for the Trianon catastrophe and for the brief 
1919 interlude of communist rule. And in Trianon-truncated Hungary, Magyarised Jews 
were no longer needed as statistical recruits to provide a solid Magyar majority. As in Poland, 
anti-Semitic legislation was introduced during the 1930’s, beginning with Jewish quotas in
3 Rothschild (1974), 36, 89, 92; census figures from, respectively, 1931, 1939 and 1930. See 
below.
4 Rothschild (1974), 35-7, 40; Krzeminski (1993), 39-40.
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higher education. Nevertheless, class could overrule ethnicity, and the wealthy Jewish 
entrepreneurial class was able to cohabit with the Horthy regime despite its declared anti- 
Semitism.
Bohemian Jewry was even more unfortunate. Relations with the Czech elite were 
strained, as the Jews were seen by nationalists as pandering to German culture and language. 
In the 1930’s Bohemian Jews had the door slammed in their faces by Czechoslovakia’s 
Germans, too, who had come under the strong influence of Nazi radical anti-Semitism.
The population statistics cited above should be treated with some caution. First, censuses 
were normally based on the criterion of first language, mother tongue or colloquial 
language, which is a problematic notion in a region where bi- or multi-lingualism is 
common. Even the classification of language groups raises questions, such as the 
amalgamation of Czech and Slovak into one national and language group, or the practice 
particularly in Polish censuses to fragment the Ukrainian and Byelorussian groups into 
smaller sub-groupings, such as Ruthenians and ‘locals’. Where respondents were asked about 
their national self-identification, a further reliability issue arises as many respondents were 
genuinely uncertain about their own nationality or thought it opportune to identify with 
some other group as self-protection against discrimination.5 One may observe that Polish 
censuses found more adherents of the Orthodox and Uniate rites than it noted ethnic 
Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Byelorussians and Russians; furthermore, many Byelorussian- and 
Ukrainian-speakers seem to have identified themselves as Poles due to their Catholic faith.6
For Jews, the language (Hebrew—Yiddish) criteria fails to identify the assimilated part of 
the community, as does, to some extent, censuses based on national self-identification. It is also 
significant to note that no inter-war census noted the Gypsy population as a national minority 
or even distinct ethnic group. This reflects both the official policies of denial and discrimi­
nation and the absence then of Gypsy national and political awareness. Nevertheless, in 1941 
Hungary is estimated to have had a Gypsy population of 100,000 to 120,000.7 Given the 
assessments of the size of the present Gypsy population, that figure seems cautious indeed; in 
pre-war Slovakia, Gypsies certainly numbered at least one hundred thousand and in Poland 
several tens of thousand.
The new states invariably chose or were endowed with formally Western-style consti­
tutions. The problem was that these new, modern political systems largely lacked a com­
patible base of autonomous spheres and power-centres. The nation-builders inevitably had to 
turn to the state, and paradoxically the state thus came to perform or organise many of the 
functions of the civil society. These attempts to create a civil society from above were not 
wholly unsuccessful, but did obviously lead to a high degree of state control of social and 
political interaction. The process of enforced social modernisation came to form the basis of 
the etatism often mentioned as a main characteristic of inter-war Eastern and Central Europe. 
And even when the state did succeed in building structures of the civil society, it then often 
proved unwilling to relinquish control.
The limited, though by no means non-existent, experience in the successor states of 
bureaucratic management also had the effect that the administrative and political elites of the 
imperial era managed to survive almost intact into independence. Particularly the higher 
echelons of the military and the civil service remained the preserve of the aristocratic land­
owning elites (where such existed, i.e. outside the Ottoman Balkans). In both Poland and 
Hungary, the gentry tradition and ethos continued to dominate over a bourgeois outlook, 
and constituted ideals to which other ascendant strata aspired. The gentry retained, particu­
larly in Poland and Hungary, strong pre-modern (though not feudal) ideals; this had the
5Cf. Liebich (1992).
6 Rothschild (1974), 37, 192-3.
7Barany (1990), 26.
The Inter- War Experience 67
added effect that it kept the emerging financial and industrial elites politically at arm’s 
length. These strata thus remained overwhelmingly Jewish or German, although they were 
largely assimilated into the dominant languages and cultures.
For obvious reasons, the Polish financial and industrial elite was overwhelmingly based in 
the more advanced areas of formerly Prussian Poland; in the Eastern parts of the country Jews 
dominated the urban professional and entrepreneurial class. The administration was, 
however, almost exclusively recruited in formerly Russian Poland.
In another sense, too, Habsburg traditions of elite politics remained in force. 
Throughout Eastern Europe in the 1900—1939 era, ‘governments did not lose elections’. The 
exceptions, Hungary in 1905 and Bulgaria in 1932, both resulted from divisions within the 
elite rather than having anything to do with the popular will. Strong state control of the 
administrative machinery enabled the elites, when united, to produce the desired election 
outcomes. But despite the strong element of facade politics, there was an outward and even 
genuine respect for constitutional probity; sensitivity to international opinion also put a lid 
on the most outrageous authoritarian ambitions.8
Another observation of a general nature, related to the one above, is that common to all 
the post-independence polities of the successor states was ‘the institution of the government 
party operating in a pseudo-parliamentary system’, i.e. that the governing party (or coalition) 
was an emanation of the bureaucracy and the technocratic and military elites. One typical 
incarnation of this was the pattern of prime ministers emerging from the administrative elite 
and proceeding to ‘elect’ a parliament to serve them. This system was, however, hegemonic, 
not totalitarian, and parliamentary opposition on both the left and the right—even radical 
opposition—was tolerated as long as it did not threaten the fundamental stability of the 
regime in power. Another effect of the marriage between the bureaucratic and administrative 
elite and the government was the personal, rather than ideological, nature of conflicts and of 
party loyalties. Informal old-boy networks, sometimes resembling secret societies, marked 
the clientilistic nature of political loyalties and encouraged opportunistic defections and 
sudden shifts in coalitions.9
Integration, Depression, Intervention
Economic and political backwardness went hand in hand, strengthening each other. At the 
turn of the century, except for some pockets of modernity, Austria-Hungary and Russia—not 
to mention Turkey—lagged far behind the West in levels of industrialisation, efficiency in 
farming, and the general complexity of economic exchange. The aristocratic elite had 
survived more or less intact (save in the Ottoman lands); by and large, they resisted the entre­
preneurial ethos and capitalist economy just as much as the vast majority of the peasantry. 
Only in Bohemia and Moravia had anything like a native entrepreneurial class emerged, and 
even there its political position had been weakened by the imperial centre and by rivalry with 
the local German-speaking community. Bohemia was alone in Central Europe to have a 
sizeable and politically conscious working class as early as at the turn of the century, and 
Czechoslovakia remained the most industrially advanced country in the region for decades to 
come: in 1936 share of industrial workers of the active working population was 44.6 per cent
8Schdpflin (1993), 12.
9 Schopflin (1993), 21-2. Among these influential elite networks transcending party lines and 
ideology, Schopflin mentions the Czech legionnaires with their shared experiences in Siberia 
1917—19. Pilsudski’s Polish Legion is another obvious example.
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in Czechoslovakia, as compared to only 21.8 per cent in Hungary and 18.5 per cent in Po­
land.10
Table 3.2: The Inter-War Central European States in Comparison: Key Variables
Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary
Stability of Ruling 
Regime/Elite
Low Medium High
Degree of Political 
Pluralism
Medium High Low
Time of 
Democratic 
Breakdown
1926 n/m 1919
Nature of Political Until 1926 extreme Parliamentary; Strong-man
System pluralism, then 
corporatism and 
‘directed’ 
parliamentarism
power-sharing 
system between 
main Czech parties; 
strong president
authoritarianism;
corporatism
Ethnic 
Homogeneity
Low Very low High
Dominant National Cultural integration Political integration Irredentism,
Issue of minorities;
territorial extent of 
state
of minorities; 
unitarism vs. 
decentralism
Hungarian
Diaspora;
integration of 
minorities
Main Foreign 
Policy Orientation
Rim states, 
equidistance to 
Germany and USSR
France, USSR, 
League of Nations
Germany
Importance of 
Urban-Rural 
Cleavage
Strong Medium Strong
Importance of Class 
Cleavage
Weak Weak; medium in 
Bohemia
Weak
Ideological Bases 
for Party 
Formation
Ideology, Ethnicity Ethnicity, Ideology Conservatism, 
Radicalism
Degree of Political 
Clientilism
High Medium High
Strength of 
Communist Party
Very weak, illegal Medium, legal Very weak, illegal
10 Wandycz (1992), 208.
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Independence in itself meant an enormous economic upheaval. The integrated free-trade 
areas of the Russian, German and Habsburg empires (or, to be precise, the Dual Monarchy’s 
Austrian and Hungarian components) were split, new barriers to trade erected and tra­
ditional markets and sources of raw materials lost for many producers. Czechoslovakia, with 
its favourable geographic location and modern industrial stock, had the easiest restructuring 
task, and that country was also less hit by the great 1930’s world depression than Poland or 
Hungary. But even in Czechoslovakia it took until 1937 for production again to reach 1929 
levels.
At the outset of independence Poland was devastated by war. Not only had 400,000 Poles 
bitten the bullet fighting for three emperors, but the slash and burn tactics of the various 
armies rolling back and forth over the country had taken a high toll on infrastructure. 60 per 
cent of industry was inactive, as its machinery had been transported to Germany or Russia. In 
the formerly Russian part 80 per cent of rolling stock was gone, 60 per cent of railway sta­
tions and 50 per cent of bridges in ruins. The problems associated with creating an inde­
pendent national economy were exacerbated by the need to unite the previously Russian, 
German and Austrian lands. Even before the war, the difference in levels of development 
between Prussian Poland and the Eastern provinces was greater than between Germany and 
Poland today.11 Three legal and administrative systems and three currencies had to be inte­
grated; railways operated with two gauge standards. Only in the Austrian part had the Polish 
language been used extensively in administration. The loss overnight of the Russian market 
created an economic dependence on Germany which Berlin mercilessly exploited; a 
‘Customs War’ halting almost all trade raged in 1925-34 before finally being settled as part 
of the surprise non-aggression pact between the two countries. No wonder John Maynard 
Keynes called Poland an ‘economic impossibility’.
Similar, though less marked problems faced Czechoslovakia. The country had largely 
escaped fighting on its own territory, but losses at the front had been high. Economically, as 
well as politically, Bohemia and Moravia had been linked to the Austrian part of the Dual 
Monarchy, whereas Slovakia had been under the Hungarian crown. As a result, only one 
railway line connected the Western and Eastern halves of the country. As one measure of the 
disparity between the different regions, one can mention that the illiteracy rate in Ruthenia in 
1921 was 50 per cent and in Slovakia 14.7 per cent, as against less than 3 per cent in Bohemia 
and Moravia. Employment in Ruthenia and Slovakia was to some 60 per cent in agriculture, 
double the proportion in the Czech lands; industry employed, respectively, 10, 17 and 40 per 
cent, and then account has to be taken for the fact that it in the eastern territories was domi­
nated by small-scale handicraft.12
Looking to Hungary, the problem was not the co-ordination of economic units pre­
viously incorporated into different political entities, but rather the loss of important markets, 
resources and trade links. As compared with Transleithanian Hungary, the Trianon- 
truncated Hungary lost 58 per cent of railroad track, 43 per cent of arable land and more 
than 80 per cent of timber and iron ore resources, to mention but some examples. In terms of 
industrial capacity, the loss was much smaller due to the imperial policy to concentrate plant 
to the Budapest area, but simultaneously these factories were cut off from both previous 
suppliers of raw material and from traditional customers.13 Then came the enormous war 
debts and reparations, which during 1921-24 generated one of the most violent bouts of 
hyperinflation seen in modern history.
Rural overpopulation and low productivity in agriculture remained the overwhelming 
economic problem throughout the region. In Poland 60.6 per cent of the population was
11 Krzeminski (1993) 54-5.
12 Rothschild (1974), 91-2.
13 Rothschild (1974), 156.
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dependent on agriculture for its livelihood, in Hungary 51.8 per cent, and in Czechoslovakia 
34.5 per cent (ranging from 25.6 per cent in Bohemia-Moravia to 58.5 per cent in Slovakia- 
Ruthenia). The Western European average at this time was 20 to 40 per cent.14
Backward agriculture meant that a large portion of the peasantry was not only landless 
and plagued by deep poverty, but remained outside commodity production and the money 
economy. There was also an oversupply of intellectuals and professionals: universities edu­
cated lawyers, doctors and teachers in numbers huge in comparison both with the economies’ 
ability to meaningfully employ them, and with investment levels in primary and secondary 
education. The threat of pauperisation generated disaffection and radicalism among the 
members of the academic intelligentsia who could not crack the labour market. As politics 
and the bureaucracy remained the main potential employer of the academically educated 
class, political parties concerned more with patronage than with ideology proliferated, and 
the state machineries became riddled with inefficiency, nepotism and corruption.15
Industrialisation combined with an intensification of farming was undoubtedly the only 
way out of the dilemma, but capital accumulation remained an almost insurmountable 
problem—in fact, only in Bohemia and parts of western Poland did agriculture generate any 
surplus capital—before the communists introduced their harsh methods to extract it.
The peasantry, being the most numerous class in society, obviously attracted the interest of 
politicians, and agrarian parties emerged as strong forces throughout the region. These par­
ties were at the same time radical in demanding land reform, and archaic or even anachro­
nistic in supporting traditionalist, anti-modern and anti-industrial values.
The ideological celebrators of peasantism appear to have misread or misrepresented 
the real views of their claimed constituents. For the peasant’s actual attitude towards 
industrialisation was less one of hostility than one of ambivalence: he was both 
fascinated and afraid. He realised that that it alone held out the promise of salvation 
from rural poverty and overpopulation. But he also dreaded industrialisation as a 
threat to his values and traditions. More specifically, he shrewdly suspected that its 
immediate costs in terms of restricted consumption and increased prices and taxes 
would be unloaded into his shoulders, or rather squeezed from his belly.16
The traditionalism and suspicion of modernisation among the peasantry was coupled with a 
strong dose of radicalism, particularly of the rightist variety. The Great War had created 
hopes of social change and exposed the urban elites’ and populations’ dependence on a docile 
rural work force. As urban society tended to be strongly influenced by ‘alien’ elements and 
culture, populism and anti-modern attitudes could easily be merged with right-radical 
nationalism, xenophobia and appeals to the masses. But however authoritarian some Central 
European regimes may have been, their agendas were conservative and traditionalist, not 
radical and dynamic, and their structure elitist or oligarchic, not populist.
Noisiest in the countries with prominent and vulnerable Jewish minorities, the Right- 
Radical leaders, while themselves usually educated and urbanised, appealed to the 
supposedly primitive, instinctive, and healthy reaction of the peasant and proletarian 
‘folk-masses’ against the allegedly decadent, ‘judaised’, secular culture of their 
bureaucratic exploiters. Indeed, the appeal of and the appeals of Right-Radicalism 
nicely reflected the contemporary condition of interwar East Central Europe as an 
agricultural society in a crisis of transition and fragmentation: though not yet
14 Wandycz (1992), 206-7; ‘interwar period’, no exact dates.
15 Rothschild (1974), 19-20.
16 Rothschild (1974), 17.
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sufficiently developed and integrated to have moved beyond this demagoguery, it no 
longer was adequately stable and integrated to remain immune to it.’17
The gradual radicalisation of the rural population was influenced by many factors. Its 
background was the turmoil and resilient desire of social change generated by the Great War 
and its consequences. To the extent that the rural societies were integrated into the greater 
economy, the effects often proved disastrous: both the world grain glut of the 1920’s and the 
depression of the early 1930’s led to a catastrophic fall in agricultural produce prices, par­
ticularly in comparison with the cost of industrial goods. The price shocks were exacerbated 
by the deflationary and fiscally-oriented stances taken by governments as a reaction to the 
depression, and by the West’s withdrawal of capital. The economic despair was a major force 
triggering radicalisation.
Moreover, what cannot be ignored is the recurrent betrayal by the peasantist parties’ 
leaders of their constituencies’ interests. These parties too were characterised by the domi­
nance of their machineries by the bureaucratic political class, which in general proved much 
more responsive to etatist requirements than to the peasant communities’ ambitions and 
needs.18
If Central Europe suffered much from the fall in world prices for agricultural produce in 
the mid 1920’s, the world depression of the early 30’s hit even harder. In Poland, probably 
worst affected of the three countries, national income fell by a quarter from 1929 to 1933 
while unemployment in industry rose to 43 per cent; in Hungary industrial production fell 
by 39 per cent during the period while unemployment in industry rose to 36 per cent. The 
falling standards of living did not only generate political discontent and social tension, but 
attempts by the governments to solve the crisis inevitably had the knock-on effect of 
strengthening state powers. Economic planning and intervention directly meant increased 
state influence over daily life, and indirectly inspired increased reliance on the state to solve 
social ills.
This trend was strengthened by the successes of the European dictatorships in accelerating 
and consolidating their economies. The example of Nazi Germany in particular propelled 
the general concept of authoritarianism onto a new level of attractiveness, especially when 
contrasted with the apparent impotence of democratic France and Britain to break the circle 
of economic stagnation. Germany, of course, also pursued a politically efficient foreign trade 
policy, whereby it purchased foodstuffs, minerals and timber from Eastern and Central 
Europe in exchange not for convertible currency but for German industrial goods, thus 
making the region more dependent on German trade than ever before. By setting new stan­
dards, Nazi Germany also inspired Central European states to try out increasingly more 
authoritarian forms of rule, legitimised their territorial revisionism and made ethnic xeno­
phobia and anti-Semitism more respectable.
Poland was the Central European country where interventionist policies were most 
widely applied, and in contrast to other states where similar measures were attempted (except 
for, to some extent, Czechoslovakia), financed mainly by internal capital sources. When 
Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, the prime mover behind the Gdynia deep-sea harbour project, 
became Minister of Finance in 1935, he introduced an ambitious six-year plan of economic 
restructuring based on radically increased state economic intervention, economic nationalism 
and autarky. The state took over large parts of key industries, and a giant Central Industrial 
Area with modern steel mills, chemical plats and armament factories was set up to the east of 
Warsaw. Regulation of foreign capital was tightened. The massive injection of state capital in 
industry certainly showed impressive results: between 1935 and 1939 industrial production
17 Rothschild (1974), 21.
18 Cf. Rothschild (1974), 18.
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increased 53 per cent, while unemployment fell from 11 per cent in 1936 to 5 per cent in 
1938. In 1939, real incomes were also up 43 per cent for the decade.19 A powerful (but short­
lived) boost was given by the annexation in 1938 of the rich Silesian mining and industrial 
area of Tesin (Cieszyn, Teschen) from Czechoslovakia, which in one stroke doubled Poland’s 
coke production, tripled pig iron output and increased steel capacity by half.20 Even so, by 
1939 not even one Pole in five worked in industry. In that respect, the etatist investment 
policies failed to absorb more than a fraction of the surplus rural population.
The Hungarian government also experimented with Polish-style economic planning and 
state micro-management, but the so-called Gyor armament and investment programme 
yielded fewer results in terms of an upsurge in industrial production. Industry remained 
concentrated to the production of armaments, chemicals and consumer commodities, par­
ticularly foodstuffs, and the desired increase in investment goods output did not materialise. 
State ownership of the means of production also remained marginal, trade dependence on 
Germany was debilitating, and industry was heavily concentrated to the Budapest area. Of the 
Central European countries, Hungary ‘by and large [...] progressed least, comparatively 
speaking, toward sustained capital accumulation.’21
Estimates of the inter-war economic performance are extremely varied. According to one 
source, Czechoslovakia’s production per capita in 1936-40 was 67 per cent of the European 
average; Hungary’s 43 per cent, and Poland’s 20 per cent.22 According to another estimate, 
Czechoslovakia’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in 1937 would have been only half of 
Germany’s, and 30 per cent of the US figure. Hungary’s GDP per capita would have been less 
than a quarter of the American, and Poland’s about a sixth.23 Garton Ash points out, however, 
that particularly the figure for Czechoslovakia seems suspiciously low. On the other hand, the 
gap between living standards in Slovakia and Bohemia-Moravia actually widened during the 
inter-war period, so that Slovakia by 1937 had only half the per capita income of the Western 
provinces.24 Accounting for this, the standard of living in the Czech lands were thus not that 
far, if at all, below Germany’s or Austria’s.
Even in the pockets of industrialisation—Bohemia, Warsaw, Lodz, Silesia, parts of Buda­
pest—worker radicalism on issues others than wages and working conditions was dampened 
by the shallow urban roots of the working class. Nevertheless, the radical-left working class 
movement was still seen as a huge threat, although opposition to communism was not only, or 
even dominantly, a class or ideological issue. The new states were founded on the concept of 
national self-determination, and anti-Sovietism. The Soviet Union, with its claim to 
represent the interests of the workers regardless of nationality, was perceived as a mortal 
threat to the new nation-states’ very existence.25 The Polish communists were particularly 
stigmatised as traitors by their support of the Soviet invasion in 1920, which if successful 
would certainly have meant that Poland would have lost its independence to become yet 
another republic in the USSR. The same went for Romania and the Baltic states, while 
attitudes in Czechoslovakia towards the Soviet Union were more relaxed. In Hungary the
19 Cf. Krzeminski (1993), 75-6.
20 The former Duchy of Teschen had been divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia by the 
Allies in July 1920.
21 Wandycz (1993), 208.
22 Wandycz (1993), 209; no further source.
23 Estimates made by the Hungarian economist Eva Ehrlich, quoted by Garton Ash (1994), 650; 
original article in Paul Marer in William E. Griffith (Ed.), Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Opening Curtain?, Boulder, Westwiew 1989.
24 Rothschild (1974), 120.
25 Tismaneanu (1993), 8.
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picture was obviously dominated by the legacy of Bela Kun’s short-lived but bloody Soviet 
Republic of 1919.
In the absence of a substantial and politically conscious working class, the communist 
parties mainly recruited their supporters among disaffected intellectuals and the national 
minorities. The radical right-wing and populist movements on the other end of the political 
spectrum partly had the same hunting grounds, appealing to the declasse petty bourgeoisie 
and recently urbanised social groups. The peasantry was also targeted by the radical right’s 
critique of the modern and its exploitation of traditional symbols and values. The poorest 
segment of the peasantry was easy prey to claims that the cities were parasites living off the 
fruit of peasant labour, especially when mixed with the juxtaposition of urban deceitfulness 
versus and honesty, the virtuous and authentic life-style of the peasant and urban 
cosmopolitanism, religion and atheism, etc. But paradoxically, the conservative anti­
modernism was later increasingly combined with modernist radicalism, exemplified by 
demands for land reform, nationalisation of big business and the strengthening of the state’s 
powers.
It should be stressed that out the relative political and economic backwardness was by no 
means reflected in cultural life. Instead, inter-war Central Europe witnessed an unique 
cultural flourishing, and Budapest, Prague, Warsaw and Cracow became leading centres of 
the contemporary avant-garde and modernist movements. This was the period of Kafka, 
Musil, Capek, Hasek, Konrad, Lucacs, Kodaly, Bartok, Koestler, Zeromski, Witkiewicz and 
Paderewski; a time also marked by an extraordinary synthesis of art, science and politics. As 
was the case immediately after the collapse of communism, leading writers, scientists and 
intellectuals were at the forefront of the political and social debate, and considered moral 
standard-bearers and paragons of different causes.
The Inter-War Political Systems
During the inter-war period, ‘the majority of the population [in Central and Eastern 
Europe] was subjected to political power without having much ability to influence it. It was 
socialised into hierarchical authoritarian modes, the acceptance of a degree of power. Power 
itself was thus legitimised partly by reference to nationhood and partly tradition; on occasion, 
this might be strengthened by the emergence of a charismatic or semi-charismatic leader. The 
pre-communist system was thus relatively stable, heavily state-centred and tending towards 
stagnation’. The reliance of myth, coupled with externalisation, frequently made it hard for 
these political cultures to come to terms with existing realities, such as economic 
backwardness and political irrelevance.26
Social mobility was low to very low, with the consequences of relative weakness in the 
structure of the state—analogous to ethno-national segmentation—a higher reliance 
on coercion or the threat of it than is compatible with political consensus, low levels 
of legitimacy and thus legitimacy. At this point ethno-national and social cleavages 
could coincide. It was an obvious choice for these weakly grounded semi­
authoritarian or fully dictatorial regimes of the interwar period to seek to build 
loyalty to the state by the promotion of nationalism. To some extent this was 
successful, but it raised two problems. In the first place, it left open or exacerbated the 
issue of the national cleavage. Reliance on the national ideology of one ethno-national 
community frequently brought that community into conflict with another, as national 
ideologies tended to be incompatible and concerned with mutually exclusive goals,
26 Schopflin (1993b), 19.
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defined in terms of territory or people. Second, nationalism as a political doctrine 
provided answers to very few questions of political organisation and the distribution 
of power. It created strong identities and a sense of belonging to the state for members 
of the dominant group, but said next to nothing about political structures, the 
resolution of conflicts of interests, the allocation of resources and values, participation 
and representation, i.e. the day-to-day problems of political, economic and social life. 
[...] The comparative vagueness of the nationalist message, together with its 
emotional intensity, produced a somewhat contradictory result. East European nations 
in the interwar era reached a fairly high state of national consciousness of their 
political identities as members of a nation and as those excluded as non-members. At 
one and the same time the implicit promise of equality and justice, encapsulated in the 
nationalist message, was left unfulfilled, with inevitable frustration and resentment at 
the social-political closures enforced against society by its rulers.27
While the political histories of the pre-war Central European countries show some parallels, 
the dissimilarities still come to the fore. Until its dismemberment in 1938-39 
Czechoslovakia was a functioning parliamentary democracy, though guided by a Czech- 
controlled power-sharing arrangement between the major parties. Poland initially evolved 
into an extreme multi-partist system, but after a coup in 1926 it became a ‘directed’ or 
‘guided democracy’ where the left-leaning ‘moral renewal movement’ attracted support 
among the military, the conservative nobility, the intelligentsia and defectors from the 
political parties, including the ethnically-based ones. Hungary became an reactionary, 
autocratic and authoritarian dictatorship already in 1919, but its political system retained 
some co-optive features and a semblance of democratic institutions.
The threat from a resurgent, expansionist Germany is often mentioned as a catalyst when 
explaining the breakdown of the democratic systems in Central Europe. In fact, however, 
authoritarianism was introduced both in Poland and Hungary well before the Nazis’ 
ascendance. Equally false is to describe inter-war Hungary, or in particular Poland, as fascist 
states. Far from being inspired by radical, fascist-style ideas of will-power and sacrifice, the 
strongman leaders in Central Europe resorted to traditional authoritarian methods to 
control societies plagued by economic hardship and rural-urban divisions, where institutions 
were weak and traditional social and religious forces strong. Both in Poland and Hungary 
the authoritarian systems were rather reactions to the double threat of Bolshevism and 
outright fascism, to increased centrifugality and instability in the party-political system. 
Indeed, the only real fascists in Poland were to be found among hard-line opposition to the 
regime, and the gravest actual threat to the Hungarian Horthy regime came from the radical 
right. This is a key qualitative difference in comparison with the Balkans experiences.
Czechoslovakia: Running Out of Time
Czechoslovakia was, comparatively speaking, the success story of inter-war Central Europe. 
Although the political system was characterised both by fragmentation and domination by the 
largest ethnic group, the Czechs, it nevertheless functioned as a reasonably democratic and 
pluralist order. The state could fall back on Bohemia’s historical traditions of tolerance, 
restraint, and ideals of social equality, but was nevertheless blighted by the ill-effects of the 
peace settlement which created permanent grievances among its neighbours and incorporated 
numerous truculent national minorities. There was further a marked cleavage between the 
industrial Czech heartland and the backward agrarian Slovakian and Ruthenian territories. 
Slovakia had a politically disaffected Magyar minority of some 700,000, whereas Carpatho-
27 Sch opflin (1993), 24-5.
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Ruthenia was populated by some 600,000 inhabitants of which two thirds were dirt-poor 
peasants speaking Ukrainian dialects, and the rest divided between Hungarian administrators 
and Jewish merchants.28 More than three million ethnic Germans lived in Bohemia, Moravia 
and Silesia, controlling a large portion of the country’s industry and external trade.
Towering over the First Republic was its first president, the moralist and philosopher 
Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a strong advocate of moderation and tolerance in political life. 
Masaryk can without doubt be described as a nationalist, but in his writings he consistently 
rejected revolutionary violence and stressed the ‘European’ legacy of introducing social 
transformations peacefully—as opposed in particular to ‘primitive Russia’s’ violent and 
destructive tendencies. The presidency’s constitutional powers were sufficiently strong— 
including the right to dissolve parliament, a suspensive veto and the capacity of being head of 
the administration—to pre-empt the paralysis of the political decision-making functions that 
plagued many of the successor states.29 The president’s enormous personal stature indeed had 
the effect that the political system immediately evolved into a presidential democracy, where 
he could dismiss premiers and cabinets at will.
The communists were the only party with significant support among all national groups; 
it had been formed when the breakaway left wings of the Czech, Slovak and Sudeten socialists 
amalgamated in October 1921. Otherwise, the party system was organised along ethnic lines 
with Czechoslovak (in some cases), purely Czech or Slovak, German and Magyar exponents 
of liberalism, social democracy, Catholicism, nationalism and agrarianism. There was, 
however, co-operation across ethnic boundaries; the Czech and German social democratic 
and pro-Rome Catholic parties came to entertain cordial relations.
One effect of the ethnic cleavage was the high degree of multi-partism in parliament. In 
the 1920 general elections 16 parties of 29 competing gained representation; in 1925, 17; in 
1929, 16; and in 1935, 14. Despite some attempts to reform election legislation, the system of 
proportional representation continued to generate a high degree of fragmentation. It did not, 
however, lead to debilitating immobilism, as the major Czech-dominated parties managed to 
work out a system of permanent extra-parliamentary consultation, clearance and 
collaboration.
With Masaryk and Benes, the long-serving Prime Minister and successor to the 
presidency after Masaryk’s resignation in 1935, acting as arbiters in inter-party strife, the 
frequent changes of government (sixteen in all during the First Republic’s twenty years) were 
largely cosmetic. Stability was guaranteed by the power-sharing and consensus-building 
Petka or ‘Committee of Five’ system. This arrangement institutionalised co-operation 
between the leaders of five Czech-dominated parties—the Agrarians, the Populists, the 
National Socialists (no relation to its German namesake), the Social Democrats and the 
National Democrats—which reappeared in one government after another, though not 
necessarily all at the same time and not excluding other parties. No government was ever 
overthrown by a parliamentary vote of no confidence; all important decisions were made by 
the five party leaders, who also distributed the spoils and patronage that went with the 
30system.
The arrangement successfully dampened the tendencies and effects of extreme multi­
partism inherent in both the constitution and the ethnic composition, thus making 
Czechoslovakia governable, but it certainly included dubious elements. Pressing political 
conflicts tended to be either shelved indefinitely so as not upset the balance, or be reconciled 
in the back-rooms instead of in the public arena. The permanent coalition made some parties 
into chronic government parties and thus insensitive to the moral and political costs of
28 Rothschild (1974), 83.
29 Broklova (1995), 20.
30 Bankowicz (1994) 143-6; Rothschild (1974), 95-100.
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participation at any price; others, feeling permanently excluded from any say, withdrew into 
sullen nay-saying and potential subversiveness. Patronage was institutionalised to the extent 
that certain ministries became the fiefs of certain parties and functionaries, and a high degree 
of party-political loyalty was demanded of civil servants.31
Another result was the cementing of Czech domination of political life at the expense of 
the other nationalities. There was legal equality for all, but the Czechs had the constitutive 
core function so that Czechoslovakia remained primarily a Czech state. This was 
accomplished not only through the Petka system, but also by gerrymandering and the 
introduction of‘Czechoslovakism’ with the Slovaks as junior partners. Though the Sudeten 
German minority represented almost a quarter of the population, their parties did not gain 
representation in the Constitutional Assembly and were only passingly represented in cabinet.
The leading parties of the minorities had, after initial protests and occasionally violent 
resistance, grudgingly pledged their allegiance to the Czechoslovak state. That situation 
changed in the early 30’s. The social democrats lost ground among the Germans to 
secessionist forces, while the dominant political element in Slovakia, the Slovak People’s 
Party, was eventually radicalised into demanding full independence. Slovak disaffection was 
fuelled by several factors: the persistent refusal of the parliament to grant autonomy; the 
perceived ‘colonial-style’ administration of Slovakia from Prague; and the Czech Protestant 
elite’s patronising declarations of the need to modernise, de-Magyarise and secularise 
staunchly Catholic and rural Slovakia. A common Czech attitude during the period was that 
there either was no genuine Slovak nation, only a Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak nation; 
or alternatively that the Slovaks could claim a separate identity, but were not yet mature for 
self-government due to a millennium of Hungarian misrule.32
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Faced with these inflammable conflicts Benes had problems filling Masaryk’s suit. If he 
was not the ambitious mediocrity his critics called him, he certainly was not up to continuing 
Masaryk’s ‘dictatorship based on respect’.
In addition to this crisis of leadership, by the late 1930’s the political strains and 
influences from abroad had weakened support for democracy among the Petka parties and 
among the ethnically Czech polity at large. The Agrarian Party, the country’s largest and 
present in all political inter-war cabinets, came under increasing control of its conservative 
flank which advocated more authoritarian solutions to the republic’s woes. As a result of 
diminishing electoral support and a falling-out in the Petka, the National Democratic Party 
moved from a position of conservative nationalism spiced with some chauvinism to outright 
fascism. The anti-system forces also counted the communist party which consistently polled 
about 10 per cent of the vote, and fared well not only in industrial Bohemia but also in rural 
Slovakia and Ruthenia, where they even dominated the left in a typical example of agrarian as 
opposed to industrial communism.33
When external forces produced a showdown in 1938, the exclusion of the minorities 
from the political elite finally resulted in their turning their loyalties elsewhere, and the 
Czechs found themselves practically alone in defence of the Czechoslovak state.34 The fact that 
the government possessed frontier defences on par with the Maginot line, a modern 
armaments industry and a first-rate army proved irrelevant. Of equally little help was the 
1935 defence pact with France and Russia, which had not only incurred Hitler’s wrath but 
also prompted strong Polish and Hungarian critique of Czechoslovakia as a Bolshevik 
aircraft-carrier in Central Europe. (Hungary, of course, had been alienated already by the 
Little Entente alliance between Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, which was 
exclusively directed against it.)
Democracy, the rule of law and—without doubt—respect for minority rights were much 
stronger in Czechoslovakia than in Poland and Hungary, but not sufficiently strong to make 
a crucial difference when the First Republic was faced with the external threat of a resurgent 
Germany. It is, however, doubtful if any internal measures could have defused the conflict 
over the Sudetenland. For Hitler it was never a question of minority rights, but strictly one 
of territorial expansion. If anything, the Sudeten Germans were guilty of accepting being 
exploited. But then again, Masaryk had asserted that Czechoslovak democracy needed fifty 
years to establish itself and win the hearts and minds of the minorities. The republic got only 
twenty—and Masaryk was probably wrong anyway in his belief that the democratic process 
in itself could bring all ethnic components together into a political nation of citizens.35
Poland: Competing Designs for the State
With a commitment to parliamentary democracy and a constitution modelled on the Ger­
man Weimar Republic and the French Third Republic, independent Poland soon became 
prey to the vicissitudes of extreme multi-partism. By 1926, there were 26 Polish and 33 
ethnic minority parties, of which 31 were represented in the legislature.36 Governments were 
short-lived and fist-fights common in the Sejm.
As in Czechoslovakia, the party system was organised in an ideological-ethnic matrix. 
There were three main groupings—socialists, nationalists and agrarians—but all spawned a 
bewildering array of regional parties and factions, largely a result of the fact that they had 
emerged in triplicate during partition. The main political forces were the nationalist
33 Cf. Allardt (1970) and below.
34 Schopflin (1993), 23.
35 Rupnik (1988), 16.
36 Rothschild (1974), 31.
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Catholic right, called Endecja; a centre bloc including some peasant groupings and Christian 
Democrats; and a left dominated by the socialists and the radical phalanx of the peasantist 
movement. The peasantist movement was divided into rightist and leftist parties, divided on 
land reform in the east and the issue of national minorities. The National Democratic right 
was the strongest force in the first parliamentary assemblies, but not sufficiently strong to 
provide stable government. On the extreme right were the fascist Palanga and National- 
Radical Camp (ONR), and on the extreme left the illegal communist party, all of them 
marginal forces. The Germans had their own socialist and nationalist parties, while a wide 
spectrum of Ukrainian and Jewish parties largely reflected the main Polish party structure. 
Most of the ethnically-based parties united in a parliamentary ‘Bloc of Minorities’, and all of 
them initially preferred to co-operate with the left as a result of the right’s hegemonic and 
assimilative ambitions.
The end to the admittedly anarchic period came in May 1926 when the moderate socialist 
Jozef Pilsudski, hero of the independence struggle and the victory over the Soviet invasion in 
1920, together with a group of other officers organised a successful coup d’etat. The slogan 
used was Sanacja, meaning a return to political health. The coup was inspired both by the 
instability of the parliamentary system itself and by the economic woes: rising unemployment, 
a collapse of the currency and the tariff war with Germany. Pilsudski reacted against what he 
saw as the right’s intransigence over land reform and other social issues, and also referred to 
the negative effect parliamentary bickering had on the defence forces’ capabilities and 
unity—in fact, however, a large portion of the officer corps supported the right. The Sanacja 
take-over was totally extra-parliamentary and secured by military units (the coup cost 379 
lives in three days of street fighting), but it soon mobilised a ‘Non-Partisan Bloc for the Sup­
port of the Government’, (BBWR)P Incidentally, similar developments occurred also in 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, which in 1919 had started independent life with Polish-style 
constitutional arrangements.
The Sanacja movement was indeed curious as authoritarian regimes go. Its strongman, 
Marshal Pilsudski, mostly stayed in the background, while parliament, the political opposi­
tion and all political parties (except for the then outlawed communist party) continued to 
function. Instead of monopolising power outright, the regime preferred methods of electoral 
manipulation, police strong-arm tactics and general harassment of the opposition to ‘direct’ 
it to the ‘correct’ path. Pilsudski’s preferences and personal prestige gave the systems some of 
the characteristics of Gaullism. The Sanacja regime did score some successes on the 
economic front—1926-29 was a period of rapid expansion in the world economy, and the 
hope of increased stability meant that foreign investment picked up—but this did not 
generate the desired and expected electoral support. In the March 1928 elections the Bloc 
parties got only a quarter of the votes. When the triumphant leftist and centrist parties then 
proceeded to form a coalition ‘in defence of the republic and for democracy’, the Sanacja 
reacted with arrests, incarcerations and censorship. Poland drifted deeper into a no-man’s 
land between democracy and dictatorship.38
Polish in ter-war politics were, however, much more complex than a simplistic juxta­
position of the Sanacja and its opponents would indicate. Any analysis must take into account 
the broad spectrum of conflict dimensions outside the party-political system and of the 
complicated pattern of antagonisms and affiliations.
The institutions of church, army and intelligentsia played an important political role, but 
much from the background. Their outlook was far from homogenous. The highest echelons 
of the church were arch-conservative, while many parish priests were radical. The army was a
,7Grzybowski (1994), 36-8; Davies (1986), 124 pp.
38 Grzybowski (1994), 37-8.
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mixture of a gentrified officer class with traditional values, and younger careerist officers 
with democratic inclinations. It was also split between Pilsudski’s Legionnaires and elements 
from the former German and Austrian armies. The intelligentsia, not surprisingly, included 
everything from Catholic pietists to anarchists.39 The attitude towards Pilsudski and his 
policies was also ambivalent: as a card-carrying socialist, he was seen as a beacon of hope for 
the masses craving reform; as a man of order, the ruling classes hoped he would be able and 
willing to counteract more radical forces.
One conflict dimension—embodied in the persons of Jozef Pilsudski and Roman 
Dmowski—nevertheless superseded the others: the question of the very nature of the Polish 
state and nation.40 Dmowski did not—partly because of ill health—seek high positions of 
power in the state after he had lost the struggle for leadership of the independence movement, 
and hardly took part even in party politics, but his thinking drove the conservative-nationalist 
opposition during the entire inter-war era.
The Pilsudski-Dmowski conflict was clearly of such a nature as to be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to reconcile by compromise. Pilsudski and his camp—including the initial 
Sanacja coalition—held that a nation is a product of history and a community of values and 
experience; there is thus room for many ethnic groups in a state as long as they are loyal to the 
whole—this position incidentally comes close to Masaryk’s. Dmowski and the Endecja 
nationalists had a social Darwinist world view where the nation was defined in almost 
mythical terms of kinship, blood and land, and ‘national egoism’ was openly hailed as the 
norm. Ethnic variations in a nation were not only disapproved of, but considered illogical. 
The task and duty of statesmen was therefore, if integration proved impossible, to separate the 
different nations into their own territorial-political entities. Dmowski’s thinking was also 
spiced with theories of judeo-masonic conspiracies and plots, adding to the highly illiberal 
view that a third of Poland’s inhabitants were excluded from political and civil rights simply 
on the grounds of their ethnic background or even their non-Catholic religious beliefs. By 
and large, Dmowski advocated active Polonisation of Lithuanians, Ukrainians and 
Byelorussians in areas where Poles were culturally dominant, but thought assimilation 
possible and desirable only for individual Jews.41
The ideological rift also had strong implications on foreign policy. The nationalists 
desired a smaller but more ethnically homogenous ‘Piast’ state; the left was inspired by the 
multi-national ‘Jagiellonian’ Republic of Poland-Lithuania. While Pilsudski wanted a Po­
land stretching ‘from [the Baltic] sea to [the Black] sea’, the nationalist-dominated delegation 
to the 1921 Riga peace negotiations actually rejected a Soviet offer to cede large additional 
tracts in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, including Minsk, as that would further have diluted the 
Polishness of the state. Dmowski was oriented to France, Russia and Czechoslovakia and saw 
Germany as the overriding menace and danger; Pilsudski’s foreign policy was based on 
equidistance to Germany and Russia (and keeping up the guard against Czechoslovakia), 
while attempting to forge security ties with the states in the Balkans and on the Baltic rim.
The nationalists around the Dmowski platform could attain a majority among its core 
constituency, the Catholic Polish-speakers, the left around Pilsudski could equally muster a 
clear overall plurality with the support of the minorities. The 1926 coup was indeed a clear
^Davies (1986), 130 pp.
40 The long-running Pilsudski-Dmowski ideological and political duel is described in detail in 
Krzeminski (1993), 35-79 and Davies (1986), 129-148.
41 In 1939, Poland had a population of 35 million, of which five million were of ethnic 
Ukrainian and 1.5 million of Byelorussian origin. 744,000 Polish citizens reported German 
nationality (this figure excludes Danzig) in the 1931 census, after a substantial exodus of 
hundreds of thousands of Germans during the previous decade. Some 9 per cent of Poles spoke 
Yiddish as first language.
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attempt to pre-empt an upturn of the balance of forces between the two camps. But if the 
Sanacja’s intention was to put a lid on parliament in order to stop conflicts emanating there 
from inflaming society at large, by the early 1930’s that strategy had failed. Polarisation and 
radicalisation continued, and the May coup increasingly began to look as ‘an attack by bandits 
on a lunatic asylum’.42
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The chosen remedy remained continuously increased repression. However, only a month 
after the authoritarian stance was strengthened anew with the 1935 constitution, the still 
widely popular and respected Pilsudski died. This signalled a further degeneration of the 
regime into increased military control, increased inter-communal conflict with stepped-up 
persecution of the minorities, and stalled land reform—all this topped off by the looming 
war. After a brief power struggle a ‘Government of Colonels’ stepped in with Commander- 
in-Chief Edward Smigly-Rydz as new strongman, and the Bloc was enlarged to the right to 
widen its base; a strange conglomeration of the two rival forces of Polish left and right at the 
expense of the ethnic minorities. Renamed the Camp of National Unity (OBN), the Bloc 
became an ideological cocktail of ‘40 percent nationalism, 30 percent social radicalism, 20 
percent agrarianism, and 10 percent anti-Semitism.’43 One may add technocratism, for the 
modernisation of industry and infrastructure was elevated to the programmatic solution of 
the state’s and regime’s problems.44
Mending fences with the nationalists meant that many of their pet projects were adopted; 
i.a. increased economic planning and steering, centralisation of the administration, the intro­
duction of yet more anti-minority measures, and a foreign-policy reorientation towards the 
Western powers. In fact, it is fair to say that by the start of the war the Dmowski’ite nationa­
lists had largely managed to hijack the authoritarian machinery set up by their erstwhile 
ideological adversaries.
All this was of little immediate effect. The defeat in 1939 and the new partition of the 
country by Germany and the USSR represented a total discontinuity in the polity. Though a 
Government-in-Exile continued to operate from London and the Soviets eventually began 
sponsoring their own claimants to the throne, for the four years until 1944 Polish political 
parties and leaders had virtually no say in the governing of the country. At the end of the 
Second World War, however, an important selection of Dmowski’s ideas ‘would be adopted 
by a Communist Party installed in Warsaw by the Soviet Union.’45
Hungary: Irredentism Triumphant
If Hungary had been a pillar of the Dual Monarchy, that country initially experienced the 
most dramatic break with the Old Order of all Central European states. Initially the 
inclination was reformist: the liberal government of Count Mihaly Karolyi embarked on an 
ambitious programme of land reform, universal suffrage and protection of workers’ rights 
and individual freedoms. But when that government resigned in March 1919, a group of 
former Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia turned communist took power and established 
a revolutionary Soviet Republic which lasted for 113 days.
It was an order from the Entente powers to abandon yet more territories to Czechoslo­
vakia and Romania that triggered the resignation of the Karolyi government, and the 
communists managed to exploit to their advantage the national trauma and outrage created 
by this loss of additional ethnically Magyar areas. The Soviet Republic was thus established 
with considerable popular support, but this was generated by national, not class fervour. 
Although the communist leader Bela Kun projected his regime as National Bolshevik and 
revisionist, in fact it was internationalist in the sense that its main aim was to hold Hungary 
for Bolshevism until the then seemingly imminent world revolution.
It did not take long for the Soviet government to squander what mass support it had 
enjoyed. The peasantry, which had supported the revolution on the expectation that it would 
bring social justice and land reform, was alienated by the government’s nationalisation
43 Wandycz (1992), 226.
44 Rothschild (1974), 71-2.
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(rather than redistribution) of larger land holdings, its vigorous collectivisation drive, 
atheism and general contempt for peasants and their values. The middle class turned from the 
revolution even sooner, as it became clear that the communists had no intention of seriously 
waging war in order to recover lost territories, only to spread the revolution, and in the 
meantime occupied itself with the vigorous eradication of signs, symbols and representatives 
of the old society. The wave of terror and purges unleashed on the country only intensified 
passive resistance, and the Soviet Republic finally disintegrated on 1-2 August 1919 under the 
added pressure of interventionist Romanian forces which eventually occupied and looted 
Budapest itself. The bulk of its leadership fled the country despite previous promises to fight 
to the last bullet, thus depriving the communist movement of whatever remained of its 
credibility.
After more political confusion and a wave of white terror came Hungary’s aborted inter­
war experiment with parliamentary democracy: a government dominated by the social 
democrats stayed in power for only five days before it was overthrown by a military coup. The 
platform of the coup was reactionary bordering on regressive; its leader, Admiral Miklos 
Horthy, was declared Regent pending the election of a royal dynasty. The formal retention of 
the monarchy was considered necessary for the validity of the revisionist claims, but if Horthy 
and his allies ever had had any intentions of actually reinstating an actual monarch, this was 
soon forgotten; repeated attempts by the dethroned Habsburg King Charles to recover the 
crown of St. Stephen were first dismissed and then put down by force. Other features of the 
Habsburg political system were, however, reintroduced. Suffrage was restricted to less than 
30 per cent of the potential electorate and open ballot was for all practical purposes restored 
in the countryside. The upper house, composed of hereditary, ex officio, corporate and regent- 
nominated members, re-emerged.46
The regime’s main political vehicle was the Government Party, initially including of the 
Smallholders coalition and the rightist-conservative Christian National Union, and 
permanently allied with the Christian Socialists. It evolved into a basically non- or supra- 
ideological organisation which embodied the amalgamation of the state apparatus and the 
political elite. In many respects the political system resembled the one later introduced with 
less success by the Polish Sanacja. Various forms of electoral manipulation and a strong 
administrative bias for the ruling bloc generated a solid base of electoral support which, in 
turn, ‘produced governments of unparalleled stability in the rest of Western and Central 
Europe at the time.’47 Opposition parties, though not the communists, were tolerated in 
parliament but not allowed to exert active and decisive influence on policy. In fact, they were 
not all that disadvantaged, as the Government party’s legislators too in practice had little say.
The ideas that motivated the counter-revolution can be described as nationalist, xeno­
phobic, anti-urban and anti-modern. One visible aspect was overt anti-Semitism: Hungary 
was the first European country in the 20th century to introduce anti-Jewish legislation.48 
Popular anti-Semitism was fuelled by frustration over the Trianon catastrophe, and un-
46 Wandycz (1992), 216.
47 Grzybowski (1994b), 171; Rothschild (1974), 161.
48 Beck (1993), 4. Nevertheless, Horthy, was not regarded as a practising anti-Semite, and the 
conservative establishment in general had no qualms striking political deals and establishing a 
modus vivendi with the Jewish Grande bourgeoisie. During the war Horthy also long resisted 
German demands to deport Budapest’s Jewish community, but finally accepted that 800,000 
Jews would be handed over to the SS for ‘re-location in the eastern territories’. This may 
although have been influenced by the fact that Hitler, after he heard of the Hungarian peace 
overtures to Churchill, had ordered the kidnapping and placing in a concentration camp of the 
Regent’s son. In all, some 600,000 Hungarian Jews perished during the war. The total death toll 
for the country was one million.
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doubtedly also by the Soviet Republic with its high visibility of Jews, including Kun himself, 
in its leadership—though the majority of Hungarian Jewry certainly did not support the 
revolution. Nevertheless, during the White Terror which followed the collapse of the Soviet 
Republic, a majority of the estimated 5,000 that were killed by pogromic lynch mobs were 
Jewish, as were a substantial part of the 100,000 Hungarians who chose emigration.
In practice, however, both the authoritarianism and the nationalist fervour of the regime 
were became moderated by economic pragmatism and by the conservative elite’s generally 
anti-populist stance and concepts of gentlemanly behaviour in politics. The urgent need to 
end international isolation and secure foreign capital only added to the effect. Count Istvan 
Bethlen, Prime Minister during the whole decade 1921-31, markedly steered a middle 
course. Some concessions were even made to the moderate left and to the peasantist parties, 
while the radical nationalists were kept on the sidelines. In fact, the extreme right and fascist­
type mass movements, not communism, soon became the most acute threat to the conservative 
regime’s stability. The radical right did undoubtedly share many of the regime’s ideals and 
political goals—not least the recovery of lost territories and anti-Semitism—but their 
general radicalism, rebellion against Western values and exploitation of the masses was 
violently at odds with the conservative establishment’s world view.
After Bethlen’s resignation, however, a turn to the right was made in an attempt to steal 
the thunder from the radicals. The right-radicals’ leader, the retired army Captain Gyula 
Gombos, became Prime Minister in 1932, but key posts in his cabinet were nevertheless held 
by conservative Bethlenites. Gombos introduced fascist slogans and paraphernalia, and steered 
closer to Germany and Italy. But despite his ambitions and strong support among students, 
refugees from the lost territories and the officer corps, Gombos was eventually forced to put a 
lid on fascist and racist fervour as a concession to the conservative aristocracy and the wealthy 
Jewish financiers. With Horthy strongly advocating moderation, plans for increased 
totalitarianism were put on hold.
In 1935, general elections were held. The Government party won a clear majority, but its 
back bench was purged to make room for more radical members. Moreover, an independent 
conservative opposition emerged, as did a phalanx of opposition to the right even of the then 
right-radicalised and officer-stuffed Government party. When Gombos died in 1936, the 
real threat of a revolution from the right no longer came from him and his political allies but 
from the anti-establishment and Nazi-inspired Arrow Cross movement. Despite 
unfavourable electoral geometry and the imprisonment in 1937 of its leader Ferenc Szalasi, 
the Arrow Cross scored a phenomenal success in the elections of 1939, pulling a quarter of 
the vote.49 By then Hungary was firmly anchored in the Axis camp. The German take-over in 
Austria and Czechoslovakia created an encirclement and a situation of total economic 
dependency, while the concurrent Hungarian annexation of southern Slovakia and Carpatho- 
Ruthenia had made it a pariah in the eyes of the West.
Horthy, however, continued to exercise restraint and move rather deftly. While actively 
fighting with the Germans against the Soviet Union, Hungary took great pains to keep the 
state of war with the Western powers a mere formality. The Germanophile army and various 
militias certainly performed outrages in occupied territories, but ‘parliamentary life not only 
survived but was even revitalised, the Centre and Left parties as well as the trade unions re­
mained free, and political journalism was intense and free. [. . .] Civil rights endured’.50 In the 
middle of German-controlled Europe, the Social Democratic Party was represented in the 
Budapest parliament until 1944. Not even when the Germans, with Horthy’s assent, occupied 
Hungary in March 1944 did the extreme right-radicals manage to push aside the Horthyite
49 Wandycz (1993), 223-4; Rothschild (1974), 181.
50 Rothschild (1974), 187.
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establishment and start their social revolution; the wholesale extermination of Hungary’s 
Jewry was, however, initiated. Only the Regent’s desperate decision seven months later to try 
to switch sides from the Axis to the Allies prompted Berlin to install an Arrow Cross regime, 
which exercised its powers with extraordinary malignancy under the leadership of the 
former ambassador to Berlin, Dome Sztojay, and General Geza Lakatos.
The political system of inter-war Hungary was strongly influenced by Horthy’s role as 
supreme arbiter. The Admiral’s political philosophy was guided by a truly anachronistic, 
paternalistic, ‘whiggish’ conservatism. In contrast to his Balkan counterparts of similar 
inclination, he was superior in the art of manipulation and co-optation. In fact, Horthy and 
the Hungarian conservative establishment managed what had eluded Hindenburg, Papen and 
the German industrial lobby; to defuse right-radicalism by inviting its relatively moderate 
elements participate in government but not letting them take control. The relative triumph 
of traditionalist authoritarian conservatism over right-wing radicalism did not, however, 
sound any sort of victory for liberal, or even ‘Western’, values. As Misha Glenny observed as 
late as in 1990, ‘Hungary may have a proud history, but its democratic traditions would 
barely fill a school exercise book.’51
Right-Wing Radicalism Between the Wars
It is somewhat paradoxical that of the Central European countries, Hungary was to have the 
most vocal, radical and popular extreme-right movement. Hungary was, after all, the most 
ethnically homogeneous state in the region, and the governing establishment pursued a policy 
incorporating many of the aims of the right-radicals. But in contrast to the situation in newly 
independent Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Magyar polity considered 1919 a national 
catastrophe and support for radical revisionism was almost universal.
The Trianon settlement contributed to right-wing radicalisation through two mecha­
nisms. As a territorial revision appeared impossible due to Entente policies, frustration was 
turned inwards in a process very similar to the one in Weimar Germany. Later, as Germany 
emerged as a motor for comprehensive revision and Magyar society had tied its fate to a 
German-initiated upheaval, Nazi-style ideologies gained increased respectability and support. 
In Poland and Czechoslovakia, being objects of German revisionism, this was hardly possible. 
In Hungary, Germany’s image and influence was also strongly enhanced by its provision of a 
market for otherwise unsaleable agricultural produce.
In addition to dissatisfaction with the Trianon settlement, one may point to several 
structural factors that contributed to the mass support for radical-right ideologies in 
Hungary. One was economic: the debilitating hyperinflation of the early 1920’s ruined the 
bulk of the middle class and hit skilled workers extremely hard. The ranks of destitute 
citizens were further swelled by hundreds of thousands of refugees from the lost territories. 
In the countryside, the promises of land reform went largely unfulfilled, as agricultural 
production remained locked in a system of equally unproductive subsistence farms and large 
estates, and the bulk of the peasantry became increasingly alienated from the slowly emerging 
capitalist, urban-based modern social system. The disenfranchisement of the rural 
Lumpenproletariat excluded them from any say in the state’s affairs and made the peasantry an 
easy target for populist appeals. The industrial working class was also susceptible to right­
wing rather than left-wing radicalism; partly as a result of the disaster with the Soviet 
republic, partly because of its shallow proletarian roots.
The greatest asset for the right-radical movement was its simple and coherent set of 
ideological commitments and political expectations. The governing aristocrat-dominated
51 Glenny (1990), 72.
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elite professed its unfailing commitment to revisionism but had nevertheless signed the 
Trianon treaty and co-operated with the League of Nations, it affirmed monarchism but had 
evicted the Kang, it asserted its distaste for Jews but all the same pursued an economic policy 
based on cohabitation with Jewish business and finance. The right-radicals, on the other hand, 
could propagate uncompromising territorial revisionism, racial anti-Semitism and 
nationalism, anti-Capitalism and anti-intellectualism undisturbed by pragmatic considera­
tions. Not least were they able to operate on a platform of ‘social radicalism in the service of 
the organic solidarity of the Magyar race’ that the establishment of noblemen and land­
owners could not possibly match. These promises of land reform, social amelioration and 
denunciations of the privileges of the elite classes were powerful tools in attracting the masses 
that the government at the same time attempted to marginalise.52
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The right-radical movement in Hungary had its organisational roots in the numerous 
secret societies and militias that formed to take revenge for the communist interlude and to 
fight in the lost territories. These bodies, manned mainly by ‘declasse elements of the lumpen 
gentry’ and at that point enjoying the tacit support of Admiral Horthy, can in many respects 
be compared with the German Freikorps, the strongly anti-democratic war veteran bands 
used by the government to fight the left and in the East. The Hungarian militias were, how­
ever, even more radically anti-systemic and driven by racial xenophobia, as demonstrated by
3
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names such as the ‘Hungarian Scientific Race-protecting Society’, ‘Hungarian Association 
for National Defence’, and ‘Association of Awakening Magyars’.53
Another manifestation of social radicalism was the nepi literary movement, which 
juxtaposed exalted peasantist, communal and patriarchal values against ‘urban decadence’ and 
‘lumpen elements’—code-words for Jews and Gypsies—as well as against the old aristocratic 
order. It is indeed interesting to observe that Magyar literature in the inter-war period was 
very preoccupied with concrete social issues and the ‘national spirit and destiny’, whereas 
most Polish and Czech writers and artists withdrew into ‘purer’ art and aestheticism. One 
obvious explanation for this is that the Polish and Czech societies had experienced satisfactory 
outcomes to national aspirations, while the Magyar polity was deeply frustrated by 1919.
The Magyar radical right was from the very outset inspired by and allied with German 
National Socialism. The movement’s leader Gombos had been in contact with German 
Nazis as early as in 1921, and even attempted to stage a coup synchronised with the Munich 
beer-hall Putsch in 1923. That same year he left the Government Party, in protest against its 
in his opinion meek and regressive ambitions, to form the tellingly named Race-Protecting 
Party. The party’s ideology and policies were based on racial chauvinism, an affinity to the 
lower classes which were seen as victims of aristocratic and Jewish exploitation, and a firm 
belief that totalitarianism was the wave of the future. The social composition and traditions 
of Hungary caused the radical right to entertain a cult of the peasantry, rural life, anti­
capitalism and archaic values to an even greater degree than did the German Nazis.
The right-radical opposition gained no parliamentary representation in the 1922 general 
elections, but won, respectively, 10 and 11 seats in the 245-member assemblies elected in 1926 
and 1931. These figures, however, determined as they are by the heavily biased and to some 
extent manipulated polling system, grossly underestimate the movement’s electoral strength 
and popular support. Already in the mid 1920’s, it could rely on a wide constituency of stu­
dents, military men, refugees from the lost territories and destitute members of the middle 
classes and noblesse. The peasantry, while largely disenfranchised, was also in the process of 
being lifted from its traditional docile apathy by the right-radicals’ promises of radical social 
change.
The inclusion of Gombos and other right-radicals in the government from 1929 did to 
some extent defuse the radicalism of the right, though not its appeal. When Gombos became 
Prime Minister in 1932, he toned down his anti-Semitic rhetoric and continued the prag­
matic Bethlenite modus vivendi with Jewish industrial and finance circles. The radical right’s 
anti-capitalist rhetoric, however, remained firmly in place and defusion came at a price: after 
the 1935 general elections, the Government parliamentary party was largely manned by 
practising right-radicals. At the same time, the Government faced new, even more radical 
forces on the extreme right: the Arrow Cross and the National Radicals, who could cash in on 
the Gombos faction’s alleged selling out.
These two parties directly copied the German Nazi party’s ideological programme, and 
were staunch allies of Germany’s larger cause in Europe. Their ascent was to some degree a 
result of the government’s new policy towards the ethnic German Schwab minority. The 
Schwabs were an ancient minority in Hungary, numbering some 700,000 and prominently 
represented in the army, administration and Catholic church. The Schwabs had a long tra­
dition of assimilation into and identification with the Magyar community, but by the 1930’s 
a large portion of the community had been energised into radical ethnic activism, directed 
not so much against the Magyars as against other minorities. In 1933, Gombos had extracted 
a promise from Hitler that Germany would not support Schwab separatism, but that policy 
was reversed after Berlin started to suspect that Gombos’ successor would make a foreign-
53 Rothschild (1974), 153.
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policy re-orientation towards the West. Germany started subsidising Schwab separatists, and 
simultaneously shifted their support to radical-right elements outside the government orbit.54
Parenthetically, one may note that the Hungarian governments firmly resisted making 
significant autonomy concessions to the Schwabs, and in fact continued its policy of enforced 
Magyarisation. The reaction among the ethnic Germans was a radicalisation and the emer­
gence of openly pro-Nazi and pro-Reich vehicles. The main Schwab organisation, the 
Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn, was, however, largely defused when it was assigned two 
parliamentary seats in the Government party group. The need to keep Hungary in the Axis 
camp, and the fact that the Schwabs lived scattered in a sea of Magyars, meant that neither 
Germany nor the Schwabs themselves could realistically campaign for Anschluss, only for 
autonomy and the dubious right to be enrolled in the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS,55
The Arrow Cross was the most prominent of the extremist right-radical societies that 
swiftly became a major force. ‘Propagating a nebulous but intransigent creed of absolute 
anticapitalism, antisocialism, anti-Semitism, Magyar racism, and populist authoritarianism, 
[it] attracted the fervent support of students, unskilled workers, and agricultural labourers 
and provoked the apprehensive enmity of all strata with vested interests, including even the 
“government” Right-Radicals.’56 Horthy blocked the attempts, inspired by the not wholly 
unsuccessful earlier co-optation of Gombos’s crowd, to include the Arrow Cross movement 
in government. But even outside government, its mere presence meant that it could force the 
introduction of many of the measures it advocated, including Nuremberg-style racial legisla­
tion. The occupation of southern Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1938-9 gave the 
movement a further boost, as Magyars living there were unattracted by Horthyite ‘feudal’ 
conservatism and eager to take revenge for the oppression they felt they had been subjected to 
by the Slovaks.57
In the May 1939 general elections, the Arrow Cross and other Nazi-type parties won 49 
seats in the 298-seat parliament. The Arrow Cross alone, however, received a quarter of the 
vote, being strongest in the countryside and in recently annexed Southern Slovakia and 
Ruthenia. Support for the extremist right was also ample among unskilled and semi-skilled 
urban workers. Though it polled behind the Government party in Budapest, it beat the 
socialist party there by two to one and even had deputies elected from some of the capital’s 
hard-core working-class districts, where the Arrow Cross was tacitly supported by the 
communist party.58
In comparison with Hungary, right-radicalism in Poland was an insignificant force. The 
national question was a major political issue, but not surrounded by as deep traumas as in 
Hungary; Poland had come out as a winner from the war, and as far as irredentism went it 
was on the defensive. The appeal of right-wing radicals was also diminished by the fact that 
Poland was a main target of German revisionism and Poles the objects of Nazi racial 
invectives.
What right-radicalism there existed in the Catholic Polish community was not presented 
by an organised party as a coherent ideology. Rather, some elements common to European 
right-radicals were taken up by the mainstream parties. Even nationalism did not take racial 
overtones, but was focused on the forced cultural and linguistic assimilation of the minorities. 
One exception was the Jewish community, which the National Democrats thought un­
desirable, though not impossible, to Polonise. After the government became controlled by the 
right, it tolerated expressions of anti-Semitic violence, but the anti-Semitic legislation it
54 Cf. Broszat (1966).
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introduced was nevertheless not racial in nature, rather designed to cut the influence of Jews 
in the economy, the professions and science. The limitation by statute of Jewish entry into the 
universities was the most visible emanation of this policy, and one may note that students were 
the one group in society that was to a larger extent attracted to and energised by right­
radicalism.
The only truly right-radical parties of any national importance, the ONR and its sister 
organisation the Falanga (Phalanx), were offshoots from the National Democratic party, and 
inspired by Italian or Spanish rather than German fascism. Their ideal was not so much a 
racially pure, folkish community as authoritarianism in itself as a solution to Poland’s 
problems. The Falanga was founded in 1935 by Boleslaw Piasecki, a 21-year-old law student 
who already had seen the inside of a internment camp as a result of his right-radical activism. 
The movement soon grew to a strength of some 5,000 members, including a squad of storm 
troopers modelled on the German SA. Its 1937 programme preached the establishment of a 
‘Catholic State of the Polish Nation, that will lead the peoples of Central Europe against 
Communism and Pan-Germanism.’59 While being as hostile to Germany as to the USSR and 
to local Jewry, the Falanga was infiltrated by the Gestapo, which employed the movement’s 
chief propagandist Stanislaw Brochwitz {alias von Brauchitsch).60
Piasecki’s anti-German stance was sufficiently strong to prompt him to set up a guerrilla 
outfit in the autumn of 1940 to fight the occupants. In 1942 the National Confederation 
(Konfederacja Narodowa) also turned its arms on Soviet partisans operating in Poland, and 
even during the last stages of the war Piasecki remained true to his vision of a Poland 
stretching to the Black Sea, distributing leaflets demanding ‘the crushing of Russia—whether 
red or white’.61 Unbelievable as it seems, even that was not the end of Piasecki, whose further 
adventures will be recounted in the following chapter.
What genuine right-radicalism there existed in inter-war Poland was rather to be found 
among the national minorities and particularly the Germans. The treatment of them was, at 
least by Central European standards, fair, and no obstacles were put up for them to express 
themselves politically. Yet most ethnic Germans in Poland were still officially considered 
‘autochtones’—i.e. Germanised Poles—and thus subjected to a vigorous assimilation policy. 
This was one factor creating disaffection, but the main cause of it was the very incorporation 
of formerly Prussian-German regions into Poland. Particularly after the National Socialist 
take-over in Germany, a majority of Poland’s remaining ethnic Germans—a group taxed by 
large-scale emigration—turned to Naziism, although a significant proportion supported 
socialist and Catholic parties. From an ideological point of view, the Polish German Nazi 
movement is of limited interest as it for all practical purposes was a subsidiary of the NSDAP 
with secession as its only real aim.
Among other minority nationalities, the radicalisation that took place during the 1930’s 
was not of the right-wing variety. Many Jews turned to Zionism, while some nationalist 
Ukrainians and Byelorussians, devoid of a national mother state, turned their energies into 
aimless violence, organised by terrorist groups such as the Organisation of Ukrainian 
Nationalists.
In Czechoslovakia, the situation was much the same. In the politically dominant polity, 
the Czech, right-radicalism was never a major force. At independence, the National Socialists,
59 Stehle (1995).
60 Piasecki exposed Brochwitz shortly before the break-out of war, informed on him to the 
Polish secret police which saw to it that he was sentenced to be executed for espionage and 
treason. Brochwitz was, however, saved from the gallows by the advance of the Wehrmacht, 
donned an SS uniform and in December 1940 personally arrested Piasecki. He was, however, 
soon released after Mussolini had intervened on his behalf.
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which despite the connotations of the name was a revisionist Marxist party, contained a 
faction which can be described as fascistoid. Like their Polish counterparts, the Czech fascists 
were inspired by the Italian, rather than the German, model. That was only logical given the 
threatening noises that were heard from across the Western border. Even after they were 
evicted from the party in the mid 20’s, the fascists remained in the National Socialist orbit, 
though periodically also allied with the increasingly authoritarianism-oriented right wing of 
the Agrarian party. During the period 1934-37, the fascist movement partially merged with 
the National Democrats to form the National Union. Nevertheless, ‘fascism’s intended 
Czech social clientele remained on the whole immune to its demagogic blandishments.’62 In 
the 1929 general elections, it collected 0.9 per cent of the vote, and even in 1935 only 2.0 per 
cent.63
Bohemia had been one of the earliest hotbeds of right-wing radicalism in Germanic 
Europe: a party bearing the ominous name Deutsche Arbeiterpartei had been formed as early 
as in 1904 by German-Bohemian workers to protect their interests against cheaper Czech­
speaking labour. It was one of the first organised political movements in Europe that overtly 
combined attempts at mass appeal with biological racism. When Czechoslovakia was formed, 
the German minority was represented by a plethora of parties which all initially subscribed 
to self-determination as a minimum demand. The greatest menaces to the Czechoslovak state 
was the DNSAP, the Sudeten affiliate of the Reich Nazi party, and the more conservative Ger­
man National Party. Both were distinctly negativist and secessionist, but the National Party 
subscribed to an elitist and corporativist ideology, whereas the DNSAP had a folkish outlook; 
it was organised in 1919 ‘along the lines of the German and Austrian anti-Semitic movement, 
adopting the swastika as its symbol. [. . .] Its program was to foster the interests of the German 
working people. It condemned unearned income and demanded social safeguards. Its goal 
was to unite all territories populated by Germans into one great German empire.’64 The 
folkish element of the party’s programme, while not negating the overriding loyalty to the 
Reich, implied a concern with the need to protect the specific characteristics of the Sudeten- 
land against mainstream German culture.
By 1933, both the National Party and the DNSAP were deactivated as a result of internal 
strife combined with harassment on the part of the Czechoslovak authorities. In the phase of 
consolidation that followed, the new Sudetendeutsche Partei under the leadership of Konrad 
Henlein came to gather the entire ethnic German right wing, on a platform indiscernible 
from that of the Reich NSDAP. By 1936 at the latest, the party had become so closely linked to 
and dependent on Berlin that it ceased to be an independent political agent. German agitation 
and the economic depression contributed to a landslide victory for the Sudetendeutsche 
Partei in the 1935 general elections. It gathered 15.2 per cent of all votes cast nation-wide— 
more than any other Czechoslovak party—which translates to a support of some two thirds of 
the ethnic German vote. This manifested the radicalisation among the Sudeten Germans: in 
the parliamentary elections of 1920, 1925 and 1929, the DNSAP and the German National 
Party had together won only 5 to 6 per cent of the vote cast nationally. The trend was to 
continue: in the pre-Munich 1938 municipal elections, the Sudetendeutsche Partei won a 
staggering 91.4 per cent majority in the ethnically German areas.
The autonomist and later secessionist movements and parties in Slovakia were also to a 
large and growing extent geared towards populism bordering on right-wing radicalism and 
even outright fascism. Its main expression was the Slovak People’s Party, which with a few 
short exceptions remained outside government, and only in 1928 declared its loyalty to the
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republic.65 Its founding leader, Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, voiced a parochial, anachronistic and 
clericalist political philosophy, but by the early 1930’s the party had in practice been taken 
over by a generation of more modern and totalitarianism-oriented elements: ‘these young 
“Nastupists” attacked the foreign as well as the domestic policies of the Prague governments, 
urged Slovak solidarity with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and eventually insisted on full 
independence—no longer mere autonomy—from the Czech lands.’66 In order to advance 
their separatist agenda and battle leftist socialism, the Slovak populists increasingly 
synchronised their policies with the Sudeten Nazis.
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Although the Slovak People’s Party never won outright majorities in Slovakia, among 
ethnic Slovaks it consistently polled half the vote or more. After Munich, the constitution was 
redrafted to give Slovakia much increased autonomy, but a radical faction among the Slovak 
populists then stepped up their campaign for full independence. Germany promptly sup­
ported them in order to create a crisis within the then renamed Czecho-Slovak federation. 
Being successful, they invaded Prague and subsequently set up a nominally independent 
Slovak state. Utterly dependent on Nazi Germany (not least for protection against still 
revisionist Hungary), the Slovak populists who installed themselves in power introduced
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authoritarian rule based on a constitution modelled upon fascist principles, banned some 
parties, trade unions and social organisations, set up a concentration camp, and established a 
Ministry of Propaganda.67 But once the war was on, ‘Slovakia became an example of a more 
general wartime policy of Nazi Germany—reluctantly sacrificing the more sympathetic but 
unruly local Radical Rightists for the sake of political stability and economic productivity, 
which in Slovakia was maintained by a regime of clerico-authoritarian conservatives.’68
One may note the strategic blunder Hitler made when he decided to totally subjugate 
Bohemia and Moravia. Immediately after Munich the political system in the Czech lands had 
drifted into authoritarianism, and foreign policy was fully subordinated to German wishes. 
The communist party was banned, and the other parties amalgamated into a so-called Party of 
National Unity. Though another party, The National Party of Labour, was authorised late in 
1938, the significance of the parliament was by then all but nil, having been replaced by 
government rule by decree. In February 1939, the Unity Party even unveiled a programme 
aiming at the creation of a ‘corporate state of the Italian type’.69
* * *
An observation which stands out in the previous expose of inter-war Central European right­
radicalism is its strongly rural base of support. In contrast to the German Nazis and the 
Italian fascists, with their cult of technology prominent under a thin coat of naturalist mys­
tique, the Eastern and Central European radical right was inspired by archaic ideas of the pre- 
feudal independent peasant as the repository of true national values.
The radicalisation of the peasantry is largely explained by the adverse economic circum­
stances, particularly the impoverishment brought on first by the agricultural crisis of the 
1920’s and by the great depression the following decade. The experience was particularly 
debilitating as the villages had only just initiated their integration into commodities 
production and the money economy; the adverse effects were thus largely interpreted as yet 
one example of urban society’s efforts and ability to exploit the peasant. The experiences of 
the First World War had of course also whetted the appetite of millions of peasants to reap 
the material fruits of modern society, as well as shown the dependence of the urban societies 
on rural labour. As their relative deprivation and exclusion from the general progress in 
Europe was ever more clearly exposed, large parts of the peasantry chose to identify groups 
outside ‘the peasant way of life’ as their enemies. This juxtaposition was both class-based— 
directed against the land-owners, the urban bureaucracies, industrialists and the socialist 
proletariat—and ethno-racial—directed at ‘national outsiders’ such as Jews, Gypsies and 
Magyars. In many instances these identifications coincided, as in the equation of Jews with 
both finance capitalism and internationalist, godless Bolshevism; or in Slovakia of Magyars 
with feudalism and cultural imperialism and Czechs with Protestantism and cultural 
hegemony.
Pressures arising from a rapid and turbulent process of modernisation has been identified 
as a standard source of popular radicalism in rural, backward and peripheral regions. The 
most widely held theories on communist support attribute special importance to socio- 
structural factors and are indeed part and parcel of traditional modernisation theories. The 
proponents of this view see mass support for communist parties as a periodical phenomenon 
and as an intermediary stage of development in societies undergoing rapid socio-economic 
change on the path towards an heavily industrialised and urbanised capitalist society. To vote
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communist ‘means that you are displeased with your situation not only materially, but also 
psychologically: a modern working class votes for social democratic parties’.70
In many cases this ‘emerging radicalism’ has been left-oriented, not only in post-war 
Eastern Europe but also in Scandinavia where support for communism has traditionally had 
two separate bases: in the established industrial regions and in the poorest rural, ‘backwoods’ 
areas. Support for the rural, emerging variety of left radicalism has been found to correlate 
with the prevalence of economic and social instability (high unemployment or 
underemployment, large differences in standard of living, large fluctuations in income and a 
high level of migration); rapid and widespread socio-economic change; weak socio-political 
traditions and norms; rootlessness and weak group identification; and expressive and 
momentary political activity.71 In contrast to industrial communism, the rural variety of left­
wing radicalism tends to emerge where individuals lacking a strong class identification 
experience deprivation. This deprivation is, however, not, as is the case for the established 
urban working class, relative and institutionalised. Rather it is ‘diffuse’, the effect of the 
modernisation process which breaks down the traditional rural groups of reference and 
comparison. The rapid entry into modernisation ‘opens up vistas which the still isolated 
individual cannot identify and compare himself with, while simultaneously obscuring his 
rural roots.’72 In general terms, ‘isolation and lack of opportunity to participate in social life 
tend to increase radicalism.’73
This theory neatly fits in with the socio-economic situation in inter-war Hungary and 
Slovakia, the two Central European countries where radicalism was strongest during the 
period. The Hungarian conservative establishment pursued a policy of actively excluding the 
rural masses from real political participation, while Slovakia remained a poor, backward, 
disadvantaged periphery in the Czechoslovak state, just as it had been in Transleithanian 
Hungary.
But why did Central European modernisation then give rise to right-wing rather than 
left-wing radicalism? As noted above, it was only in Slovakia that communism proved 
successful in gaining substantial support from the deprived, anomic rural masses. One reason 
was most certainly the strategy of the communist parties, which during the 20’s and 30’s were 
cadre-driven, dogmatically proletarian and extremely suspicious of social alliances with older 
and larger classes. And among the peasantry, communism was moreover strongly identified 
not only with ‘soulless’, materialistic industrialism and an urban way of life, but also with 
‘alien’ social and ethnic groups and with a foreign power—the Soviet Union—which was 
seen as threatening the hard-won and cherished national independence.
The important fact to note, however, is not the form radicalism took, but that that radi­
calisation occurred in the first place. Right and left radicalism obviously do not share the 
same value structure, but many of their basic aims are similar or even identical. In the inter­
war Central European context, this was particularly true for the issues of land reform and 
social equality, as well as for the overriding view of the relationship between masses and elites.
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The Establishment
of Communist Hegemony
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hand or on the table. Drax’s aces and kings 
would be totally valueless. It was sheer 
murder.
— Ian Fleming, ‘Moonraker ’
The Anatomy of Take-Over: A Comparison
Since the late 1940’s, the dominant view among Western scholars has been that Stalin’s 
ambition during the final stages of the war and immediately after it was complete 
Sovietisation of the countries and territories where the Red Army stood. This theory, as 
introduced in Hugh Seton-Watson’s seminal 1951 book The East European Revolution, 
identifies a clear pattern of an active Soviet quest for domination, with three phases: genuine 
coalitions, false or facade coalitions, and ultimately monolithism or total Soviet control. The 
design would have been the following. First, moderately left-wing and agrarian parties 
compete with the communists;1 there is some scope for genuine pluralism but only under 
close supervision by the Soviets and a communist-controlled security apparatus. In the 
following stage, a coalition is still formally in power, but hardly any real opposition to the 
communists is accepted. Finally, the communists are in total control; if other parties are 
allowed, they are no longer capable of any autonomous action.
This theory is indeed supported by much of what is known about actual developments, 
and provides an accurate description of events as they happened. Yet that does not prove that a 
master plan for the imposition of Soviet-style rule was in existence at the beginning. It is true 
that most European countries occupied or liberated by the USSR eventually emerged with 
rather similar political systems, but those which went communist did clearly not follow the 
same map for the ‘Road to Socialism’. Neither were the same timetables utilised.
The communist parties which came to power in Eastern Europe were structurally varied. 
The state of the communist cadres was weak almost everywhere, due both to repression at 
home and to the purges among the exiles then resident in the Soviet Union. Only the Yugo­
slav and Czechoslovak parties could bolster significant mass support before the war, while in
1 The ruling Eastern European Marxist-Leninist parties will in the following, for simplicity’s 
sake, be called ‘Communist’ although they in some cases carried other official names: in Poland 
the ‘United Workers Party’; in Hungary, the ‘Workers Party’ before 1956 and the ‘Socialist 
Workers Party’ thereafter; and in the GDR the ‘Socialist Unity Party’. The ‘Romanian Workers 
Party’ became communist by name also in 1965, as were the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian ruling 
parties throughout the period.
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Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the communists had been middling-size forces at best; in 
Poland, Hungary and the Baltic republics the communist parties were sects with 
memberships of only a few hundred or thousand. However disciplined and determined, they 
were clearly not capable of carrying out even a Leninist coup by themselves.
Common to the communist parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary was, 
however, their eventual rejection of the Yugoslav-inspired idea of a Popular Front ‘from 
below’. This forms a cleavage in relation also to Bulgaria and Romania, ‘where communist 
domination of the post-war coalition governments had been a reality since the end of 1944 
and adopting Tito’s model of simply involved dropping a pretence introduced under inter­
national pressure’.2 In Central Europe, the communists (read: Moscow) would not risk 
putting excess power in the hands of a front that might later turn illoyal, quite apart from the 
fact that generic support for the communist model of social development was much weaker 
than in the Balkans.
Thus, if all the Eastern and Central European communist parties were objects or 
instruments, rather than acting subjects, the degree of autonomy they enjoyed—or, if one may 
say so: their ‘National Flavour’ varied. The most autonomous were obviously the Yugoslav 
and Albanian parties—the latter, though, being totally dependant on the former. The 
Bulgarian party had needed relatively little overt Soviet military help in becoming the 
country’s dominant political force, and as a consequence it would depend less on it to stay in 
power; the Bulgarian Communist Party also ‘had a long, indigenous history and therefore 
was not perceived as a foreign imposition.’3
The subordination of the communist parties to Soviet models of thinking and political 
behaviour was a vital ingredient in the establishment of Soviet hegemony in Central Europe. 
There was little room for the parties themselves to strengthen mass support by traditional 
methods, i.e. by fine-tuning policies to the local environment.
Yet it is also true the cataclysmic events of the war-time period had utterly changed the 
political and sociostructural landscapes. The flocking of new members to the communist 
parties cannot be accounted for by opportunism, hypocrisy and coercion alone—by early 
1948 the Czechoslovak communist party boasted more than two million members in a 
population of 13 million and its Hungarian and Polish counterparts well over one million 
each. As Czeslaw Milosz described in his 1951 novel The Captive Mind, the new members 
had rather complex motivations. The upheavals of the war and the complete breakdown of 
the pre-war political order encouraged Salvationist, utopian ideologies. Indeed, the 
communists did not—they did not have to—destroy the ‘Old order’; the old feudal-elite 
societies of Eastern Europe had already been mortally wounded by the radical right-wing 
movements of the 1930’s and the years of war. The desolation increased scepticism in 
individualism and pluralism, as opposed to the order and at least rudimentary level of security 
which the communists were in a unique position to supply.
Here supply met demand, more in the promise of radical change itself than in the 
ideology and societal model the communists were propagating. There was, to be sure, great 
expectations of a clean break with the past after the war in all European countries, not only in 
the Eastern ones. As Ralf Dahrendorf has noted of this pan-European ‘grand turn to the left’: 
‘One can understand that, faced with the rubble left behind by the Second World War, large 
numbers of people were prepared to embrace any progress on offer, including nomenklatura
2 Swain and Swain (1991), 62.
3 Stokes (1993), 50; Sudoplatov et al. (1995), 233, however adds that ‘[s]ensing the danger that 
might come from monarchist emigres, Dimitrov decided [in 1944-45] to eliminate the entire 
political opposition; he purged and liquidated all key figures in the former parliament and 
government of czarist Bulgaria. [...] Dimitrov’s followers exploited the absence of a political 
opposition for more than thirty years.’
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socialism.’4 As another observer has noted of the Czechoslovak communist party’s success in 
the first post-war elections in 1946:
The programme of the Czechoslovak Communist Party did not essentially differ 
from others but was more complete and convincing. Unlike others, Communist 
policies had not yet been tried out, and the post-war voters wanted a radical solution. 
The Communists’ position of an expanding demagogic party was more advantageous 
in the existing climate, which suited their purposes, than that of the parties who had 
been part of the pre-war democratic coalition governments and realised that it was 
precisely a supra-party character of state bodies which was so important for the 
survival of democracy.5
In the process, the ruthlessness which the communist leaders had internalised during the 
vicious internecine battles in Moscow was to their great advantage. In 1945, Eastern Euro­
pean communists were not particularly preoccupied with the finer points of Marxist theory, 
not to mention electoral support, parliamentary etiquette or even fair play and generosity. 
Power was what counted: not only power for power’s sake, but the power to transform 
society fundamentally. In George Schopflin’s words: ‘The authoritarian attitudes [the 
communists] learned from the Comintern and their years in the Soviet Union, their ideo­
logical certainty, their rejection of debate and argument, their hostility to autonomous 
action, their contempt for views other than their own and their attitude of treating political 
opponents as political enemies served them in good stead in their march for power and con­
tinued to inform them until well after their successful seizure of it.’6
The actual establishment of the Popular Democracies was dependent on three conditions: 
‘the external force of the Soviet Union, which dominated the region at the end of the Second 
World War; the readiness of a determined minority of communists in each country to coer­
cion, deception and manipulation of their fellow countrymen in order to secure a monopoly 
of power for the communist party; and the physical exhaustion and political disorientation of 
the war-ravaged populations.’7 It thus closely followed the lines drawn up by Lenin in his 
famous handbook for proletarian revolution, What is to be Done? In it he points to two main 
prerequisites for success: the existence of a strong revolutionary party which pursues the 
‘correct policy’ under a determined and disciplined cadre leadership; and a situation of 
deepening social crisis and tension—possibly, even preferably, brought about by war— 
conducive to mass mobilisation and a demoralisation of and division among the ruling elites.
The establishment of communist rule in Eastern Europe was not based on the express will 
of a majority of the populations, and essentially took the forms of coups aided by a foreign 
power. Yet all that is irrelevant—or rather, flattering—from a Marxist-Leninist point of 
view. Like Hitler, Lenin did not much appreciate the ability of the mass to understand its 
own best. From that belief sprung the theory of the communist party as the organiser of a 
‘vanguard of the proletariat’ to counter the petty-bourgeois mass.9 The very core of Leninist 
revolutionary philosophy is in fact that communists should take power through a Putsch, 
carried out by an determined minority. It does not matter how small that minority is, as long
4 Dahrendorf (1990), 51.
5Broklova (1995), 38-39.
6 Schopflin (1993), 55-6.
7 Batt (1991), 3.
8 Lenin (1963).
9 In a speech at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Bolsheviks in 1921 Lenin unequivocally de­
clared: ‘Only the Communist Party is capable of unifying, educating and organising a vanguard 
of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of 
withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations of the mass.’ Cf. Bullock (1993), 82.
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as it can pursue its ultimate aims in a disciplined fashion and grab the opportunity if one 
arises.
If that was not the case in Central Europe, revolutionary conditions as defined by Lenin’s 
rationale were, however, present in several European countries when the war ended. 
Genuinely popular, radical and disciplined communist parties operated in Greece, France 
and Italy, all societies experiencing very high levels of mass mobilisation and having weak and 
divided traditional elites.10 Even so, after a period of turmoil, the non-communist forces in 
these countries emerged on top, while the very opposite was the case in Eastern and Central 
Europe. It seems prudent to conclude that the presence of the Soviet Red Army was of decisive 
importance in determining the outcome. In simple terms: to the east of the Iron Curtain, in 
the Soviet sphere of influence, communism could prevail; to the west of it, in countries 
politically dominated by the United States, it could not.
Yet that interpretation is too simplified—even tautological: the Iron Curtain was 
eventually positioned along the borders of countries where the communists emerged trium­
phant. It is true that no European country or territory outside the Soviet sphere of military 
domination did go communist, but neither did all do so where the Red Army stood in may 
1945. Being in the Soviet sphere of influence can thus be seen as a necessary condition for a 
communist victory, but not as a sufficient one.
One particularly interesting deviant case is Finland, which as a defeated associate and ‘co­
belligerent’ of Germany had to cede a great deal of sovereignty to a Soviet-dominated 
Control Commission, allow the establishment of a Soviet military base within shelling range 
of the capital, and lost some 15 per cent of her territories to the USSR. The re-legalised 
communist party, dominating a ‘Popular Front’ umbrella including left-wing socialists, 
gained 23.5 per cent of the vote in the first post-war elections, entered government and gained 
control of the Interior Ministry and political police. Its leadership made noises about the 
attractiveness of the ‘Czechoslovak road’ and, according to some accounts, was actively 
preparing a Putsch.11 The pattern was reminiscent of the Central European and Balkan ones, 
yet parliamentary democracy in Finland survived intact. This is all the more remarkable as 
Finland had been part of Russia before 1917 and thus was an obvious target for Soviet im­
perialists—indeed, the Soviet Union had attempted Finland’s incorporation along with the 
three Baltic republics during the 1939-40 Winter War.
Another deviant case is Austria, which like Germany after the war was stripped of its 
sovereignty and divided into four zones of occupation. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union 
eventually settled for a full withdrawal in exchange for a treaty of permanent neutralisation, 
instead of attempting to create a socialist statelet in the eastern zone.
10 In both France and Italy, the communists were the strongest parties, with memberships rising 
to, respectively, 900,000 and two million. By 1944-45 they dominated the resistance move­
ments, and had a strong position in the first post-war governments in a situation when new 
constitutions were being built after the collapse and discrediting of the pre-war and war-time 
political systems. In Greece, the communists had converted their resistance to the occupation 
into an armed insurrection against the reconstituted pre-war government, which escalated into 
a civil war that cost more than 100,000 lives.
11 The veracity of the allegations of a serious communist plan for take-over in Finland has di­
vided historians, but the emergence of new material, presented by Kimmo Rentola (lecture 
quoted in Helsingin Sanomat, 13 January 1995), adds credibility to the view that a coup was 
indeed being prepared in late 1947 and early 1948, when the radical left was faced with 
prospects of a resounding defeat in the upcoming elections. The plans seem to have been 
shelved only when the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance’, in essence a 
combined Soviet security guarantee and dormant military alliance, was signed on 6 April 1948. 
For more sceptical view—though based on older material—see Upton (1973) and Paastela 
(1991).
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A third deviant case is Yugoslavia, where the regime that came to power at the end of the 
war was communist, but soon developed extremely hostile relations to the USSR. One could 
also mention Iran, from where the Soviets withdrew in May 1946; during the war Iranian 
sovereignty had been severely curtailed by Soviet and British occupation to protect lines of 
communication, and after the war Soviet authorities had helped in setting up autonomous 
Kurdish and Azeri ‘People’s Republics’ in the north of the country. Though often forgotten, 
Norway and Denmark were also partly liberated from German occupation by Soviet troops 
in 1945.12
There is a range of explanations for these deviancies. Competent diplomacy allaying 
Soviet security fears has been mentioned as an important factor in the Finnish case, along with 
the fiery military resistance Finland had earlier put up to the Soviets while at the same 
showing restraint towards its German ally. The relatively moderate losses during the war, 
both in human and material terms, also meant that society as a whole was not as demoralised 
as in most other European countries. Also, the political and administrative elite remained 
almost intact and in office after the 1944 armistice.
As regards Austria, Soviet policy there appears to have been determined by the German 
question, which it until the mid-1950’s attempted to resolve by a neutralisation and perma­
nent demilitarisation, even if that would have meant abandoning the German Democratic 
Republic established in October 1949. Austria also lacked a communist party of any signifi­
cance. In the case of Iran, strong intervention from the United States was certainly a factor 
behind Soviet withdrawal. Yet then again Washington showed little interest in interfering in 
Soviet handling of Finnish affairs, as did Britain, which was even represented (although 
clearly as junior partner) in the Control Commission. As for Yugoslavia, one may surmise 
that a split within the communist camp was a non-preferred outcome, and when that became 
a fact, a military invasion emerged as the only way to topple Tito. That alternative was indeed 
taken under serious consideration, but finally dropped as being potentially too cosdy. The 
fear of over-extension has also been cited as one reason for the limitation of Soviet 
intervention in Finland and Austria.
Unfortunately, all these explanations of deviance emerge as distinctly ad hoc. Equally ad 
hoc, even tautological, seem many of the rationalisations for why the future popular democra­
cies went communist: that the level of political radicalism was higher, that the elites had been 
thrown into sufficient disarray, that communist strategy was more proficient, that Soviet 
military-strategic interests were stronger, or that Western responses were less successful, to 
mention but a few. All these hypotheses may be relevant, but are impossible to verify with 
reference to quantifiable data.
All over Eastern Europe the communist take-over followed the same vanguardist strategy 
as earlier in Russia, with the exception that the parties now could rely on strong external 
support. The fact that the ruling parties started out from a Leninist position, ignoring the 
absence of a collapsing capitalist society—or, for that matter, of the absence of any sort of 
capitalist society—meant that they had to perform a revolution in reverse. Revolutionary 
conditions had to be built after the revolution. Lacking natural class-based support, the new 
communist rulers were sooner or later forced to accommodate and exploit residual belief 
systems such as generic radicalism, etatism and nationalism in order to strengthen their bases 
of mass support.
‘Objective factors’, to use the term in its original Marxist sense—i.e. the level of capitalist 
development and the political maturity and awareness of the working classes—appear to have
12 Finnmark above the Arctic Circle and the Baltic island of Bornholm, respectively. The fylke 
(county) of Finnmark was, by coincidence, a bastion of rural communism; in the first two post­
war elections the Norwegian Communist Party made its strongest showing there, winning 21.5 
per cent of the vote in 1945 and 16.5 per cent in 1949. Cf. Selle (1990).
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been of minor importance for the establishment of communist hegemony in Eastern Europe, 
just as had been the case in Russia. The last areas of the future Socialist Bloc to come under 
communist domination was indeed the Central European industrial heartland of Bohemia 
and Moravia. At the same time, the two countries where local communists took power with 
genuine popular support and without substantial aid of the Red Army were Yugoslavia and 
Albania, both ranking among Europe’s most backward and least industrialised states. The 
Yugoslav communist party had, however, managed to take charge of a common national cause 
with broad popularity outside the traditional bastions of communist class-based support.
Even if some of the factors mentioned by Lenin as necessary for a communist triumph 
were present in Eastern Europe in 1945, all were certainly not. The particular importance 
that Lenin attributed to civil war as a catalyst for revolution13 does not seem to be wholly 
borne out by the post-war events. The Second World War encompassed a civil war element in 
almost every country in Eastern Europe, but it is hard do discern any clear correlation 
between that and the modes of communist victory. Of course, Yugoslavia, the country were 
the fiercest internal fighting took place during the war did go communist, while Finland, the 
only one in the Soviet sphere of interest which saw no civil war-type situations at all, did not. 
Yet in Greece or Italy, scenes of extremely brutal civil war, the communists did not triumph. 
The civil war which broke out in Poland in 1943/44 was not a revolutionary catalyst, but 
rather directed against the communists and the Red Army.
On the other hand, the theory that cumulating upheavals create mass radicalism which can 
be exploited by a determined minority appears to be consistent with the chronological order 
of the take-overs: first Poland, then Hungary, and Czechoslovakia last. In relative terms, 
Poland suffered the biggest losses of life of any belligerent in the Second World War. The 
Hungarian armed forces had sustained huge casualties on the Eastern Front, the majority of 
the country’s Jews had been deported to German death camps, and finally large tracts of 
Budapest and other major cities were levelled during the eviction of the Germans. In 
comparison, Czechoslovakia fared much better. Slovakia’s armed forces suffered heavy losses 
during the alliance with Germany and the country was the site of serious fighting in 1944- 
45, but throughout the war Bohemia-Moravia remained largely untouched by fighting, 
carpet-bombing or deportations.
The upheavals did not end with the war, as population transfers on an enormous scale 
continued for years. The Polish state was moved several hundred miles to the West, with 
territories lost east of the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line compensated at German expense. In 
all, an estimated 22 million people were forcibly transferred to, from or within Poland 
between 1936-56, equalling no less than 70 per cent of the 1939 population.14 Czecho­
slovakia faced the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia to the USSR, but even more drastic was the 
deportation in 1945-48 of some three million Sudeten Germans and tens of thousands of 
ethnic Hungarians, i.e. every fifth citizen of the First Republic. In Hungary the number of 
deported Germans was about a quarter of a million, with an equal number remaining. Hun­
gary’s borders were not substantially re-drawn from their pre-war delineation though the 
war-time nullification of the Trianon settlement was reversed.
All in all, relatively varied set of background factors emerges in Central Europe, as 
summarised in Table 4.1.
13 Richard Pipes (1994) has demonstrated the importance not only Lenin, but also Bucharin and 
even Marx, attributed to civil war for fomenting revolutionary change.
14 Davies (1986), 82; the figure of 22 million does not include the estimated three million 
transported to German death-camps in Poland.
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Table 4.1: The Communist Take-Over in Central Europe: Key Variables
Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary
Status During War Occupied by and 
partly annexed to 
Germany
Partly annexed to 
Germany and 
Hungary; Slovakia 
German puppet 
state; Bohemia- 
Moravia German 
‘Protectorate’
Allied with 
Germany
Collaboration with
Axis Powers
Very low Low in Czech lands, 
High in Slovakia
High, strong local 
fascist movement
Formal Status Victor Victor Vanquished
Soviet Military Liberator, Permanent Liberator, Occupier,
Presence presence withdrawn in late 
1945
Permanent 
presence
Post-War Settlement Territorial losses to 
USSR compensated 
from Germany
Loss of Carpatho- 
Ruthenia, Germans 
deported
Irredentist war 
gains reversed
Number of War Dead 6 million+ 400,000 900,000+
(of 1938 population) (17 per cent) (2.7 per cent) (c. 7 per cent)
Post-War Ethnic 
homogeneity
Very high Medium, Sudeten
Germans deported
Very high
Initial (1945-47) Soviet 
Strategic Aims
Hegemony Friendly regime Friendly regime
Initial Communist
Position in Front
Hegemonic Dominant Strong
Soviet Military- 
Strategic Interest
Communication to 
occupied Germany
Secondary Communication 
to occupied 
Austria
Subsequent (post-1947) 
Soviet Strategic Aims
Hegemony Hegemony Hegemony
Date of First Elections January 1947 May 1946 November 1945
Reported Communist 
Share of Votes
80 per cent for 
‘Democratic Bloc’
38 per cent 17 per cent
Communist 
Domination of 
Government
June 1945 February 1948 May 1947
Imposed Merger of the 
Socialist Parties
December 1948 June 1948 June 1948
Intensity of Communist Very high before war, Low before war, Medium before
Party Purges Low after war High after war war, High after war
Poland, first the main battleground for Soviet and German forces, and thereafter situated 
between the USSR and the its zone of occupation in Germany, was of crucial strategic impor­
tance in the wider context of the immediate post-war era. In comparison, Hungary and
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Czechoslovakia were clearly secondary, albeit that Hungary as a defeated belligerent was 
formally occupied, and the Soviet forces thus had legitimate (or at least legal) grounds to 
interfere in Hungarian politics.
It is also impossible to discount the impression that traditional Russian imperialism 
inspired Soviet actions. After the partitions of 1773, 1793 and 1795, most of Poland was 
incorporated into the Czarist empire for more than a century. The fourth partition resulting 
from the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop protocol showed anew the low regard in which the 
Soviet leadership too held the idea of Polish independence. The attempts during 1939-41 to 
physically liquidate the existing elite and potential new elites must be interpreted as further 
evidence of Soviet aspirations to establish as total a hegemony over Poland as possible, 
aspirations that remained in place in 1945. Raw expansionism was a factor also in Romania.
In Poland and Romania Stalin intervened decisively to ensure the establishment of 
sympathetic regimes: these, after all, were the countries which had had territorial 
disputes with the Soviet Union throughout the inter-war period, disputes which 
Stalin had solved in 1939 and 1940 and whose resolution he sought to make 
permanent. Here there was no pretence about coalition governments and communists 
not being interested in power; the communists were to have power and would if 
necessary be kept in power by the Red Army.15
Turning to the mass level, it is notably difficult to discern a positive correlation between the 
strength of the various local communist parties and the modalities of their coming to power. 
Indeed, Poland and Hungary, with their minuscule pre-war communist movements, went 
communist before Czechoslovakia, where the party had constituted a politically relevant 
force for two decades.
A more profitable approach may be found in the evaluation of the level of generic 
radicalism. Charles Gati has argued that approximately half the voters in both Hungary and 
Poland in 1945 favoured a revolutionary change of some sort, even though not necessarily a 
communist one.16
[I]t is quite clear that this radicalism was not committed to the communists from the 
outset; on the contrary, it was far less focused than that. The substance of this 
radicalism should be traced back to the nature of peasant belief systems [. . .] and, at the 
same time, to the legacy of right-wing radicalism of the interwar period. The salient 
characteristic of these Central and Eastern European right-radical movements was 
precisely their radicalism, their determination to destroy the existing structure of 
power and wealth and to create something fundamentally new in their place. The 
implication of this situation for the post-war period was that there existed a sizeable 
section of society which was ready to think in radical categories, for whom the root- 
and-branch extirpation of the old elite was welcome and who were fully prepared to 
respond to the language of total transformation used by the communists.17
Much the same can be said about Slovakia, where the nationalist party won the first elections, 
but paradoxically not about the Czech lands, despite the communists’ excellent showing in 
the same round of elections. The legacy of the pre-war era provides one explanation for this. 
Political culture in Bohemia and Moravia was much more strongly geared to moderation 
than it was in the rest of the region.
15 Swain and Swain 1993, 33.
16 Gati (1986), 69.
17 Schopflin (1993), 68-9.
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Moreover, there is a dichotomy between Poland and Hungary (and Slovakia) on the one 
hand, where democracy had failed (if most miserably in Hungary), and the Czech lands, 
where it had collapsed only under external pressure, on the other. In 1945 Czechoslovakia 
emerged with a government and constitution directly linked to the pre-war era, and which 
enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy and support at least outside Slovakia. Poland and 
Hungary had to start from scratch, if partly for different reasons. In both these countries, the 
pre-war political systems had lost the support of large segments of the population even before 
1939. Then the Polish government was pre-empted to return from exile by the Soviets, while 
practically all lower-level administration had been uprooted by the Germans. Hungary’s pre­
war regime, warts and all, had been overthrown in 1944 by even more right-wing and 
unrepresentative forces, which subsequently were replaced by a Soviet occupation 
administration.
The Cold War and Popular Democracy
If the systems of government that initially were established were not democracies of a 
Western type, neither were they regimes of the Soviet variety. For years to come, Soviet 
theoreticians did dare only to describe the new political systems as preliminary stages in the 
progression towards the highest form of democracy—the Soviet, socialist type. The tempo of 
progress towards this goal seems to have been unclear both to Soviet and Eastern European 
communist leaders for quite some time. From the immediate post-war period, Zbigniev 
Brzezinski18 has found interesting quotes from Bierut and Dimitrov about, i.a., the 
importance of safeguarding private property and enterprise, indicating (though not proving) 
that they did not envisage as quick a transition to total communist dominance in their 
respective countries as eventually proved to be the case. Indeed, sources recently made 
available suggest that the Hungarian communists, including the leaders returning from exile 
in Moscow, initially anticipated a transition period of several decades before the dictatorship 
of the proletariat could be established,19 and the 1945-47 economic programmes of the 
Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments indicate socialist rather than communist 
aims. Indeed, ‘in retrospect, it is difficult not to interpret the approach towards the non­
communist groups with its many and sharp turn-abouts as part and parcel of a genuine 
uncertainty about party strategy.’20 It was not until the late 1950’s that Soviet theorists came 
to hold the view that the dictatorship of the proletariat practised in the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European systems of popular democracy were de facto interchangeable.
In fact, much evidence bears witness to the fact that there was no fixed Soviet blueprint for 
Eastern Europe until the time of the establishment of Cominform in September 1947. It was 
only then, at a meeting in Poland, that Andrei Zhdanov launched the Two Camps’ thesis, 
which called for all communist parties to ‘take the lead in resisting the plans of American im­
perialist expansion and aggression in all spheres.’ However, even the ‘Two Camps’ speech 
identified two categories in the ‘anti-fascist front’ in Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia, Albania, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia—the latter somewhat surprisingly, as the communist take-over 
had not yet taken place there—were called ‘new democracies’, while Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary and Finland were placed in another category, still without a precise label. The
18 Brzezinski (1961).
19 Cf. Dessewffy and Hammer (1995), 11.
20 Berglund and Dellenbrant (1994), 17; they refer, i.a., to the inopportune policy of the East 
German communists in 1945 to decline an offer from the Social Democrats to merge, only to 
force through such a solution in the following year, when the Social Democrats had developed 
second thoughts.
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inclusion of Finland in the second category is particularly interesting, as it indicates a possible 
Soviet fallback position for the Eastern European countries: democratic and national but 
considerate of Soviet interests and concerns.21
The final decision to go for all-out power in Eastern Europe seems to have been moti­
vated largely by Soviet geostrategic considerations. With the introduction of the Truman 
Declaration of 12 March 1947,22 at the very latest, it became clear that the United States 
government was determined to stem communist influence in its sphere of influence in 
Europe, and had ‘opted for Western unity instead of East-West negotiations.’23 The United 
States’ adoption of the formerly British role as guardian of the balance of power in Europe 
proved a huge setback for the Soviets. While Britain, whose obligations the US took over, had 
been equally consistent in trying to halt Soviet and communist expansion especially in Po­
land, Czechoslovakia and Greece,24 it had done so on the basis of level-headed power-politics. 
The Americans, with their traditions of opposing cynical Realpolitik and ‘imperialism’, had 
to legitimise their intervention to protect vital interests with the high moral principles of 
upholding democracy and freedom. As Henry Kissinger puts it: ‘[Bargaining with the 
Soviets over reciprocal concessions would be out of the question. Henceforth, the conflict 
could only be settled by a change in Soviet purposes, by the collapse of the Soviet system, or 
both.’25
The obvious flip side of this American policy, known as containment, was that it en­
couraged the Soviet Union to force a similar consolidation within its own sphere—and then 
it too had to use the principle of ideological consistency to legitimise its hegemony in its 
sphere of influence. In the final analysis, Europe was divided on American initiative along 
ideological lines parallel with the spheres of interest delineation.
This process was mutually reinforcing. The exclusion from government of the French 
and Italian communist parties in early 1947 prompted a radical reassessment among the 
communists, as it increased the possibility of similar developments particularly in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, which both at the time still were ruled by semi-genuine coalitions. The 
immediate reaction was that the policy of harassment of non-communist parties in these two 
countries was turned into a campaign of outright suppression. The Marshall plan, which was 
to be operational in December that year, encouraged the Soviets to further tighten their 
political grip, knowing they could not compete with the United States when it came to 
buying influence.
Pavel Sudoplatov, the then Soviet spy chief, tells of how the news were received in 
Moscow that the British and American governments wanted to replace reparations from 
Germany and her allies with international aid, based not on bilateral agreements but on 
international control:
This was totally unacceptable because it would obstruct our consolidation of control 
in Eastern Europe. It meant that Communist parties already established in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would be deprived of economic
21 Kissinger (1995), 443.
22 According to this doctrine, directly provoked by the representation that Britain was unable to 
uphold its commitments in Greece and Turkey, US policy would be ‘helping free people to 
maintain their free institutions and national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to 
impose upon them totalitarian regimes.’
23 Kissinger (1995), 445.
24 According to the Churchill—Stalin deal of May 1944, Greece was within the British sphere of 
influence, while Romania was in the Soviet one.
25 Kissinger (1994), 453.
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levers of power. Six months after the Marshall Plan was rejected by the Soviet Union, 
multiparty rule in Eastern Europe came to an end.26
The decision to unify the administration of the Western zones of occupation in Germany, 
embodied by the introduction on 20 June 1948 of the Deutsche Mark, was interpreted by the 
Soviets as the final step of ideological consolidation on the part of the West. But by then, 
Moscow could already act from a position of increased strength, with reconstruction after the 
war well under way and having the near certainty of soon being able to match the American 
atomic bomb.
The widening rift between Moscow and Tito’s Yugoslavia was also of importance for the 
consolidation process. Ever since 1943, Tito had been pushing for a Balkan federation, an 
idea the Soviets agreed with in principle but would not openly endorse due to fears of upset­
ting the British. Blatantly disregarding instructions from the Centre, in 1947 Tito stepped up 
his support to the Greek communist insurgents, in direct contravention of the Anglo-Soviet 
spheres of interest deal, and simultaneously launched a diplomatic and goodwill offensive in 
Eastern Europe. Now the Soviets were faced not only with the prospect of worsening 
relations with the war-time Western allies, but with the equally serious possibility of a rival 
centre of communist authority. By late 1947, the Popular Fronts in Bulgaria and Romania 
had in fact been modified according to the Yugoslav model of revolution ‘from below’, i.e. 
revamping the Fronts into ‘disciplined mass organisations with an elected leadership’.27
By the spring of 1948 the Moscow-Belgrade split was a fact for everybody to see, with the 
Soviets charging Tito with every deviation in the book, and the Yugoslav leadership accusing 
the USSR of betraying its commitment to revolution. Indeed, ‘Titoism’, equated specifically 
with the concept of revolution ‘from below’, was to be one of the gravest accusations during 
the purges after the July 1948 expulsion of the Yugoslav communist party from Cominform. 
Ironically, the communist leaders of Yugoslavia and Albania remained deeply convinced 
Stalinists, horrified at the prospect of a break with Moscow. It was only the fear of their 
ouster on Soviet orders that provoked them to embark on an openly anti-Soviet course—even 
if that was a highly logical result of their war-time strategy in using patriotism for building 
mass support.
Ideological consistency was the basis for the hastened streamlining of the Socialist Bloc, 
manifested by the novel theory of Popular Democracy as only another form of the proletariat 
of the dictatorship. The policy of extreme condensation within the Bloc was not, however, to 
survive for long after the death of its architect, Joseph Stalin. Already by the mid-1950’s, the 
Central European group of communist states embarked on a path of social and political 
diversification. The GDR, Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, albeit not Romania and 
Hungary (nor Yugoslavia and Albania), ended up with multi-party systems. Policies of 
collectivisation and crash industrialisation were also at this point pursued with quite varying 
degrees of intensity.
Moreover, neither Stalin nor his successors did not choose the maximalist option, i.e. the 
formal incorporation of Eastern Europe into the USSR. This indeed appears to have been a 
possibility: Milovan Djilas has recounted how Stalin at a meeting in Moscow in January 
1948 proposed setting up a Polish-Czechoslovak, a Hungarian-Romanian, and a Yugoslav- 
Albanian-Bulgarian federation; and possibly merging them with, respectively, the 
Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Russian Federation.28
26 Sudoplatov et al. (1995), 232.
27 Swain and Swain (1991), 6. A thorough account of the early days of the Soviet-Yugoslav con­
flict is found in Vuchinich (1982).
28 Djilas (1963), 137. In this remarkable, illuminating first-hand account, Stalin is also quoted as 
saying The west will make Western Germany their own, and we will shall turn Eastern Ger-
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As the forms of the communist take-over greatly came to influence subsequent policy and 
the arrangement of institutions, it is worthwhile to sketch the developments in some detail. 
The countries will be treated in the order in which they went definitely communist.
Poland: A Question of Turf
During occupation, political life in Poland all but ceased. The level of collaboration was 
extremely low, and the Germans did not even try to install any Quisling-type regime. The 
local Polish resistance, which encompassed political liberals, agrarians, Catholic clericalists 
and right-wing extremists alike, conducted a low-level civil war against the occupation 
forces. At the same time, ethnic cleansing was conducted on a massive scale in the eastern 
provinces of Volhynia and Galicia, where Ukrainian bands, often with the support of the 
Germans, massacred tens or hundreds of thousands of Catholics during 1942, 1943 and 1944. 
This was part of a series of communal atrocities, which after 1944 continued in the form of a 
communist-led campaign against the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army. Then, large areas in 
the south-east were laid waste as a massive transfer of ethnic Ukrainians to the newly-acquired 
north-west was organised.29
As Poland was being liberated, the communists had the cards stacked strongly in their 
favour, the stackers being the military administration that the Red Army and Soviet security 
organs immediately set up to protect the Polish Committee of National Liberation (in 
Polish: PKWN). This had been flown in from Moscow in July 1944 to take charge in the first 
liberated areas, in pre-emptive action directed against the bourgeois Government-in-Exile in 
London and its Home Army, the Armia Krajowa (AK).
This was a truly amazing reversal of fortune. The previous two decades had not been 
fortuitous to Polish communism. Thoroughly discredited in popular terms by their rallying 
to the enemy during the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, the communists never regained more 
than marginal importance on the national political arena. The inter-war party membership 
predominantly, though not overwhelmingly, comprised of Jews and the party was militantly 
atheist and supportive of Soviet claims on territories lost to Poland; none of which circum­
stances were set to enhance mass support among the Catholic majority of the Polish polity. 
Many leading Polish Bolsheviks, including Feliks Dzierzynski, the first head of the Cheka, 
indeed decided to settle permanently in the USSR.
After losing their two seats in the Sejm in 1922, the Polish Communist Party (KPP) never 
regained parliamentary representation. In 1926 the communists, together with elements of 
the military and the moderate left, supported the May coup but then ‘became the laughing­
stock in political circles’ when they were promptly dispersed by Pilsudski’s gendarmes for 
doing so.30 The Marshal was, as we have seen, not at all interested in replacing a conservative 
government with a leftist coalition, but rather in altogether ridding Poland of what he 
perceived as degenerated party politics. The tally in 1937 recorded only 3,927 KPP mem­
bers31, but it was nevertheless a high-water mark. In 1938 the party was dissolved by the 
Comintern, and most of its members with families physically liquidated—the prevailing 
estimate of victims is around 5,000. The few who survived did so mainly because of freak
many into our own state. ’; no less than a modern implementation of cuius regio eius religio. 
However, in 1946 the Generalissimus declared to Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists that ‘all 
of Germany must be ours, must be communist.’ This attests to the somewhat erratic style of de­
cision-making during Stalin’s last years.
29 Cf. Davies (1995), 8-9.
^Davies (1986), 90 pp; Grzybowski (1994), 37 pp.
31 Davies (1986), 91; Rupnik (1989), 117, gives a figure of ‘barely 20,000 members before the 
war.’
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circumstances; i.e. being held in Polish jails, living in the West, or kept on ice by the NKVD 
for possible future use. The campaign against the KPP had many motives. One was Stalin’s 
wish to settle old accounts; the party had strong internationalist traditions, and had largely 
sided with Trotsky in the 20’s. Also, the Soviets harboured strong (and apparently well- 
founded) suspicions that the KPP was infiltrated by Polish counter-intelligence.
New material for the purges was received with the Soviet occupation of Poland’s Eastern 
half, starting 17 September 1939, as a result of the Secret Protocol to Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Non-Aggression pact of 23 August. Some 200,000 square kilometres of formerly Polish 
territory was annexed to the USSR, as Molotov declared that ‘the Bastard of Versailles’, as he 
called it, had ‘ceased to exist’. The Germans and Soviets, in their respective zones of occu­
pation and annexation, proceeded with much the same aim: the destruction of all potentially 
hostile elements within Polish society.32 In this the NKVD and Gestapo co-operated closely, the 
Soviets handing over German communist emigres and Jews in exchange for deviant leftists 
and nationalist Ukrainians.
When Germany then invaded the USSR in June 1941 and Soviet strategy again required a 
Polish communist party, the KPPs ranks were so utterly decimated that an altogether new 
party had to be constituted, clandestinely in Warsaw in January 1942. Its core consisted of a 
handful of KPP survivors and of an ‘initiative group’ smuggled in from the USSR. In its first 
manifesto, the party, named the Polish Workers Party (PWP), ‘stressed the twin goals of 
national independence and social revolution, thereby breaking with the internationalist 
ideology of the KPP and initiating the characteristic blend of Nationalism and Leninist 
Socialism.’33 Yet the natives did not get a free reign:
At this same time, in Moscow, the Polish Bureau of the CPSU set up a body called the 
Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) under the chairmanship of Wanda Wasiliewska. Their 
aim was to create a vehicle for Soviet control over all the new Polish organisations, 
both military and civilian, which were then in the making [...] The ZPP was designed 
not so much to strengthen the Polish communists as to attract all Poles irrespective of 
their political connections who could be induced to serve under Soviet orders.34
According to this strategy, the main efforts of the ZPP and the PWP were not to be directed at 
the anti-Nazi struggle (for which the Soviet army would take prime responsibility), but 
against the London government and its institutions. Sights were already set on the post-war 
era. It follows that the co-operation between the PWP and other political organisations was 
not part of a long-term strategy of generating mass support: any alliances were likely to be of 
a temporary character.
Stalin followed what could be termed a dual strategy; communists would be 
encouraged to attain power through a popular front ‘from below’, but, as a back-up in 
case that failed, Stalin built up within the Soviet Union parallel Communist party
32 Reed and Fisher (1988). The 1940 Soviet massacre of Polish officers at Katyn is the most in­
famous example. Katyn was not an isolated occurrence: in ‘Western Ukraine’, political commis­
sars handed out leaflets urging the Ukrainians and poor peasants to take out revenge with 
slogans such as: ‘For Poles, masters and dogs, a dog’s death’, uniting appeals of national libera­
tion and class emancipation. See Bullock (1993), 709, quoting Jan T. Gross, Revolution from 
Abroad; The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, (Princeton 
1988).
33 Davies (1986), 91.
34 Davies (1986), 92-96 points out that the consistent strategy of the Soviets was that ‘every time 
that the Polish communist element attempted to establish measure of autonomy, it was over­
taken shortly by the imposition of a watch-dog group sent from Moscow’. Cf. Toranska (1987), 
an indispensable illumination of the era of High Stalinism in Poland.
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organisations which could intervene decisively with the support of the Red Army. 
These organisations [...] played a crucial role in Poland where the communists’ 
popular mandate scarcely existed.35
That highly cynical view is not wholly undisputed. There may in fact have occurred a reason­
able increase in the spontaneous support of communism after 1941, as the war set strong 
social forces in motion. Leftist parties had a chance of generating support ‘by fulfilling the 
expectations of the majority which craved for social reforms such as agrarian reform, the 
nationalisation of industry and basic resources and democratisation of access to education and 
culture’.36 Indeed, until after the Yalta Conference, the London Government-in-Exile not 
only insisted on the pre-1939 boundaries, but also wanted to retain the authoritarian constitu­
tion of 1935.
The PWP in Warsaw had in fact initially been calling for a Popular Front ‘without 
traitors or capitulators’, but in 1943, on the Comintern’s insistence, the line softened for a 
while. The Party was prepared—or rather managed—to set up alliances with some second- 
rate forces, mainly the left flank of the Polish Socialist Party (PSS) and some leftist 
organisations catering to peasants and intellectuals. Nevertheless, only marginal elements 
even on the left of Polish politics actually defected from the London to the Moscow camp 
before early 1945. Talks also started with the Warsaw representatives of the London 
Government, and reached moderate success. But as the Red Army advanced, the Soviets took 
full control of the local communist parties. In Poland, this meant a purge of the home 
communists led by Gomulka, who had sinned by launching a communist partisan movement 
without Moscow’s blessing, and went to far in the forging of alliances.
HUFVUDSTADSBLADET ARCHIVES
People's Power: 
Socialism Soviet 
style was 
introduced 
immediately 
after the 
annexation of 
Eastern Poland. 
Here a 'Workers' 
and Peasants' 
Council' in 
Grodno holding 
its first meeting 
in October 1939
The new Secretary-General of the PWP was Boleslaw Bierut, head of the Soviet-sponsored 
Lublin interim government. Ever since returning to Poland in the summer of 1943 Bierut, a 
Comintern operative, had insisted that undisputed communist control over the popular front
35 Swain and Swain (1993), 33.
Y Grzybowski (1991), 43.
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set up by Gomulka was more important than whether or not the socialists joined it. The 
Bierut strategy was clear: ally only with weaker forces that can later be swallowed. This was 
demonstrated again in February 1945 when the relatively broad-based Council of National 
Unity cut its ties with London, recognised the Yalta agreement and created prospects for a 
genuine government of national unity. The Soviet secret services had to ferry the representa­
tives of the Council to Moscow,37 as Stalin and Molotov stalled all talks on Poland’s future 
with the US and Britain.38
At this time, outright civil war broke out between fighters from the Home Army and 
communist-led security forces aided by the Red Army. Faced with the fait accompli of Soviet 
control in Poland, and fatally weakened by losses during the Warsaw uprising of August 
1944, the Home Army had been formally disbanded in February 1945, with most members 
folding their tents, others joining the communists and a few going underground. The last 
holdouts of the AK were on the whole defeated and disarmed by April, although armed 
resistance continued on a moderate scale for another two years.39
The communist establishment which was installed to rule Poland with Soviet support was 
truly a motley crew. Norman Davies lists40 five main categories, ingredients which in differ­
ent combinations were seen all over Eastern Europe.
(1) the few hundred survivors of the pre-war KPP, premier among them Gomulka;
(2) Soviet citizens of Polish origin, including Bierut, Radkiewicz, Romkowski and 
Zawadzki, all former or present employees of the Soviet security apparatus. Stanislaw 
Radkiewicz, a native of Byelorussia, became the first chief of the communist secret police, the 
Urzad Bezpieczenstwa, set up in late 1944, and Romkowski his deputy. The most influential 
in this category was Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski, a Soviet citizen who ran the Polish 
armed forces as Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief until 1956, as well as being 
Deputy Premier and Politburo member;
(3) Polish communists and radical leftists from the West, such as the economist Oskar 
Lange, or Poles previously active in European Resistance, such as Gierek, a miner from 
Belgium; and
(4) Poles recruited among the huge number of refugees, deportees and prisoners in the 
USSR. They had in early 1943 been permitted to form a ‘Union of Polish Patriots’, and later 
also ‘Kosciuszko’ units within the Red Army eventually numbering more than 100,000 men. 
Many were of Jewish origin, as the Soviet authorities ‘judged them unlikely to sympathise 
with the Polish population at large, and were drafted in force to the security organs.’
Not leaving anything to chance, the Soviets took care that the dominant group consisted 
of:
(5) ‘acting Poles’, i.e. Russians or Ukrainians hastily dressed in Polish uniform, and often 
not even possessing more than rudimentary command of the Polish language.
This set-up points to the extent of compulsion, control and terror. Already in May 1945, 
the communist-controlled security apparatus in Poland numbered some 11,000 members:
37 The 16 were arrested in Marshal Zhukov’s HQ even though they had been assured of immu­
nity. They were eventually put on public trial in Moscow in June 1945 for ‘subversion’, and sen­
tenced to prison and hard labour.
38 Tismaneanu (1993), 16-17; Swain and Swain (1993), 41-42.
39 The main forces of armed resistance were right-wing National Armed Forces (NSZ), fighting 
in the Holy Cross mountains until late 1945; the National Democrat-oriented Freedom and 
Independence Movement WiN, its 40,000 men in the Lublin—Bialystok area surrendering to an 
amnesty in February 1947; and the nationalist Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army (UPA), which was 
finally routed by joint Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak forces in July 1947, and by the extensive 
Vistula programme of population transfers to the north and north-west. See Davies (1986), 80.
40 Davies (1986), 45-47.
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‘Throughout Eastern Europe communist-run security services supervised, save in Yugoslavia 
and Albania, by Soviet “advisers”, played a crucial part in the transition to “people’s 
democracies’”, and this was more pronounced in Poland than anywhere else, save possibly the 
Soviet occupation zone in Germany. Until 1947 Soviet advisers with the right to final 
decision were posted to every UB office.41
The provisional government also included a number of pre-war glitterati. Among those 
co-opted were Edward Osobka-Morawski (first Chairman of the Committee for National 
Liberation and then, until early 1947, Chairman of the Council of Ministers), who had led a 
break-away pro-communist faction of the Socialist Party before the war; the demoted 
General Michal Roma-Zymierski (the first Minster of Defence); the Zionist Sejm deputy 
Emil Sommerstein; Kwiatkowski, the pre-war Finance Minister; and even Boleslaw Piasecki, 
known as leader of the ONR and the Palanga, the pre-war fascists. Piasecki was to set up the 
Pax organisation, which tried to establish a common communist-Catholic platform to rule 
the country.42
On 28 June 1945, the communists scored a major victory when the Prime Minister of the 
London government, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the right wing of the Peasant move­
ment agreed to return from exile and enter into a Provisional Government of National 
Unity. At this point it was not overtly dominated by the communists or their allies; the 
agrarian, socialist and communist parties had six seats each, the Catholic Labour Party 
three—in fact, though, all other operating parties were infiltrated by the communists. The
41 Andrew and Gordievsky (1990), 285; 287. The UB was the communist secret police.
42 Piasecki’s story, bizarre as it is, is worth recounting parenthetically as it illus trates the lengths 
to which the Soviets were prepared to go to ally themselves with the generic radicals—and, to a 
lesser extent, to appease the Catholic Church.
In the summer of 1945 he was sprung from Warsaw’s Mokotow prison by the NKVD General 
Ivan Serov after intervention from prominent Polish communists, particularly Politburo 
member Jakub Berman, and given the task of publishing a Catholic journal bearing the non­
committal title Dzis i Jutro (Today and Tomorrow). Immediately after his release, he also met 
repeatedly with Gomulka. The magazine had a clear, if coy, Catholicist and nationalist stance, 
from the outset propagating the Catholic nationalist agenda that Piasecki had voiced already 
during the Falanga days. To bridge the gap between spirituality and materialism he coined the 
term ‘wieloswiatopogladowosc’; roughly translatable as ‘multiple-world-viewism’ but in effect 
meaning pluralism. The magazine and the Pax organisation that developed created around it 
soon developed into a refuge for ‘poor and persecuted clerics, ruined noblemen, homeless 
leftists, Catholic liberals and nationalists. Bishops, even the Cardinal Primate himself, started to 
treasure the good offices of Piasecki, particularly during the Stalinist era‘. La., he served as a 
conduit when the communists and the Church struck their first deal in 1950. Piasecki, 
however, played it both ways, financing an association of ‘Patriotic Priests’, i.e. collaborators with 
the regime against the express orders of the Vatican. Only three days before Stalin’s death in 
March 1953 he made an ultimatum to Primate Wyszynski: either support capitalism or the 
building of socialism. When Wyszynski was arrested the following autumn, Pax all but 
collapsed, and Piasecki was widely branded as a traitor when he spoke out against liberalisation 
during the Hungarian crisis of 1956.
At the same time Piasecki hit it bit—very big—financially. Within a decade after the war he 
controlled a vast business empire publishing novels, prayer books and papers with a combined 
circulation of more than 300,000, and virtually cornered the market in religious paraphernalia. 
With a Jaguar motor car in the stable of his luxury villa and a private telephone line to the secu­
rity police, he was the ‘first and greatest capitalist in the communist Eastern Bloc’. Piasecki died 
on New Year’s Eve 1978/79. Cf. Stehle (1995); Toranska (1987) includes accounts of Berman’s, 
Gomulka’s, Bierut’s, and the secret policewoman Julia ‘Lula’ Bristigerowa’s discussions with and 
about Piasecki.
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main significance of Mikolajczyk’s return was that it led the US and British to recognise the 
transitional government, abandoning its London rival.
As the socialists and communists pushed for swift reform, i.a. nationalising all factories 
with more than forty employees and putting production under state control, Mikolajczyk, 
the peasant leader and former Prime Minister in the London government, found himself in 
the odd position of simultaneously being Vice Premier and for all practical purposes leader 
of the opposition. The showdown came during the plebiscite in the summer of 1946. Miko­
lajczyk directed his supporters to vote no to one of the three—all rhetorical—questions 
posed, so as to differentiate from the communist-dominated bloc. After some blatant vote 
rigging the Bloc declared a resounding victory for its ‘three times yes’ line, which de­
moralised the Mikolajczyk camp.
In November 1946 the socialists agreed to an election pact with the PWP, fearing that a 
Mikolajczyk comeback would mean reaction, Soviet clampdown and even a new civil war. In 
the February 1947 elections the Bloc was reported as having won four of every five votes cast; 
the result is suspicious, to say the least. Mikolajczyk soon after got word that he was about to 
be implicated as a traitor and foreign spy, and fearing for his life slipped out of the country in 
October. Within two years the party system was fully consolidated under the complete 
hegemony of the communist party, renamed the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP; in 
Polish: PZPR) after finally amalgamating with the rump Socialist Party.43
Subordination to the Soviets was to be the guiding light for the communist party well 
into the 50’s, and any attempt to create a ‘Polish path to socialism’ was instantly repressed, as 
witnessed by the replacement of Gomulka with Bierut in late 1948. Gomulka was a devout 
Stalinist, but nevertheless had second thoughts about the Party joining the Cominform, 
doubted the terms of the PWP merger with the socialists, and opposed agricultural 
collectivisation.
The intentions of the communists’ Front tactics can be debated. One initial aim was 
certainly to undermine the London government’s claims to legitimacy by presenting the 
alternative ones in Lublin and Warsaw as the sole authorities of real power in the land. 
Another motivation, linked to the first, was to placate the Western Allies. The strategy was 
only partly successful. In a letter to Churchill in March 1945, Stalin demanded that the 
Polish government be manned with individuals who not only were ‘not fundamentally anti- 
Soviet’, but insisted on ‘persons who have actively shown a friendly attitude towards the 
Soviet Union and who are honestly prepared to co-operate with the Soviet state.’44 This goes 
to show the virtually non-existent room for manoeuvring available to the Poles, including the 
local communists. It may not have been absolutely clear to the Soviets or to the Polish 
communists, but the West gave up early on Poland, instead concentrating on the German 
question. Not wholly without significance was the disgust which Western public opinion felt 
after the anti-Jewish pogroms in Cracow in 1945 and in Kielce in 1946.45
One urgent task for the communists was to create a mass following. This was not easy: ‘in 
the immediate post-war years, the communist party and its allies commanded no significant 
popular support in the country. The great majority of Poles remained loyal to the Polish 
Government-in-Exile and, subsequently, supported the opposition lead by the Polish Peasants 
Party [led by Mikolajczyk]’46 But as the party strengthened its hold on power, membership
43 This process is described in detail in Grzybowski (1994), 40-47; also Coutouvidis and Rey­
nolds (1986), Krzeminski (1993), 114-7 and Davies (1986), 4-6 and 80-100.
44 The letter is quoted in Churchill (1954), 436.
45 Some recent evidence strengthen the impression that Soviet and communist agents were 
instrumental in provoking the pogroms, with the intent of making Western opinion less 
favourably disposed to stand up for Poland’s sovereignty. Cf. Krzeminski (1993), 119.
46 Bromke (1967), 60-1.
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rolls expanded to some 1.3 million by the end of 1948. The absorption of the Socialist Party, 
however, accounted for a large portion of the influx.47
Obviously, all these new members had not been closet communists before; in case they had 
been politically active at all, it was likely to have been in some of the more mainstream pre­
war parties or movements. A large portion of the new membership had a peasant background 
and were eager for social advancement. Many others, though this portion started decreasing 
already in the 50’s, were industrial workers. The recruitment drive was also aided by the use 
of political patronage, especially in the ‘Recovered Territories’, i.e. the areas to the East of the 
Oder-Neisse line annexed from Germany. These were resettled with some five million new 
inhabitants, mainly from Central Poland but also from the eastern provinces lost to the 
USSR—‘Polish Lwow moved to German Breslau’, as somebody has observed. These 
territories, devastated and plundered, were ‘for all practical purposes treated as a communist 
colony, where non-communist parties were unable to establish even a toe-hold.’48
The legality and historical justification of Polish claims to the lands were shaky at best, 
and it is clear that the settlers were unsure of their future. Stalin’s curt statement at Potsdam 
that the Western, not—as at Churchill appears to have understood—the Eastern Neisse 
(Nysa) would constitute the new Polish-German border indicates shrewd Soviet calculation: 
‘the enmity between Poland and Germany would be intractable if Poland acquired historic 
German territories, including the ancient German city of Breslau, and evicted 5 million 
more Germans’. This was part of Stalin’s effort to make the Poles feel that their security and 
territorial integrity was, in the final analysis, dependent on the support of the USSR.49 The 
Polish communists wasted no time in pointing to the alliance with the Soviet Union as the 
only safe guarantee against German revanchism. This argument was indeed to be a permanent 
slogan of the PUWP and a basis for genuine mass support.
Despite the loss of ancient Polish cities and districts such as Lwow (Lviv) and Wilno 
(Vilnius) to the USSR, Polish nationalists indeed had some reason to rejoice. Never in history 
had the Polish state had a more homogenous population base; 96 per cent were now Polish­
speaking Catholics. Not only was the pre-war Dmowski’ite vision of a smaller but ethnically 
unitary, ‘Piast-style’ state revived. The communists were quick to exploit the fact: history was 
vigorously reinterpreted and rewritten to legitimise the new borders and propagate Slavic 
unity. The hero of the day was, absurdly, the Piast Prince Mieszko I, who in 966 had chanced 
to receive Christianity from the Slav Bohemians instead of from the Germans.
Hungary: From Occupation to Sovietisation
Hungary, in contrast to both Poland and Czechoslovakia (but like Romania and Bulgaria), 
had been an ally of Germany. This meant that the Red Army eventually entered not as a 
liberator, but formally as a conqueror, occupying the country and installing a Soviet- 
dominated Allied Control Commission that was to play a active and crucial role in the 
communists ascent to power.50
In Hungary, the pre-war communist party had been in a sorry state almost similar to that 
of its Polish or Romanian counterparts. Acting in illegality, it also carried the double-edged
47Rupnik (1989), 117.
48 Schopflin (1993), 67. The expulsions are chronicled in great and gruesome detail in the 
three-volume Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bev dikerung aus den Gebieten ostlich der Oder- 
Neisse, (Augsburg 1993), originally published in 1954 as a Federal Ministry for Expellees white- 
book. Wiskemann (1967) provides a good summary of the events.
49 Kissinger (1995), 434-5.
50 A good overview of Hungarian politics in the immediate post-war years is provided by Gati 
(1986), particularly pp 73-99.
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stigma of the short-lived Soviet Republic under Bela Kun in 1919: the good news for the 
Hungarian communists was that they belonged to the few who actually had managed to stage 
a successful revolution, the bad news that they were booted out of power within weeks. After 
1919, the communists quickly lapsed into obscurity. By the 30’s, the Hungarian Party was 
down to a membership of 2,000, and in 1936 the party organisation was even temporarily 
dissolved. Even if the party was given some boost by the Hungarian annexation of Slovakia, 
with its relatively well developed communist movement, at the end of the war it is estimated 
as having had a membership of only some 3,000 in a population of ten million.51
For most of the war, the resistance against the pro-German, authoritarian policies was 
almost exclusively led by an alliance of the Socialist and Smallholders Parties. The commu­
nists remained an essentially irrelevant political force, even to the somewhat tragicomic 
extent that the leaders of the illegal party in 1943 again ordered its dissolution. The 
opportunity for the communists came when the Socialist and Smallholders Parties were 
finally banned and forced underground in March 1944. Stressing their common illegality, 
the communist home leader Laszlo Rajk persuaded these two parties to form a tripartite 
alliance on the basis of equality.
On 1 October 1944, a delegation from Admiral Horthy arrived in Moscow to negotiate 
an armistice. This provoked the Germans to take control of the capital and the vital 
Hungarian oil fields, and to install a puppet regime under the radical-right Arrow Cross 
movement. By then Soviet troops were already advancing into Hungary proper, and leftist 
activists started flowing to Soviet-controlled territory in order to take up arms against the 
brutal Arrow Crossers. The communists and socialists planned a merger and the staging of a 
Slovak-style uprising to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat.52
This was not what the Soviets had in mind. At this stage Moscow did not want any ultra­
revolutionary behaviour, insisting instead on a ‘Popular Front’ model of initial broad-based 
coalitions. The Moscow-dictated policy line won the day in early 1945, when the highest 
party leadership returned from exile in the USSR. It had much in common with its Polish, 
Czechoslovak and Romanian colleagues: it was largely Jewish, had strong Stalinist leanings 
and professed total loyalty to Moscow. The ‘Muscovites’, to quote one authority, ‘established 
a clique dictatorship under a leading foursome made up of General Secretary Rakosi and his 
faithful underlings Ernd Gerd (the former NKVD officer who had presided over the purge of 
anti-Stalinist revolutionaries in Barcelona during the Spanish civil war), Mihaly Farkas, and 
Jozsef Revai, a former disciple of the celebrated Marxist thinker Gyorgy Lucacs who had 
been converted to hard-line Stalinism.’53 They denounced the ‘Left sectarian veterans of 
1919’, strengthened the alliance with the Socialist Party, grabbed hold of the trade unions, 
but made no decisive bid for power. Energies were concentrated on a longer-term project, 
undermining the country’s clearly strongest political force in terms of electoral support, i.e. 
the Smallholders Party.
Despite backing from the Soviet occupation authorities, the communist party polled only 
17 per cent of the vote in the November 1945 general elections. These were resoundingly 
won by the Smallholders party with no less than 57 per cent of the vote. Even the social 
democrats, with 17.4 per cent, were ahead of the communists.54 Nevertheless, a grand 
coalition remained in place, though the leftist parties formed a front within the front which 
controlled the important security forces and the unions. The communists, making use of
51 Schopflin (1993), 53; Rupnik (1989), 117.
52 Swain and Swain (1993), 50 pp; Bullock (1993), 929-30.
53 Schopflin (1993), 17. Incidentally, of the four only Revai was non-Jewish. The leading ‘Home 
Communist’, Laszlo Rajk, as well the first head of the communist secret police, the AVO or 
Allamvedelmi Oszdly, Gabor Peter, were also Jews.
54 Grzybowski (1994b), 173.
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secret agents and ‘crypto-communists’ ‘systematically created or strengthened conflicts 
among and inside rival parties. These splinter groups were then swept out of government 
with allegations that they were ’’fascist” or “enemies of the people’s democracy.’”55
The uneasy coalition between the radical left and the Smallholders came to an end in early 
1947. On the previous New Year’s Eve, the communist-controlled Interior Ministry and the 
security service reported having uncovered a conspiracy in which officials of the Smallholders 
were implicated as trying to restore the Regency, which by then was a criminal offence. The 
then Prime Minister, the Smallholders’ leader Ferenc Nagy was not impressed with the 
evidence and refused to authorise arrests, but the Soviets intervened and arrested the 
‘conspirators’. The round-up pulled in the main leadership of the Smallholders Party, who 
were then charged with plotting against the occupation forces. This was clearly over the top, 
albeit that the right wing of the Smallholders Party ever since 1945 had campaigned against 
the occupation, the heavy reparations and communist influence, as well as raised the question 
of the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia in no less than chauvinistic terms.
The repression weakened the Smallholders Party to the extent that it lost its leading role 
in the coalition. Nagy resigned after being threatened with implication in anti-Soviet 
activities; in May he decided not to return from a holiday in Switzerland. Then the National 
Party was banned. The election law was modified so that the circle of citizens excluded from 
the franchise extended even to local-level leaders of the inter-war Government Party, to those 
who had been interned or sentenced in political cases since 1945, and to various members of 
‘rightist groups’: in all, 460,000 people were expelled from the electoral register, which was 
thus cut down to some 5.3 million voters.56 Yet despite this ‘salami tactics’—the catch-phrase 
coined by Rakosi—and blatant (but apparently incompetent) vote-rigging,57 not even the 
August 1947 election gave the communists an indisputable grip on power. They did become 
the single largest party, but still commanded far from a majority on their own after polling 
only 22.3 per cent of the vote.
From then on developments largely followed the same path as in Czechoslovakia some 
months later. The Independence Party was dissolved in late 1947, while the National Peasant 
Party was headed by a communist penetration agent, Ferenc Erdei. In March 1948 the left 
wing of the socialists won out and that party merged with the communist party into the 
Hungarian Workers Party. Already in early 1947 a National (later called Popular) 
Independence Front had been established as an umbrella organisation for the leftist parties in 
government and major social organisations; it was more a subsidiary of the communist party 
than dominated by it. Among other things, the Front had the right to screen all candidates for 
public office. Equipped with these powers the front was used as the vehicle to make the May 
1949 elections into a tightly controlled plebiscite for communist rule. Unsurprisingly, it was 
announced that 95.6 per cent of voters had supported the single Front list, and one-party rule 
was introduced for all practical purposes. It was, however, not until 1953 that the non­
communist parties were evicted from the Front and had to formally dissolve.58
Czechoslovakia: Suave Manouevering and Intimidation
Czechoslovakia was the only Central European country where the communists enjoyed 
substantial support in the 1920’s and 1930’s, and the party was allowed to operate freely until 
the Munich partition. Starting off in 1918 as a party with strong Austro-Marxist leanings, it
55 Dessewffy and Hammer (1995), 12.
56 Dessewffy and Hammer (1995), 13.
57 Cf. Gati (1986), 23 pp; much of the fraud apparently had to do with the misuse of absentee 
voters’ blue ballot slips.
58 For a detailed documentation of the story, see Ignotus (1975).
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was taken over by the Comintern machinery in the late 20’s, Bolshevised, and purged to blind 
obedience. As the party was transformed into a Leninist cadre organisation, membership rolls 
shrunk by more than 90 per cent from 1918 to the early 30’s, and ‘from this stage until the 
60’s, the KSC remained one of the most obedient parties from Moscow’s standpoint.’ 59 Still, 
retaining formal legality meant that the main part of the party cadres remained in Czecho­
slovakia during the 30’s, thus surviving the most ferocious Moscow purges.
As a result of the 1938 Munich agreement, the Sudetenland was annexed by Germany and 
southern Slovakia by Hungary. The rest of Slovakia as well as the eastern province of 
Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) took the opportunity to declare autonomy. In March the 
following year the Germans marched into Prague and created a Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia, where some Czech institutions were formally preserved but totally subjected to the 
‘protector’. Slovakia then declared full independence and gained at least the trappings of it 
under the leadership of the radical nationalist prelate Jozef Tiso and the auspices of Nazi 
Germany. Finalising the carve-up, Ruthenia was annexed by Hungary in March 1939, while 
Poland took over the Czechoslovak half of the Teschen (Tesin, Cieszyn) area.
Though the communists came to dominate the resistance movement, the scope of their 
activities in the Czech lands was very limited until the German withdrawal starting in April 
1945. The communists were able to organise and dominate the ‘Revolutionary National 
Committees’ then set up locally, but did not even try to wrest control of the Czech National 
Council, where they were one party among several.
The situation was different in Slovakia. The resistance movement there was formally led 
by the Slovak National Council set up in the summer of 1943. In theory there was a parity in 
the Council between communist and non-communist representatives. The communists, 
however, had the advantage of controlling their own partisan movement: in August 1944 it 
staged an armed uprising which, although crushed within a few weeks, bestowed increased 
prestige upon the communists and helped them to eventually dominate the so-called national 
committees set up after the Soviets crossed into Slovakia in October 1944. Some weeks 
earlier, the Slovak social democrats had merged with the Slovak communists; the reason for 
preserving the autonomy of the Slovak communist party for some time appears to have been 
the need to prevent the social democrats from forming a strong party operating over the 
whole territory of Czechoslovakia.60
In May 1945, president Benes returned from exile and was presented with a National 
Front National Assembly, set up according to the five-party Kosice power-sharing agreement 
of April 1945. In the interim Cabinet which was formed, the communist and social 
democratic parties were only two out of five parties represented, though, significantly, they 
controlled the sensitive ministries of Interior (with police, security forces and army), 
Information, Education and Agriculture (including land reform). Significantly, the main 
rival of the communists, the Agrarian Party, was banned from operating, as were all fascist 
and semi-fascist parties.
Meanwhile, in the Sudetenland and elsewhere, some three million ethnic Germans and 
thousands of ethnic Hungarians were forcibly expelled, creating a terra inoccupata similar to 
the one in Poland.61 As in Poland’s ‘Recovered Territories’, communist patronage became
59 Schopflin (1993), 53; see also Bankowicz (1994), 145 pp.
60 Broklova (1995), 34. The story of the communist ascent to power in Czechoslovakia is 
documented in Bloomfield (1979), Kaplan (1987) and Myant (1981).
61 The Germans in Czechoslovakia before the war counted 3.5 million, 22 per cent of the total 
population. But whereas most of Lower Silesia, Pomerania and Prussia were thoroughly 
Germanised, in Bohemia and Moravia, Germans and Czechs had for centuries lived in a mosaic 
of ethnic and linguistic diversity, and never been subjects of the German Reich. Apart from the 
Sudetenland rim, Central Bohemia and Moravia also had a substantial German-speaking
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rampant. On 25 October 1945, Benes issued the draconian Presidential Decree No. 108, 
which stipulated confiscation without compensation of ‘property of physical persons of 
German or Magyar nationality’. By then most remaining Germans were already packing to 
leave.62 Radical land reform was implemented and all enterprises employing more than 150 
people were expropriated; the confiscation was made substantially easier and less 
controversial by the fact that nearly 70 per cent of Czechoslovakia’s national wealth had been 
in Nazi hands.63 Electoral law was amended so as to exclude all citizens not of Czech, Slovak 
or Slavonic nationality, i.e. primarily Germans and Hungarians, but also Jews.64
The presidency retained, as a legacy from the First Republic, extensive executive powers, 
but Benes remained strangely aloof and deferential in his dealings with Soviet leaders, 
‘anxious to please and be accommodating’.65 His strangely passive behaviour during the 
events of February 1948 and his disappearance from the political scene thereafter do indeed 
lend some credence to allegations that the President actually was a long-serving Soviet agent 
of influence.66
Yet the Czechoslovak communists did not follow the Polish example. Instead of quickly 
taking over the National Front and seizing power, they—on direct instructions from Mos­
cow—embarked on a gradualist and rather unexciting path to socialism. The first post-war 
parliamentary elections were held in May 1946, when the communists won 38 per cent by 
themselves, more than twice the share of any other party, and a majority of 51 per cent to­
gether with their socialist allies. The left was strongest in Bohemia and Moravia, while in 
Slovakia the Democratic Party, a formation that presented itself as all-national and cam­
paigned under the broad slogan ‘For the triumph of democracy and the Christian world 
outlook’, won no less than 62 per cent of the vote.
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The pre-election programmes of all competing parties were leftist and pro-Slavonic in 
character. ‘What was absent in them was orientation on Central Europe and Europe in 
general. The supra-national humanitarian accent of the pre-Munich republic was attenuated.’ 
The communist party presented itself as ‘national and patriotic’, and as a guardian of Czecho­
slovakia’s position in the Slavonic family with the mighty Soviet Union as its head. While 
stressing the fraternity between Czech and Slovak, it took a radical line on the national 
minorities, demanding the expulsion of every single ethnic German and a population ex­
change with Hungary. The Slovak communists were even more militant, trying to link their 
brand of communism with Slovak national tradition.67
The strong showing in the elections seems to have prompted the Party, led by the former 
Moscow emigre Klement Gottwald (already Prime Minister in a communist-dominated 
cabinet) to take a more radical approach, possibly fearing that its ascent might prompt other 
parties in the National Front to bloc against the left. The risk had increased with Secretary- 
General Rudolf Slansky’s Tito-inspired success in transforming the National Front into 
more of a mass organisation, with a more visible role given to trade unions, women, youth 
and other civic organisations. From the Soviet point of view this created the double jeopardy 
of the communists losing actual control of the Front—as soon was to happen in France and 
Italy—and of Moscow losing control of the Party.68
The fears were exacerbated by opinion polls in January 1948 which forecast that the 
communist share of the votes in the elections set for May would fall to 28 per cent.69 Soviet 
agents in the country forwarded increasingly pessimistic assessments to Moscow, outlining 
the prospect of an impending anti-communist coup d’etat.7® The Soviet leadership then 
decided on a change of strategy, prompting a drawing-up of lists of leading opponents of 
communism and preparing for a ‘decapitation of reaction’.
The first sign of a sea change was that Czechoslovakia withdrew from participation in the 
Marshall plan, which the Gottwald government rather surprisingly had acceded to in July 
1947. In February 1948, Gottwald declared that only the left wings of bourgeois parties were 
acceptable as partners, and ‘action committees’ were formed to purge the Front, as well as 
other parties and organisations.71 The security forces had by then been purged and refilled 
their ranks with hard-line communist supporters. The Stdtni Bezbecnost geared up it accu­
sations against the communist party leadership for being soft and ‘coddling reaction’, and 
also provided all ministers with ‘bodyguards’ whose real job was to spy on them. All this led 
to an outcry among the Catholic, Democrat and National Socialist parties. Their representa­
tives in cabinet resigned en masse, mistakenly expecting this to lead to the fall of Gottwald 
and his cabinet and immediate new elections. The Prime Minister had no such plans, how­
ever, instead letting armed communist militia loose on the streets and in the factories and 
having the security forces detain non-communist leaders and activists.
In early March, parliament, in an atmosphere of fear, approved the programme statement 
of Gottwald’s government and voted for the introduction of a single National Front ballot. 
The left wing of the social democrats under the fellow-traveller and former Czechoslovak 
Ambassador to Moscow, Zolenek Fierlinger, agreed to join the communist party in a new 
government, on conditions dictated by the latter and the action committees. In May a new 
constitution was enacted by the rump National Assembly, defining Czechoslovakia as a 
People’s Democracy on the road towards socialism. Soon after, elections were held in which 
the electorate was faced with the alternatives of endorsing or rejecting the National Front
67 Broklova (1995), 39.
68 Swain and Swain (1993), 48-49; Bankowicz (1994), 146-9.
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list. The result was, of course, clear in advance; a turnout of 93.5 per cent was reported, with 
89 per cent of voters supporting the list. Benes resigned the next month and Gottwald took 
over the presidency, while the social democratic party formally merged with the communists.
The Purges
It was not long after the establishment of the People’s democracies in Eastern Europe that the 
Soviet leadership got increasingly suspicious of the true loyalty of their henchmen in Warsaw, 
Prague, Budapest and the other Eastern European capitals. The misgivings were fuelled by 
the Soviet breach with Yugoslavia: Titoist deviation’—an euphemism for suspected inde- 
pendent-mindedness and national priorities—was one of the main indictments when the 
purges after 1948 were pinpointed at the communist parties. This came after a phase when 
the machinery of repression had primarily been directed at forces, real or imagined, that were 
liable to endanger communist control of society in general: leaders, members and supporters 
of non-communist parties; union activists; the clergy; the officer corps; the police; 
academics—in short, what remained of the pre-war elite. Some show trials were organised 
also during this phase, with the aim of generating fear and mobilising the public behind the 
Party.
The theoretical basis for the second phase of the purges, when the blowtorch was turned 
on the party cadres—and also on the security apparatus itself—was the theory that class 
struggle intensifies as socialism is being built. This conception was created by Stalin himself 
to legitimise the Soviet purges in the 1930’s: its essence is that the more ‘enemies’ are 
unmasked, the closer to socialism society is. Indeed, the purges in Eastern and Central Europe 
resembled a condensed version of the Soviet experiences since the early 1930’s, complete with 
their own mini-Stalins Bierut, Gottwald and Rakosi.
Yet the Party purges largely—but not altogether—passed Poland, Romania and Bulgaria 
by. One can only speculate as to the reasons for this: they may not have been needed to secure 
Soviet control as that had been firmly cemented by 1947 at the latest—and that by particu­
larly brutal repression of non-party forces. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Moscow could 
not be as confident, and therefore opted for widespread repression within the Party.72 The 
machinations behind the purges are well documented elsewhere73, but a short expose is 
relevant as the purges and show trials had such a traumatic effect on Eastern European 
communist parties well beyond Stalin’s death in 1953.
In September 1948, the Secretary-General of the Polish Workers Party, Wladyslaw 
Gomulka, was ‘forced into a humiliating public recantation of his miserable errors, and 
eventually into prison.’74 Gomulka, who also served as Minister for the Recovered Terri­
tories, had made the political mistake of having reservations about the PWP joining the 
Cominform; his demise was also connected with the ongoing discussions of a communist­
socialist merger as he was opposed to dictating the terms and wanted a smoother, more 
voluntary union. Gomulka’s independent-mindedness is shown, i.a., by his public declaration 
that ‘we have completely rejected the collectivisation of agriculture. Our democracy is not 
similar to Soviet democracy, just as our society’s structure is not the same as the Soviet 
structure’. Gomulka’s replacement as party leader was the former NKVD operative and Stalin 
loyalist, the President of the Republic, Boleslaw Bierut. Bierut did not share Gomulka’s 
views on the need for a Polish version of socialism as opposed to directly copying the Soviet 
blueprint. The Polish party clearly contained more believers in a native road to socialism
72Swain and Swain (1993), 66; Rupnik (1989), 111.
73 Cf. Hodos (1987); a good summary is found in Andrews and Gordievsky (1990), 336-348.
74 Davies (1986), 7.
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than its Hungarian and Czechoslovak counterparts, but the terror in Poland was still by and 
large limited to non-party figures, particularly high-ranking military officers and the clergy. 
At the time ‘Soviet suggestions to resort to anti-Semitic pronouncements in purges were 
resisted.’75
In the summer of 1948, Moscow informed First Secretary Rakosi that none other than 
Laszlo Rajk, then Interior Minister and thus responsible for the security services, was 
suspected of spying for Western intelligence. The evidence was supposedly ‘coded references’ 
that Soviet agents had ‘discovered’ in intercepted letters written by Noel Field, an American 
with extensive war-time contacts among Eastern European communists, especially with the 
Yugoslavs. It was soon noticed that Field (who, in a bizarre twist, sat incarcerated in Prague 
while simultaneously being implicated as an Soviet agent in the Alger Hiss hearings in 
Washington) had helped Rajk return to Hungary in 1941 after three years in French 
internment. As Rajk had also been friendly with his Yugoslav colleague, Interior Minister 
Aleksandar Rankovic, the conspiracy theorists in Moscow had no trouble concocting proof 
that Rajk had been planted as an infiltration agent in the leadership of the party, working 
simultaneously for the US and for Tito, that ‘chained dog of the imperialists’.
Rajk was arrested on 30 May 1949, severely interrogated, and finally agreed to confess 
publicly—apparently after being convinced of his Stalinist duty to expose Tito as an agent of 
imperialism. He had also been promised clemency or even a new identity and life in the 
Soviet Union. Rajk was nevertheless put on trial in September 1949, sentenced to death 
together with five of his seven accomplices in the vast but illusory conspiracy and spy-ring, 
and executed on 15 October. The Party purges continued until 1953, rendering, i.a., the 
future party leader and one of Rajk’s leading detractors, Janos Kadar, a stiff jail sentence. 
Indeed, the purges affected not only the higher party echelons, but a wide-ranging campaign 
of terror simultaneously was inflicted on the broad population. Official Hungarian statistics 
show that 700,000 people were sentenced between 1948 and 1953, and according to 
estimates, at one point or another during the Stalinist period, every third family had a 
member in jail.76 In addition, from 1950 onwards more than 100,000 members of the old 
middle classes were deported into the countryside.77
The Rajk trial and sentence finally prompted the Cominform to denounce the Yugoslav 
leadership and call for all communists to help overthrow Tito. The Soviet Union and its 
allies broke diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and offered support to a pro-Stalin 
Government-in-Exile which was waging an assassination and terror campaign against the 
Belgrade government. Plans were even drawn up for an outright invasion of Yugoslavia, in 
which the armed forces of the Eastern European countries (except the GDR) were committed 
to aiding the Red Army.
The most dramatic show-trials were held in Czechoslovakia, targeted on Slovak 
autonomists and non-’Muscovite’ leftists (‘undergrounders’ as well as ‘Londoners’). They 
also had strong anti-Semitic overtones.78 As Rajk was being put on trial in the autumn of 
1949, the Hungarians and their Soviet advisers alerted the Prague leadership of a ‘Czech 
connection’ that was to come up during the proceedings. The Soviet security service generals 
Makarov and Lichatchev, who had supervised preparations for the Rajk trial, were trans-
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ferred to Prague. A special department was set up within the Interior Ministry to investigate 
Party crimes, and it soon found a series of ‘bourgeois nationalists’, among them Foreign 
Minister Vladimir Clementis and the future party leader Gustav Husak (a Slovak), who 
looked set for a tour in the dungeons, or worse.
However, the sudden replacement of the Makarov and Lichatchev in the summer of 1950 
changed the direction of the ‘investigation’; ‘the main emphasis henceforth was on Zionism 
rather than Titoism as the chief tool of the subversive plots of the Western intelligence 
services.’79 This certainly was a direct result of Stalin’s increased anti-Semitism, which had 
been fuelled by the disturbingly spontaneous and genuine enthusiasm shown by many Soviet 
Jews for the state of Israel. In Czechoslovakia, the Soviet advisors could count as allies a 
number of anti-Semites within the StB, which even proceeded to establish an ‘anti-Zionist 
department’. While the campaign against the ‘Titoist-Zionist agents’ failed to incite large- 
scale public anti-Semitism, it started producing arrests of Party members in the winter of 
1950-51. By the following summer the Secretary-General of the Party, Rudolf Slansky, had 
been identified as the chief conspirator. Slansky was indeed a ‘Muscovite’ and no less a hard­
line Stalinist than Rajk, but he happened to be of Jewish origin.
So was Bedrich Geminder, another Politburo member; Foreign Minister Clementis; and 
eight of 12 other co-defendants at the ‘Trial of the Leadership of the Anti-State 
Conspiratorial Centre Led by Rudolf Slansky’ in November 1952. During the show trials, 
the prosecutor and media did their best to whip up anti-Semitic feelings: Geminder was 
repeatedly asked if he was able to respond in Czech, and the party organ, the Rude prdvo 
published an editorial on Czechs of Jewish origin which stated that ‘Under the cloak of 
Jewish national interest, they pursue only their class interest and dirty moneymaking 
trickery’.80 Eleven of the fourteen, including Slansky, were sentenced to death and executed, 
after which their ashes were scattered on a country road outside Prague. The remaining three 
received sentences of life imprisonment. Soon after, a Jewish-Zionist ‘doctors’ plot’, similar 
to the one unearthed in Moscow on Stalin’s instructions, was discovered in Hungary,81 
beginning with Gabor Peter, the Jewish head of the AVO (or Allamvedelmi Osztdly, as the 
security police was then called), being arrested as an agent for British and Israeli intelligence.
The purges as well as the anti-Semitic campaigns were scaled down after Stalin’s death in 
March 1953, but the scare left a permanent impression on Soviet and Eastern European 
politics.82 It was not to be the last appeal to pre-communist chauvinistic prejudices, but even 
more importantly, the purges firmly established a style of top-down politics, where almost 
every form of independent civic initiative and critical public discourse was not only 
discouraged, but violently repressed. Indeed, between 1957 and 1967, i.e. after Stalinism had 
been formally denounced, some 4,000 people were put on trial for political ‘betrayals and 
deviations’ in Czechoslovakia alone.83 As Norman Davies writes, Stalinism (here in its Polish 
version) created a remarkable set of mental attitudes.
Xenophobia was the official fashion. Any contact with the outside world was instantly 
denounced, creating an atmosphere where political trials looked normal and innocent 
men and women could be arbitrarily sentenced as foreign spies. People were 
encouraged to live communally, and to think collectively. [...] The Russian system of
79 Andrews and Gordievsky (1990), 341.
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informers was introduced in factories and schools. [...] A specific form of 
megalomania took hold. All the public works of the day had to be colossal. 84
Despite the excesses and the paranoia, the purges, especially as they were accompanied by an 
avalanche of propaganda, fulfilled important functions in strengthening the communist 
regimes. If even leading party-figures, well known as die-hard Stalinists, were liable to 
sudden demotion, imprisonment or even execution for treason, then clearly no one was safe 
and all acts of opposition were doomed at the outset.
Repression guaranteed not only fear-induced public obedience in the face of huge pro­
grammes of primitive capital accumulation and social engineering (‘Ivan the Terrible with 
electrification’, as someone has paraphrased Lenin), causing a state of permanent turmoil and 
extreme social mobility. The permanent purges of all institutions—government and party 
offices, academia, industry, the security organs, the armed forces—continuously created 
openings for hundreds of thousands of upwardly-mobile members of the lower strata. As 
political reliability was introduced as a criterion for filling all non-menial jobs—the more 
important the job, the more important was demonstrated trustworthiness—knee-jerk loyalty 
to the regime was strongly encouraged. A system of social stratification was established which 
created a large group of functionaries who had the regime to thank for their advancement 
while simultaneously and correctly fearing they would be sold down the river just as their 
predecessors had been. This combination of fear and opportunism created a pool of loyalist 
supporters for the regime. In the longer run, the creation of a political nomenklatura was of 
course to prove devastating, as a huge number of decision-making posts were occupied by 
individuals who lacked proper professional qualifications and training.
The show trials themselves, however weird, drove home the message of the politicisation 
of everything, particularly the administration of justice. They also established the Party’s 
claim to omniscience and omnipotence, not just in the past and present, but also projected 
forward into the future. The patently absurd and ridiculous claims of vast and simultaneous 
conspiracies of Zionist, Titoist, Trotskyist, Imperialist and Fascist ‘forces’ was a way of 
saying that the Party would deal with all its enemies in the same way. Finally, it has also been 
observed that the Stalinist trials have roots in the Eastern Orthodox Christian rites which, as 
opposed to the Western Christian communion, has a tradition of public confession of sins.
But if the Stalinist methods were effective for implementing communist control over the 
Soviet satellites in the short run, the long-term results were more ambiguous. If the over­
riding ambition was forced and breakneck modernisation, this was indeed accomplished in 
terms of a rapid rise in industrial production. Yet as the economic goals were defined exclu­
sively in the political sphere by party fiat according to ideological dogma, the capital accumu­
lated was allocated in highly irrational ways, creating a distorted and soon also obsolete 
economic structure. The megalomaniac projects in heavy industry slowed productivity 
growth and living standards for the industrial working class were generally falling during 
the Stalinist era, even to below pre-war levels. The lack of economic incentives was compen­
sated for by the use of authoritarian methods of compulsion, which obviously further 
alienated even the class in whose name the regimes were ruling.
In agriculture, results were even more depressing. The ideologically motivated war on 
the peasantry and the incompetence by which the newly collectivised farms were managed 
could not but drive the rural population into sullen resistance. As earlier in the Soviet Union, 
it was the rural population that was to supply the capital needed for industrialisation, at the 
cost of their already low living standards. In addition, forced collectivisation and the 
resulting imposition of industrial methods of worker supervision and division of labour into 
agriculture diminished the appeal of consensual co-operation. The pre-war process—albeit
84 Davies (1986), 8.
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slow—of subsistence farming being replaced by commodity production for the market, and 
the peasantry’s inclusion into a modern economy of exchange, was not only slowed but 
reversed.
The brutal methods and appalling human suffering imposed in the process of forced 
modernisation could, of course, not but create a mental backlash. While the communists 
managed to force society into passive compliance and lip-service to the rituals, the inevitable 
counter-reaction was an increasing withdrawal to the private sphere. The distrust and fear of 
the new political system caused large segments of the population to nostalgically recall the 
concepts of the previous eras, even when they originally had been opposed to them. The most 
obvious evidence of this is the resilience, even revival of religion. The process of secularisation 
that had started in Central Europe during the inter-war years was actually reversed, as the 
communist revolution provided religion and Church institutions with an attractiveness and 
legitimacy it had already begun to lose: ‘in this sense the Stalinist revolution halted a particu­
lar secularising trend and actually acted as an anti-secularising force.’85 So if Stalinism 
modernised machinery, in many respects it also created more archaic minds.
85 Schopflin (1993), 102.
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If you can’t make it
Stay hard, stay hungry, stay alive
If you can
— Bruce Springsteen, 'This Hard Land’
Elite-Level Politics During Communist Hegemony
How did political culture develop during the years of communist power, after the Stalinist 
era had passed? This chapter attempts to chart the structures of and developments on the elite, 
meso and mass levels. Much attention is focused on the systemic crises which erupted in 
Central Europe with almost staggering frequency. The reason for this is quite simple: the 
crises appear not as aberrations, but indeed as the main mechanism though which intra- and 
extra-systemic change was instituted.
The defining features of post-war Central Europe were the twin phenomena of 
communist party domination and USSR hegemony. The former has often, for reasons 
propagandistic or naive, been interpreted as merely a reflection of the latter: according to this 
notion, the communist parties of the so-called satellite states were only and always 
instruments for Soviet control.
Although this argument may be partly true for some Central and Eastern European states 
at some periods in time (the take-over in Poland immediately after the war, the period of the 
show trials and High Stalinism 1949-52, and the aftermaths of the suppressions of the 
Hungarian and Czechoslovak uprisings in 1956 and 1968 spring to mind) it is clearly too 
simplistic. That theory gives few, if any, tools for analysing conflicts in the Central European 
polities—as they would then have been settled in and by Moscow. It also blatantly disregards 
the various political and social traditions of the individual socialist countries, and fails to 
account for the continued political diversity among, as well as within, these polities.
The ‘monolith theory’ has indeed largely fallen out of fashion as a way to seriously analyse 
the political and social history of the Socialist Bloc. As early as in 1961, Zbigniev Brzezinski 
differentiated between the Stalinist period of 1945-52 and the subsequent post-Stalinist 
epoch characterised by various degrees of pressure towards conformity.1 It is clear that ‘the 
new options which became available to the local East European communist party elites after 
Stalin’s death were conducive to a climate of experimentation within the framework of the 
common ideological heritage on the assumption that the road to socialism in Eastern Europe 
need not always be identical with that of the Soviet Union.’2 This finally opened vistas for 
national variations of communism, and consequently made it possible (and necessary) for the 
communist parties to openly exploit indigenous political and social traditions, particularly 
nationalist and traditionalist sentiments.
1 Brzezinski (1961).
2 Berglund and Dellenbrant (1994c), 18.
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The Yalta and Potsdam agreements stipulated in loose terms that countries liberated by 
the Soviet forces should introduce ‘democratic’ systems of government and establish friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union. In practice, this formula became heavily tilted towards the 
friendship stipulation; according to the Soviet interpretation, the degree of friendship was 
even the principal indicator of the prevalent level of democracy. This was sometimes even 
codified: the constitution of the German Democratic Republic—a front-line country that 
epitomised the division of Europe and the very existence of which was explicitly based on 
ideology—prominently confirmed that country’s permanent and irrevocable alliance with 
the Soviet Union.
The USSR had vital interests in Central and Eastern Europe and defended them vigorously 
and ruthlessly if needed. But at the same time, the cohesion of the Socialist Bloc was upheld 
not only through coercion, but also by the common interests and ideological prescripts of the 
various national elites. When and where these common interests were weak, cohesion was 
weakened. In terms of power politics, the Eastern bloc was a hub-and-spokes system of junior 
members with strong bilateral links to the USSR, rather than a multi-polar configuration of 
relationships between equals. It was the common relationship with the Soviet Union that 
defined the relations between the junior members. They were in fact frequently cool to the 
point of trade wars, travel restrictions, or even violent border incidents as reported, i.a., 
between Poland and the GDR, between Poland and Czechoslovakia, or, in particular, between 
Romania and Hungary.
Soviet domination, cemented by the superpower spheres-of-influence configuration of the 
Cold War period, meant a dramatic reversal of tides in Central Europe. During the previous 
millennium the region had by and large been on the periphery or semi-periphery of Western 
Europe—even the bulwark of the West; now it became the borderland of an even more 
backward USSR: an antemurale Sovietis. Poland had of course experienced periods of Russian 
domination, but for Czechoslovakia and Hungary it was a historic first.
The new relationship between centre and periphery cannot be described as but colonial or 
semi-colonial, where trade flows, prices and the division of labour within the Socialist Camp 
were determined by the interests of the Soviet Union and by the interests of the ruling parties. 
This produced an truly unique model of societal development and international co­
operation.
The goals of Real Existing Socialism were certainly socially progressive—indeed, the 
regimes based their claims to legitimacy on their ambitious programmes of social 
modernisation, economic growth and the eradication of old privileges. This was also, 
together with references to Marxist-Leninist theory, the foundation of the regimes’ claims to 
legitimacy and basis for generating mass support. In some respects, the Soviet conception of 
modernisation was administered directly. This meant heavy investment in literacy, education, 
health care and urban development, but also Soviet-style obsession with centralised planning,3 
industrial gigantomania and contempt of agriculture. Where the new socialist states had been 
industrialised before the communist take-over, they soon became saddled with an antiquated 
coal- and steel-dominated structure of production; in the previously more backward, 
agrarian-dominated societies the result was much the same, only after even more social 
turmoil, misallocation of capital and environmental degradation.
The communist blueprint for modernisation may have produced the desired effects in 
terms of a rapid and substantial growth of the industrial working class and a boost of heavy 
industrial output which strengthened at least the defence capabilities of the Socialist Bloc. It
3 Planning methods could border on the imbecile. A student at Prague’s Workers’ Planning 
School has recounted how he in the early 50’s followed the drawing-up of a central plan for 
Czechoslovakia; it included, just as the Soviet model did, quotas for ‘number of reindeer 
herdsmen’ and ‘high-seas fishing’. Cf. Rupnik (1989), 178.
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did not, however, generate economic structures that in the longer run could compete 
successfully with the capitalist world and create long-term public contentment with the social 
and political order. The erosion of the regimes’ base of support which this failure caused 
among a population no longer consisting of impoverished, intimidated and ignorant masses, 
combined with a weakened resolve and ability to use repression, eventually led to the undoing 
of Real Existing Socialism.
Indeed, it ‘collapsed because of a loss of legitimacy resulting from the disjuncture that had 
developed between the radical promise still present in its ideology and an economic inability 
to meet it. As promises of equality, solidarity and communal well-being proved hollow, more 
traditional concepts, such as nationalism, ethnocentrism, etatism or religious traditionalism, 
took their place.’4 These traditional ideological values were indeed never far from the 
surface, hibernating both within factions of the ruling structures, and in the non- or anti­
communist strata of society. The development was strikingly similar to that of early Soviet 
Russia, where the Bolsheviks pragmatically incorporated national-chauvinist or technocratic 
elements into their policies in order to tactically garner vital support from groups 
fundamentally opposed to purist Marxism-Leninism.5 In Eastern and Central Europe, just as 
in Russia, the communist regimes were also fundamentally and permanently transformed by 
the influx of ideologically non-orthodox elements. It is, after all, people who make parties 
and not the other way around.
The Scope and Avenues for Political Pluralism
From the outset, the political systems of socialist Central Europe were qualitatively different 
from the Soviet version. Marxist-Leninist theoreticians did stress that ‘popular democracy’ 
was a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and predicted an eventual convergence of 
popular democracy with the Soviet form of government to developed socialism, but 
significant structural differences nevertheless remained up until 1989-90.
The constitutions of all the Central European states defined the applied political system as 
socialist, and explicitly gave the communist parties a permanent leading role. But in contrast 
to the Soviet Union, where the system of government was totally overhauled after the 
October revolution, some pre-war institutions and structures were retained. Another salient 
feature of the popular democracies was the Popular, Patriotic or National Fronts, which 
under communist party supervision and guidance incorporated various social organisations 
across socio-economic and ideological lines, and were responsible for the election process. 
Poland and Czechoslovakia (but not Hungary) remained multi-party systems throughout the 
period, although the so-called allied parties accepted both the supremacy of the communist 
parties and the validity of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The number of allied parties did 
decline over time, as an indication that the demarcation line between the Soviet Union and its 
East European allies was fading away, but this was not a dominant trend.6
The multi-party systems of Eastern Europe had little in common with their Western 
counterparts. The allied parties can be described as ideological-social interest 
organisations—flavoured by traditional ideological concepts such as liberalism, agrarianism, 
Christian Democracy or nationalism—where individuals, classes and strata not yet ready for 
full-blown communism could find a half-way house. The constitutionally defined and 
permanent subordination of the allied parties to the communist party clearly indicated that 
the party system was hegemonic, not competitive. Much the same can be said about the
4 Swain and Swain (1993), 101.
5Cf. Chapter 2.
6 Berglund and Dellenbrant (1994c), 20-21.
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election process: until the terminal days of communist hegemony, the Front lists were 
normally accepted in full—a fact officially attributed to the thorough process of screening 
candidates to reflect society’s preferences and to objectively represent its social structure, but 
by critics seen as a result of the ballot system which for all practical purposes was open. 
Parliamentary debates where fundamental conflicts were brought to the open were rare, 
occurring only in conjunction with severe internal crises in the communist parties. Non- 
unanimous voting results in parliament was otherwise tolerated only when some morality­
type issues were debated, such as abortion legislation. As with the election process, the low 
level of parliamentary debate when enacting governmental legislative initiatives was officially 
explained with reference to the system of pre-consultation and the effective channels of 
feedback.
The status of parliament was further deflated by the fact that many of its powers were 
permanently delegated to a smaller organ, normally with powers to issue decrees with the 
force of law: a Presidium (in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the GDR), a Presidential Council 
(in Hungary and Bulgaria), or a Council of State (in Poland, the GDR after 1960, Romania 
post-1961, and in Bulgaria from 1971). These were in session year-round, in stark contrast to 
the full chambers which normally sat only intermittently. Yet the question of the legitimacy 
of the parliament or other representative institutions was never an issue, as the legitimacy of 
the political system as a whole was defined by references to objective, scientific truths 
established in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin and manifested by the leading role of 
the Marxist-Leninist parties, the principle of democratic centralism, and the eternal 
friendship with the Soviet Union. In fact, all important state decisions were taken by the 
highest echelons of the ruling party.
This harmonic picture of the political process does, however, not tell the whole truth. 
Political conflicts did obviously exist, but were fought out and adjudicated in other arenas 
than the electoral or parliamentary systems. The most important of these were the communist 
parties. They were supposed to function according to the Leninist doctrine of democratic 
centralism, the essence of which is that all Party members must abide by and further the 
implementation of decisions made by the majority in democratic order. In practice, however, 
factionalism could be rife and prolonged. Observers outside the Marxist-Leninist tradition 
often stress the centralist element of the dogma or even regard democratic centralism as an 
oxymoron; at least for communist parties in power, the democratic process has been 
described as weak, with policy and personnel decisions made by the highest leadership and 
then rubber-stamped successively by the lower levels of the organisation. There is no question 
that the Marxist-Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat has little to do, both in 
theory and in practice, with Western-style democratic socialism’s commitment to equality, 
the right to choose, objective justice and broad access to the decision-making process. The 
low transparency of the decision-making process and the high degree of ideological rhetoric 
made it difficult to discern the mechanisms behind policy shifts, and prompted many Western 
observers to interpret politics in the Socialist Bloc mainly in terms of power and the 
ascendancy of fall of certain leading individuals, as demonstrated by the peculiar kind of 
content analysis known as Kremlinology.
The picture is blurred by the fact that contested leadership changes within the Socialist 
states were usually portrayed as structural changes, even when they were only substitutes for 
such. This does not, however, imply that the party leaderships were wholly unresponsive to 
demands emanating from the lower echelons of the party hierarchy. Conflicts at the top were 
often fired by personal antagonism and ambition, but could also reflect substantive 
differences in views on major policy, with leading personas appealing to various 
constituencies within the party and society at large. Even in an environment where association
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for political ends was strictly controlled and formally subordinated to the communist aims, 
groups continued to form in society to express political preferences.7
One incarnation of this was, of course, the recurrent factionalisation within the ruling 
parties; the dogma of democratic centralism, however, meant that these normally had to 
operate in a clique-like fashion, and organised around informal, personal and affective ties. 
There was certainly also some scope for autonomous action outside the ruling parties. The 
allied parties provided one type of vehicle: while formally subordinated to the ruling parties, 
they and their media could propagate the fine-tuning of the system according to the 
preferences of their respective constituencies: rural-agrarian, regional, Christian, etc. 
Regional governments, such as the Yugoslav or the one established in Slovakia in 1969, have 
also been mentioned as other expressions of semi-autonomous organisation. So have the 
churches, though their importance should not be overestimated: the Polish Catholic Church 
certainly was a mighty and active force, but that was far from the case as regards the 
Czechoslovak and, in particular, the Hungarian Catholic Churches. In the German 
Democratic Republic, the Evangelical Church did play a role in organising the 
demonstrations in 1989, but infiltration of the Church by the security services was then, as 
before, so extensive that it has been called ‘almost a sub-division of the Stasi .8 In the Balkans, 
where Orthodox Christianity dominates, the Churches tended to docile due to the long- 
running tradition of subordination to the state.
By the 1980’s, Party-sponsored mass organisations emerged as another group of vehicles 
for the expression of group preferences, and with some capacity for autonomous action. Of 
particular importance were the official youth organisations and peace councils in some 
Eastern European countries (notably in Hungary), which openly came to challenge the 
official Party line on issues such as environmental degradation or the arms race, and even 
occasionally collaborated with the extra- or anti-party opposition in doing so.9
The main source of intellectual pluralism during Real Existing Socialism was, however, 
the technocratic elite. As the societies and economies became more advanced, complex and 
differentiated, they were increasingly dependent on administrative and technical expertise. 
Even when the technocratic structures were associated with the very core of the system, such as 
the Academies of Science, the Party Central Committee research institutes or even the 
security services, they often formed groupings advocating sector interests that contributed to 
pluralism, if not to outright opposition. Already by the 1960’s the expert classes’ demands for 
flexibility became the main impetus for reform, as technocrats rebelled against what they saw 
as political impediments to development and rational social development and engineering. 
Indeed, the debates over change tended to be conducted not on the floor of a parliament or 
even during Party meetings, but more or less informally within and between the 
administrative, technocratic and academic elites. As the dogma of the leading role of the Party 
led to a blurring of the line between state and party, managerial-technocratic conflicts within 
the state sphere were almost automatically mirrored as schisms within the Party.
The Post-Stalinist Crises
The three main crises which rocked Central Europe—enveloping the entire region but in 
1956 centred on Hungary, in 1968 on Czechoslovakia, and in 1980-81 on Poland—were all 
‘predicated on an assumption of homogeneity and [...] were, to an extent, energised by
The argument below is from Waller (1994), 136-8; the development of the Eastern and 
Central European independent peace movements is charted in detail in Tismaneanu (1990).
8 Halter (1995), 90. Stasi was the Office—later Ministry—of State Security.
9Cf. Tismaneanu (1990).
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nationalism’.10 Yet they generated widely different outcomes. For Czechoslovakia, 
‘normalisation’ after 1968 meant two decades of ‘deep freeze’, during which the regime 
centred its strategy for maintaining power not on domestic reform but on maintaining 
internal control and on ensconcing itself firmly under the Soviet wing. As the cynical joke 
went in Prague: ‘We are the most non-aligned people in the world. We don’t even interfere 
in the affairs of our own country anymore.’ That sarcasm had, however, lost most of its 
poignancy by the early 1970’s in both Warsaw and Budapest. Hungary, after a period of very 
harsh repression, was by the early 1960’s put on a path of economic liberalisation known as 
‘Goulash Communism’, the essential ingredient of which was the de-politicisation of 
everyday life. In Poland, the government applied parallel strategies of employing moderate 
repression, buying off the population with foreign credit, and making populist appeals to 
nationalism.
The uncertainty created by the death of Stalin—the man who had personified permanence 
and ideological consistency—brought the first wave of unrest to Central Europe. The 
collective leadership which took over in Moscow declared a ‘New Course’ for the economy 
with relaxation of the crash programme of growth, and indicated a willingness to ease Cold 
War tension to free additional resources for private consumption. The Stalinist methods of 
repression were not officially denounced until 1956, but already the announcement of Beria’s 
arrest in July 1953 sent a powerful signal that the security apparatus was to be reigned in.
May 1953 saw outbursts of labour unrest in Czechoslovakia, prompted by a currency 
reform and news of government plans to further restrict labour mobility. A wave of strikes 
swept the country; in Plzen portraits of Gottwald and Stalin were publicly torn down. Then, 
on 16-17 June, a violent workers’ rebellion erupted in East Berlin, directly triggered by a 
raising of working norms, but stirred by mounting resentment with food shortages resulting 
from farm collectivisation and the nationalisation of much of the remaining private sector. In 
Hungary, too, there were widespread strikes and disturbances during June. Embarrassingly, 
all these protests were not only spontaneous but initiated by the very working class in whose 
name the regimes were claiming to rule.
Any analysis of the responses must take into account the dual nature of the 1953-56 events: 
they were at once political rebellions against the social order and movements of national 
emancipation against a foreign power, i.e. the Soviet Union.11 Indeed, the immediate reaction 
to popular unrest varied widely. In Czechoslovakia the government backed down, but 
acknowledged ‘mistakes’ made. No significant changes in the highest leadership were made; 
the local incarnation of Stalinism, Gottwald, had already passed away from pneumonia 
apparently contracted at Stalin’s funeral. The new Party leader, Antonin Novotny, who kept 
his position until 1968, managed a go-slow policy of de-Stalinisation and partial reform.
In the GDR, Soviet tanks aided local forces in crushing the protests during fierce street 
battles. If anything, the disturbances resulted in a hardening of attitudes within the ruling 
party. The exceptionally severe crackdown in East Berlin should nevertheless be seen in the 
context of European power politics and Western containment. At the time, the Cold War was 
focused on divided Germany and divided Berlin. The nationalist element of the protests, 
though not dominant, were thus particularly dangerous from a Soviet and SED point of view, 
as it questioned the very existence of the East German state and the Soviet say in the future 
solution of the German issue. Yet the point was partly taken: the GDR government adopted a 
more national stance—particularly visible in relations with Poland—while Moscow kept 
simmering the offer of a re-unification of Germany in exchange for its neutralisation and 
non-rearmament. The Soviets even threw in the prospect of a return to Germany of some lost
10 Schopflin (1993), 264.
11 Tismaneanu (1993), 55-6.
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territories, particularly the Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) exclave in East Prussia, which in April 
1945 had come under Russian administration.12
The most radical outcome was seen in Hungary. After intense Soviet pressure Matyas 
Rakosi stepped down as Prime Minister and the leadership structure was made collective. 
Encouraged by Khrushchev and Malenkov, Rakosi’s successor, Imre Nagy, embarked on a 
radical programme of economic reform along Soviet lines. Nagy explicitly warned that, as he 
put it, the link between the working class and the communist party was in danger of being 
broken. He publicly admitted that the Party had Tailed to realise the basic economic law of 
socialism—the constant raising of the standard of living of the population.’13 As a remedy, in 
addition to increasing the supply of consumer goods, the Front was revived to serve as a 
channel for increased participation. To create a wider base of mass support for the Patriotic 
People’s Front, patriotism was made respectable and fused with ideas of democracy and 
socialism. Although he firmly defended the party’s leading role, Nagy envisaged the right for 
citizens to set up, within the front, organisations as they saw fit, thus allowing non-party 
members to exert significant influence on policy. The programme of forced collectivisation 
of agriculture was abandoned, the notorious internment camps of the Hungarian Gulag were 
dismantled and a partial amnesty granted for political prisoners.
Table 5.1: The ‘New Course’ in Eastern Europe 1953-55; Political Instability in 1953 14
Level of 
Political 
Turmoil
Share of net material 
product, %
Accumulation Consumption
Share of investment by 
sector, %
Industry Agriculture
1953 1955 1953 1955 1953 1955 1953 1955
Bulgaria + n/a n/a 66 77 40 39 10 18
Czechoslovakia + 25 20 57 61 42 39 14 20
GDR ++ n/a n/a 82 81 50 52 17 15
Hungary +++ 25 15 46 58 48 41 6 11
Poland + 28 22 54 60 52 43 10 15
Romania ++ 32 24 n/a n/a 57 57 7 14
Yugoslavia n/a n/a 53 54 45 34 5 9
12 The Soviet offer of unification for neutrality or a Soviet security guarantee was first given by 
the so-called Stalin notes of March and April 1952 (the essence of which were the establishing 
of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bonn), and reiterated between Stalin’s death and 
the 17 June uprising. It was again raised during 1954, supported by some West German Social 
Democrats, but turned down by the Western allies. Only in May 1955 did Khrushchev ‘decide 
to back the GDR fully’; the following autumn the USSR restored full sovereignty to the GDR, and 
simultaneously recognised the Federal Republic of Germany. That year the neutralisation and 
withdrawal of occupation troops from Austria was in fact successfully negotiated with the West, 
along similar lines proposed for Germany. Cf. Swain and Swain (1993), 96-7.
13 Quoted in Swain and Swain (1993), 78-80.
14 Source for economic data: Swain and Swain (1993), 113; adopted from Brus, Wlodzimierz, 
‘1953 to 1956: ’’’The Thaw” and “The New Course’”, in Kaser, M. C. and E. A. Radice (Eds), 
The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919—1975, Vol. Ill, Oxford 1986.
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As Table 5.1 indicates, the relaxation of forced industrialisation initiated by the Soviet 
leadership after 1953 did have marked effects on both levels of consumption and on 
capitalisation in agriculture. This seems to indicate a rather strong degree of responsiveness. 
There appears to be a correlation between the level of political unrest during 1953 on the one 
hand, and increased allocation of funds for consumption and agricultural investment at the 
expense of industry, on the other. Yet externalities played a critical role: it was Khrushchev’s 
‘New Course’, with its calls for an easing of crash modernisation, which started the process 
where increasingly consumer-oriented policies and the venting of pent-up disaffection 
became mutually reinforcing. Whether a similar process could have been initiated without 
Soviet example and encouragement is impossible to say.
The GDR stands out as an exception, with falling consumption ratios and investment even 
more heavily tilted towards industry. But at the same time the figures indicate that the share 
of consumption already in 1953 was markedly higher than in any other country in the group. 
This can be interpreted as a result of the fierce competition with the Federal Republic: 
between 1949 and 1961, when the border was sealed, 2.7 million East Germans emigrated in 
search of a better life.15 Nevertheless, the GDR deviancy raises the question of whether there 
actually was a causal connection between unrest and economic liberalisation—and of which 
of the was the cause and which was the effect.
In any case, the Soviets were well informed of the dismal state of the Eastern European 
economies, and clearly took the view that an accommodation would be more productive than 
repression. The new collective leadership in Moscow also had other considerations. The anti- 
Titoism which had been a strong feature of late Stalinism had been reversed and relations 
with Belgrade restored. To retain unreconstructed Stalinists in charge in Eastern Europe was 
untenable given that Moscow was trying to steer a new course in foreign and economic policy 
and attempted to ensure that the Stalinist irrational excesses in purges of the party, 
government bureaucracy and the military would not be repeated.
After the crisis of 1953 had passed a short period of lull set in. The establishment of the 
Warsaw Pact in May 1955 signified both an institutionalisation of Soviet military hegemony 
in Eastern Europe and an indication of the fact that the communist regimes were regarded as 
sufficiently entrenched to allow them a more equal—though not fully equal—alliance 
relationship with the USSR. This proved to be a grave miscalculation, as 1956 brought the 
arguably most severe challenge to the Marxist-Leninist system of government in Eastern 
Europe before the final collapse in 1989-90. Again the impetus came from Moscow, with the 
explosive exposition of Stalinist ill-deeds by Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU. 11 
was certainly not the intention, but the ‘secret’ speech could not but seriously undermine the 
Marxist-Leninist movement’s claims to omniscience and infallibility.
The next wave of eruptions started in Poland, where a leadership vacuum had developed 
when Party leader Bierut had died in April 1956, of shock or—according to some accounts— 
committing suicide after Khrushchev’s elucidation. In June, workers in Poznan who were 
dissatisfied with an increase in work quotas staged a riotous strike which was put down by 
tanks and resulted in more than 50 fatalities. This was only the culmination of a period of 
brewing discontent. The hard-liners in charge of the Party had for some time been attacked 
by a more liberal grouping for showing a lack of understanding for the plight of ordinary 
working people. The six-year economic plan started in 1947 had proven a disaster, and there 
were widespread fears that the promise not to introduce collective farming in Poland made 
in connection with the 1944 land reform programme would after all not be honoured.16
15 Stokes (1993), 60.
16 Krzeminski (1994), 126-7.
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Finally 
Rehabilitated: 
Gomulka (left, 
in glasses), 
Zawadzki and 
Ochab arriving 
at a banquet at 
the PUWP
Central 
Committee, 
December 1956
HUFVUDSTADSBLADET ARCHIVES
Yet the political instability of 1953-56 which ended in the ‘Polish October’ essentially 
remained an intra-party affair. Even the ‘liberals’ within the Party did not believe that the 
solution could possibly come from outside it; they only hoped for more enlightened 
leadership. Indeed, they eventually won out with the return of Gomulka to the position of 
First Secretary, at a Central Committee session where a high-level Soviet delegation headed 
by Khrushchev himself sat in uninvited. The Soviets reluctantly accepted Gomulka’s come­
back, but the rhetoric in Moscow on the Polish situation was consistently hard-line, blaming 
disturbances on ‘imperialist agents and a lack of vigilance’ and making clear that reform 
efforts were to be strictly contained to within the party. This was a major difference in 
comparison with the more relaxed attitude towards liberalisation in Hungary.17
Gomulka’s main assets were his credentials as a war-time ‘Home Communist’, later 
persecuted as a nationalist non-conformist. His re-ascendance became the first step on the 
‘Polish Road to Socialism’, which was to cause Moscow so much trouble further down the 
road. Apart from the national assertiveness he propagated, Gomulka also insisted on the need 
for lessened repression, increased tolerance of criticism in culture and more autonomy in the 
economic field, particularly advocating a scaling-down of investments in heavy industry. 
Nevertheless, he was careful to affirm his loyalty to Poland’s commitment to the Warsaw 
Pact and to the Soviet line in international politics. The Soviet Marshal Rokossowski, 
however, was forced to step down as defence minister and C-in-C, and the bulk of the 
remaining Soviet advisers, the ‘acting Poles’ mentioned earlier, were sent home.
Gomulka shared the opinion that Poland needed a firm military and security alliance 
with the Soviet Union to withstand German revanchism and the demands to return 
conquered territory. This fear, widespread among the general public, was not dampened 
when none other than Walter Ulbricht, the hard-line GDR leader, at the height of the Polish 
crisis in October 1956 proposed an ‘internationalisation’ of Szczecin (Stettin), the formerly 
German port city on the Oder estuary. The move can only be seen as an flirtation with the 
GDR’s large constituency of expellees from the east. Ideological differences exacerbated the 
strains across the Oder-Neisse line: Gomulka never accepted the East Germans’ general 
attitude, which he saw as Stalinist, while Ulbricht repeatedly complained in Moscow that 
Polish political non-conformance endangered his beleaguered republic.18 A reunification and
17 Cf. Swain and Swain (1993), 93.
18 Krzeminski (1994), 140.
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neutralisation of Germany would, of course, also have raised prospects for the stationing of 
yet more Soviet troops in Poland; one of Gomulka’s first foreign-policy victories was indeed 
a treaty limiting the USSR’s military presence in Poland.
Gomulka’s domestic hard-line adversaries, known as the ‘Natolin ’ faction, also 
entertained nationalism, but of a different brand. During the crisis of 1956 they had 
barricaded behind ‘strong anti-intellectual, xenophobic and anti-Semitic slogans.’19 They 
openly jeered their opponents as ‘revisionists’ and ‘Jews’, and tried to generate support by 
blaming Stalinism on the Jews who indeed had been quite numerous and prominent in the 
earlier leadership. By 1959, when the Party gathered to a Conference of Stabilisation, the 
hard-line formation had become dominated by careerist ‘peasant sons’, who had even less 
patience with intellectualism and subtle hair-splitting than the original Natolinites: ‘Their 
world view was simple: polonocentric, anti-German and secretly russophobe.’20 Already at 
that time, party hard-liners had adopted large portions of the pre-war Endecja National 
Democracy heritage, and this was to be ever more accentuated during the following decades. 
After 1956 the hard-line faction, always a major force and at times even dominant within the 
Polish communist party, can justifiably be described as chauvino-communist or National 
Bolshevik in character.
The even more serious crisis in Hungary started in much the same way as in Poland, with 
a gradual cracking-up of the Communist Party’s monolithic appearance and a livening 
intellectual debate from 1953 onwards. Rakosi manoeuvred back to the top when Nagy fell 
ill during the Malenkov-Khrushchev power struggle in 1955, but his credibility was fatally 
weakened the next year by Khrushchev’s exposition of Stalinist malice and disregard of 
‘socialist legality’. Rakosi’s campaign against ‘the conspiracy led by Nagy’ caused acute 
embarrassment in Moscow, so the Soviets finally intervened to replace Rakosi with his 
second-in-command, Ernd Gerd. Gero tried to present himself a national man but was 
almost as tainted by Stalinism as his predecessor, and a seen as a very poor alternative by the 
crowds who in 1953 had invested their hopes in Imre Nagy. The leadership change thus 
proved to be strategically ill-conceived: it demonstrated both to the increasingly liberal- 
minded Party majority and to the public at large that the prospects for genuine but orderly 
reform were slim.
During the summer of 1956 huge demonstrations erupted, expressing support for the 
reforms in Poland and demanding similar policies at home. Appetite was further whetted by 
the ceremonial reburial on 6 October of Laszlo Rajk, the former hard-line Interior Minister 
who was re-cast in the unlikely role of a martyr of democracy.21 Then, on 23 October, a 
spontaneous student rally eventually brought a quarter of a million people to the streets of 
Budapest; the unrest culminated in the toppling of a Stalin statue and an attempt by the crowd 
to seize the Radio Building. By nightfall, units of the police and army openly sided with the 
protesters and their demands for a reinstitution of the rule of law, the disbanding of the 
security forces, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, that Rakosi and his allies be brought to trial, 
and for the return of Imre Nagy to the leadership.
That same evening, Gero did bring in Nagy as Prime Minister, but simultaneously 
proclaimed a state of emergency, called on the security forces to fire on the crowds, and asked 
for Soviet aid. The escalating violence against the demonstrators, however, proved too much 
for the Central Committee, which on 25 October ousted Gero. His replacement as Party 
First Secretary, in a new leadership formally organised as a collective, was Janos Kadar, the 
former Stalinist who had fallen out of grace during the aftermath of the Rajk purges.
19 Tismaneanu (1993), 65.
20 Krzeminski (1993), 133-7.
21 Cf. Rothschild (1989), 156 pp.
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The initial success of the protesters led to a continued escalation of demands. Reform of 
and under the leadership of the communist party was soon not enough; the protesters turned 
into revolutionaries and went for a total overthrow of the communist system and the 
establishment of a genuinely pluralist democracy. Popular support for the revolt was without 
doubt strong, even overwhelming, as proven by the direct democracy that sprung up 
spontaneously around revolutionary committees and councils. Nagy, the initial reformer, was 
forced along with the tide and ended up a revolutionary, who ‘went far beyond the logic of 
intra-systemic change and joined the momentum of an anti-systemic movement that rapidly 
swept away the whole edifice of bureaucratic socialism.’22 In a radio speech on 30 October he 
announced that the Cabinet had abolished the one-party system and that a new government 
would be formed on the basis of the 1945 coalition.
Although the protesters were driven by strong anti-Sovietism, the absence of intervention 
from Soviet troops—except for during the riots of 24 October—made the initial phase of the 
revolution an essentially internal Hungarian affair. Khrushchev vacillated, uncertain whether 
to apply force or to bite the bullet and ‘get out of Hungary’. The Soviets maintained a 
markedly low profile, professing a policy of non-interference in internal affairs, and 
declaring the equality of the states of the Socialist Bloc. Behind the curtains, however, the KGB 
Chief Ivan Serov, who had flown to Budapest along with Politburo members Mikoyan and 
Suslov, advocated taking a harder line.23 This Soviet dithering may partly have been an 
attempt to lull the revolutionaries into a sense of security, but the calculation at the time may 
also have been that vital interests worth the high political cost of active intervention were not 
yet threatened. That point was in any case reached when Nagy announced the establishment of 
a ‘military-revolutionary council’ to lead the armed forces, on 31 October declared 
Hungary’s intentions to start negotiations for the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the 
following day proclaimed the country’s neutrality. While the Soviet Union could have lived 
without Hungary alone as a military ally, the precedent would almost certainly have had 
catastrophic follow-on effects in the other Warsaw Pact countries.
A Hero ’s Fare­
well: Seven years 
after being 
executed for 
"Titoism”, Ldszlo 
Rajk received a 
state funeral— 
the die-hard 
Stalinist was 
portrayed as a 
national hero. 
Left is Zoltan
Vas, speaker of 
the National 
Assembly, to the 
right former 
Foreign Minister 
Gyula Kallai
HUFVUDSTADSBLADET ARCHIVES
22 Tismaneanu (1993), 75.
23 Cf. Andrew and Gordievsky (1993), 354-5, referring to Khrushchev’s published memoirs.
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The Ringleaders: 
The military 
leadership of the 
insurrectionists, 
4 November 
1956. From left 
to right, General 
Pal Maleter, 
Defence 
Minister Kdroly 
Janza, and 
General Istvan 
Kovacs
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Losing the Battle: Fleeing Hungarian 
insurrectionists surrendering their weapons 
to Austrian border guards, November 1956. 
The reforms in Hungary turned into an 
anti-systemic revolt after factions in the 
highest communist party leadership started 
appealing directly to the masses
The decision to intervene was obviously made easier by the simultaneous British and 
French engagement in Suez24, and the clear message from the West that it would restrict its 
intervention in Hungary to verbalities. Anything else would obviously have threatened to 
bring down the whole edifice of Cold War stability.
The Soviets had formally agreed to start negotiations about Hungary leaving the Pact, but 
early on 1 November the Red Army started pouring fresh troops into the country, while
4 Israel invaded Suez on 29 October, and on 31 October France and Britain announced they 
would intervene on the ground. Their troops started arriving four days later, within hours of the 
Soviet intervention in Hungary.
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simultaneously pulling its units out of Budapest. The full assault started three days later, after 
a group of Hungarian leaders including the Defence Minister Pal Maleter had been arrested 
at a conference they attended at the Soviet military HQ. The same day Imre Nagy and some of 
his associates sought refuge at the Yugoslav embassy. Kadar, who surreptitiously had dropped 
out of sight after the cabinet decision to leave the Warsaw Pact, re-emerged and was installed 
as leader of a Soviet-backed ‘revolutionary government of the workers and peasants’ which 
was in full control of the country within days.
Nagy had been promised free conduit to political asylum in Romania, but was 
nevertheless arrested and executed after a secret trial in June 1958. According to Karoly 
Grosz, the last leader of Socialist Hungary, it was Kadar who personally insisted on the death 
penalty—overruling the Soviets who had recommended ‘sending [Nagy] to prison for a 
couple of years and then giving him a teaching position at some agrarian institute. [...] He 
wanted no competitors who could later become dangerous to him. He was also driven by the 
quest for revenge. He once told me that we lost 357 comrades during the counter-revolution. 
So 357 of them as well should be put six feet under,’ Grosz told in an interviewer in 1996.25
The Hungarian events of 1956 demonstrated not only how vicious intra-party power 
struggles could be, but above all the outer limits of Soviet patience with reform in Eastern 
Europe. The insurrection also raises the fundamental question of why Hungarian reformism 
escalated into an insurrection that swept the bulk of the party (the purges after 1956 left it 
with only 37,000 members, as compared with 900,000 before26) and even large portions of 
the party elite, while other Eastern European countries at the time experienced only 
comparatively insignificant turmoil and no serious genuinely anti-systemic challenges.
One factor was the degree of cohesion within the Party elite, and its willingness to contain 
its internal conflicts and not appeal to the lower echelons of the Party or even to non-Party 
society at large. Stalin’s death led to a power-struggle in the Soviet leadership, and competing 
personalities and competing policies in Moscow each had their supporters in Eastern Europe. 
Although there existed a broad consensus about the need for change, its scope and direction 
was hotly contested. And where unity or the outer appearance of unity could not be 
maintained, ‘a gap [was created] in the system and through that gap, all sorts of forces—the 
one which had been suppressed though not destroyed by Stalin’s atomisation—could arise 
and re-emerge.’27
Even in Hungary, the initial manifestations of opposition and critique were not explicitly 
political in an anti-systemic sense—indeed the intellectual critics often saw themselves as 
communists or at least as Marxists—but rather voiced dissatisfaction with bureaucratic 
incompetence and heavy-handedness. Yet increased freedom in culture almost invariably 
brought on more direct critique, usually escalating from the exposure of petty corruption, 
mismanagement at the local level and abuses of power, to outright questioning of the systemic 
performance, structure and legitimacy.
George Schopflin has argued28 that the leadership situation in 1953 was quite similar in 
Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria: in all cases there was a strong, hard-line leader (Bierut, 
Rakosi, Chervenkov) felt himself threatened by a rival with not only charisma and potential 
mass appeal, but also enjoying some support within the Party’s highest leadership. The 
difference between Poland and Hungary on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other was that 
the competing leaders and factions in the Bulgarian Politburo agreed on the overriding need 
to keep the system intact—a reversed democratic centralism, where the highest echelons 
actively refrained from consulting and appealing to lover echelons. Chervenkov’s downfall
25 Kogelfranz (1996), 182.
26 Wandycz (1992), 253.
27 Schopflin (1993), 114-5.
28 Schopflin (1993), 115.
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and replacement by Todor Zhivkov as party leader was a gradual and piecemeal affair (taking 
two years, from 1954 to 1956) which could be presented as an orderly transition. While 
Zhivkov was slightly more reform-minded than his predecessor, the shift in policy line was 
relatively minor. Indeed, Chervenkov’s greatest liability was his personal traits and attempts 
to create a cult of personality that had by then fallen out of fashion.
In Poland, on the other hand, the death of Bierut in 1953 had created a vacuum which not 
only widened the factional split but also brought the conflict to the open as the players 
jockeyed for position. When Gomulka returned, he was certainly not unopposed, but could as 
a victim of Stalinist repression ride on a wave of public support and goodwill which his 
Hungarian counterpart Gero totally lacked. Also, Gomulka had the advantage of the absence 
of any rival who could seriously undermine his position. This helped him find a balance 
between the broad public demands for economic reform and increased freedom, to which he 
acceded, and Soviet security interests, which he respected and saw as partly consistent with 
Poland’s own.
The Hungarian elite split of 1956 had its roots in 1953, when Nagy, after having been 
promoted on Moscow’s orders, delivered a crude dressing-down of Rakosi at a Central 
Committee meeting. This alienated the latter’s allies, and created a permanent fissure in the 
leadership. Nagy found his efforts at liberalising reform stalled by the party apparat and 
bureaucracy, but the promises given had already stirred the intelligentsia, the workers and 
peasants who would be the main beneficiaries of the revised policy. The polarisation was 
exacerbated when Rakosi and the other hard-liners were hit by Khrushchev’s not-so-secret 
speech. The nomination of Gerd as Rakosi’s successor was a worst-case scenario: something 
neither the liberals in the Party, the radical intellectuals, nor the public at large were willing 
to accept as a sufficient indication of change. Instead, it was widely interpreted as proof of 
systemic rigidity.
Nagy had already in 1953 irrevocably brought the brewing intra-Party conflict to the 
open. During his 1955-56 walk in the wild he viciously attacked the bureaucracy, claiming 
that ‘[p]ower is increasingly being torn away from the people and turned sharply against 
them [...] the people’s democracy in which power is exercised by the working class is 
obviously being replaced by a Party dictatorship [in which] power is not permeated by the 
spirit of socialism but by a Bonapartist spirit of minority dictatorship.’29 This attack, as others 
in a similar vein, was directed primarily at Rakosi and his closest allies, but also implicitly 
threatened party and apparat middle ranks. At the same time, it was seen by the population at 
large as a promise of a possible return to the 1948 situation. Nagy’s conduct thus had a strong 
mobilising effect on both pro- and anti-systemic political forces.
There appears to be a rather simple reason for the fact that Czechoslovakia, which also 
experienced social unrest in the early summer of 1953, took another path than its neighbours 
to the immediate north and south: the restoration of order was effected quickly, according to 
the Stalinist model then still prevalent in the USSR, instead of the more flexible approach 
possible after Khrushchev was firmly in power. The impact of 1953 was thus to ‘strengthen 
the factions of neo-Stalinist authoritarians in the Communist Party, whereas the in the 
aftermath of 1956 the influence of such groups inside [the Polish and Hungarian parties] was 
significantly and permanently reduced.’30 In Romania, the Party leadership, overwhelmingly 
hard-line, maintained a united front and managed to counter serious worker and student 
unrest essentially by paying off the protesters.
29 Quoted in Swain and Swain (1993), 85.
30 Batt (1991), 16-17.
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Intra-elite manoeuvring and successes at conflict resolution and containment is a 
necessary, but still not a sufficient explanation for why paths diverged. One also has to look at 
the mass level and to structural factors.
Support for the communist take-over in Eastern Europe had never been overwhelming, 
and many of the supporters had backed it either because they thought it would benefit them 
personally or would be beneficial for the radical development and modernisation of the 
country as a whole. The mismanagement of the economies was thus certain to dent public 
support: communism had not brought increased material well-being to the broad population 
even remotely to the extent promised. Indeed, the implementation of the coal/steel/machine- 
building philosophy was paid for by the working class, and even more by the rural population 
which for all practical purposes was treated as a class enemy. By the mid-1950’s, the abysmal 
living standards could no longer credibly be explained by the devastation of the war or with 
bourgeois-imperialist wrecking. Ultimately, discussion about the economic performance, if 
allowed to the extent as in Hungary, obviously raised questions about the communists’ very 
competence to rule, and consequently about legitimacy.
In the case of Hungary one may note particular features in the political culture. 
Radicalism, including Marxist varieties, enjoyed considerable support among leading 
Hungarian intellectuals both before and immediately after the Second World War, but by 
the mid 1950’s, many of the earlier proponents of the socialist project had grown 
disenchanted with the implementation of Marxist ideals by the apparatC This disaffection 
was particularly significant, as the Hungarian intelligentsia had strong revolutionary and 
anti-despotic credentials going back to 1848 and beyond. It had also gained broad moral 
authority, as the group had been severely persecuted under Stalinism. Intellectuals were also 
widely regarded, not least by themselves, as the repository of national values. Given all this, 
not only was the intelligentsia willing and ready to raise strong critique, but it also found a 
responsive audience.
These factors combined o some way to explain why the post-Stalinist crisis of 1953-56 in 
Hungary escalated to a genuine attempt at counter-revolution, while it elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe—and, of course, in the Soviet Union—essentially could be restricted to an intra-elite 
power struggle, or as in Poland to an intra-Party power struggle. The lasting and universal 
legacy of 1956 was a further diversification within the Central European Socialist Camp. In 
short, Hungary was eventually propelled into a process of controlled economic liberalisation, 
as Czechoslovakia experienced reluctant and slow de-Stalinisation. In Poland, the 
government attempted parallel crash industrialisation and consumerism, and fragmentation 
increased among the party elite with the ‘chauvino-communists’ gaining strength.
The 1960’s Crisis
Czechoslovakia eventually came to epitomise the 1960’s failed attempts at radical 
restructuring, but the front-runner candidate for instability during that decade was initially 
Poland. The period of economic reform there was temporarily halted by 1959, and in 1964 a 
campaign against critical intellectuals was launched. By 1965 Gomulka had proven a 
disappointment to liberals and conservatives alike, and Polish society began a descent into 
centrifogality and instability. Most visibly, it took the form of a Kulturkampfbcvwevn., on the 
one extreme, the revisionist historians and the artistic avant-garde on Central Europe’s most 
vibrant cultural scene, and, on the other, the hard-line so-called ‘Partisans’.
Following in the footsteps of the Natolinites and the ‘peasant sons’, the ‘Partisan’ hard­
liners entertained a strongly authoritarian world view. The group was led by General
31 Tismaneanu (1993), 69.
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Mieczyslaw Moczar, chairman of the association of former communist partisans and Interior 
Minister in 1964-68. It was, to some extent, just another example of an informal communist 
party clique brought together by a mixture of shared convictions and personal ties. But the 
Veterans’ Association also went beyond that, as its aim was to bring together war-time 
communist and anti-communist veterans under a banner of Polish patriotism. The essence of 
Moczarism was a shared conviction of the need for strong state powers, an army as the armed 
fist of the nation, and Poland’s independence and freedom from foreign interference, be it 
German or Soviet. It was in fact basically an attempt by the communist apparat to make peace 
with the Home Army (AK), London Government and Endecja elements it earlier had 
violently persecuted.
As Stefan Staszewski, a leading Party functionary later turned oppositional, has put it, this 
development was a result of Gomulka’s need to strengthen the watered-down official 
ideology with new ‘anti-Semitic-nationalistic-fascist ’ components.32 This flirtation—to say 
the least—with the political right wing was obviously a result of the economic crisis and the 
resulting weakening of party legitimacy. But Staszewski in fact goes as far as to interpret 
Gomulka’s evolution from his opposition to Stalinism at the time of his ascent to power to 
his later flirtation with ‘Communo-fascism’ as almost a structural necessity in Polish—and 
arguably all Eastern European—Real Existing Socialism. According to this view, strong and 
active anti-democratic and anti-liberal formations, including the bureaucratising apparatuses 
of party, armed forces and security organs, repeatedly showed a readiness to co-operate with 
some of the most reactionary pre-war elements.
The national issue came to the fore in 1965, when Poland’s Catholic bishops in a letter to 
their German colleagues had ‘forgiven and begged for forgiveness’, i.e. for the war and its 
legacies. The Party hard-liners saw this not only as interference in the Party’s prerogative to 
determine foreign policy. It also prompted them to attack the Church for betraying Polish 
interests and going soft on German revanchism; indeed, their critique gained credibility by 
the cool response the bishops received from Germany. The conflict over the German 
question brought Gomulka even closer to the hard-liners—to uphold the division of 
Germany was, as mentioned earlier, a pillar of his foreign policy—and he was subsequently 
swept along by their increasingly xenophobic campaign as well.
Large parts of the Partisans’ ideological baggage and rhetorical arsenal came straight 
from the pre-war Endecja, which also had blamed ‘enemies within’ generally, and Jews 
specifically, for Poland’s perceived misfortunes. But while many of the leading Party hard­
liners certainly were rabid anti-Semites and nationalists, their main goal was not a national 
revival and purges of Jews, but a reversal of the liberalisation in intellectual and economic 
life. The nationalist campaign primarily served as an instrument in the campaign to remove 
Gomulka, whom Moczar, his erstwhile ally, eventually accused of leniency in his dealings 
with the ‘imperialist-Zionist conspiracy’. Gomulka himself was by most accounts (though 
not by all) not personally an anti-Semite, but he chose to play along, realising that he could 
not rely on the support only of oppositional intellectuals. He thus eventually came out against 
‘The Fifth Column’—an euphemism for Jews—but distinguished between Zionist Jews, 
cosmopolitan Jews, and patriotic communist Jews, the latter of which he said should be 
treated as loyal Poles.
In February 1968 the hard-liners went on a broad offensive. When the performance of a 
Mickiewicz historical play was banned as anti-Soviet, a wave of student protests broke out, 
which then were suppressed by force and resulted in hundreds of arrests. The disturbances 
were used as a tool to intensify the campaign against the few Jews remaining in Poland; they 
had already been already branded as illoyal because of the widespread Jewish support of Israel
32Toranska (1987).
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during the Six Day War in 1967 when the Polish government supported the Arab side. Many 
Jews in the Party, armed forces, bureaucracy and academia were dismissed as "revisionists’ or 
"Zionists’ and urged to emigrate; intellectuals were arrested on the sole ground of their 
ethnicity. The wave of emigration which ensued eventually encompassed the majority of the 
country’s 35,000 Jewish citizens. Gomulka managed to stay on for two more years, more or 
less a lame duck dependent on the temporary support he received from a Party faction of 
pragmatic ‘Technocrats’ led by the Silesian Party chief Edward Gierek.
The hard-line Partisans scored some successes in 1968, but at the same time they had taken 
the dangerous step, considering the stability of Party hegemony, of appealing directly to and 
mobilising the masses under the banner of nationalism, an issue that at least theoretically 
could be fully reconciled neither with Leninist dogma nor with Poland’s alliance with the 
USSR.
For liberal intellectuals, on the other hand, March 1968 signified the final 
disillusionment with the Party’s ability to self-transform. This was the start of "anti-politics’, 
the project to create autonomous structures not only outside the party, but ignoring 
altogether traditional forms of political opposition. As Jacek Kuron, one of the leaders, 
concluded: in a totalitarian society, even preserving culture, reading literature and discussing 
philosophy constitute political opposition precisely because they ignore politics in a situation 
where the state attempts to politicise everything.33 As the 1968 events demonstrated crude, 
even archaic demagoguery on the side of the hard-liners, the development of the intellectual 
opposition also indicated and advanced the maturing of Polish civil society.
Among the Central European countries, the chauvinist communist wing was clearly best 
organised and most influential in Poland, but it was also a force to be reckoned with in 
Hungary, where the nationalist and anti-Semitic party faction coalesced around the National 
Patriotic Front, and in Slovakia.34 The most curious parallel to Polish developments is, 
however, the strategy employed by the Romanian government.
The Romanian communist party had a long-running tradition of distinct nationalism, 
but after Nicolae Ceausescu became leader in 1965 the state ideology became outright 
xenophobic. The discourse that Ceausescu garnished in communist jargon tapped the very 
themes that had dominated before and during the war when Romania was governed by a 
rightist-nationalist regime: the country’s historic glory, the origins of Romanian ethnicity,
33 Stokes (1993), 25.
34 Parenthetically, one may note the dual attitude of the East German SED to the nationalist 
theme. The strained relations with Poland have been mentioned earlier, and there leadership 
also expressed curious attitudes towards anti-Semitism. The few hundred Jews who lived in the 
German Democratic Republic were exhibited as proof of the true anti-fascist nature of the 
state, but at the same time suspected as agents of Zionism and Israel. The GDR also remained 
extremely hostile to the state of Israel and to Zionism; Israel was not formally recognised by East 
Berlin until 1990, and all demands for compensation for the Holocaust were rejected. Recent 
research has also shown that the East German secret service was directly involved in anti-Semitic 
campaigns conducted in the Federal Republic. The intent was to show the resilience of anti- 
Semitism and Naziism in Western Germany and thus to undermine the Federal Republic’s 
standing in the Western community. During the 1960’s, the Stasi organised an appeal in the FRG 
for Adolf Eichmann, who was then standing trial in Jerusalem; desecrated Jewish cemeteries; 
and sent threatening letters to Jews living in West Germany. As a recent study on the theme 
claims: the ‘purportedly so anti-fascist GDR [. . .] in fact produced anti-Semitism, cynically used 
and misused Jews.’ Wolffsohn (1995); the book claims that the Stasi was involved the painting 
of swastikas on the Cologne synagogue on Christmas Eve 1959 and in many of the 470 recorded 
anti-Semitic incidents in the FRG the following year; the incidents prompted a Sondersitzung of 
the Bonn Bundestag while Chancellor Konrad Adenauer demanded corporal punishment for 
painters of swastikas.
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the nature of the ‘national essence’ and the preservation of national unity. National values, 
symbols and cultures that had been shelved immediately after the communist take-over were 
brought out from the closet step-by-step. Even historical figures from the feudal past (and 
later from the inter-war era, too—including the fascist-style dictator Ion Antonescu) were 
rehabilitated as forerunners to the Romanian variety of Marxism-Leninism.35
The Romanian Party did incur severe critique from Moscow, particularly after the 
decision not to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but there is no doubt that it was 
successful in generating mass-scale support among the country’s majority ethnic-Romanian 
population. The Romanian communist party’s presentation of itself as primarily the bearer 
of national values, as opposed to the local agent of an internationalist ideology, certainly is a 
major explanation for the fact that the country escaped much of the turmoil experienced by 
others in the Socialist Bloc. In fact, what opposition there was to Ceausescu and communist 
rule, it was mainly voiced in terms of the same nationalism employed by the regime.
In many ways, the ideology that underpinned Ceausescu’s leadership was indeed 
reminiscent of the one advocated by the Natolin—Partisan faction of the Polish Party. This is 
not all that surprising, given some of the structural similarities between the two countries: 
both were diffuse as state entities, had experienced radical border revisions following both 
World Wars, and had a legacy of partitions and rule by several foreign powers. Romanians 
and Poles alike were historically settled among other nationalities, and large parts of the 
respective ethnic communities lived outside the states’ borders. It was, however, no 
coincidence that the Romanian communist party turned on a markedly more nationalist 
course than its Polish counterpart: Soviet strategic interests put limits on overt Polish 
Russophobia; Romania had not, as Poland, experienced an ethnic homogenisation as a result 
of the Second World War36; and the traditions of political clientilism and feudalism were 
much stronger in Romania, with its legacy of Ottoman rule and Orthodox Christianity.
National tension ignited also the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968, but was then of a different 
variety. Many Slovaks felt their part of the country was strongly disadvantaged by economic 
policy, were irritated by what they perceived as Czech cultural hegemony, and had been 
outraged by the 1960 constitution which eradicated almost all provisions for Slovak 
autonomy. Novotny’s open insensitivity to Slovak culture and aspirations to more autonomy 
lost him the support of Slovak conservatives, his natural allies, and directly triggered his 
downfall and replacement by Alexander Dubcek.37
The problems in the Czech-Slovak relationship was not, however, the main reason for 
Novotny’s fall. Practically untouched by substantial reform until the mid-60’s, the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party was faced with increasing demands, both within and 
without, for an opening-up of public debate. Above all, economic performance had been 
disastrous, with negative growth rates in 1962 resulting in the unheard-of decision late that 
year to abandon the third five-year plan. The acute problems in the economy ‘seriously shook 
the confidence of the leadership and constrained it to look hard at the need for economic 
reform’. But once the reforms were off the ground, economists and managers alike were 
dismayed at noticing how the Party, fearful of the loss of power resulting from the overhaul 
of the system, attempted to sabotage reform. This mobilised technocrats to come out in 
support of ever more radical reform, and eventually forced them to acknowledge the political 
impediments to economic rationality.38
35 Hockenos (1993), 168-9.
36 By the late 70’s, of Romania’s population of some 23 million, 1.7 million were ethnic Magyars, 
two million Gypsies, and 300,000 Germans (although the later figure decreased dramatically 
through emigration).
37 Cf. Dean (1973).
^Schopflin (1993), 153-4.
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Paying Tribute: Hundreds of Czechs filed 
past the pall of Jan Palach, the student who 
committed self immolation in Prague's 
Wenceslas Square on 16 January 1968.
Beside the coffin stand professors from the 
Prague University
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The nomination of Alexander Dubcek as new leader in January 1968 was welcomed by 
both hard-liners and reform-minded forces within the Party. While he firmly believed in the 
leading role of the party, he also wanted to revitalise the system with the introduction of 
Czech humanism. Dubcek was a Slovak, but had spent many years of his life in the Soviet 
Union.
Dubcek’s programme for reform encompassed both the economic and political spheres. 
He proposed a real federalisation of the state, with the implied loosening of central Party 
control. An ‘Action Programme’ published in April declared the goal of building ‘a new 
profoundly democratic form of socialism conforming to Czechoslovak conditions’, summed 
up by his slogan ‘Socialism with a human face’. While the specific proposals were not all that 
radical (as for the economy, they centred on strengthening direct worker control at the 
expense of the bureaucracy), the discussion which was let free to evaluate them created a snow­
ball effect. With the introduction, for all practical purposes, of free speech, the debate could 
not for long be contained so as not to include the single-party system and the fundamentals of 
Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, demands were soon voiced for political pluralism and an end to 
limitations to legitimate political opposition.
In June a group of young intellectuals published the ‘Two Thousand Words’ manifesto, 
intended to strengthen the reformist grouping within the ruling party. By the conservatives as 
well as by the Warsaw Pact allies—who had warned the Czechoslovaks as early as in March— 
it was nevertheless seen as a dangerous call to action from below: ‘The object [of the Action 
Programme] was not a destruction of socialism, but its transformation was so to be so drastic 
that it appeared revolutionary. That is how the leaders of East Germany, Poland and the 
Soviet Union perceived it.’39 They feared a repetition of the Hungarian events, where 
cautious reform had been overtaken by popular demands for ever more radical change,
39 Wandycz (1993), 256-7.
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including a rejection of Soviet domination. This apprehension was indeed well founded and 
borne out by subsequent events, but also acknowledged by Dubcek, who throughout was 
careful to stress that there was no question of Czechoslovakia leaving the Warsaw Pact or 
Comecon. But after stern warnings from the Warsaw Pact allies in early August, the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party was forced to reverse a decision to formalise its departure 
from Leninist principles, and agreed to suppress the newly-established social democratic 
party and other mass organisations working outside the framework of the National Front.
HUFVUDSTADSBLADET ARCHIVES
New Doctrine: 
Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev 
signing the 
Bratislava joint 
declaration of six 
communist 
parties, 5 August 
1968. Next to the 
Secretary- 
General are 
Podgornyi and 
Shelest
PRESSFOTO-AP
Breaking 
Resistance: 
Soviet tanks 
slamming into a 
vehicle barricade 
in Prague, 21
August 1968
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This was still not enough. On the night of 20-21 August, troops from the USSR, Poland, 
the GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria invaded, providing ‘internationalist help’ against the ‘right­
wing and opportunistic’ forces. Dubcek finally resigned in April 1969 and a loyalist faction 
in the Party, led by Gustav Husak, another Slovak, took full control of the Party. Half a 
million Party members were eventually purged when the new leadership embarked on a 
course of ‘normalisation’.40
There are obvious similarities between the Czechoslovak and the earlier Hungarian 
attempts at liberalisation: one can point at the radicalisation of the Party and its gradual loss 
of control over reform, at Soviet fears of a domino effect, and at the external interventions 
themselves. Conversely, the main difference lies in the extent to which reforms progressed. In 
Hungary, the end result was a full-blown insurrection and a ‘grand retreat’ led by the Party 
leadership itself. In Czechoslovakia the intervention came well before that stage, even though 
Dubcek’s plans envisaged a continuing and institutionalised hegemony for the Communist 
Party within the National Front. The Czechoslovak events were also strongly spiced by the 
national Czech-Slovak issue, the parallel of which was absent in Hungary. Indeed, the 
federalisation of the state in 1969 into its two main constituent national parts remained the 
most visible legacy of the Prague Spring reforms.
Another difference can be discerned in long-term Party reactions. The Husak 
government did not resort to the amount and even nature of revenge and repression seen in 
Hungary immediately after 1956, but its policy of‘forgetting’ froze society into an static 
state. Husak, who stayed in power until 1988, can be described as a ‘doctrinaire Leninist’, and 
the years of his rule have been summed up as an ‘era of motionless and spiritual death’.41 For 
two decades after 1968, there were practically no attempts at reform, political or economic. 
In 1972, the word ‘reform’ itself was officially outlawed from public vocabulary when the 
Academy of Sciences ideologically repudiated reform economics. Even discussing 
‘improvements’ in the economic system became grounds for accusations of ‘fomenting 
counter-revolution.’42
This stagnation not only created passivity and alienation, but led to a continuing slide in 
relative economic performance: Czechoslovak GDP per capita in 1960 equalled 90 per cent of 
Austria’s, but by 1985, after several years with zero growth rates, it had fallen to 60 per cent.43 
Foreign trade was diverted to the Comecon bloc, which in the 1970’s represented some 80 
per cent of Czechoslovakia’s imports and exports. Although Slovakia was given a boost of 
investment, it was largely put into heavy industry, machine-building and armament plants. 
Yet the strict central planning, at least in comparison to Hungary and Poland, enabled the 
Czechoslovak regime to redistribute material welfare according to political criteria, so as to 
ensure full employment, keep prices stable and sustain the semblance of a welfare state. 
Combined with strict censorship, efficient internal security and a nomenklatura system 
applying Czech bureaucratic discipline, containment of dissent proved possible for a 
surprisingly long time.
The aftermath of 1956 marked a shift in the balance between the populist and the urbanist 
traditions of the Hungarian Party. Rakosi and his closest allies—and to some extent Nagy as
40 Tismaneanu (1993), 101-3.
41 Bankowicz (1994), 154.
42 Batt (1991), 18.
43 Both figures are from Swain and Swain (1993), 172, quoting Wlodzimierz Brus, ‘1966 to 1975: 
Normalisation and Conflict’, in Kaser, M. C. and E. A. Radice (Eds), The Economic History of 
Eastern Europe 1919—1975, Vol. Ill, Oxford 1986. The normal caveat for economic data on the 
Socialist countries applies here: if anything, they seem to be on the high side. Nevertheless, the 
trend is illuminating.
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well—were internationalists who strongly identified with the October revolution and had an 
urban, often Jewish background. In contrast, Kadar, despite being put in power by the 
Soviets, was an exponent of the more national and populist wing of the Party, which stressed 
the importance of incorporating aspects of the national spirit into state ideology. This 
nationally-oriented Party faction, ‘through a more plebeian notion of class struggle which 
incorporated all forms of historical resistance to the ruling classes, drew a line of continuity 
from early anti-Habsburg independence movements to the ruling communist regime. The 
urban, European-oriented Marxists, such as Erik Molnar or the philosopher Lukacs, 
considered such historical conceptions primitive, relying instead on the more classical 
arguments of the Marxist traditions.’44
With these semi-populist inclinations in store the Kadar leadership chose to embark on a 
policy of continued reform, after the initial phase of harsh repression. This had much to do 
with personalities: Kadar has often been described as benevolently paternalistic dictator, who 
‘had a vision of a largely egalitarian modern socialist society which he set out to achieve 
through a series of gradual economic reform.’45 He was not averse to increased participation 
(albeit very gradually and in tightly controlled forms) to broaden the social and political base 
of the regime, and de-politicised everyday life. From 1967, multiple-candidate elections were 
allowed and in 1983 they became mandatory. The rule of law was strengthened, i.a. through 
the introduction of pseudo-independent institutions to monitor conformity with the 
constitution. Nevertheless, one limit remained: the final authority of the Party could not be 
challenged.
In the field of economic policy, a thorough analysis led the Party leadership to conclude 
that Hungary could not rely solely on the Comecon markets and mechanisms, but had to 
become competitive in the open world markets. The process started in the early 1960’s and 
was formulated in the 1968 New Economic Mechanism. It outlined a decentralisation of 
decision-making, the abandoning of central planning with compulsory targets in every 
sphere, and a freeing of some prices. It was a long-winded process with repeated setbacks, but 
by the early 1970’s Hungary was commonly described as the ‘happiest barrack in the camp’, 
both with reference to the level of individual freedom and to the availability and quality of 
consumer goods. Between 1970 and 1978 national income rose by an average of 6 per cent 
per year, and personal consumption by 4 per cent annually—albeit fuelled by a huge increase 
in hard-currency debt. Shortages in the food supply, the overriding problem of nearly all 
socialist countries, were all but eliminated as a result of an agricultural policy which stressed 
incentives to farmers in the form of higher prices and increased freedom of decision. The flip 
side of this was, however, a shortage of money to buy the goods. After a halting of reform in 
the mid-70’s, a new phase was initiated which included even stronger market elements: there 
was a cutback in subsidies, further decentralisation of economic decision-making, and even 
break-ups of large state monopolies and enterprises.
On the whole, the Hungarian government’s attempts at co-opting intellectuals and 
technocrats through decentralisation and de-politicisation proved successful. The loyalty of 
the working class was bought with price stability, full employment and generous social 
benefits, the provision of which became the overriding aim of economic policy. But by the 
mid-1980’s all this could no longer be accomplished, as inflation had eroded purchasing 
power and forced an ever larger proportion of the work force to take second jobs in the grey 
or black sectors of the economy, ‘exploiting themselves’, as the saying went.
Informal networks were tolerated in most Eastern and Central European countries as a 
means to overcome rigidity and bottlenecks, but in Hungary the process led to an increasing
44 Hockenos (1993), 319-20.
45 Grzybowski (1994b), 181.
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diversification of organisational forms.46 For ideological reasons, it was not a path the 
government and Party were happy to take, and even less, particularly compared to Gierek’s 
Poland, a conscious exploitation of populism. But with the Kadarist strategy hinging so much 
on delivering decent material conditions, the step-by-step privatisation of ever-larger sectors 
of the economy had to be tolerated. Although the legal private sector employed only 5 per 
cent of the Hungarian work force in the late 70’s, according to official estimates two thirds 
of households earned additional income in the ‘second sector’,47 mainly by providing services 
on the market. The transformation of informal neighbourhood-based subsistence production 
into formally recognised production exchanged in market-like relations was only reluctantly 
allowed by the authorities in the 1970’s. By the 1980’s, however, the domain of the second 
economy was no longer restricted to providing agricultural products, building or services 
beyond the state sector, but extended into the very industrial core of the economy.
The Polish Crisis, Solidarity and Martial Law
The main legacy for the Socialist Bloc as a whole of the Prague Spring was the so-called 
Brezhnev Doctrine, which essentially stated that a country that had once gone socialist could 
never be freed from the common interests of other states in the socialist commonwealth. This 
served as an overt threat that the USSR reserved for itself the freedom to intervene in Eastern 
Europe whenever it felt that socialism, as interpreted in Moscow, was threatened. For good 
reason, Western passivity in such a situation was taken for granted.
The Brezhnev doctrine was the backdrop against which the new round of political 
turbulence in Poland was played out. In December 1970 Gomulka was finally forced out as a 
result of widespread worker unrest, caused by new radical increases in the prices of foods and 
fuels, which he ordered the police and army to suppress. In the unravelling of the fragile 
political balance that followed, Edward Gierek, a former mine-worker known as a 
pragmatic and able manager, became Party leader. Not surprisingly, given both his 
background and the events surrounding his ascendance, Gierek chose to appeal directly to 
industrial workers, by denouncing Gomulka’s harsh reprisals and with promises of 
expansionist economic growth. In exchange for providing decent material conditions— 
‘stuffing sausages in the workers’ mouths’48—there were to be no overt protests against the 
way the Party ran society, and the demands for free trade unions and a lifting of censorship 
were disregarded.
Gierek’s strategy demanded production levels on par with promised consumption levels, 
and in the longer run the Polish economy was not able to accomplish that. After failing to co­
opt workers to increase tempo and working hours, a programme was initiated to finance 
industrial expansion and modernisation with capital borrowed abroad; money was easily 
forthcoming due to detente and the petrodollars flowing over in Western banks. 
Simultaneously, Gomulka’s policy of autarky was replaced by a drive to increase trade with 
the market economies of the West. During 1970-75, the stock of Western machinery in 
industry rose twenty-fold, salaries were up by 40 per cent in real terms, and Poland clocked in 
the highest economic growth rates in Europe, more than 10 per cent annually.
It was, however, a pipe dream. If the scheme to finance expansion with foreign capital 
ever was feasible, it was soon rendered impossible by the constant social unrest: a major 
proportion of the borrowing had to be channelled to consumption in order to protect social 
peace. Of the more than $20 billion Poland borrowed abroad in the 1970’s, $6 billion went
46 Grabher (1994), 6-9.
47 Deppe and Hoss (1989), 40.
^Stokes (1993), 20.
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directly to the importation of foodstuffs.49 A large part of the rest was squandered on 
unprofitable investment projects, channelled to the Comecon trading partners in the form of 
imported input in goods exported for soft currency50, or frittered away in widespread graft 
and corruption. During all of the 70’s, Poland’s trade balance remained negative.
Despite huge imports, shortages of foodstuffs remained endemic. This was not so much a 
result of government intervention in agriculture, as, paradoxically, of the absence of it. 
Although Polish farming had not been collectivised, neither had the bulk of the peasantry 
developed into an entrepreneurial class, but remained locked in inefficient small-plot 
cultivation. The Gierek government did introduce incentives to encourage specialisation and 
larger units in agriculture, but the main method used to stimulate food output was to lift the 
prices paid to farmers for produce. Fiscal prudence would have demanded a simultaneous 
raising of consumer prices or reducing subsidies, but these measures were invariably 
withdrawn when industrial strikes erupted. The inevitable result of this overheating was, of 
course, accelerated inflation and pressures to tighten fiscal policy even more, all of which only 
generated new bouts of unrest. By 1978 the state was in effect bankrupt and shortages of 
foodstuffs, medicine and fuels became desperate.
In the process of this gigantic loan-financed Ponzi scheme, the Party for all practical 
purposes gave up its pretensions of ideological consistency for populist technocratism. It 
could, however, not escape its claims to omniscience, as its hegemonic political position was 
internally and externally motivated in exactly those terms. When things went wrong, there 
was nobody else to blame, and no other way to contain dissent than coercion. The great lesson 
to be learned from the Polish events, the GDR leader Erich Honecker told the Czechoslovak 
Politburo in the spring of 1981, was to see that ‘the foreign debt did not reach that dangerous 
level’51—a somewhat superfluous caveat, as Czechoslovakia had been more restrained than 
any other Comecon country in accumulating foreign debt; in 1988 outstanding hard- 
currency loans amounted to only $3 billion-$4 billion.52 As for the Polish comrades, lacking 
the resolve and means to resort to Czechoslovak-style repression, Honecker’s warning was by 
then a difficult one to heed, as it had been shown again and again that political stability was 
equal to food price stability and that food price stability could be financed only by 
borrowing.
Gierek’s problems were exacerbated by his weakened credentials as a patriot. Among 
Party hard-liners he was widely seen as toadying to the West. They were particularly incensed 
when he in 1975 negotiated the emigration to the Federal Republic of 125,000 ethnic 
Germans in exchange for DM2.3 billion in grants and loans. Before, no ethnic Germans had 
officially been acknowledged as remaining in the country, and hard-liners also believed the 
German credits created a dangerous dependency. His handling of the relationship with the 
Soviet Union was equally disastrous: also in 1975, Gierek decorated Leonid Brezhnev, the 
very author of the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty, with the Virtuti Militari, an order 
instituted during the war with Russia in 1792 and normally given only for extraordinary 
courage shown on the battlefield. Soon after this gaffe he proposed introducing into the 
constitution a statute on ‘unbreakable brotherly alliance’ with the USSR. This created an even 
bigger public uproar, and although the clause subsequently was changed to a more non­
committal ‘strengthening the friendship and co-operation’ with the Soviet Union, Gierek 
had been fatally discredited among broad sections of the Polish population.53 When the next 
big crisis came, Gierek and the technocrats had few favours to call in from any quarters.
49Myant (1982), 18; also Blazyca (1992).
50 Krzeminski (1994), 145-6.
51 Garton Ash (1994), 157.
52 Tismaneanu (1993), 149.
53 Krzeminski (1994), 151.
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Coming Home: Pope John Paul's 1979 visit to Poland demonstrated the superior power of the 
Catholic Church to energise the masses
The problem for the Party was all the greater as the intellectual opposition and shop­
floor leaders of the working class had by then found each other, and this alliance was openly 
supported by an increasingly politically active and radical Catholic Church. In addition, the 
period of detente between the superpowers and the Helsinki Final Act put new external 
limits on repression.
In June 1976 workers struck in Radom after yet another round of price hikes; serious 
bloodletting ensued, something Gierek had promised he would never allow. The strikers 
were supported by a rudimental pseudo-union, the Committee for the Defence of Workers 
(KOR), created by intellectuals from the 1968 anti-political movement. In April 1978 the 
formation of an independent, but still illegal, trade union was announced in Gdansk; among 
the activists was the Lenin Shipyard electrician Lech Walesa.
The peculiar historical and social circumstances in Poland go a long way to explain the 
events of 1980-81. One fact that deserves particular attention is the huge influence enjoyed by 
the Catholic Church. During the 70’s it had an extraordinarily charismatic and politically 
astute leader in its Primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, and gained the heaviest possible 
external back-up when Karol Wojtyla, the former Archbishop of Cracow, was elected Pope 
John Paul II in 1978. It is almost impossible to overstate the importance of the his papal 
grand tour of Poland in 1979: it allowed millions of people to collectively show their 
support of something outside, and fundamentally opposed to, the communist belief system; 
proved the weakness of the Party in comparison with support for the Church and ‘the other 
Poland’; and generally demonstrated to everybody the power of the masses.
In August the same year, soon after a second papal visit and following new price hikes, 
cutbacks in subsidies and the dismissal of a worker on political grounds, the Gdansk activists 
organised new strikes that now swept both the Baltic coast and the Silesian mining and 
industrial areas. This time, the government felt it had to negotiate—if only because several 
high-ranking military leaders declared their refusal to order their troops to shoot on the 
strikers. When talks started it became clear that the demands had escalated to include the 
right to free trade unions, a lifting of censorship and the release of political prisoners. By the 
end of the month, when the massive popular support for the protests was clear for everybody 
to see, the Party Central Committee evicted its hard-liners54 and thus opened the way for a 
dialogue on not only economic, but also political concessions. On the last day of August,
54 Gierek officially exited on 5 September, and was replaced as Party leader by Stanislaw Kania, a 
cautious man widely seen as a compromise candidate.
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Walesa signed the documents legalising the Solidarity trade union. Within months it 
developed into a mass movement with some ten million members from all strata of society— 
every third Party member joined. For the next eighteen months, Poland was in fact governed 
by an uneasy tripartite constellation of Party, Solidarity, and Church.
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Behind Dark 
Glasses: General 
Wojchiech 
Jaruzelski 
reviewing troops 
after the 
introduction of 
Martial Law in 
December 1981. 
During these 
days, I often held 
onto the cold 
handle of my 
pistol’, he later 
told
On the March: A 
troop convoy 
passing the 
United Workers 
Party 
headquarters in 
Warsaw, a week 
after Martial 
Law was 
introduced. Even 
then, the party 
could not bring 
itself together to 
assume the 
initiative
Among many quarters of the etatist-oriented elite, however, Solidarity was seen not only 
as a mortal danger to the Party, but as a threat to the very existence of the Polish state. With its 
radicalism and lack of moderation and self-discipline, Party ideologues argued, Solidarity
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threatened to create an ‘anarchy’ similar to the one which had led to the 18th Century 
partitions. They clearly referred to Soviet worries and may have had a point: in 1980-81, the 
Cold War was at a new height, and the Soviet Union had demonstrated with the invasion of 
Afghanistan that the Brezhnev doctrine was very much in force. With this hyperrealist 
interpretation of the nature of the relationship between Poland and the USSR (as well as 
having a deeply distrustful attitude towards Germany), powerful elements in the Party and 
armed forces continued to see the Soviet Union as ‘the only guarantor of Poland’s 
sovereignty, albeit a limited one.’55
The need to preclude a looming Soviet intervention was the rationale given by the 
military leadership when it proclaimed martial law on 13 December 1981. It could back up 
the claim with strong rhetoric from Moscow and hard information on Soviet troop 
movements. Whether that was just posturing is, however, as of yet unclear: there certainly was 
not any visible involvement of Soviet personnel during any stage of the actual imposition of 
martial law. Nevertheless, the Polish military leadership had held extensive talks with the 
Soviet High Command throughout the previous autumn, and it is clear that the core of the 
communist establishment, in and out of uniform, owed allegiance to the Soviet agencies 
which had given them their positions in the first place.56 Nevertheless, General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, the coup leader, himself probably thought he had saved Poland from a Soviet 
invasion, ‘the abyss’ it had been standing on he edge of.57 A paradoxical effect of the military 
take-over was also that the Polish army, for the first time since the Second World War, had 
gained the ability to put up a serious fight against a possible Soviet invasion.
Jaruzelski had become Prime Minister already in February 1981 and Party First 
Secretary the following October, but the regime installed by the martial law had little 
support in Marxist-Leninist theory—in fact, it strongly resembled traditional authoritarian 
military rule of a Latin American type. Indeed, the coup itself was proof that the Party had 
lost its ability to govern. During 1980-81 the Party had ‘collapsed at the culmination of a 
long process of decay, which had been sapping respect for its corrupt leaders, its failed 
policies, and its irrelevant ideology for years.’58 The paralysis went so deep that even during 
martial law, the Party could not pull itself together to consolidate its reassumed power. 
During the policy of‘normalisation’ instituted under martial law, Poland did not experience 
anything on the scale of the purges and the social terror seen in Hungary after 1956 and in 
Czechoslovakia after 1968. What the regime managed, though, was a stabilisation of the 
economy; a series of radical price hikes meant that the average standard of living dropped by a 
quarter during 1982 alone, and foreign trade was diverted towards the Comecon Bloc.
Power was assumed by a Military Council for National Salvation (WRON)—the name 
chosen was symbolic, as it did not include words such as ‘socialist’ or ‘worker’ which had 
been applied to the interim post-crisis regimes earlier in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
Jaruzelski had been a member of the communist party since the war, but he nevertheless 
managed to project himself as first and foremost a Polish patriot: the general could indeed 
point to his background as a member of the gentry and a career officer, and it was no secret 
that he had lost both parents during the family’s war-time deportation to the USSR. The 
Jaruzelski government was also eager to take advantage of the possibilities for demure 
populist anti-Russian posturing created by Gorbachev’s perestroyka. In 1987, the Jaruzelski 
government persuaded the Soviets to agree to a joint investigation into some of the most 
blatant cases of Soviet interference in Polish affairs, such as the massacre of some 23,000
55 Krzeminski (1994), 163.
56 Davies (1986), 22.
57 Andrew and Gordievsky (1990), 486; this is a recurrent theme in practically all interviews 
Jaruzelski has given since.
58 Davies (1986), 20.
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Polish officers an Katyn and two other localities in 1940, the liquidation of the pre-war 
Communist Party, and the deportations to the east of Poles from territories occupied by the 
USSR after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Yet efforts to generate institutionalised mass support, as through the Patriotic Movement 
for National Rebirth (PRON) or the official trade union (OPZZ), failed miserably. So did, by 
and large, half-hearted endeavours to present the Soviet Union as the only possible protector 
of Poland’s frontiers against German revanchism.59 Among hard-liners in the Party, however, 
xenophobia and nationalism gained increased prominence. Its prime outlet became the 
Patriotic Association Grunwald, founded in 1980, which continued the anti-Semitic, anti­
German and covertly anti-Soviet nationalist tradition of the Partisans, whose leader Moczar 
was a member of the Politburo during 1980-81.60 Though it was always officially disavowed 
by the Party leadership, many consider Grunwald a vehicle created by forces inside the 
security apparatus and enjoying the patronage of high-ranking, but anonymous communist 
officials.61 If that is indeed the case, it says a lot about attitudes among the communist hard­
line elite: by way of illustration, during one demonstration staged by Grunwald in Warsaw in 
1981 to counter a student anti-government meeting, demonstrators carried banners 
denouncing ‘the terror of the Jewish clique’, and marched on the former secret police 
headquarters, where the crowd proceeded to commemorate ‘Polish communists persecuted 
by Jews during 1949—53’.62 Bizarre as it seems, Grunwald's pet theory was the existence of a 
‘continuum stretching from the security service interrogators of the 1950’s to Solidarity 
activists in the 1980’s.’63
Grunwald, whose actual base of popular support remains unclear and in any case consisted 
mainly of older folk, went into hibernation in 1983. Nevertheless, its nationalist-xenophobic 
agenda was prominently represented in the martial law regime. Thus, when members of the 
KOR Workers’ Self-Defence Committee were tried in 1984 for ‘conspiring against the state’, 
they were accused by the prosecution for, among other things, being in the service of 
‘international Zionist freemasonry’.64 All in all, during martial law, the chauvino- 
communists’ influence was probably stronger than at any other time during communist rule.
Ethnicity as a Structural Factor
The preceding analysis has indicated that ethnicity and nationalism have been important, even 
crucial determinants of political behaviour in modern-era Central Europe. Communal 
tension and irredentism were major destabilising forces during the first half of the 20th 
century, and simmered under the surface during communist rule, occasionally being 
exploited by the regimes themselves or erupting as anti-communist protest. Yet the context
59 Garton Ash (1989), 239, quotes sociological studies which show that, in 1980, 10.7 per cent 
of respondents saw a threat to Polish independence from the Federal Republic of Germany, 
while no less than 49.6 perceived the Soviet Union as constituting such a threat. By 1984 the 
proportions had fallen to 4.7 and 23 per cent, respectively—the last figure indicates that martial 
law, for all its drawbacks, was interpreted as having diminished the possibility of a Soviet 
intervention.
60 Tellingly, the still-existing association takes its name from the great 1410 battle in which a 
Polish-Lithuanian army defeated the Teutonic Knights, stopping and eventually reversing 
German expansion in the East. In Germany, the event is known as the Battle of Tannenberg.
61 Cf. Vinton (1991b).
62 Cf. Ruge and Ruge (1990), 45.
63 Sabbat-Swidlicka (1982). Several Solidarity leaders, including Michnik, Kuron and Geremek, 
were of Jewish descent.
64 Cf. Ruge and Ruge (1990), 45.
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has changed dramatically since the inter-war period. The demographics of Central Europe 
have been altered almost beyond recognition by the worst two disasters to hit European socio­
cultural diversity in modern times: the all but complete destruction of Eastern European 
Jewry, and the expulsion of nearly all the German communities east of the Oder and in the 
Danube basin. During the murderous and barbaric 1940’s, the ancient Eastern European 
identity which Jacques LeRider has described as an ‘inter-cultural koine’,65 was all but 
eradicated in the name of social engineering.
The killings and population transfers during and shortly after the Second World War 
created the ethnically most homogenous macro-political units that have ever existed in the 
area. Even so, the communist governments made it policy to implement ambitious 
programmes of assimilation, including tight controls on ethnic-minority organisation, 
education and cultural autonomy.66 The degree of homogeneity accomplished by 1960 is 
indicated by the ethno-lingusitic fractionalisation index in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalisation Index, I960 67
Poland 28
Hungary 98
Czechoslovakia 490
Albania 93
Bulgaria 220
East Germany 17
West Germany 26
Romania 252
USSR 666
Yugoslavia 754
These figures should certainly be treated with caution. For one, the ethno-lingusitic diversity 
calculations are based on official or semi-official head-counts which may be biased. What the 
indices nevertheless point to is the fact that the three Central European communist countries 
were remarkably ethnically homogenous in comparison with other countries of the Socialist 
Bloc. Czechoslovakia is of course an exception, the main reason being the Czech-Slovak 
duality within the federation.
Ethnic and linguistic boundaries were not, however, completely congruent with the state 
delineations in 1960, and have not become so since. The starting-point for the following 
discussion is a compilation of conflicting estimates of Central Europe’s minority populations 
at the time of the transition.
65 LeRider (1994), 106.
66 Cf. McQuaid (1991), 19; Reisch (1991), 14-15; Obrman (1991).
67 The World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators (1975), database; formula F = I—SUM 
(N/N) * (N-I/N-I).
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Table 5.3: Estimates of the Sizes of Central European Minorities, circa 1990(>*
Lowest Official or Highest Highest
available semi­ credible available
figure; official figure figure;
generally figure; of generally
not credible variable not credible
credibility
Poland (pop. 39,000,000)
Byelorussians 200,000 400,000
Ukrainians 150,000 400,000
Germans 4,000 100,000 1,000,000 2,000,000
Roma (Gypsies) 16,000 45,000
Jews 3,000 15,000
Czechoslovakia (pop. 15,600,000)
Roma (Gypsies) 400,000 800,000
Hungarians 590,000 700,000
Ukrainians (Ruthenians) 45,000 300,000
Germans 55,000 150,000
Hungary (pop. 10,500,000)
Roma (Gypsies) 35,000 400,000 1,000,000
Germans 35,000 175,000 200,000
Slovaks 30,000 120,000
Southern Slavs 40,000
Jews 80,000 100,000
Romania (pop. 23,000,000)
Hungarians 1,700,000 2,500,000
Germans 30,000 60,000 200,000
Roma (Gypsies) 200,000 230,000 760,000 7,000,000
Ukrainians 60,000 350,000 600,000
Bulgarians 12,000 30,000 130,000
Lipovans 12,000 100,000
Table 5.3 raises two interesting points. First, a comparison with Table 3.1 above makes 
abundantly clear the dramatic homogenisation that has taken place since the 1930’s. Catholic 
Polish-speakers accounted for less than 70 per cent of the Polish pre-war population of some 
30 million, but by the late 1980’s minorities comprised less than 8 per cent of a total head­
count of 38 million—indeed, using a more conservative estimate particularly of the ethnic 
German presence, minorities may have accounted for only 3-4 per cent. In Czechoslovakia 
the development has been almost equally dramatic. The ethnic German minority, which until 
1939 accounted for almost one fourth of the republic’s population, is by and large gone, and 
so is the Ukrainian-Ruthenian minority. The numbers of ethnic Germans and Jews in 
Hungary have in absolute terms declined by, respectively, more than 50 per cent and 80-90 
per cent.
All the same, that some ethnic relationships are virtually unchanged since the 1930’s. A 
major Magyar Diaspora remains in Hungary’s neighbouring countries, and the Czech-
®Liebich (1992), 38.
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Slovak relationship emerged so antagonistic from the era of communist hegemony that the 
Czechoslovak federation split up almost immediately after transition from communism. 
After that, some half a million Slovak-speakers are reported to have chosen to take up Czech 
citizenship. The number of native Czech-speakers opting for Slovak passports has, however, 
been almost negligible.69
In any case, many of the question marks that surrounded the inter-war ethnic tallies have 
disappeared, as the post-communist governments in Central Europe have seemed to be more 
forthright about minority head-counts than their communist and pre-war predecessors. The 
strategies of amalgamation (e.g. the creation of a ‘Czechoslovak’ nationality), and of fragmen­
tation, (i.e. splitting minority groups into sub-groups) were by and large abandoned after 
1989 in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, at least as an instrument to prop 
up the ethnic majority’s status. The Romanian government, however, still splits the country’s 
ethnic Hungarian and German minorities into three more or less artificial sub-groups each 
(Hungarians, Szeklers, and Changos; Germans, Schwabs, and Saxons)70, and in the former 
Yugoslavia facts on the ground are obviously even more obscured.
Estimates of minority numbers have tended to be revised upwards after the transforma­
tions of 1989-90. This is partly an effect of the opportunities for emigration or ‘repatriation’ 
that have opened up for members of certain ethnic communities, but it also reflects a relaxa­
tion of pressures to conform. Anti-Semitism was a powerful force during the entire commu­
nist era, prompting many Jews to hide or suppress their ethnic, cultural and religious 
identity. Even during the later days of communist rule, ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe 
were branded en masse as ‘fascists’, providing a powerful incentive for self-concealment of 
ethnic identity. After 1989, however, the incentive structure was reversed: proof of, in par­
ticular, German ancestry then suddenly became a ticket to the prosperous West; many of the 
recently self-declared Volksdeutsche are indeed derided as Volkswagendeutsche. It appears to 
be the case that a substantial number of Poles, Romanians and Russians have declared them­
selves ethnic German mainly for economic reasons, and that there has been widespread use of 
falsified documentation.
The Germans
Almost 40 per cent of Poland’s present territory was within the 1937 borders of Germany. 
From 1944 to 1949, most of the inhabitants of these areas either fled or were deported to the 
far side of the Oder-Neisse line. The same went for many of the 1.7 million inhabitants of 
Central Poland who had declared themselves, or been declared, German by nationality 
during the occupation71—in yet another an indication of how fluid ethnic identification and 
self-identification can be in these areas. The Polish government, however, let or forced some 
to stay, primarily in order to man mines, industry and shipping in the so-called Recovered 
Territories. A quarter of a million Germans were permitted to emigrate between 1956 and 
1959, and another 100,000 during the 1960’s. Those who stayed behind were generally 
classified as ‘autochtones’, i.e. Germanised Poles, and became the subjects of intensive 
Polonisation.
By 1970 the Polish government denied the existence of any substantial ethnic German 
minority in Poland: those self-identified ethnic Germans who remained, it argued, had 
forfeited any claim to German nationality either passively by choosing to remain within 
Poland’s new post-war borders, or actively by declaring themselves Poles. This policy was 
underminedin 1975 when the Polish authorities granted 125,000 exit visas to Germany in
®Cf. Pehe (1993).
70 Cf. Liebich (1992), 32.
71 Garton Ash (1994), 236.
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exchange for credits from the Federal Republic. According to the Polish government, the 
deal did not, however, imply an admission of the existence of a German minority, and up 
until 1989 it maintained that both the Greek and Macedonian minorities were larger (4,500 
each) than the German (2,500).72
The German Red Cross, on its part, in the 1970’s estimated that the number of Poles 
entitled to German citizenship could exceed one million, and that some 400,000 of them 
were willing to leave.73 Even after the post-1989 swell of emigration, hundreds of thousands 
of ethnic Germans remain in Poland, with major pockets of German-speakers in the Opole, 
Katowice and Czestochowa regions of Upper Silesia. In the 1991 general elections, the 
German list won 1.5 per cent of the vote; if this is used as an indication of the size of the 
minority, the reckoning would add up to some 600,000.74 This figure may seem high, being 
equivalent to the size of the German minority in 1939; the correct point of reference should, 
however, be the 10-12 million people that lived in the German provinces annexed to Poland 
as a result of Yalta and Potsdam.
From a Polish nationalist point of view, the situation became even more problematic as 
the ‘Silesians’ or Slonzaks, an ethnic group not heard of since the inter-war period, began to 
reassert their ethno-cultural identity. From 1990, a bi-lingual newspaper, the Gazeta 
Gornoslaska—Oberschlesische Zeitung, has catered to the Slonzaks in Upper Silesia. The 
Silesians straddle the Germanic-Slav fault line, and have since the 1920’s been considered 
more or less overtly pro-German by nationalist Poles.75
Only some 200,000 ethnic Germans were allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia after the 
expulsions of 1945-48, and various forms of discrimination, including the denial of any 
formal minority rights until 1968, prompted many to emigrate in the following decades. 
Those remaining are scattered throughout the Czech republic and Slovakia. This has led to 
strong assimilation, and many formerly ethnic Germans appear to have changed their self­
declared nationality to Czech or Slovak in government surveys.76 The improvement of 
relations between Czechoslovakia (and both its successor states) and Germany have 
contributed to the coming-out of some ethnic Germans, but the number is nevertheless 
certain to be substantially lower than 100,000 in the Czech lands. In Slovakia, 5,629 citizens 
declared themselves German in the March 1991 census; the actual number of Carpathian 
Germans may however be even three times higher.77
72 McQuaid (1991), 20.
73 Garton Ash (1994), 237. It should be noted that the record of ethnic German minorities is 
complicated by the ius sanguinis citizenship principle applied in the Federal Republic’s 
legislation. According to this, anybody (in Eastern Europe) who shows proof of German 
ancestry, can claim to have considered herself or himself as mainly German by culture, or even 
has a father or grandfather who fought in the German armed forces, is entitled to German 
citizenship and—implicitly—enjoys the protection of the Federal Republic.
74 During those elections, German minority candidates took 26 per cent of the vote in the 
Opole district, and an activist declared that he had collected the signatures of 260,000 people 
who declared themselves of German descent. After the ban on education in the German 
language was lifted in 1989, the number of schools in the Opole area offering courses in 
German jumped to 184. Cf. McQuaid (1991), 20. This may, however, reflect the increased 
opportunity value that knowledge of German is perceived to have: representatives of the 
German minority in Silesia have complained that teachers financed by the Federal Republic 
under a minority protection agreement with Poland are instead assigned to schools in Central 
Poland, thus catering-mainly to students learning German as a foreign language.
75 Gerner et al. (1995), 242.
76 Obrman (1991), 11.
77 Kohler (1994), 3.
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In Hungary, the Germans remain the largest national minority bar the Gypsies, 
numbering 200,000 to 220,000 according to estimates provided by the minorities and 
accepted by the government.78 Some 150 villages and towns have officially been designed 
bilingual, in stark contrast to the situation in the 1950’s when the use of German language in 
public was outlawed.79 The ethnic Germans in Hungary have, however, a tradition of 
assimilation into the Magyar majority, and identification with Germany proper is weak: few 
speak fluent German, and then it is usually Schwabian dialects, not Hochdeutsch.
As in the Czech republic and Slovakia, Hungary’s German community has not established 
any political party, but, as seven other ethnic minority groups, it gained representation by 
quota in the first freely-elected parliament. Moreover, in the December 1994 municipal 
elections candidates from the electoral list of the League of Hungarian Germans won 
cumulatively some 680,000 votes, i.e. three to four times more than even the highest estimate 
of the number ethnic Germans in the country.80
The Jews
The Jewish element in Central Europe is small in absolute terms, particularly in relation to 
the inter-war period, but in Hungary as in Poland Jews have been more prominent in 
political and cultural life than their numbers would suggest. Throughout Central Europe, 
Jews are fully integrated and only anti-Semites consider them ‘national minorities’.
The largest Jewish community is found in Hungary, estimated to number 80,000 to 
100,000 people. In Czechoslovakia, two thirds of the 45,000 Jews who survived the 
Holocaust or returned from exile had emigrated by 1950; most went to Israel with which 
Czechoslovakia at that time entertained cordial relations. A second wave of emigration 
occurred in the aftermath of the Prague Spring, after which only 5,000 to 6,000 members of 
the Jewish religious community is estimated to have remained.81 Definition poses some 
problems here as well. The communist authorities in Czechoslovakia, as their counterparts in 
other Soviet Bloc countries (but in contrast to the Soviet Union), regarded Jews not as an 
ethnic minority but as members of a religious denomination. Non-religious Jews were thus 
not necessarily accounted for. Slovakia’s Jewish community is now estimated to number 
3,000.82
Poland’s Jewish community currently equals only a third of a per cent of its pre-war 
strength. There seems to be a clear dichotomy between identification and self-identification: 
Jews who have opted to stay in Poland despite continued discrimination tend to identify 
themselves as Poles, while the public tends to identify them as Jews. According to media 
reports a Jewish revival has been under way in Poland since 1989: the community is reported 
to have grown from an estimated 4,000 to over 10,000 members, as many parents have told 
their children of a heritage they have kept hidden since the 1940’s. Some say this trend may 
eventually swell the Jewish community to 50,000 people.83
The Magyars
Magyars form the largest extra-territorial ethnic communities in Central Europe. Even 
according to conservative estimates, some 1.7 million ethnic Magyars live in Romania, at
78 Reisch (1991), 15.
79 Kalnoky (1995).
80 Kalnoky (1995).
81 Obrman (1991), 12.
82 Hockenos (1993), 235.
83 Cf. Brzezinski (1995).
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least 600,000 in Slovakia (comprising 12 per cent of the total population), 400,000 in Serbia, 
and 160,000 in the Ukraine. The Magyars tend to form majorities or solid minorities in the 
areas where they are settled; this is the case particularly in the south and the east of Slovakia 
where they constitute up to 90 per cent of the population, and in some areas in Romanian 
Transylvania.
Although not subjected to quite the same extent of maltreatment in the immediate 
aftermath of the war as the Germans, Slovakian Magyars were considered a hostile national 
element and subjected to various forms of official discrimination.84 In a compulsory 
population exchange in 1945-48, some 75,000 Magyars were forcibly moved from Slovakia 
and 87,000 Slovaks from Hungary,85 an operation for which the post-transition Hungarian 
government has demanded a formal apology from Bratislava.86 This is but one expression of 
the lingering tension between Hungary and Slovakia, arguably the most serious inter-ethnic 
conflict with international implications in Central Europe. It appears to be the case that the 
inter-communal strife has been exploited and even fomented by political leaders in both 
Slovakia and Hungary.
The Gypsies
The size of Eastern Europe’s Gypsy community is hotly disputed. Before the Second World 
War, official censuses did not even record Gypsies as a community. The communist-era 
authorities either followed the same policy, refusing ‘to recognise the legitimacy of the 
Gypsies as a distinctive ethnic group’87, or, if they acknowledged the existence of a Gypsy 
community, tended to grossly underestimate it.
Attitudes towards families attempting to hold on to their traditional nomadic life-styles 
varied from tolerant neglect to forced assimilation and resettlement, but in any case it was far 
from opportune to identify oneself as Gypsy. In 1958 Czechoslovakia outlawed ‘nomadism’ 
outright, effectively branding many Gypsies as criminals. Special identity cards were issued, 
and substantial cash rewards given to Gypsy women who agreed to be sterilised.88 In 1961, the 
Political Committee of the Hungarian communist party declined to acknowledge Gypsies as 
a distinctive ethnic minority because ‘they had no common language or identifiable country 
of origin.’89 This decree in turn served to legitimise the continued absence of education in 
Roma and other Gypsy languages. Gypsy languages have not been used in and for education, 
and the bulk of the Gypsies have been assimilated linguistically into the majority: 70 per cent 
of Hungarian Gypsies speak only Hungarian. Moreover, as the mother tongue has been used 
as the criterion for determining nationality, they have not shown up as Gypsies in official 
censuses.90 In addition, census offices have difficulties listing many Gypsies because they lack 
fixed addresses.
After the collapse of the communism, governments have brought less power to bear on 
non-conformist individuals and social groups. Even so, many Gypsies continue to identify 
with the majority ethnic group—be it because of self-perceived assimilation or for fear of 
discrimination.
84 Obrman (1991), 9.
85 Reisch (1991), 14.
86 Der Spiegel, 39/1994, 161.
87 Barany (1992), 42.
88 Barany (1992), 42-3.
89 Barany (1990), 28.
90 Liebich (1992), 36.
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In any case, recent estimates put the numbers at 600,000 in Hungary, at 800,000 in 
Czechoslovakia, and at 50,000 in Poland.91 This represents a major revision that cannot be 
accounted for solely by the higher than average birth-rates in Gypsy families. The 1971 
Hungarian census recorded 320,000 Gypsies, while the numbers quoted by Czechoslovak and 
Polish officials in 1990 were, respectively, 380,000 and 15,000.92
Before the break-up of Czechoslovakia, most of the federation’s Gypsy population lived in 
the eastern half of the country. Indeed, as most Gypsies in what is now the Czech Republic 
were killed by the Nazis during the Second World War, the majority of Bohemian and 
Moravian Gypsies now have their roots in Slovakia or Ruthenia, from where many families 
were resettled to areas vacated by Sudeten Germans.
The Slavs
The USSR’s annexation of the 180,000 square kilometres east of the Curzon Line in 1945 all 
but cleared Poland of its previously so numerous Ukrainian and Byelorussian minorities. 
About half a million Ukrainians from within Poland’s new borders were also expelled 
immediately after the war, in exchange for about 1.5 million ethnic Poles driven out from 
the Soviet acquisitions in Byelorussia, Ukraine and Lithuania.93
In 1947, a further 150,000 ethnic Ukrainians were transferred to the annexed formerly 
German territories in the west and north-east. This was part of the ‘Operation Vistula’, 
designed to break the back of the then ongoing Ukrainian insurrection; as a result East 
Prussia and Pomerania now in fact have much more numerous Ukrainian than German 
communities. Even after the expulsions and resettlement campaigns, some 300,000 ethnic 
Ukrainians remain in Poland’s south-east corner around the city of Przemysl. On the other 
side of the border, in the eastern part of Galicia now part of the Ukraine, an estimated 
210,000 ethnic Poles remain.94 As ever, multi-lingualism and conflicting religious and 
linguistic affiliations makes clear-cut ethnic identification and self-identification 
problematic.
Some 60,000 ethnic Poles also live within the borders of the Czech Republic, 
concentrated to the Tesin (Cieszyn) area in Upper Silesia.95 The most volatile and politically 
vocal Polish community abroad is, however, found in Lithuania. The approximately 300,000 
ethnic Poles make up seven per cent of Lithuania’s total population, forming strong 
majorities in the rural areas surrounding the capital Vilnius (Vilna). Since the war, 
Lithuanian Poles have been a disadvantaged and poverty-stricken group with limited access to 
higher education and mainly working on the land.96
Czechoslovakia lost its Ukrainian-Ruthenian minority in much the same way as Poland 
lost its Byelorussian and Ukrainian ones; when Carpatho-Ruthenia was ceded to the USSR in 
1945 only a tenth of the previously 600,000 Ruthenians remained within the new borders. 
The Uniate Church was disbanded and Ruthenians forced to join the pro-Moscow Orthodox 
Church. Moscow also pressed the Czechoslovak authorities to identify Ruthenians as 
Ukrainians, and as a consequence many of them many instead opted to identify themselves as 
Slovaks. This process was accelerated by farm collectivisation, which disrupted the social 
structure of the areas in Slovakia inhabited mainly by Ruthenians. In 1991, after the 
Ruthenian nationality was reintroduced as a heading in official statistics, some 19,000
91 Cf. Barany (1992), 41-2.
92 Barany (1990), 26; Barany (1992), 41-2.
® Davies (1986), 82.
94 Cf. Der Spiegel, 44/1994, 182-4.
95Obrman (1991), 11.
96 Cf. Burant (1991).
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individuals chose to list themselves as such; about half of those had previously been recorded as 
ethnic Ukrainians.97
Modernisation as a Structural Factor
A macro-level examination of the socio-economic structure under ‘mature’ socialism makes 
clear how successful the regimes really were in transforming and modernising the Central 
European societies, both in absolute terms and in comparison with Western Europe—in 
Table 5.4 Austria is used as a point of reference.
Table 5.4: Socio-Economic Indicators for Central Europe 98
Poland CSSR Hungary Austria Highest*
Urban population, % 1950 23 14 20 38 71 (UK)
(in cities 100,000+) 1960 27 14 22 38 72 (UK)
1976 20 17 28 31 72 (US)
Labour force in 1960 29 46 35 46 44 (FRG)
industry, % 1977 38 49 58 41 Hungary
GDP, % in industry 1960 51 65 58 49 56 (Lux)
1978 52 60 47 33 62 (GDR)
in agriculture 1960 23 13 20 11 n/m
1978 16 9 15 5 18 (Bulg)
Energy consumption, 
kg per capita
1965 3,504 5,676 2,812 2,630 9,201 (US)
GDP per capita, $ 1978 3,650 4,730 3,480 7,520 12,990 (Swi)
average growth 1960-75 4.0 2.7 3.1 4.3 6.6 (Gre)
rate, % annually 1970-78 5.9 4.3 5.1 3.6 Poland
Literacy rate, % 1960 98 99 98 98 100
1970 98 n/a 99 99 100
Students per one 
million inhambitants
1967 8,000 10,110 5,030 6,810 28,400( US)
Telephones 1960 41 105 56 139 481 (US)
per 1,000pop. 1975 76 177 100 283 697 (US)
Newspaper circulation 1960 145 236 143 208 477 (Swe)
Per 1,000 population 1975 248 300 233 320 572 (Swe)
Television receivers 1965 66 149 81 98 362 (US)
per 1,000 population 1975 180 249 223 246 571 (US)
Infant mortality 
per 1,000 live births
1965 42 25 39 28 13 (Swe)
Doctors per one 
million inhabitants
1964 1,211 1,754 1,795 1,772 2,393 (USSR)
Dates may be approximate; * European or North American countries quoted in the World 
Handbook n/m: Not meaningful
97 Obrman (1991), 12.
98 World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (1972) and (1983b).
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The story these indicators tell, especially when contrasted with the figures for the pre-war and 
immediate post-war period, is one of rapid and dramatic industrialisation, urbanisation and 
modernisation. Already by the 1960’s, the predominance of agriculture in the economy was a 
thing of the past and its place taken by industry. This translates into a huge socio-economic 
transformation. By 1977, 58 per cent of the Hungarian labour force was employed in 
industry, the highest proportion given for any country in the world; as noted in Chapter 3 
above, in 1936 the figure had been 21.8 per cent," and even in 1960 only 35 per cent. In 
Poland and Czechoslovakia industrialisation was somewhat less dramatic, but still very 
impressive.
Yet these indicators point to the problems of initiating a transformation to post­
industrialism, normally characterised by growth in the service sector. Whereas most Western 
European countries noted a steep decline in the share of industrial production of total output 
by the late 1960’s, industry retained a dominant position in the communist economies. By the 
mid-1970’s, industry accounted for a larger proportion of GDP, and services for a smaller 
proportion, in every East European socialist economy than in any Western European or 
North American country.100 Indeed, the era up to the 1970’s can be described as ‘growth 
without development’.
The level of urbanisation also remained below the median value for Western Europe. 
Here the present statistics may be somewhat misleading by only accounting for residents of 
cities with 100,000 inhabitants or more. Much of urban growth in Central Europe, 
particularly that associated with greenfield industrial development, took place in somewhat 
smaller towns or agglomerations of administratively separate municipal units, as in Polish 
Silesia or in the rust belt of northern Bohemia and Moravia.
The socialist countries’ continued investment in industrial development paid dividends in 
the form of accelerated output growth during the 70’s—particularly in relation to the oil 
crisis-ridden West—but it is doubtful to what extent that contributed to a corresponding rise 
in standards of living; Poland certainly is a case where consumers saw a fall in living standards 
after the mid 1970’s, despite seemingly robust GDP growth. As pointed out earlier, GDP and 
GDP per capita figures are in the case of the Socialist Bloc inherently unreliable and in 
presumably on the high side. But even the figures given by the World Bank show the socialist 
economies lagging way behind the developed Western economies, rather being on par with 
Mediterranean European economies such as Greece or Portugal. The relatively high levels of 
infant mortality seem to reflect the governments priorities on industry instead of services. All 
socialist countries could report a relatively high number of physicians, but this did not result 
in a correspondingly high level of quality of health care. Ordinary doctors enjoyed both 
relatively low salaries and not a particularly high status in the socialist societies.
What the figures show, nevertheless, is the steady albeit slow emergence of a modern 
consumerist society. Full adult literacy was accomplished by the late 50’s, and by the 
following two decades media outlets and consumption—with programming, of course, 
strictly controlled by the regimes—proliferated to almost Western levels.
Yet objective indicators of the standard of living are one thing, the perception is quite 
another. ‘Growth without development’ meant, as pointed out above, a cementing of the 
industrial-era economic structure, but also that product quality and incremental 
innovation—the very backbone of modern capitalist development—took a back seat. This is 
hard to capture with hard data, but here is how an Anglo-American satirist saw the scope for 
1970’s Bulgarian consumerism:
"Wandycz (1992), 208.
100 Albania and Yugoslavia are excluded from this comparisom. World Handbook (1983b), Table 
6.5,210; Table 6.6, 223-5
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Sofia had a dark and enormous department store called TSUM, at least as big as 
Selfridges in London, spread over five floors and containing not a single product that 
appeared to have been produced more recently than 1938—chunky Bakelite radios, 
big stubby black fountain pens that looked like something Lord Grade would try to 
smoke, steam-powered washing machines, that sort of thing. I remember standing in 
the television and radio department in a crowd of people watching some sort of 
historical drama in which two actors wearing beards that were hooked over their ears 
sat talking in a study, the walls of which were clearly painted on canvas. The television 
had—no exaggeration—a four-inch circular black and white screen and this was 
attracting a crowd. I spent almost a whole day in TSUM, wandering in amazement, not 
just because the products were so wondrously old-fashioned but because whole 
families visited it as if it were some sort of marvellous museum of science and 
technology.101
Measuring Stability: Objective Indicators
Turning to the question of political stability, the indicators of political protest and 
government sanctions quoted in Table 5.5 may be of interest, if somewhat inconclusive and 
diffuse. The chosen points of reference here are Portugal and Spain: both these countries were 
on approximately the same level of socio-economic development, and ruled by authoritarian 
governments until the 70’s. Portugal has roughly the same population as Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, while Spain is comparable with Poland.
Table 5.5: Indicators of Political Stability
Poland CSSR Hungary Portugal Spain
Protest 1948-77 97 282 28 246 358
demonstrations 1970-77 22 20 1 215 264
Political strikes 1948-77 19 39 24 35 173
1970-77 9 1 0 23 121
Riots 1948-77 82 68 32 187 265
1970-77 6 3 1 146 191
Deaths from 1948-77 575 101 40,010 66 216
Political violence 1970-77 22 2 0 40 159
Government 1948-77 663 1043 2,258 525 1,102
sanctions * 1970-77 34 96 5 326 632
Regime support 1948-77 65 54 29 43 42
demonstrations 1970-77 9 21 12 22 14
Political 1948-77 31,131 57 2,943 0 35
executions 1970-77 0 0 0 0 6
Source: World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (1983) * ‘Action taken by the authorities 
to neutralise, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, 
or the state itself
101 Bryson (1992), 218.
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When contrasted with Spain and Portugal, the Central European countries seem relatively 
stable, particularly if the upheavals during the formative years of 1948-53 are discounted. 
The source material clearly shows that protest and repression was on a quantitatively higher 
level during particularly that period, as demonstrated by the high number of political 
executions in Poland (31,082 in 1953-56), and in Hungary (2,587 during the same period), 
and the many deaths from political violence in Hungary (40,007 in 1953—56, i.e. associated 
with the 1956 uprising). In Spain and Portugal, the authoritarian regimes had been set up a 
decade earlier; they also collapsed in the 1970’s, some 15 years before Eastern and Central 
Europe were plunged into political transition. In the case of Spain, it should also be noted, 
many protests were not directed at the Franco regime alone, but were motivated by regional 
separatism and continued after the introduction of monarchy and democratic rule.
The figures should obviously be treated with some caution. In the case of Eastern and 
Central Europe, more so than for Spain and Portugal, underreporting of events was a major 
problem, due to censorship and not all-encompassing monitoring by the Western media 
sources on which the World Handbook chiefly depends. Another problematic aspect is that 
quantitative and even qualitative variations within the same categories of events are not always 
noted. Thus the World Handbook notes only one political strike in Poland in 1976; this 
apparently refers to the Radom strike which mobilised tens of thousands of workers and 
rocked the whole government. The same figure—one political strike—is also given for 
Czechoslovakia that year. This obviously does not prove that the Czechoslovak labour force 
would have been even remotely as militant, nor as influential, as the Polish.
But even so, Table 5.5 indicates a consolidation of the Central European regimes during 
the 1970’s, as seen both by a falling level of protests and by a scaling-down of overt repressive 
measures. The figures above seem to indicate that of the three, Hungary was politically the 
most tranquil country in the 70’s. During that period, Poland appears to be somewhat more 
turbulent than Czechoslovakia, but then again one should remember that Czechoslovakia’s 
population less than half that of Poland’s. The Czechoslovak regime also appears to have been 
the most repressive, as indicated by the relatively high number of government sanctions 
introduced.
The Emergence of Civil Society
The fifteen months of Solidarity has been called the only revolution in history organised, led 
and made by the working class itself. That may be a slight exaggeration, but it certainly is true 
that neither the Party leadership, any Party factions, nor an oppositional elite were the 
driving forces behind the systemic change of 1980. The demands for change were also not, as 
earlier in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, formulated in Leninist, Marxist or even broadly 
leftist terms. The protests were not directed against the Party’s current interpretation of 
Marxist-Leninist theory, or against particular abuses and mistakes made in the 
implementation of Party hegemony, as had been the case in the initial stages of the 1956 and 
1968 Eastern European turmoil. From the very beginning, Solidarity instead questioned the 
communist system as such and disputed all aspects of its legitimacy.
Did it also mean a triumph, however temporary, of the civil society? Notwithstanding the 
reservations in Chapter 2 about the concept of ‘civil society’ as a determinant for democracy, 
it is still a useful analytical tool. It would seem profitable to investigate how the ultimately 
triumphant oppositional political forces—call it ‘civil society’ or ‘autonomous self­
organisation in society’—could came about in an environment dominated by regimes with 
authoritarian and even totalitarian ambitions.
Indeed, in the case of the socialist states, the concept of civil society has generally been used 
as an euphemism for autonomous structures, for the anti-systemic opposition, or even as the
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very goal for parts of the opposition. As one observer put it: ‘The democratic opposition [in 
Eastern Europe] argued its commitment to democracy on the grounds that it was seeking to 
re-establish civil society.’102 Here, the argument is turned inside out: the strengthening of 
democracy is seen as furthering the emergence of a civil society, not the other way around.
The organisation of the opposition movements can be analysed by traditional methods, 
either logical or empirical. Even if some elements in the opposition to communist rule in the 
Central European countries portrayed themselves as ‘anti-political’, it can also be described as 
a classical case of an opposition building mass support by gradually creating quasi-political 
structures outside the framework which the ruling regime has defined as political, and 
continuously attempting to push that boundary.
More important than ‘civil society’ is thus modernity; the analysis of the inter-war era 
indicated that the best prospects for democratic survival are found in societies with strong 
traditions of statehood and advanced secularisation—this can be, but is not necessarily the 
same as is meant by ‘civil society’. The extent to which the democratic opposition could gain 
and hold mass support was thus paradoxically dependent on the extent to which the commu­
nists had succeeded in their ambitions to modernise.
Before moving on to a discussion of the last decade of communist rule, some attention 
should be focused on the mechanics of liberalisation. ‘Liberalisation’ here does not primarily 
mean the introduction of democracy, but a loosening of the regime’s grip.
Figure 5.1: The Game of Liberalising Dictatorships
Status Quo
Dictatorship
Narrowed
Dictatorship
Insurrection Transition to
Democracy 
Source: Przeworski (1991), 62
Adam Przeworski has made the perceptive observation that it is not the lack of legitimacy, but 
the presence of an opposition that threatens a dictatorship. When the regime starts to tolerate 
some form of opposition, it indicates that it is divided between reformers who want to 
broaden the power-base, and hard-liners who want to crush the opposition. With the help of 
game theory, Przeworski demonstrates how a process, started by forces in the regime who
102 Schopflin (1993), 207.
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advocate a broader dictatorship, can generate a set of different outcomes.103 The scheme is 
shown by the figure above.
The starting-point is that the opposition has politically significant support, but lacks an 
institutional framework in which to present its views and negotiate interests. At this point, a 
liberalising ‘reform wing’ of the dictatorship’s elite may act to integrate the opposition by 
tolerating some autonomous action inside a ‘National Front’, essentially broadening the 
dictatorship.
The process may stop here, but it can also continue with the opposition (Przeworski, 
incidentally, uses the term ‘civil society’ as synonymous for it) continuing to organise 
autonomously. Now the regime liberalisers face the alternatives of either turning back the 
clock on reform and agreeing to repress popular mobilisation, or of continuing towards a 
transition to democracy. Repression, if successful, generates a once-again narrowed 
dictatorship. If unsuccessful, it leads to an insurrection, the outcome of which is uncertain: it 
can be democracy, a victory for the old dictatorship or the establishment of a new 
dictatorship. Behind this analysis lies the assumption that the opposition, too, is divided 
between moderates and radicals. A successful extrication to democracy thus depends on the 
ability of reformers and moderates to forge an alliance.
One possible assumption behind an eventual transition to democracy is that at least some 
liberalisers are in fact proto-reformers, i.e. they prefer a democracy over everything except a 
broadened dictatorship, their initial goal. This, of course, also implies that liberalisers all 
along deceive the hard-liners within the dictatorial regime. In another conceivable scenario, 
liberalisers—who are assumed being dominant in the regime—may initially calculate that 
repression of opposition organisations would be successful; this calculation is, however, not 
shared by the (presumably radical-dominated) opposition, which continues to mobilise, 
wrongly believing that the liberalisers share their estimate of the low potential for successful 
repression. If organisation is allowed to be carried far enough, liberalisers gradually have to 
downgrade their estimates of successful repression. In that case, and if they prefer a transition 
to democracy over a full-blown insurrection, reformers may end up supporting a transition.
These modes of behaviour are not as paradoxical as they sound, Przeworski notes. First, as 
civil society (i.e., the opposition) develops, leaders within the dictatorial regime may get to 
know its leaders personally, and come to the conclusion that the opposition is not all that 
threatening. Second, liberalisers in the regime may be irrational; in a situation of increasing 
pressure—generated by unstoppable popular mobilisation, external blockades, economic 
crises, and the like—liberalisers may persuade themselves that an opening will end in a 
successful outcome for themselves, even that they will win competitive elections if they 
proceed all the way to democracy. This was in fact exactly the reasoning of Jaruzelski and his 
reform-oriented followers in the Polish government and Party elite, when they in 1987-88 
chose to opt for negotiations with the moderate opposition. The formula, which ultimately 
failed miserably, was ‘designed to divide the opposition by excluding the outspoken anti­
communists, but it was wide enough to attract large segments of the opposition to regular 
round-table negotiations with the government.’104 What came as a surprise to many Party 
reformers was that the subsequent elections turned into a plebiscite against the system which 
they could not win.
Thus, if the outcome is a transition to democracy, liberalisers were either actually 
prepared to go all the way, but had to hide their intentions from hard-liners; discovered in 
mid-course that repression was unlikely to succeed; found that they did not have as much to 
lose as initially thought; or, finally, had no choice and just put a good face on it.105
103 Przeworski (1991), 45-66; for an appreciating review, see Steinel (1992).
104 Grzybowski (1994), 57.
105 Przeworski (1991), 65.
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This logical exercise seems to be supported by the chain of actual events in the Socialist 
Bloc. The Hungarian uprising in 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the Polish events of 
1980-81 had different outcomes partly for the very reason that the measures of repression 
against the opposition were instituted in different phases.
In all cases, it started with liberalisers opening up to accommodate at least parts of the 
opposition within a broadened dictatorship. In Hungary, when the highest party leadership 
emerged as proto-oppositionals, hard-liners supported by external forces decided on 
repression, which led to an insurrection. This insurrection, however, ended with the 
establishment of a new dictatorship founded on a the same base as the pre-reform one. In 
Czechoslovakia, when hard-liners in the regime saw that the reformists’ attempts at 
broadening the dictatorship—even Dubcek did not question the communist party’s leading 
role—threatened to generate ever more organisation and mobilisation of the opposition, they 
defeated the liberalisers and opted for a status quo dictatorship. In Poland, opposition 
organisation forced the regime to attempt to broaden its base, but when faced with the 
alternative of turning to genuine reform ending in a transition to democracy, hard-liners 
opted for repression quickly enough to be able avoid an outright insurrection, successfully 
installing a narrowed dictatorship.
In these three cases, the character of the opposition also varied. In Hungary, two main 
forces were at work. One consisted of ‘liberalisers’, intra-party factions opposed to residual 
Stalinism, whose aims were a reform of the system. The other force, which emerged only 
once infighting within the party had opened the floodgates, was decidedly anti-systemic and 
built around the remnants of the institutionalised political forces repressed by the 
communists after 1945. But while the anti-systemic opposition obviously resented communist 
hegemony and totalitarian ambitions, they were not all per se anti-communist, and there was 
broad consensus—soon embraced also by liberalising communists—about a return to the 
1945-48 political constellation, in which the communist party indeed had played an 
important, if not hegemonic role. The centrifugal forces of mass mobilisation, however, 
swept away the rekindled institutions and replaced them with entirely new organisations, 
often with strong elements of direct democracy and fuelled by nationalism. These then 
became the driving force behind the insurrection.
In Czechoslovakia, the process did not go as far in 1968; the intermediate level of mass 
mobilisation, compared to earlier in Hungary, allowed the political game to be played 
mainly at an elite level. When the hard-line clampdown came, the opening-up of the political 
system had not progressed so far as to having had permitted significant radically anti-systemic 
forces to emerge on the political arena. The politically visible and significant oppositionals 
by and large remained committed to some form of socialism, and voiced their concerns in 
Marxist terms. The catch-phrase ‘Socialism with a human face’ neatly sums up the fact that 
the Prague Spring was essentially a struggle between, respectively, supporters of the reformist 
and authoritarian-radical schools of Marxism.
One result of 1968 was as total reconfiguration of the main opposition throughout 
Central Europe. Leftist idealists were both discredited and disillusioned by the outcome, 
which had shown both the inability of the Party to generate change from within and the 
extremely limited leeway Czechoslovakia at the time had as an ally of the Soviet Union. The 
crushing of the Prague Spring and Brezhnev’s subsequent declaration that ‘the triumph of the 
socialist system in a country can be regarded as final’ could lead to only one logical 
conclusion: to create an alternative to the existing system—however socialist that alternative 
would be—depended on the present system collapsing first. It also, as events showed, 
depended on the Soviet Union giving up its ambitions of hegemony.
Whatever theoretical groundwork for orderly change was laid by the elites, intra-systemic 
and oppositional, one may conclude that the main impetus for the transition from
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authoritarian communism came from the disaffection among the masses with absolute and 
relative economic inefficiency. As this chapter has indicated, strikes and other disturbances 
tended to occur in strong conjunction with economic crises: price hikes, withdrawals of 
subsidies, increases in work norms or bouts of inflation, particularly when they generated or 
coincided with conflicts in the highest leadership structures. Given the claims to omniscience, 
hegemony in decision-making and their ideological hang-ups, the ruling parties tended to be 
at a loss for quick remedies for the true problems in the socialist-style economy. Many, if not 
all, communist leaders realised that Marxism-Leninism provided less than a perfect road­
map for the actual handling of ever more complex economies, but they also were aware that 
their hold onto power was dependent on applying that theory’s legitimation of dictatorship. 
Hungary was almost alone in introducing market elements in the economy, while most other 
regimes preferred merging traditional, generic strong-man authoritarian elements into the 
Marxist-Leninist prescripts for the political sphere.
The implicit realisation that communism already by the 1960’s had fulfilled its historic 
role as a brutal but expedient agent of modernising change forced the ruling parties to retreat 
into the antediluvian, pre-modern ideals which had opened up the path to power for them. 
Shaking hands with the past, they increasingly gave up their ambitions to serve as agents for 
cautious change. Once a Soviet-style socio-political and economic structure had been put into 
place, the communist parties turned into conservatives without capacity for dynamic renewal 
of their internal belief structure. During the three main crises of Real Existing Socialism, in 
1956, 1968 and 1980-81, one could thus see a paradox at work. Structural modernisation led 
to the development of civil societies with increased socio-political awareness and demands for 
modernisation beyond the communist model, but the rulers, who originally had built their 
claims to power on the promise of modernisation, withdrew into increasingly archaic and 
non-materialistic systems of belief and argumentation inherited even from before the glory 
days of their ascent to power. What sounded the death-knell for Real Existing Socialism was 
thus the absolute success, but relative failure of its modernisation project.
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Table 5.6: Structural Factors in the 1980’s
Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary
Ruling Party Cohesion Low High Medium
Party Hegemony Attempts at 
negotiation, then 
dependent on 
Martial Law
Dependent on 
bureaucracy, 
internal security
Legitimacy 
through economic 
performance
Reform Orientation Vacillating Low High
Repression High ability, low 
resolve
High ability, high 
resolve
Used in 
moderation
Main 80’s Bases of Trade unionism, Human-rights Nationalism,
Opposition Forces Catholic Church activism, Slovak 
nationalism
environmentalism
Opposition Strength, 
early to mid-1980’s
Very high Very low Low
Opposition Strength, Very high, all Explosive Medium; intra- and
1988-90 extra-party emergence extra-party
Mode of Transition Round-table Regime collapse Round-table
By 1968, experience had persuaded many cautiously oppositional Czechoslovak Marxists that 
a democratisation of the communist regimes was impossible, as every attempt at reform 
would appropriate some aspect of the total control that the regimes would not be prepared to 
relinquish. This realisation was gloomy, but it also freed oppositional thinking to take new 
paths, beyond pure reformism. In Poland, the development followed similar lines. The 
1965-68 protests there had been driven by a reformist socialist ideology similar to the one in 
Czechoslovakia (i.e. leftist social democracy), but thereafter Marxism lost most of its appeal. 
There was an increasing sense among leftist intellectuals that Marxism not only did not 
work, but actually could not work.
The post-1968 democratic oppositionals in Eastern Central Europe came to pin their 
hopes on a gradual, and in their view inevitable, erosion of the regimes’ cohesion, depriving 
the systems both of their capabilities to act decisively and of whatever legitimacy remained. In 
the meantime, leading oppositional thinkers such as Vaclav Havel, Gyorgy Konrad, Janos 
Kis, Leszek Kolakowski, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron advocated the establishment of an 
ever-wider sphere of life free from the ideologisation imposed by the regimes. The essence of 
this ‘anti-political platform’ was the call to the individual to lead an ‘ethical and decent’ life. 
During the indefinite period of waiting for the communist system to implode, forming an 
opposition on the basis of a particular programme carried the risk of substituting one form 
of utopianism for another, they claimed.106 As Konrad outlined his strategy of opposition:
What I have in mind is not some kind of anarchic, romantic rising; the time for that is 
long past [...] The most effective way to influence policy is by changing a society’s 
customary thinking patterns and tacit compacts.107
106 Cf. Stokes (1993), Ch. 1.
107 Konrad (1984).
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Despite its intellectualism and traces of sophistry, the anti-political movement did indeed 
succeed in depriving the communists of the moral high ground by exposing their hollow 
pretensions of being the champions of the oppressed. The anti-politicians did, however, not 
want to—and could not—present an alternative model of societal organisation, not to 
mention creating an organisational framework capable of bringing an action programme to 
the masses. In the longer run, this obviously created frustrations. So by the mid-1970’s, 
leading anti-politicals in Poland had gravitated to increased activity in the form of trade 
unionism, worker self-help, and underground publishing and education. The Czechoslovak 
oppositional movement, lacking any such outlets because of more intensive government 
control and repression, became increasingly dispirited, with many leading figures, including 
Milan Kundera, giving up all hope of change and choosing emigration.
It was the notion of universal human rights which eventually formed the common ground 
for the Church and the non- or even anti-clerical opposition. Human rights was a profitable 
strategy, as the regimes in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, had accepted the 
broad-based definition of human rights of the so-called Third Basket of the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act. For the secular democratic opposition, ‘the concept of human rights became the 
most effective weapon [in its fight against the totalising regimes], one that wrought 
devastation in the intellectual coherence of the system.’ The protection of human rights had 
also been elevated to a prime moral obligation by the socially interventionist and activist 
Second Vatican Council—where John Paul II, then still Cardinal, was a driving force. Yet 
human rights in themselves presented no comprehensive political programme, only an 
instrument to demolish the regimes’ self-legitimation. In fact, democracy was conceptualised 
very differently by leading post-1968 oppositionals in Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary.108
What set 1970’s Poland apart were the resources and enormous mass appeal of the 
Catholic Church. The Polish Church, if any, could present a clear ideological alternative to 
communism; it did not, as the Orthodox Churches in Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia (not to 
mention Russia), have strong traditions of subservience to and symbiosis with the state; it did 
not, as the Catholic Churches of Croatia and Slovenia, carry the stigma of war-time 
collaboration with the Germans; and it had not been even nearly as subjugated by the 
authorities as the Hungarian or Czechoslovak Catholic Churches. In the 70’s, some two- 
thirds of Poles regularly attended Mass.
Although the Polish Church did oppose communist hegemony, was supportive of 
Solidarity and advocated pluralism, its political message was somewhat blurred, in particular 
split between radical parish priests and a more cautious leadership. From 1945, Church and 
Party had entertained an uneasy relationship with recurring swings between repression and 
accommodation: the Church was ‘always attacked and wounded, but still basically recognised 
by the communist authorities.’109 In effect, the compromise eventually arranged by Cardinal 
Wyszynski was that the state promised a low level of interference in Church matters, while 
the Church declared itself satisfied with a limited autonomy that promised a continuation of 
religious service and autonomous church-sponsored kindergartens, schools, seminaries and 
monasteries. Even during the tumultuous summer of 1980, the highest Church leadership 
tried to exercise a moderating role towards both Party and Solidarity."" Still, many clerics 
saw an obligation to protect national values against Sovietisation, and Catholic-oriented 
intellectuals even assumed leading positions in Solidarity. Meanwhile, Walesa and many 
other union leaders went out of their way to show their—certainly genuine—piety, and the 
opposition’s use of religious symbols was abundant.
108 Schopflin (1993), 207-8.
109 Michnik (1993), 66.
110 Davies (1986), 58.
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Wyszynski embracing Lech Walesa, 
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Kluz, Assistant Bishop of Gdansk
The introduction of martial law strengthened the Catholic Church’s social and political 
influence: it then became the only significant remaining outlet for mass frustration, and in 
parallel could act as an intermediary between state and society. After martial law was 
declared, church attendance soared to an amazing ninety-five per cent111 and there was a wave 
of adult baptism, vocations and church building. During his June 1983 tour of Poland, the 
Pope told the crowds that the world must continue to bear witness to the truth, as ‘when the 
Polish worker stood up for himself with the gospel in his hands and a prayer on his lips’. To 
Jaruzelski, his message was even blunter: the basis for ‘social renewal’ or Odnowa (a term the 
opposition had hijacked from the communists), John Paul II stressed, could only be the social 
accord that had ended the 1980 strikes and legalised Solidarity."1
Yet the political influence of the Church, in terms of organisational capabilities and 
moral authority, carried ambiguities. It threatened to politicise yet another sphere of life, the 
religious, and also brought religion—or at least religious institutions—into day-to-day 
politics. As the re-Catholisation of social life was largely a result of political discontent, it also 
diluted the density of Roman Catholicism, inasmuch as the Church was not and could not be 
a political institution: ‘The fact that Roman Catholicism became one of the principal 
expressions of the aspirations of Polish society in the 1980’s meant that both religion and the 
political aspirations expressed through it were given an awkward, intermediate expression. 
Neither the political nor religious aims could be expressed.’113
This perceived danger was one reason why Cardinal Jozef Glemp, who became Primate 
after Wyszynski (who died a few weeks before martial law was proclaimed), was more 
inclined to collaboration with the regime than his predecessor, the Pope or the lesser clergy.
111 Garton Ash (1989), 48.
112 Garton Ash (1989), 45-7.
113 Schopflin (1993), 265.
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Glemp concentrated his efforts on protecting and consolidating the Church’s position 
through increased access to the media, securing state financing for church construction, and 
gaining guarantees for a continuation of religious education on all levels. He sought to 
strengthen the Church through pastoral work, and clearly opposed the romantic idealisation 
of insurrection and resistance common among many parish priests which he feared could 
only bring misfortune on Poland.
Glemp’s etatist, anti-insurrectionist way of thinking was in many respects quite similar to 
that of Jaruzelski and other leading military figures. Indeed, it has been noted that ‘the 
primate’s ‘personal politics were those of Endecja\ He was deeply suspicious of the leftist 
origins of Solidarity; in a 1984 interview he declared that Walesa had lost control of 
Solidarity because the union ‘was a sack into which everything had been thrown, all the 
opposition Marxists, Trotskyites, and then all the careerists and Party members.’114 True to 
his nationalist leanings, Glemp also agreed with Jaruzelski on the need for a tougher stance 
towards Germany—both were in unison that no German minority existed in Poland—and 
made some statements that were interpreted as being, and also as meant to be, anti-Jewish.115 
But although the Catholic-nationalist ideology voiced by Glemp was a strong force in 
Poland, large segments of the opposition movement was as opposed to the Catholic­
nationalist ethos as they were to communism. This division was later to be manifested in the 
break-up of the Solidarity movement in the run-up to the presidential elections of 1990.116
It is worthwhile to quote what General Jaruzelski has had to say about Glemp’s personal 
political biography. According to the General, ‘Glemp came from a socialist worker family 
and was a member of the communist youth before he discovered his Catholic calling. By 
contrast, I went to a Church school and was a member of the Catholic youth,’ he noted, 
adding that ‘Such paradoxes are found only in Poland’.117 This somewhat sarcastic but 
pertinent observation indeed summarises what the present study is all about.
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In Czechoslovakia, the opposition scene was long dominated by Vaclav Havel’s idealistic 
assessment, which stressed the obligation of individuals to take responsibility for their own 
actions, implying that there would be no need for institutions, interest aggregation or the 
assumption of state power. Havel’s genuinely idiosyncratic project was marked by moralism 
and anti-utopianism, and was directed as much against the West as against communism. This 
fact greatly confounded the Prague regime, which also expected the opposition to behave like 
a system-loyal party opposite, trying to organise itself and appealing to the masses in a 
conventional fashion. Of course, given the repressive ambitions of the regime, the reluctance 
of the democratic opposition to organise on a particular platform was understandable.
The signatories of the path-breaking document Charter 77—half movement, half 
manifesto—included not only Havel and anti-politicians, but also Trotskyites, Catholics, and 
populists, among others. The Chartists did shrewdly choose not to openly dispute the 
legitimacy of the regime, but only called upon the regime to honour the constitutional and 
international obligations to which Czechoslovak law specifically subscribed. By this, the 
drafters could hope to attract support from much wider quarters than the Dubcek-inspired 
communist party opposition. As the philosopher Jan Patocka put it: ‘Our rulers can now 
never be quite sure who its they are dealing with. They must ask themselves whether those 
who still obey them today will be willing to do so tomorrow.’118
The government’s response to the signatories of Charter 77 and other petitions was 
extremely harsh by the standards at the time—this was, it should be pointed out, during the 
heyday of detente. Indeed, the reaction drove home the extraordinary repressive ambitions 
and capabilities of the Czechoslovak government: ‘Prominent Chartists were stripped of 
their identity documents and were issued with slips of paper with which they could not even 
post a registered letter. Their driving licences, marriage certificates and other official papers 
necessary for daily function in an authoritarian state were withdrawn. Their telephones were 
cut off and they no longer received normal postal deliveries. Some lost their flats and their 
children were expelled from classes.’119 Workers were asked to sign an anti-Charter 
condemning a document most had not seen—and indeed were forbidden to read.
There is no doubt that the government took Charter 77 very seriously, and foreign 
observers tended to see it as the most important expression of resistance in Czechoslovakia. 
Nevertheless, the regime is likely to have considered religious revival an even more serious 
long-term challenge. Especially in Slovakia, Catholicism remained strongly fused with 
nationalism, often also inspired by nostalgia for the parochial ideology of the pre-war Hlinka 
Slovak People’s Party and the 1939-44 Republic of Slovakia. In 1984, 70 per cent of Slovak 
children were baptised, as opposed to only 30 per cent in the Czech lands.120 By the early 
1980’s, the Czechoslovak Catholic Church was reinvigorated by the Second Vatican Council, 
the social dynamism of John Paul II, the Polish events, and by the increasingly activist local 
Cardinal, the octogenarian Frantisek Tomasek. In 1987 Catholic activists circulated a 
petition calling for freedom of religion and the separation of church and state; it was signed 
by 600,000 people.
With all this in mind, it was hardly a coincidence that only four of some 1,000 signatories 
of Charter 77 were Slovaks. Many Slovaks did in fact see the pro-democracy movement as an 
attempt to discredit Gustav Husak simply because of his nationality. Events after 1989 also 
seem to confirm the theory that anti-communism had a much less fertile ground in Slovakia 
than in the Czech part of the federation, with about 80 per cent of Slovaks reporting
118 Patocka (1977).
119 Pilger (1987), 433.
120 Ramet (1987), 78.
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misgivings about a market economy and preferring what soon was dubbed ‘national 
socialism’.121
In Poland, the secular and Catholicism-inspired parts of the opposition were more closely 
linked. This was perhaps one reason why the secular faction lacked as clear a figure-head as 
Havel. The events of 1980-81 also showed that political activism on a mass level was both 
possible and potentially profitable. Nevertheless, Adam Michnik, one of the most visible and 
eloquent ideologues of Solidarity, long remained a staunch anti-politician who shared 
Havel’s deep suspicion of utopianism, which he feared would lead to a new terror. Up until 
the mid-1970’s, Michnik had, or at least espoused, few ideas about the nature of an alternative 
power: in a famous essay, he wrote that ‘the leading idea of Solidarity is to achieve a Self- 
Governing Republic and not to seize power.’122 Like Havel’s, Michnik’s political philosophy 
strongly stressed the importance of reason for tolerance. Both sought inspiration in history, 
but wanted to see it as a guide to action rather than as a mythical source for passion or 
ideology.
Not all Polish oppositionals agreed with these ‘legitimists’, and many argued that a more 
confrontational resistance was needed. After martial law Jacek Kuron all but abandoned anti­
politics, and called for disciplined organisation and even the use of force to overthrow the 
‘occupation’. Some fringe groups advocated sabotage against Soviet installations and the 
disrupting of the armaments industry, but many also held onto their anti-political beliefs: 
Zbigniew Bujak, a working-class Solidarity leader, saw Havel’s anti-political essay ‘The 
Power and the Powerless’ as the theoretical foundation for his political activity and argued 
that the hope for Solidarity after it was forced underground lay in a long-term project of 
‘continuing self-limiting revolution by constructing an independent society outside the 
parameters of ordinary politics.’123
In Hungary, the long-running Kadarist strategy for strengthening the Party’s legitimacy 
and ability to rule had been ‘constant economic reform, a pragmatic approach, and the 
virtually open admission that ‘the present system was full of defects, but also the best that 
Hungary can hope to have.’124 But even if the Hungarian economy was successful by Socialist 
Bloc standards, by the mid-80’s the level of foreign debt was approaching a debilitating 
level—on a per capita base it was higher than for any other Comecon member and a national 
default appeared as a real possibility. With the acknowledgement that the era of rising 
prosperity was over and that the standard of living was to fall for an indeterminate period of 
time, the main pillar of Kadarism was collapsing. Another, the relative liberalism in 
comparison with neighbouring communist systems, then crumbled with the general 
opening-up brought about by Gorbachev’s glasnost.^
The Polish events of 1980-81 activated the Hungarian opposition and broadened it 
beyond the minuscule, even in comparison with Czechoslovakia, circle of intellectuals who 
could take in the fairly sophisticated message.126 The Hungarian anti-political movement—if
121 Ulc (1992), 28-9.
122 Michnik (1985), 90; an overview of the anti-political movement in Poland is found in 
Ascherson (1982)
123 Stokes (1993), 105.
124 Schopflin (1991), 61-2.
125 Haraszti (1990), 72-3.
126 Dessewffy and Hammer (1995), 17. Gy orgy Konrad was the leading Hungarian proponent of 
the Havel-Michnik ideal of anti-politics: his position was, in essence, that the attainment of 
power was undesirable; what was important was the individual’s gradual enlargement of his 
sphere of autonomy and freedom. Anti-politics, Konrad argued, meant concentrating on 
ignoring official hierarchies and on developing the small freedoms which already existed with 
the eventual objective of pushing the state into the margins of life. This rather extreme ideal of
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that term is justified—also drew from a wide variety of ideological strands, from Trotskyism 
to agrarian populism. Many members of the democratic opposition had been students and 
admirers of the Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs, but the Polish events of 1980-81 caused 
the majority of the circle to break with Marxism even in its most revisionist forms. From 
then on the opposition’s world view was overwhelmingly inspired by Western liberalism, 
individualism and the concept of the free market.127 At this point, however, the intellectual 
opposition movement was not perceived as a threat to the existing order: a confidential 
Politburo resolution described it as a relatively harmless phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
repressive practices were resorted to in order to curtail the so-called enemy opposition at 
home and abroad128, in parallel with a subtle co-optation of and limited concessions given to 
the critics who operated on a populist-national platform.
In fact, the first opposition groupings to gain substantial mass appeal and real political 
influence were concerned with singular issues such as environmental degradation 
(particularly the gigantic Danube Dam project129); the position of Magyars abroad, 
particularly in Romania; and with rehabilitating national symbols of the past. In mid-1987 
there were huge anti-Ceausescu demonstrations in Budapest, organised by the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum, a pressure group formed by populist-nationalist intellectuals. The 
government was not particularly keen on clamping down on anti-Romanian protests. In fact, 
it actively tried to present itself as an effective protector of Magyar minorities abroad, to the 
extent that relations with Bucharest were brought to a new post-war low.
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Prime Minister 
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actively withering away the state was, however, not shared by all Hungarian anti-politicians, 
particularly not after the impact of Solidarity. Janos Kis, for instance, came to argue that some 
form of a Rechtsstaat and competitive parliamentary framework had to be established in order to 
ensure that any openings created by displays of civil courage could be made permanent. Kis 
envisaged a liberal, parliamentary and democratic societal order where there would be 
independent legal institutions to guarantee individual freedoms, but where the Party would 
continue to rule in order to accommodate Soviet demands.
127 Cf. Hockenos (1993), 108.
128 Grzybowski (1994b), 187.
129 The protests against the project are chronicled in some detail in Haraszti (1990), 76-83
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At the time, the advent of Soviet perestroyka and glasnost had fundamentally changed the 
rules of the game and propelled the radical reform wing of the party, led by Rezsd Nyers and 
Imre Pozsgay, into prominence. Already in the early 1980’s they had turned the whole issue 
around and argued that political reform and increased pluralism was a precondition for 
solving the economic problems. It was in many respects an attempted re-run of the Prague 
Spring programme. When the ageing and ailing Janos Kadar was deposed in May 1988, 
alliance-building with various outside forces was well under way among Party leaders.
The more reluctant Party reformers were led by Karoly Grosz, who eventually became 
new First Secretary. In the 70’s he had been affiliated with a populist-orthodox Party 
grouping known as the ‘workers’ opposition’, and ‘essentially looked toward some kind of 
authoritarian model combining economic performance with high levels of coercion’.130 
Nyers and Pozsgay, the leaders of the reform-minded party faction, were on their part 
increasingly attracted to a radically opened, democratic system. Pozsgay had, however, already 
in 1986 felt strong enough—particularly after unambiguous signals that the Kremlin was in 
the process of withdrawing support from the increasingly senile Kadar131—to establish 
contacts with the populist, conservative and nationalist non-Party opposition, in order to 
prepare for a future ‘centrist coalition’ against hard-line communists and the democratic 
opposition. Pozsgay’s participation in 1987 in the annual Lakitelek meeting of national­
populist poets was not only a dramatic pluralist opening on behalf of the reformists in the 
Party, but also clarified the difference between the democratic and populist currents in the 
non-Party opposition.132 The latter was prepared to seek accomodation and compromise with 
the ruling party, the former was not.
The Lakitelek circle was inspired by the national-romanticist world view espoused by 
prominent communist-era nepi-nemzeti, or folkish, writers such as Istvan Csurka, Sandor 
Csoori and Sandor Lezsak. The nepi literary movement had originally emerged in the 1920’s 
as a reaction to the traumatic experience of the Trianon settlement. Trianon, the early nepi 
writers argued, was but one expression of foreign intrusion into the Hungarian soul. 
Modernisation and Western influence was seen as a plot by foreign protagonists—mainly 
Germans and Jews—to erode ‘true Hungarian consciousness’, which had its repository in the 
traditional small-farm peasantry and their folkish and autarkic way of life. The national­
populist movement which the nepi writers inspired opposed both capitalism and socialism 
and advocated a ‘Third Way’ in between.133 The nepi emphasis on the ‘nation’ and ‘real 
Hungarians’ carries anti-modern connotations, and the anti-urbanism and anti-capitalism has 
a strong undercurrent of anti-Semitism. The essence of nepi thinking remains the idealised, 
folkish vision of traditional rural and small-town Hungary with its roots in the inter-war 
Horthyite Christian Course.
By the early months of 1988, rudimentary opposition parties began to form, and by the 
summer and fall of 1989 a plethora of fully-fledged political parties had sprung up. The 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) was clearly the strongest of the new opposition 
parties. Founded by an unholy alliance of Lakitelekians, hard-core dissenters, nationalist 
populists, and reform-oriented former ruling party members, it soon evolved into a catch-all 
party with broad nation-wide appeal, dominated by intellectuals, entrepreneurs and white­
collar workers.134 The election of Jozsef Antall, the son of a National Liberal minister in one 
of Horthy’s governments, as new party leader in October 1989 finalised the HDF’s move 
away from the founding fathers’ moral anti-capitalism into a more moderate, Western-style
130 Schopflin (1991), 62.
131 Grzybowski (1994b), 187.
132 Stokes (1993), 93.
133Hockenos (1993), 114.
134 Grzybowski (1994b), 189-90; Toka (1995), 32-3; see chapter 6.
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conservative-liberal position. Although the party mainstream was not outspokenly anti­
capitalist and came out in support of large-scale privatisation in 1989, HDF moderates too 
advocated a strong state and a gradualist approach to economic reform. The HDF of 1989-90 
has been described as ‘slightly right-of-centre’, but that has to be seen in the context of a 
political spectrum which in Hungary at that time was heavily tilted to the right. Even after 
the elevation of Antall to party leader, the nepi-nemzeti leaders remained in the presidium, 
and ‘the right-wing writers began to campaign for a thoroughgoing change of the guard in 
the civil service, the media, and so on.’135
To the left—i.e., applying a less nationalist, more Western and market-oriented stance— 
of the HDF emerged the Alliance of Free Democrats. It counted among its founders and 
leaders prominent members of the former anti-political movement, such as Konrad and Kis. 
The HDF and the AFD clearly had different social constituencies. If the populists primarily 
had a provincial, humble, non-Jewish, and non- or anti-communist background, the 
leadership core of the AFD was heavily drawn from the urban, Budapest and Jewish middle 
class and intelligentsia; many were children of established communist figures or had even 
been communists before being drawn into the human rights and democracy movement.136 
The AFD economic programme published in the spring of 1989 advocated full-scale and 
preferably quick privatisation.137
An offshoot of the AFD was the Federation of Young Democrats, best known under the 
acronym FIDESZ. That formation shared the AFD’s anti-political traditions but adopted even 
more radical neo-liberalism. FIDESZ, with its strong youth appeal, clearly demonstrated the 
generation cleavage in Hungarian politics—until 1993 it restricted membership to under 
35-year-olds.138 In the final stages of the 1990 election campaign FIDESZ, using classical 
monetarist arguments, distanced itself from the AFD, whose economic programme and 
positions on social welfare were criticised as too optimistic.139
During late 1988, the pre-war parties also re-emerged on the political map: the 
Smallholders Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Christian Democratic Party, the 
successor to the 1930’s Democratic People’s Party. These ‘nostalgia parties’ were, as soon 
became clear, rather amateurishly run and lacked clear, comprehensive ideological platforms.
The transformation to real pluralism also ripped apart the formerly ruling Socialist 
Party. The formal split came in October 1989, when the conservative wing under Grosz 
established a new Marxist-Leninist party, while Nyers, Pozsgay, Gyula Horn and the reform 
wing of the old ruling party formed the Socialist Party. The latter attempted to make a clean 
break with both Marxism-Leninism and the past; already in February 1989, Pozsgay and his 
fellow radical reformers had rehabilitated the 1956 uprising and even declared the socialist 
path ‘wrong in its entirety’.
The so-called Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia does go a long way to prove 
Tingsten’s thesis that political system changes are more motivated by a legitimacy crisis of the 
old system than by the appeal of a new, alternative system.140 By 1988, encouraged by the rapid 
openings in Poland and Hungary, the anti-political oppositionals in Czechoslovakia began to 
turn from human rights monitoring into full-blown political activism. They were certainly 
inspired by the government’s vocal endorsement of Gorbachev’s policies of perestroyka and 
glasnost. That, however, was only lip service: the regime continued to react to any
135Toka (1995), 33.
136Schopflin (1991), 62.
137Toka (1995), 33.
138 The social composition and bases of support of the various parties is discussed in T okes 
(1990).
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confrontation with harsh repression. When the communist regime finally collapsed, during 
the course of ten days in November 1989, it was only under the external pressure from the 
events in Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic which left Czechoslovakia 
a lone bastion of Leninist orthodoxy in Central Europe. The regime’s successes in keeping 
down the opposition for long meant, however, that not even a rudimentary oppositional party 
system existed to assume the power that then lay in the streets.
In fact, the only opposition in place to assume state power were the loose associations 
which had organised the demonstrations and strikes that toppled the regime; just like 
Poland’s Solidarity, they were movement-parties which with a broad-coalition form, a vague, 
non- or anti-ideological and strongly moralistic form, and an informal internal 
organisational structure.141 They were largely centred on well-known personalities, such as 
Havel, Dubcek, Jiri Dienstbier or Vaclav Maly; Cardinal Tomasek also moved in the 
background.142 The opposition was not only diffuse; it was also split between the two parts of 
the federation: in the Czech lands, the anti-system opposition was called the Civic Forum 
(Obcanske forum), in Slovakia, Public Against Violence (Verenoj proti ndsilu, VPN).
141 Batt (1991), 55.
142 Garton Ash (1990), 78-130, is the definitive eye-witness account of the chaotic days in 
Prague in November 1989.
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The Founding Elections
The competitive electoral politics after 1989 proved untenable the assumptions of social 
harmony and unity which had influenced both the old nomenklatura elite and its anti­
political or nationalist-populist opponents. Instead, competitive, adversarial, Western-style 
politics was to carry the day.
By late 1990, both the Czechoslovak and the Polish political system were moving into 
extreme multi-partism. The Polish party-political configuration was similar to the 
Czechoslovak, but because of the drawn-out transition it had a much stronger institutional 
base. After the round-table negotiations which the Jaruzelski government initiated in 
February 1989, Solidarity acted as a coalition which swept the polls in the semi-free elections 
the following June, winning 99 of 100 seats in the Senate, and 160 of the 161 contested seats 
in the first round of the elections to the lower house. After this brutal exposure of the 
government’s unpopularity, the ‘allied parties’ immediately moved to distance themselves 
even more from the ever-less-ruling Polish United Workers Party, and in January 1990 the 
PUWP itself split into two competing leftist parties. The gradual normalisation of politics 
and the receding threat of a communist backlash soon also led to the collapse of the Solidarity 
coalition: the parliamentary party fragmented into what has been derided as ‘couch parties’ 
because their membership could allegedly fit onto a large sofa. Polish multi-partism was 
exacerbated by the election legislation introduced before the 1991 polls, which not only 
introduced strict proportional representation, but also left the nomination of candidates to 
loose electoral committees.
In Czechoslovakia, the broad Civic Forum and Public Against Violence coalitions also 
split soon after the founding elections, albeit with relatively strong core elements remaining 
under the campaigning umbrella. In the run-up to the first free elections in June 1990, the 
Civic Forum voiced the slogan ‘Parties are for party members, the Civic Forum is for 
everyone’, and defined itself as ‘a democratic civic force, protecting autonomous groups from 
possible attempts by the state to co-opt them’.1 But at the same time a more differentiated, if 
not necessarily clearer, party system was emerging. The communist party split into three new 
parties; the former ‘allied parties’ reformulated their positions; many of the pre-war parties 
were re-constituted; along with new ones formed on the basis of mainstream ideologies such
1 Batt (1991), 61.
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as liberalism, social democracy, Christian Democracy, or agrarianism. Already by January 
1990, some 200 parties or political organisations had registered.2
Hungary, however, had a somewhat different experience of immediate post-transition 
party politics. The widespread acceptance of the constitutional arrangements generated by the 
round-table discussions and referendum of 1989 ‘lent an initial normalcy to Hungarian 
politics’.3 Well before the founding elections, the party system had consolidated along fairly 
conventional lines, avoiding both the extreme diversity and the turbulence of its Polish and 
Czechoslovak counterparts. This more mature state of the party system was mainly a result of 
the extended process of relatively unobstructed political pluralisation since 1987, which had 
fostered the development of more differentiated, coherent, party-like structures.4 Another 
important reason for this was the electoral system, a mix of single-seat constituencies and 
multiple-member constituencies for which a nation-wide following of at least 4 per cent was 
required for a party to gain representation in the Diet.
One indication of Hungarian normality was the moderate turnout in the first free 
elections: 63.2 per cent in the first round and 45.9 per cent in the second. In contrast, voter 
turnout in the June 1990 general election in Czechoslovakia was an astonishing 96 per cent, a 
clear indication of hyper-mobilisation.
The June 1989 general election in Poland, where some seats were pre-apportioned, 
generated a turnout of 62 per cent in the first round and only 25 per cent in the second; in the 
wholly free local elections in May 1990, turnout was 42.2 per cent, and in the presidential 
elections the following November, 60 per cent in the first round and 53.4 per cent in the 
second.5 In the Polish case, however, the explanation for the relatively low voter turnout 
appears to be less a sense of a return to normalcy than electoral fatigue after a decade of social 
and political turmoil. Similar indications of voter fatigue could be indeed be observed in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary by 1991-92. A rising tide of anti-Europeanism, anti­
intellectualism and anti-democratic feelings followed growing discontent with what was 
widely seen as the politicians’ petty bickering in the face of a huge economic crisis. The 
communists’ politicisation of society also appears to have resulted in the discrediting of 
politics as such.6 Given the fact that elite and mass socialisation had taken place during 
communism when all real antagonisms were deliberately obscured, it is not surprising that it 
proved difficult for many to face up to the fact that the market economy and parliamentarism 
necessarily manifested themselves through conflict, and all the techniques for handling these 
conflicts were not in place at the time of the transition. These tendencies were, nevertheless, 
less marked in Poland with its long and turbulent transition period than in Hungary, which 
had been ruled by the paternalistic Kadar regime—or in Czechoslovakia, only just emerged 
from two decades of very heavy-handed ‘normalisation’ which had allowed almost no scope 
for voluntary participation.7
The almost identical showings of the communist parties or their immediate successors 
stands out as an interesting fact—in all three countries, they fell within the 13 to 15 per cent 
range. The outcome in all cases was certainly decisive defeats, i.e. the loss of power, but the 
elections nevertheless reflected a solid ability of the former ruling parties to attract groups 
threatened by economic reform—particularly old-age pensioners—in addition to the loyal 
apparatchiki who probably formed the core base of support. The successor parties benefited 
from the inability of other leftist parties to put forward programmes attractive to groups
2 Bankowicz (1994), 159.
’Stokes (1993), 171.
4 Batt (1991), 55.
5 Batt (1991), 119-129.
6 Schopflin (1993), 261.
7Cf. Kolosi (1995), 117.
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feeling threatened by the changes,8 and also enjoyed a substantial campaigning advantage in 
terms of financial resources, manpower and country-wide organisations.
Table 6.1: The Founding Elections
Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary
Date June 1989 October 1991 June 1990 Mar-Apr 1990
Electoral System Multiple­
member 
constituencies 
Sejm: 161 of 
460 seats 
contested 
Senate: all 100 
seats contested
Proportional 
Representation
Multiple­
member 
constituencies;
5 % threshold 
in Czech lands, 
3 % in 
Slovakia
(a) Single­
member 
constituencies
(b) County 
constituencies 
with 4 % 
national 
threshold
Ballots 1 n/m 117 22 19
Parties represented 7 29 82 7
Largest Party Solidarity Democratic Civic Forum; Democratic
Share of Vote, % Sejm: 161 seatsSenate: 99 seats
Union 13.5 Public Against
Violence 48.0
Forum 24.7
Communist Vote 3 n/m 13% 13.6 % 14.6 %
1 Registered for election 2 Federal Assembly; two additional in Slovak National Council 3 Former 
ruling party or successor(s) thereof; n/m: Not meaningful
Yet the successor parties varied considerably in terms of programmatic goals, attitudes 
towards the past, unity and coherence. The dominant successor party in Poland, the Alliance 
of the Democratic Left, eventually came out in tacit support of the fundamentals of the 
radical market-oriented economic transition programme. In Hungary too the formerly 
ruling party split: the radically reformist successor party, essentially social democrat in 
character, fared best despite internal conflicts within the leadership; the competing hard-line 
party failed to clear the 4 per cent national threshold for the 1990 Diet. The Czechoslovak 
party retained elements of its Marxist-Leninist programme and, notably, its name. But like its 
counterparts in Poland and Hungary it strove to project a radically renewed character, 
almost unconditionally endorsing every political change and economic reform (although 
calling it ‘constructive opposition’).9 The entire leadership was renewed and most KSC 
candidates standing for office were political newcomers on the national scene—some were 
not even party members.10
Aside from the former ruling parties, which fall somewhat in between, two major party 
meta-families can be discerned throughout post-transition Eastern Europe: the 
‘programmatic’, and the ‘socio-cultural’. The programme parties operate within the 
framework of ideological platforms such as socialism, liberalism, conservatism or ecologism. 
The socio-cultural parties, on the other hand, are driven by religion, nationalism, ethnicism
8Cf. Boguszak etal. (1995), 93.
9 Boguszak et al. (1995), 93. 
10Ulc (1992), 20.
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or agrarianism, or oriented towards particular socio-economic groups.11 This distinction 
was, however, by no means clear-cut from the beginning. Up until the founding elections and 
for some time thereafter, the largest anti-communist parties in all three countries contained 
factions from both party meta-families.
Most of the former allied parties can nevertheless be classified as being of the socio­
cultural variety. This was only natural. Already during the period of communist dominance, 
their express assignment had been to provide for the controlled expression of the particularist 
interests of farmers, the urban middle strata or national minorities; to serve as ‘transmission 
belts’. During 1989 the allied parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland cut their remaining ties 
to Marxism-Leninism and appealed directly to their core support groups, usually reinstating 
the programmes and symbols they had used before their subordination to the communists in 
the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. The advantage the former allied parties had in the form of 
intact organisational structures and what nostalgic feelings their ancient history inspired did 
not, however, compensate for the stigma of long-term co-operation with the communists. 
Their success in the founding elections was moderate at best, but the situation later 
changed—in fact already during the 1991 Polish elections, by which time the Peasants Party 
had managed to reclaim command of its natural constituency with promises of cheap credits 
and price control for agricultural input goods and products.
The majority of the parties from the immediate post-war era also reconstituted 
themselves. These ‘nostalgia parties’ did not bear the stigma of co-operation; indeed they 
were martyred as victims of repression. Most of them nevertheless failed to build up 
sufficiently strong organisations or electoral platforms in time for the founding elections: 
programmes written in the 1940’s or even earlier were obviously of limited relevance to the 
actual problems facing Central Europe after 1989. The most conspicuous exceptions to this 
general observation were the Slovak National Party and the Smallholders and Christian 
Democratic parties in Hungary; all three firmly rooted in distinct socio-cultural 
constituencies.
Thus, entirely new party formations mastered the founding elections. Dominant among 
the programmatic parties were outfits—not all of them can seriously be called ‘parties’— 
advocating a clean break not only with communism, but also with the pre-war 
authoritarianism-spiced traditions. They have been called ‘liberal’ or ‘neo-liberal’, but the 
proper label for their world view and ideals would be ‘Western’, as they included social 
democrats, some Christian democrats and even some successor formations of the former 
ruling parties. Even so, outright liberal or neo-liberal parties were more successful than any 
current Western European party of that denomination. The Civic Forum won an outright 
majority in Bohemia and Moravia, its then still liberal-moderate ally PAV became Slovakia’s 
by far largest formation, while the assemblage of Free Democrats and Young Democrats 
constituted the second-strongest parliamentary grouping in Hungary.
The Party System on the Right
Modernist, Western-oriented ideologies did not totally dominate the non-communist side of 
the political spectrum. The forces rallying behind Lech Walesa’s 1990 presidential bid; the 
populist phalanx of the Democratic Forum in Hungary; the Slovak National Party (SNP) and 
the Christian Democratic Movement (CDM); and a range of parties catering primarily to the 
agrarian population in all three countries represented another blend. They had much more in 
common with pre-war Eastern European paternalistic conservatism than with the 
individualistic, free-marketeering brand dominating in modern Western European
11 Klingemann (1994) makes this distinction.
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conservatism. Instead of placing the emphasis on the free market and the individual’s freedom 
from state interference, as most current Western European conservatives do, ‘the conservative 
traditions to which [Eastern European] right-wing or “moderate” parties hark back to are 
those appropriate to a pre-modern polity and society, that of the 1930’s, nationhood and 
religion.’12 While staunchly anti-communist, they often appear as pseudo-leftist, with their 
stress on egalitarianism, community and state-sponsored welfare. Of course the collectivism 
of traditionalist conservatism is not—as in the case for Marxist collectivism—universalistic 
and inclusive, but rather particularistic and exclusive.
Yet even when taking into account the radical fringe, the Central European right-wing 
has not by far been as militant, or influential, as similarly motivated parties and movements in 
the Balkans, not to speak of Russia. By all accounts, very little in the way of the 
‘conspiratology’, ethnic mysticism and historical falsification energising the Russian or 
Yugoslav nationalist extreme right could be discerned in Central Europe in the years 
immediately following the transition.
Poland: Parties of Christ and President
The Polish party system remained weakly differentiated for some two years after the 
conclusion of the round-table talks in 1989. An initial reason for this was the need to present a 
united front against the then still communist-dominated government, as a 1981-style backlash 
could not totally be ruled out for some time. As was the case in Czechoslovakia, there were 
also widespread fears that agents of the former ruling bodies would attempt to hijack the 
opposition movements if they evolved into more disciplined, hierarchical organisations. 
These anxieties were, however, gradually laid to rest as it became clear—at the very latest 
during the collapse of the GDR—that the Soviet leadership was prepared to tolerate 
pluralism and even a roll-back of its sphere of interest.
Solidarity’s assemblage in the 1989 Sejm was indeed extremely diverse, spanning ‘social 
democrats, workers’ self-management activists, liberal adherents of the free market, 
agrarians, centrist unionists, Christian democrats and right-wing conservatives.’13 This broad 
coalition did not, unsurprisingly, survive competitive electoral politics for long. The strains 
increased between the movement’s leaders in government and parliament who continued to 
see Solidarity as a force for instituting political and social change, and union activists wanting 
it to be a defender of direct workers’ interests (not least in the face of increasing competition 
from the invigorated ‘official’ OPZZ unions). Even with Solidarity dominating the post­
round-table government, a wave of strikes and peasant blockades rocked the country in 1990.
By the summer of 1990 proto-party formation was under way within the Solidarity 
coalition. Walesa increasingly distanced himself from the government of Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki which many parliamentarians, activists and voters increasingly saw as elitist and 
too technocratic. The cracks within the Solidarity elite widened dramatically when Lech 
Walesa announced he would stand in the presidential election in November and December 
1990. As the first fully free parliamentary elections did not follow until late 1991, the 
presidential polls may indeed be interpreted as a surrogate founding election.
Walesa and his supporters in the Centre Alliance (PC) chose to stand on a more Catholic 
and populist platform than the government mainstream. Mazowiecki, who subsequently 
decided to compete for the presidency, emerged as the leader of the other main grouping to 
emerge from Solidarity, the Citizens’ Movement Democratic Action (ROAD). The schisms 
during the 1990 presidential elections exposed cleavages in the Polish political culture which
12 Schopflin (1993), 259.
13 Vinton and Barany (1990), 197.
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had previously been obscured by the communist vs. anti-communist dichotomy. If 
Mazowiecki represented Western-style intra-elite consensualism and low-key reform, the 
charismatic and self-reliant Walesa symbolised a somewhat anachronistic strong-man, quick­
fix style of politics. This conflict dimension soon superseded the pro- vs. anti-communist 
cleavage as the dominant one in Polish politics. Notably, the Catholic Church came out in 
support of Walesa, even though Mazowiecki had risen through the ranks of Church- 
sponsored institutions. Mazowiecki, however, advocated the separation of Church and State 
into their singular spiritual and temporal domains, while Walesa held the Catholic Church 
to be an inseparable part of the Polish nation and state. ROAD was branded left-of-centre by 
Walesa and his supporters, but Zbigniev Bujak, the former anti-politician activist mentioned 
earlier who became one of its leaders, rather pertinently qualified its orientation rather as 
‘West-of-centre’, ‘projecting a liberal, progressive, secular and “Westernising” self-image’, in 
contrast to the Centre Alliance’s ‘alleged primitive, inward-looking, traditionalist 
nationalism and anti-Semitic tendencies.’14
The division obviously also had much to do with economic policies: Mazowiecki was 
strongly identified with the successful, but increasingly unpopular austerity measures that had 
been introduced, while Walesa, with no formal government position, could afford to make 
broader promises with stronger electoral appeal. In 1991, 60 per cent of the Polish 
population had incomes at or under the existence minimum, and in September that year 
unemployment hit 1.9 million. In comparison with Hungary and particularly with 
Czechoslovakia, where unemployment was unheard of at the time, Poland’s economy 
experienced a much more painful transition from plan to market.
As Adam Michnik later noted, Walesa won the presidential elections because he was an 
idol of the masses, promising them ‘a miracle and a quick route to prosperity, the elimination 
of corruption and unemployment and other equally empty promises’.15 After Walesa’s victory 
in the presidential election, the Solidarity split was formalised: Mazowiecki walked out both 
of the government and of Solidarity’s parliamentary group to form the Democratic Union. 
He was replaced in office by Jan Bielecki, while Leszek Balcerowicz remained Finance 
Minister.
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The Polish constitution provides the president with fairly strong powers: legislative 
initiative, veto power over legislation, the right to dissolve parliament16, influence over the 
formation of government and the capacity to nominate high public officials such as the 
central bank governor and the commander of the armed forces. During 1991, Walesa set out 
to expand the influence of the Head of State over day-to-day politics to a maximum. He 
created a parallel system of governmental power centred of the Belweder presidential palace, 
employing some 200 personal advisors. After the return of the former ruling party to power 
late in 1993, Walesa challenged the very constitutional order of the state by dismissing the 
Prime Minister and subordinating the army and special forces to presidential powers. All in 
all, Walesa’s five-year term in office (1991-96) can be described as one of almost chronic 
constitutional crisis.
In the 1991 Sejm elections the electoral attractiveness of political Catholicism was 
demonstrated anew by the success of the Catholic Electoral Alliance (CNU, in Polish: ZChN) 
which won 10.7 per cent of the vote and emerged as the third strongest single force. The 
dominant element in the Alliance was the Christian-National Union, which has been said to 
run on a ‘Catholic supremacist platform’,17 and can indeed be described as a fundamentalist 
party. In 1991 it campaigned on a semi-populist, welfareist platform, opposing the influx of 
foreign capital, warning of a threat to vital national interests by a subordination to supra­
national EC structures, and criticising the austerity policies of the Balcerowicz stabilisation 
plan.
The CNU also identifies a dangerous threat to the Polish state from without, in the rather 
predictable form of a combined German-Russian menace. The party is thus strongly hostile 
to Poland’s German minority, which it sees as a transmission belt for Germany’s supposedly 
hegemonic ambitions. That does not refrain the CNU from, on its part, promoting the 
defence of Roman Catholicism and the Polish Diaspora in the territories lost to the Soviet 
Union.18 In many respects the CNU carries on the legacy of the pre-war National Democrats, 
although Dmowski’s movement was mainly energised by secular nationalism and assimilative 
ethnocentrism rather than by Catholic missionary zeal.
Yet the CNU’s main message is moral. It envisions a Poland thoroughly steeped in 
Christian values, a national Catholic state prepared to combat both the residual legacy of 
communism and the Western evils of consumerism and moral permissiveness. Its world view 
is openly anti-modern and anti-Western: the CNU journal, Polish Matters, identifies 
‘Christianity, Church, Fatherland and Honour’ as the foundation for a Polish renascence.19 
In line with the Vatican the CNU condemns divorce, the use of contraception, abortion, and 
premarital sex, while coyly propagating eugenicist ideas. It also has a bent for conspiratology: 
the responsibility for social and economic failure is laid on ubiquitous ‘enemies’ of the 
nation: the overtly tolerant liberals and elites intoxicated by false Western values.
Catholic or otherwise denominational parties exist in most European countries, but in 
most cases political Christianity is either marginal or subordinated to more secularised 
formations. The success of the CNU arguably reflects the unique Polish experience, with the 
Catholic Church enjoying exceptionally strong authority and being willing to serve as a
16 The president can dissolve parliament against the will of the cabinet only if parliament cannot 
agree on a budget within three months, or if parliament passes a vote of non-confidence in the 
Prime Minister without nominating a new candidate for head of government. The modalities 
of what constitutes a ‘non-constructive’ vote of non-confidence was, however, hotly disputed 
during Lech Walesa’s term of office in the Belweder Palace.
17 Grzybowski (1994), 68.
18Hockenos (1993), 252.
19 Hockenos 81993), 250-251.
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higher moral and political authority in the regulation of any worldly matters. The CNU is 
particularly loyal to the Church, but the Church exerts strong influence over a large portion 
of the Polish party system: Tew parties seem willing to consider the strictly secular position of 
the socialist and liberal parties who want to restrict the influence of the Church to religious 
matters only and to ban religious instruction from the compulsory school system.’20 It 
appears to be the case that the Polish party system in this respect manifestly failed to reflect 
broader society, which certainly was overwhelmingly pious but also politically secular. One 
particularly germane indication of the rupture between the electorate and their 
representatives was the Sejm decision to drastically tighten abortion legislation. The new 
rules followed the strongly worded wishes of the Church, ignoring the fact that the majority 
of Poles accept it to be either available on demand or after a medical and ethical consultation 
process.21
The 1991 presidential campaign brought out some anti-Semitic rhetoric on the part of 
Walesa. After being asked if he considered the ROAD and the Democratic Union being a 
‘Jewish party’—the question was prompted by some ambiguous remarks he had made 
earlier—Walesa inquired why Michnik and Geremek, two of the leaders of the liberal 
movement, were ‘concealing their origins’ and stated that he was proud to be a Pole, and 
would be equally proud to be a Jew if he happened to have that ancestry. Although Michnik, 
among many others, has said he is convinced that Walesa personally is not an anti-Semite—a 
view supported by the fact that he refrained from making statements that could be interpreted 
as being anti-Semitic as soon as the campaign was over—it is equally true that Walesa was not 
averse to stress his ‘100 per cent Polishness’, especially after rumours were put into 
circulation that Mazowiecki, the lifelong Catholic scholar and activist, would in fact be 
Jewish. It was also only after the election that the Catholic Church issued a pastoral letter 
condemning anti-Semitism, although it then did it in unprecedentedly strong words.22
Walesa’s position in the ideological spectrum is indeed somewhat puzzling in the light of 
the pre-war legacy. He certainly proved to share the etatist philosophy of the Endecja, but 
simultaneously expressed his admiration for Marshal Pilsudski, whose portrait is said to be 
prominently displayed in his study. Indeed, he seems to have attempted to stitch together the 
two main ideological heritages from the 1920’s and 1930’s; the precedent is the gradual turn 
to the right made by the Sanacja after Pilsudski’s death. What united Pilsudski and his 
opponents was, as pointed out earlier, their common urge to secure a strong government 
above party politics.
The true significance of the anti-Semitic overtones during the campaign does not, 
however, lie in what they may tell about Lech Walesa, but in what they tell about the 
electorate. With one third of Poles feeling that the few thousand remaining Jews ‘have too 
much power’ in the country, and 47 per cent opposing the right for Jews to stand for 
parliament,23 votes could be certainly be won by subtle anti-Semitic posturing. The 
brandishing of Mazowiecki and his liberal associates as cosmopolitan crypto-Jews also fitted 
neatly into the traditional Polish dichotomy between Western-oriented modernists and 
Catholic-nationalist traditionalists. This was further demonstrated by the surprising success 
of another presidential candidate: Stanislaw Tyminski, a virtually unknown Peruvian- 
Canadian businessman of Polish extraction, finished second in the first round with almost a 
quarter of the vote and ahead of Mazowiecki. Tyminski’s campaign was built on crude 
demagoguery, promising even quicker fixes than Walesa to the reform-fatigued population
20 Grzybowski (1994), 68.
21 Cf. Table 6.8 below.
22 Hockenos (1993), 292-3.
23 Hockenos (1993), 289-90.
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and appealing to anti-establishmentarian sentiments by then directed as much at the 
‘Solidatura’ as against the former ruling structures.
The presidential elections were the first fully free polls in Poland, and clarified many of 
the cleavages that were to dominate the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1991. By 
then, the communists had been out of power for some two years and reform was well 
underway. This meant that a significant constituency for protest votes had assembled, reacting 
to the economic changes and expressing nostalgia for the mythical image of the security they 
had under communism. This nostalgia was, somewhat paradoxically, often blended with 
virulent anti-communism. But at the same time many of the parties and movements which 
tried to exploit it were heavily infiltrated or even organised by former middle-ranking 
apparachiki and secret policemen.
That was, however, not the case with the most successful force on the extreme right, the 
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN). The party was formed as early as in 1979 on 
a programme of non-compromising opposition to the communist regime and Soviet 
influence, which had bestowed upon it substantial legitimacy and credibility. Having scorned 
the 1989 round-table talks, it went to the 1991 polls on a platform of radical anti- 
establismentarianism, directed both at the former system and at Solidarity, and collected 7.5 
per cent of the vote. The KPN’s undisputed leader Leszek Moczulski has been ridiculed— 
rather than feared—for his fondness for paramilitary charades, internal discipline and 
militaristic paraphernalia. The party is also nationalist, but rather inspired by Pilsudski’s 
vision of a multi-ethnic Poland than by ethnocentrism; one of its main themes is the 
sponsorship of an East Central European federation. In line with this, the party has never 
advocated anti-Semitism and is supportive of the rights of Poland’s national minorities. But 
despite its fierce anti-communism, it has been called the ‘most consistent advocate of state­
socialist measures’ in the 1991 parliament.24
This sets the KPN apart from another radical-liberal party with its roots in the final years 
of the communist period. The Conservative-Liberal Party (UPR), founded as the ‘Movement 
for Real Politics’ (RPR) in 1987—70 years to the day after the Regent’s Council’s declaration 
of Poland’s independence—is probably the foremost expression of modernist conservatism in 
Poland. The party programme, largely modelled on the British Conservative Party’s, 
advocates capitalism based on private ownership and a free market economy; the 
decentralisation of state powers and their limitation to the fields of foreign affairs, defence 
(based on a strong, professional army), internal order, environmental protection and the 
administration of justice; the abolition of publicly-administered social welfare; the abolition 
of all restrictions on the free movement of goods, services and people. The UPR has also 
demanded the lustration of all leading political figures and the criminalisation of 
pornography.
Like the KPN, the UPR is very much a one-man show, run by the quintessential political 
entrepreneur Janusz Korwin-Mikke. He did not manage to gather the 100,000 signatures 
required to stand in the 1990 presidential elections,25 but in the 1991 Sejm elections the UPR 
won 2.26 per cent of the votes and three seats; later the group was augmented by the defection 
of one CNU parliamentarian. In the 1993 parliamentary elections the UPR increased its share 
of votes to 3.4 per cent, but did not clear the 5 per cent threshold. The party has its strongest 
base of support in Warsaw and other major cities.
Even if the KPN is strongly populist and has shown little willingness to compromise in 
parliament, it is still operating within a broadly defined political mainstream. This sets it 
apart from the truly extremist fringe, which comprises of the Party X, Self-Defence, Polish
24 Vinton (1994), 17-18; Vinton (1991).
25 Korwin-Mikke stood, however, in the 1995 presidential elections, winning 2,4 per cent of the 
votes in the first round.
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National Community, and the National Fatherland Party. An evaluation of these should be 
quoted at some length, as it illustrates the truly eclectic ideologies and anti-rational world 
views of the populist-nationalist extreme fringe throughout the region.
They perceive Poland’s current tribulations as the result of a criminal conspiracy, 
usually involving collusion between government officials and international 
organisations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Implicit 
to this outlook is the notion that the barriers to prosperity are artificial and political 
rather than objective and economic. Exhortations from the government for patience 
and sacrifice are in fact a giant swindle meant to lull the public into sacrificing the 
prosperity it is rightfully owed by the state. Wrapped up in this notion is the idea that 
the new economic elites are just as bad or worse than the old communist regime, or 
that the two are really one and the same. In appealing to the public these ‘outsider’ 
forces thus boast that they have had no part in the ‘establishment’ and no desire to join 
it. Most problematic, they depict the current effort to build a market economy as an 
exercise in deliberate destruction rather than a long-overdue attempt to construct a 
workable economy from the ruins of a failed system.26
‘Party X’, was created early in 1991 on the back of the astonishing electoral success of 
Tyminski, for whom 3.8 million Poles had voted in the previous presidential elections. The 
party dismissed democracy as an even worse form of government than communism, and 
openly espoused radical ethnic nationalism. As foreign brethren like the Czech Republicans 
or the misnamed Russian Liberal-Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Party X ‘drew 
on a sinister underworld of former communist activists and secret police functionaries’ to 
build its organisation, and ‘the driving force behind the party seemed to come not from 
popular demand, but rather from subversive figures with some association with the 
communist system’.
Indeed, the party set up headquarters in offices provided by the Grunwald Patriotic 
Association, while Jozef Kossecki, a Grunwald member and professor of‘social cybernetics’, 
became its deputy chairman. Not surprisingly, the Grunwald Association’s long-running 
interest in revealing ‘Zionist plots’ and general anti-Semitic rhetoric was vigorously taken up 
by Party X The blame for Poland’s current problems were squarely placed on various 
foreign powers, whose conspiracies were propagated as the root of the country’s misfortunes. 
The party’s electoral success was, however, dismal, and the three elected deputies soon 
defected to other groups in the Sejm.17
By the 1993 general elections the Party X was joined in the polling booths by two other 
ethnocentric-extremist parties, the Self-Defence farmers’ union and the Polish National 
Community. Both had been in operation at least since 1991 and, like Party X, built their 
public profiles on overt anti-Semitism, strong criticism of the Church and the Pope, and the 
equation of the democratic system with the former communist one. Though aiming for 
representation in the Sejm, the two parties devoted the most part of their energies at extra- 
parliamentary activities which often took violent forms.28 Self-Defence’s leadership also 
included several well-known figures from the Grunwald Association and the former 
communist party’s nationalist hard-line—notably Edward Kowalczyk, who had been a 
deputy premier in the martial law government. The Polish National Community mainly 
catered to skinheads and the truly extremist fringe.
26 Vinton (1994), 18.
r Vinton (1991b); Vinton (1994).
^Vinton (1994), 16-19.
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In 1992, the National Fatherland Party emerged as a radical splinter group from 
Christian-National Union. It campaigned on a platform opposing foreign ownership and 
defining Polishness in ethnic-racial terms, particularly excluding Jews, whom its chairman 
publicly has accused of‘using the Germans to destroy the Polish people during the war’.29 
The party leader is Stanislaw Rybicki, a factory manager expelled from the PUWP in 1971 
for ‘undermining the party’s prestige’, and who had been active in Tyminski’s presidential 
campaign.
In any case, openly extremist parties enjoyed little electoral support before and 
immediately after the 1990 presidential and 1991 Sejm founding elections; even surprisingly 
so considering the extent of social and political turbulence and economic hardship the 
population experienced. It appears as—and many surveys confirm this—the vast bulk of the 
public at the time was primarily concerned with electing governments with the competence 
to pull through economic reforms. The true protest vote materialised only somewhat later, 
when these reforms were consolidated.
Hungary: Liberals, Moderates and Populists
Not even in Poland has traditional conservatism been even remotely as successful as in 
Hungary’s 1990 founding elections, which were resoundingly won by the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum together with its junior partners, the Independent Smallholders Party 
(ISP) and the Christian Democrats. After a bitter and divisive campaign the three won a total 
of 42.9 per cent of the votes given to parties that cleared the 4 per cent threshold. Given their 
particularly strong showing in rural single-seat constituencies, this translated into over 60 per 
cent of the parliamentary seats.
The Democratic Forum, while split between populists and moderates, typifies an Eastern 
European conservatism largely unaffected by ideological modernisation. It voiced some of 
the same pet themes as the Polish Christian-National Union, albeit not that party’s fervent 
clericalism. The Forum’s express ideological foundation is the ethnic Hungarian nation and 
its traditions, values, culture and past. While not anti-market per se, the HDF chose to 
highlight the state’s role in providing security for the individual as part of the national 
community. Consequently its economic programme was in a sense leftist, advocating state 
intervention and spending to shore up family economic security.
The Christian Democratic Party articulated similar themes, but put even more emphasis 
on religion as a binding force in society. Its programme was explicitly based on the Ten 
Commandments, and the main campaign topic was the introduction of compulsory religious 
instruction in schools.30 The HDF and Christian Democrats were eventually joined in 
government coalition by the Independent Smallholders Party, despite the fact that the ISP’s 
demands for rapid re-privatisation, particularly the redistribution to peasants of collectivised 
land, were not in harmony with the overall aims of its partners.31 But otherwise the 
Smallholders by and large subscribed to the traditionalist agenda, as demonstrated by the 
slogans of‘God, Fatherland, Family’ and ‘Wine, Bread, Peace’ it adopted from its pre-1948 
predecessor.
The founding elections were decided on bread-and-butter rather than socio-cultural 
issues, and the HDF’s gradualist approach eventually went down better among the electorate 
than the radical liberalism of the Free and Young Democrats. The radical traditionalism 
espoused by some visible HDF personas seems to have been of marginal relevance for the 
outcome, and the HDF ministers were indeed drawn from the moderate faction of the party,
29 Luoma (1995).
30 Hockenos (1993), 112-3; also Schopflin (1991).
31 Kolosi (1995), 115.
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which attempted to present itself as modelled on mainstream Western European Christian 
Democracy.32
That the relationship between the two main anti-communist parties was in fact not all 
that antagonistic was subsequently demonstrated by the semi-secret deal that the HDF and AFD 
made during the coalition negotiations. It settled a wide range of issues, including the 
election of a new president (the Free Democrat Arpad Goncz) and the rules for the running 
of parliament.33 This agreement essentially side-stepped the HDF’s coalition partners, gave 
the AFD a consultative role in government, and transformed the populist faction of the HDF 
into a de facto opposition force.
At the same time, the centrists of the HDF did not once and for all distance themselves 
from the extremist views propagated by the party’s populist faction. When the poet and 
Forum co-founder Istvan Csurka published pamphlets during the election campaign 
claiming, i.a., that the ‘pursuit of self-interest’ by a ‘dwarf minority’ blocked Hungarians 
from realising their true national aspirations, it provoked protests from all other major 
parties, but was not publicly condemned by moderates within the ranks of the HDF.34 Even if 
the moderates did not share all of Csurka’s views, they appreciated the coherent, complete and 
concise ideological mind-set that the populists presented to the electorate—pointing to the 
nation as the pivotal category from which the party’s popular appeal, legitimation and 
concept of democracy flowed. Indeed, HDF moderates as well stressed that the party was an 
incarnation of a mythical link between the Magyar people and the Magyar nation’s historical 
destiny.
The folkish-ethnic concept of a nation transcending the state is not wholly unproblematic 
given that the Hungarian state, though more ethnically homogenous than ever before in its 
history, contains several substantial national minorities, and that several million ethnic 
Magyars live outside Hungary’s present borders. As might be expected, the Democratic 
Forum’s self-identification as a supra-political voice of the nation generated a sceptical 
approach to representative and competitive democracy. It was embodied in the authoritarian 
style and low level of tolerance of critique during the first two years of the HDF-dominated 
Antall government in 1990-92, and reached something of a high point when one deputy 
leader openly declared as his opinion that it was necessary to suspend democracy for the 
period of the transition.35 Indeed, for many within the Democratic Forum, ‘the notion of a 
fatalistic, spiritual mission implies recourse to a morality above such temporal matters as 
electoral mandates, state law or economic policy.’36
The HDF politicians see themselves as more than ordinary people who were elected as 
politicians. They behave as if they were ordained with the task of the nation’s salvation 
from an authority much higher than the majority of voters. In parliament, they behave 
as if they simply can’t understand why the opposition is there. They don’t seem to 
understand that just because they received 1.5 million votes and the opposition 1.2 
million, they aren’t free to exercise power as they please.37
Whatever its intentions, the HDF-led government in practice adopted a middle-of-the-road 
stance. The Third Way, a soft landing from communism into a socially conscious market 
economy proved impassable given the sorry state of public finances. The HDF and its
32 Schopflin (1991), 64-5.
33 Schopflin (1991), 64.
34 Hockenos (1993), 111-2.
35Kolosi (1995), 120.
36 Hockenos (1993), 118.
37 Hockenos (1993), 119-20, quoting an interview with the Hungarian political scientist Andras 
Bozoki
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coalition allies, while long on public support, also proved embarrassingly short on 
administrative talent; they came to rely heavily on initiatives and support in parliament from 
the liberal, market-oriented opposition. And despite promises to carry through a thorough 
lustration, the government also was forced to retain much of the communist-era elite within 
the bureaucracy, industry and finance simply to keep things going. It should also be noted that 
the Antall government introduced the probably most liberal and tolerant minority 
legislation in Central and Eastern Europe to date.
The diminishing popular appeal of symbolic, ideological-cultural politics among the 
electorate was demonstrated anew during the local elections held in the autumn of 1990. The 
outcome was strongly asymmetric to the results of the parliamentary polls: the clear majority 
of the national-conservative parties was lost to the liberal parties—the AFD and FIDESZ—in 
the larger cities, while many the rural areas were carried by former communist functionaries 
standing as independents.38
Czechoslovakia: A Tale of Two Nations
Of all parties successful in the 1990 Czechoslovak elections, only the Communist Party had a 
federal organisation which throughout the federal territory nominated candidates for all 
legislative bodies. All other parties with a federal structure failed to win seats either in the 
federal or in the republican assemblies.39 The main regionalist party in the Czech lands was 
the Movement for Autonomous Democracy-Movement for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS). 
It ran on an autonomist, Catholicist agenda and had its main base of support in the area 
around the Moravian capital Brno. In Slovakia, regionalism was much more conspicuous. 
The Slovak National Party immediately campaigned for full independence for Slovakia, and 
was soon joined in this by the Christian Democratic Movement. Among the major parties in 
Slovakia was also the Egyiitteles (Coexistence)-Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement 
alliance, which catered to the Magyar community. It won outright majorities in five 
southern districts with a large Hungarian-speaking population; its successes and failures 
‘more or less duplicates the map of the ethnic composition of the population’.40
The clear winners in the June 1990 Czechoslovak founding elections were, however, the 
twin coalitions. Civic Forum won 53 per cent of the vote in Bohemia and Moravia, and 
Public Against Violence 32 per cent of the vote in Slovakia—the latter somewhat 
surprisingly since a landslide for the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement had been taken 
almost for granted.41 Together the CF and PAV commanded a majority of the seats in the 
federal assembly.
Throughout the election campaign, the CF and PAV remained amorphous, American-style 
party organisations, dominated by personalities rather than by any programmatic agendas. 
But almost immediately after the polls they fragmented into more party-like organisations 
with more distinct political-ideological platforms. The Civic Forum split into three main 
groupings. The Civic Movement gathered the majority of left-oriented members, many of 
whom were rooted in the 1968 ‘Socialism with a human face’ ideals; the Civic Democratic 
Alliance had a clearly non-socialist orientation; as did, to an even greater extent, the strongest 
and most popular of the trio, the Civic Democratic Party.42 Under the leadership of its 
chairman, the then Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, it adopted a radical neo-liberal, free-
38Markus (1993), 1172-3.
39 Kostelecky, (1995), 120.
40 Kostelecky (1995), 124.
41 Gabal (1995), 111.
cUlc (1992), 27.
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market stance inspired by Klaus’s ideological role models Friedrich von Hayek, Milton 
Friedman and Margaret Thatcher.
The outstanding success of hard-core liberalism in the Czech lands appears somewhat 
puzzling, considering the failure of similar movements in other parts of Eastern Europe to 
consolidate the positions many of them won immediately after the transition. One may point 
to several possible explanations. The Klaus government could start out with favourable 
internal and external conditions: Czechoslovakia had the most stable economy in the former 
Socialist Bloc, with no significant foreign debt, a very favourable geographical location 
encouraging the inflow of capital, and timid trade unions. The historical traditions of 
moderation and tolerance in Bohemia—from the Hussites through Masaryk’s First 
Republic—also played in.
Most stunning, particularly in a Central and Eastern European context, was the cool 
attitude the Czech elites and masses took to Slovak secessionism, in effect greeting the victory 
of the separatists in the other half of the federation with a sigh of ‘good riddance’. The break­
up of the federation certainly took an economic burden of the Czech shoulders, but the 
granting of independence for Slovakia is still the only peaceful partitioning of a state 
recorded in modern Europe bar the dismantling of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905. 
If the break-up of Czechoslovakia testified to the strength of nationalism in Slovakia, it also 
pointed to the absence by and large of it in the Czech lands.
Instead, what Czech nationalism there is has rather been directed at Germany. The issue 
of the expelled Sudeten Germans’ property and right to return, coupled with demands from 
both sides for apologies for historical wrongs, have remained a permanent thorn in the side of 
Czech-German relations. Even the modest calls for reconciliation with the expellees and 
with Germany made by President Havel created a deep rift between him and Prime Minister 
Klaus, who was backed by all parliamentary parties and by the bulk of public opinion.
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Post-1990 events seem to confirm that Slovak public opinion was not only broadly 
supportive of full independence and ‘a strongly nationalistic political culture’43, but also
43 Bankowicz (1994), 166.
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markedly less anti-communist than Czech voters. Nevertheless, the separatist issue for some 
time remained overshadowed by the economic and political transformation. It exploded fully 
onto the scene only in 1991, both in the form of outspoken Slovak separatism and in the 
ascent of the xenophobic but federalist Republican Party in Bohemia and Moravia. Public 
Against Violence, previously moderately liberal and clearly pro-Western, then ‘shifted to a 
more assertively autonomist position’ under pressure from the outspokenly separatist 
parties.44 In 1991 it finally disintegrated into a string of mainly anti-federalist parties. The 
first democratically elected Slovak premier, the demagogic and somewhat brutish PAV leader 
Vladimir Meciar, started to argue the case of independence in ‘unequivocal and 
uncompromising terms’.45 Meciar, a former member of the Communist Party with strong 
links to the heavy-industry lobby in Slovakia, ‘succeeded in winning widespread support as a 
populist and a nationalist’ and went on to found the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS) which subsequently became the country’s strongest party.
The break-up of PAV took place against the backdrop of the growing support for the 
Slovak National Party, which was the most distinctly nationalist party to gain national 
representation in the 1990 polls.46 The SNP, building on the traditions of the pre-war Hlinka 
Slovak National Party, openly admires the clericalist and semi-fascist war-time Republic of 
Slovakia. It has demonstrated open hostility towards Magyars, Jews and Gypsies, whom its 
leaders has described as ‘dark forces’; the three Slovak Magyar parties have been branded as 
‘satanic’ vehicles for Hungarian revisionist ambitions.47 By 1993-4, also Meciar and the 
HZDS had developed a strongly authoritarian style of government, and particularly the 
scandalous news emanating from the conflict with President Michal Kovac generated much 
badwill for Slovakia abroad. 48 As a result, Bratislava has even been dubbed a ‘Gangsters’ 
Capital’; George Soros, the US billionaire of Hungarian descent who has given huge sums in 
aid to Eastern Europe, argued in 1994 that the ‘combination of nationalist ideology and
44 Batt (1991), 98-100.
45 Bankowicz (1994), 163.
46 Ulc (1992), 29.
47 Mather (1994).
48 The conflict between the heads of state and government culminated in August 1994 when 
the president’s son, Michal junior, was assaulted, inbued with liquor and transported over the 
border to Austria where he, after an anonymous tip from Slovakia, was arrested on suspicion of 
economic crimes. Opposition politicians immediately accused professionals from the 
communist-era secret police of having handled the operation; the opposition leader Jan 
Carnogur sky even called upon Meciar to present an alibi for the night of the abduction. The 
same month police officers also searched the living quarters of Rudolf Balaz, the chairman of 
the Conference of Bishops and a vocal supporter of the president, professedly looking for proof 
of the bishop having smuggled abroad national art treasures. Reaction abroad was also extremely 
critical towards the 1995 minority legislation, which, i.a., the Council of Europe found to be at 
odds with Slovakia’s treaty obligations. In March 1996, the parliament in Bratislava ratified a 
Basic Treaty on relations with Hungary, encompassing guarantees for the rights of the Magyar 
minority. Although Hungary ratified already in the summer of 1995, the three Magyar parties 
found it unsatisfactory and voted against, particularly as parliament simultaneously added a 
clause on the Right of Interpretation which defined minority rights as individual instead of as 
collective. In conjunction with the ratification and prompted by demands of the Slovak 
National Party, parliament also passed a Law on the Protection of the Republic, which 
criminalised the organisation of public gatherings with the intent of overturning the 
constitutional order of the state, its territorial integrity, its capacity for defence or its 
sovereignty. The spread of ‘incorrect’ information about the state abroad was also criminalised; a 
‘general clause’ interpreted as opening the door for future political trials. Cf. Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 March 1996, 6.
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commercial interests’ prevailing in Slovakia is ‘the classic recipe for the rise of Fascism and 
National Socialism’.49
The three ethnic-Hungarian parties in Slovakia have gathered 10-12 per cent of vote in 
the post-transition elections, or about equal to minority’s proportional strength. The Slovak 
Magyar parties have been the most vociferous minority movements in Central Europe, 
campaigning for greater local autonomy, proposing the establishment of provinces along 
ethnic lines throughout Slovakia’s Magyar southern belt (fszakmagyarorszdg, or ‘Northern 
Hungary’, as it is sometimes called), and demanding compensation for property confiscated 
from Magyars during 1945-48. They can indeed point to some real discrimination: until 
1993 Slovakia retained the strict Czechoslovak language laws, i.a. banning street signs in 
Hungarian in mixed areas and requiring ethnic Hungarian women to add the Slovak suffix 
‘ova’ to their names when they married.50 During his second term of office, from June 1992 
to March 1994, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar rejected plans for the 
establishment of a Magyar-language university, instead demanding that schools in the 
Magyar areas increase their education in the Slovak language. Notably, the constitution of 
Slovakia points out that the state is one of‘the Slovak people’.
Prime Minister Meciar has rejected demands for a minority treaty with Hungary and the 
application of the principle of reciprocity in minority policies: his argument has been that 
Slovak Magyars should not be subjected to the same maltreatment as ethnic Slovaks living in 
Hungary. However, no serious conflicts between Hungarian Slovaks and official authorities 
have been reported.51
The only substantial radical-right movement operating in the Czech lands is the 
Republican Party. It is a typical exponent of the Eastern European variety of post-transition 
beer-hall extremism, combining populism with contempt for democracy. It is vociferously 
anti-communist, despite the fact that many of its functionaries have apparat backgrounds— 
the Republicans’ founder and leader Miroslav Sladek worked as an official in the 
communist-era central censorship office, and a number of former secret police officers have 
been among its most prominent media advocates. Nevertheless, the Republicans demanded a 
complete purge of all members of the Communist Party, and even accused Havel of 
clandestinely having been a Communist Party member and StB informer. The Republicans 
also opposed the split-up of the federation, and continues presenting itself as a ‘Czechoslovak’ 
party; in fact, it even demands the return of Carpatho-Ruthenia to a reconstituted 
Czechoslovakia.
In the elections held after the split-up of the federation the Republicans received 600,000 
votes and captured eleven of the 200 seats in the Czech National Council. This success is likely 
to have been mainly a result of its vocal anti-immigrant stance: it is overtly racist in its 
attitudes towards the Gypsy minority and resident immigrants, demanding the ‘resettling’— 
i.e. expulsion—of both groups.52 Despite their fierce anti-German rhetoric, the Republicans 
have established close contacts with Franz Schonhuber’s Republicans in Germany, and even 
adopted their logo as their own.
The Truly Extreme Fringe
Despite its insignificance in a parliamentary context, an overview of the Central European 
extreme right would be incomplete without a discussion of the thuggish ultra-right fringe.
49 Stehle (1995b), 10.
50 Mather (1994).
51 Gerner et al. (1995), 252.
52Ulc (1992), 28.
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This refers to expressive, often violent, groupings without a clear leadership structure, 
articulated ideology or comprehensive political aims.
The skinhead movement started out as a style fad—green bomber jackets, heavy high-top 
boots, shaved heads—associated with punk-rock music and football in the late 1970’s, first in 
Britain but quickly spreading to other European countries. The subculture found its greatest 
appeal among urban working-class and lower middle class youth fearing downward social 
mobility. Although they were at first apolitical bordering on the anomic, by the mid-1980’s 
skinheads increasingly started displaying fascist and racist symbols, slogans and attitudes, 
initially as pure provocation but gradually as more of an adopted ideology. Since then, 
skinhead gangs have been used as storm troopers and a pool for recruitment by established 
extreme right-wing parties such as the British National Front, the West German National 
Democratic Party or Deutsche Alternative, and Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden.53
The appeal of the skinhead identity is easy to comprehend. It provides an outlet for 
masculinity and aggression, while the gangs’ uniform dress, hierarchical internal structure 
and discipline provide a sense of community, order and purpose in a society where socio­
economic transformation is challenging the established social order and wiping out 
traditional working class jobs. Immigrants are an obvious target when skinheads vent their 
frustration.
Skinheads started appearing in Eastern and Central Europe around 1982, first in the 
German Democratic Republic, directly inspired by the West German skinhead scene, and 
later in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, where there also was a great deal of 
fraternisation with Austrian and German skinheads. As the subculture was inspired by 
Western models, skinheads obviously were hostile to the communist system, and their use of 
Nazi imagery were of course the ultimate provocation. Yet the communist authorities did not 
interpret the use of fascist symbols as political statements, but rather as signs of asocial 
behaviour, which indeed largely was the case. However, the interpretation of the skinhead 
subculture as primarily a Western aberration and a law-and-order problem led to a failure to 
address the domestic social roots of the emergence of violent youth gangs. In this the Eastern 
European authorities were, of course, as much at loss as their Western counterparts.
It has been noted that a large pool of the early East German skinheads were young male 
workers from socially secure families, and that youths with parents associated with the core of 
the state—bureaucrats, party apparatchiki, Stasi or military personnel—were strongly over- 
represented in the gangs. Many were children of orthodox communists and brought up with 
authoritarian values; they had taken in the rules of the authoritarian society, if not its 
ideological content. The skinhead personality type tends to covet the thrill of weapons and 
battle, and eagerly signed up to the voluntary paramilitary training the communist states so 
eagerly provided, beginning with the Pioneer pre-teen squads which had all the trappings of a 
paramilitary force: hierarchy, uniforms, drill, and decorations. In the GDR, skinheads could 
hone their fighting skills in the pre- and proto-military Gesellschaft fur Sport und Technik, 
and the armed forces themselves served as a prime arena for skinhead recruitment and 
training. Skinheads were also eager to participate in the communist youth organisation Freie 
Deutsche Jugend's ‘Ordner' squads, which had the task of keeping the order at FDJ and party 
events. A 1989 study showed that one right-wing criminal offender in four surveyed had been 
a member of FDJ Ordner details.54
By 1988, the East German skinhead subculture had adopted a more articulated political 
ideology, beginning to see itself as a continuation of the National Socialist movement, 
complete with convictions of racial supremacy, demands for the reunification of Germany
53 Buford (1991) gives valuable insight into the British National Front’s recruitment drives 
among football hooligans and skinheads.
54 Hockenos (1993), 69-103.
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and hostility to deviants from their image of true Germanness. The aim was, ridiculous as it 
may sound, to overthrow the GDR state by violence, just as German neo-Nazis to this day 
dream of toppling the Federal Republic. Some skinhead leaders eventually graduated from 
street thuggery into more organised pseudo-politics, and established contacts with the older 
generation of GDR ultra-rightists.
Apart from the GDR, the skinhead scene is markedly less vibrant in the former communist 
countries than it is in Britain, Sweden, Austria or Germany. Indeed, Eastern European 
skinheads’ use of Nazi insignia and symbols appears even more bizarre, particularly as it is 
commonly combined with the fierce xenophobic nationalism. While far removed from 
institutionalised politics, Czech skins often mention the pre-war anti-German fascist party as 
their inspiration; they have also expressed support for the Republican party. This is not 
surprising given the fact that the skinheads have directed much energy at the persecution of 
non-European immigrants and the Gypsy community. During the spring of 1990, a wave of 
riots swept northern Bohemia, whose grim industrial towns presented the country’s largest 
concentration of Vietnamese ‘guest workers’ and ethnic Gypsies. The rioters found a strong 
resonance among normally law-abiding citizens who appear to have shared many of the 
skinheads’ views on the causes of criminality and of the threat to employment from 
immigration.55
One estimate in 1995 put the number of Gypsies in the Czech Republic at about two per 
cent of the total population, or some 200,000.56 This may be on the low side, as Czech 
authorities have refused to grant citizenship to a large number of Gypsies: after the break-up. 
Czechoslovak citizens could choose freely between taking a Czech or a Slovak passport—but 
only provided the applicant did not have a criminal record from the past two years, which 
many Gypsies had due to the communist-era vagrancy legislation. Ten per cent of Czech 
Gypsies have not been able to acquire citizenship since 1993, thus being barred from public 
office, elections, restitution of confiscated property, participating in the privatisation 
programme and, frequently, the social security system. Some human rights movements indeed 
consider the Czech citizenship legislation ‘the most discriminating since the Second World 
War’. Observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe have also 
pointed to ‘grave deficiencies’ in the nationality legislation.57
In Hungary, a skinhead subculture emerged in the early 1980’s, coalescing around the 
underground music scene and a leading Budapest football team. When it developed from 
drunken brawling into pseudo-political activism, its main targets were immigrants, Gypsies 
and Jews. In 1992, Hungarian skinheads were estimated to number between 1,500 and 2,500, 
with a fifth constituting a truly neo-Nazi core. Neo-Nazi groupings in Hungary have 
established close contacts with Arrow Cross revivalists among the Hungarian Diaspora, as 
well as with German and Austrian neo-Nazi groups. Hungarian right-radicalism also falls 
back on the domestic tradition with its Arrow Cross symbols, insignia and pet themes. This 
constitutes a difference in comparison with Poland and Czechoslovakia, where native fascist 
traditions are weaker and identified with foreign occupation.58 Indeed, the Polish skinheads 
have distinguished themselves by harassing members of the German minority. Some Polish 
neo-Nazis adhere to a peculiar brand of slavono-fascism and cultivate contacts to the Russian 
ultra-right, where the Russian Nazi Party under former wrestling champion Yuri Vlasov 
brandishes swastikas and openly idolises the Third Reich variety of rightist radicalism.
55 Cf. Knox (1994).
56 Hockenos (1993), 220; Perlez (1995), B9.
57 Perlez (1995), B9, with reference to the Czech ministry of Internal Affairs; the figure of 
Slovaks having acquired Czech citizenship is quoted as 360,000.
58 Hockenos (1993), 153-159.
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The Structure of Conflicts and the Voting Pattern
With this sub-chapter, the analysis moves to the aggregate mass level. It presents a macro-level 
analysis of the voting pattern in the founding elections, with the aim of identifying the 
structuring cleavages determining party formation, the degree of popular support for free 
elections and institutionalised multi-party systems, and the relationship between social 
structure and party politics.
The obvious ‘super-issue’ during the run-up to the founding elections was system change 
in general and communism vs. anti-communism in particular. The interests of various social 
groups were only weakly articulated, and insofar as they were, they confronted not other 
legitimate actors on the electoral scene but rather the communist-era ideology or what was 
perceived as the elites’ vested interests.59 The dominant cleavage was thus one between 
reformed or orthodox communist parties on the one hand, and all other parties on the other. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that very broad opposition coalitions fought and won both 
the semi-free Polish general election in 1989 and the fully free elections in Czechoslovakia 
the following year.
In all three Central European countries this super-issue was resolved by the victory of the 
former opposition; yet the cleavage remained reflected in the subsequent roles of government 
and opposition. The former hegemonic parties were widely perceived as the main opposition 
regardless of the intensity of conflicts within the anti-communist bloc.
Bernhard Wessels and Hans-Dieter Klingemann have, on the basis of country-specific 
surveys conducted in late 1990 and early 1991, tracked system preferences in a range of 
former communist countries.60 As Table 6.2 shows, these register a fairly large variation in 
public support for political systems allowing for political opposition: it ranges from some 60 
per cent to well over 90 per cent. By reference to Dahl’s two-dimensional differentiation of 
political systems on the basis of inclusiveness and free competition as the starting point, one 
may still note a very high level of popular support—in fact, clear majorities—for polyarchy, 
i.e. the combination of free elections and multi-party competition.
Table 6.2: System Preference by Country 61
Closed 
hegemony
Inclusive 
Hegemony
Competitive 
Oligarchy Polyarchy
Czechoslovakia 2.4 16.5 6.0 75.1
Hungary 1.3 4.2 10.8 83.7
Bulgaria 0.7 2.1 6.1 91.1
Romania 0.9 4.6 12.9 81.5
Estonia 0.9 2.8 9.9 86.4
Lithuania 2.4 8.9 12.3 76.4
Ukraine 5.2 16.2 18.3 60.3
Krasznoyarsk region 5.7 11.9 13.6 68.8
Slovenia 5.2 5.9 12.8 76.1
East Germany * 1.2 13.2 3.4 82.2
Poland n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a: Not available; * Survey made in November 1992
59Toka (1995b), 79.
60 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 12-22; N=522-1165. The paper and the computations 
therein are quoted extensively below.
61 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 19.
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It appears difficult to reach conclusive systematic explanations for these country-by-country 
differences. For instance, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which supposedly enjoyed the highest 
degree of a civil society in the sample (possibly excepting Slovenia) do not, perplexingly, 
show a markedly high level of support for pluralist competitive democracy—in the case of 
Czechoslovakia in fact quite the opposite. Support for polyarchy was weakest in the Ukraine 
and in the Krasznoyarsk region of Russia, which would point to the particular Soviet 
experience being a factor; on the other hand public support for multi-party systems and free 
elections was high in Estonia and Lithuania, at the time of the surveys both still formally part 
of the Soviet Union (although Lithuania had by then unilaterally declared independence).
Differentiation by voters’ party family sympathies provides some additional insights. 
Supporters of the reformed communist parties were—as would indeed be expected—the 
most sceptical of multi-party democracy and freely contested elections. Voters for the 
programme parties (conservative, liberal, socialist, ecological) were the most supportive, 
while the attitude towards polyarchy ranged between the two former groups among 
supporters of the socio-cultural parties. One average, support for polyarchy among 
supporters of the three party meta-families was 64 per cent, 80 per cent, and 75 per cent, 
respectively.
Democracy thus commanded the support of a majority voters in early 1991, but not 
overwhelmingly so: in five of the nine countries (in the case of Russia, the Krasznoyarsk 
region) covered by the surveys, a considerable part of the population opposed a democratic 
development, and ‘cautiously speaking, one could state that the proportion is large enough to 
be regarded as a critical mass challenging democratisation’62 It is, however, important to note 
that opposition to democracy was not clustered around any particular party or party group, if 
tilted towards the former communist parties. The exception is the Ukraine, where more than 
40 per cent of communist party voters preferred competitive oligarchy, and an additional 23 
per cent expressed a preference for either closed or inclusive hegemony.
Table 6.3: System Preference of Voters by Party Family 63
Closed 
Hegemony
Inclusive 
Hegemony
Competitive
Oligarchy
Polyarchy
Communist 5.8 8.7 21.8 63.6
Socialist 1.4 10.8 3.6 84.1
Ecological 0.8 10.0 4.6 84.6
Liberal 1.4 9.9 5.9 82.9
Christian 0.8 12.2 5.8 81.2
Conservative 1.6 3.1 9.0 86.3
Farmer 3.3 11.7 10.0 75.0
Nationalist 2.7 13.1 9.5 74.7
Ethnic 2.2 20.9 1.1 75.8
Others 4.7 7.4 10.1 77.7
Given that the majority of voters for both government and opposition parties (be they either 
reformed communist or non- or anti-communist)64 expressed a preference for democracy, at
62 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 20.
M Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 20; the country set as in the table above. Party classification 
from Ibid. 34-35.
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the time of the surveys there seem to have been limited prospects for a ruling party or 
potentially ruling party to abolish multi-partism and the system of free elections. Yet it is 
equally conspicuous that the system of closed hegemony, which was practised during the 
period of communist domination, enjoyed only marginal, even minimal, support in all 
sampled polities. Criticism of competitive multi-party politics was, as one could assume, 
concentrated to supporters of the former ruling parties: more than one fifth of voters for the 
reformed communist parties supported competitive hegemony, i.e. an electoral system 
resembling the one applied in the first semi-free elections held in the USSR, where voters 
could choose among candidates on a single Communist Party list. Voters for ethnic parties 
were also more sceptical of democracy than average, although their second choice after 
democracy was inclusive hegemony, i.e. multi-party systems without competitive elections. 
That appears to reflect a fear of majority dictatorship, founded on uncertainty about 
constitutional guarantees for minority interests and rights.
One may thus conclude that the attitude towards democracy was a major political 
cleavage, but that it did not dominate voters’ party choice. The reform wings of the 
communist parties had indeed come out in favour of competitive democracy well before the 
founding elections, which thus no longer explicitly were about the preferred political system 
per se. Even so, the former ruling parties’ commitment to change was doubted in many 
quarters, contributing to the persistence of the communism-pluralism ‘super-cleavage’.
Other cleavages influencing voter behaviour in the founding elections are less easy to 
identify, but the dimension of religion vs. secularism was present to varying extents 
throughout Eastern Europe. As has been elaborated in detail above, the Polish presidential 
elections of 1990—when Walesa’s election bloc was pitted against Mazowiecki’s 
Democratic Union, the reformed communists and the formerly allied Peasants Party— 
indicated a clear and important cleavage pattern between Social Catholicism and secularism. 
Nevertheless, the Democratic Union participated in the new government formed by Bielecki 
after Walesa was elected president. This indeed seems to confirm that the government­
opposition constellation at that time was more influenced by the communism-liberalism 
cleavage than by other issues, including the role of religion in society and politics.
In the case of Hungary one may also point to an urban-rural cleavage demonstrated in the 
party structure, ‘but after examining the programmatic profile [of the Smallholders party, 
which finished third in the founding elections] which places heavy emphasis on 
reprivatisation of land, low taxation to encourage entrepreneurship and adherence to 
Christian values, one might doubt whether the urban-rural dimension is strong enough to 
create conflicts.’65
In the founding elections, voters had a wide range of choices between parties offering 
programmes with differing aims and goals. This should have provided a basis for 
sociostructural alliances and coalitions between social groups and political parties. Yet the 
question remains whether ‘these political “supplies” were only created by elites and that the 
degree of differentiation of elite political positions is dissimilar to the degree of 
differentiation of political “demands” of the electorate’?66
The numerals in the cells in Table 6.4 represent scale point differences from the mean 
position of the population on a ten-point left-right self-anchoring scale. Negative values 
indicate a deviation to the ‘left’, and positive values a deviation to the ‘right’. Empty cells 
indicate that the party group was not existent or insignificant at the time of the elections or 
surveys.
wAs non-, but not anti-communist parties one may classify some of the allied parties in Eastern 
and Central Europe and, e.g., the Agrarian Party in Russia.
65 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 7.
66 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 9.
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Table 6.4: Voter Left—Right Self Placement: Deviation of Party Voters from Left—Right Mean 
of Population 67
Voters of:
Deviation from 
Left-Right Mean COM soc ECO LIB REL CONS AGR NAT ETH OTH
Poland -1.1 +0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
Czechoslovakia -2.5 -1.0 -0.5 +0.6 +0.6 -0.9 -0.6 + 1.0
Hungary -1.2 +0.1 +0.5 +0.1 +0.1 -0.2
Romania -0.5 +0.3 +0.9 +1.3 +0.9 +0.8
Slovenia -0.5 -0.2 +0.2 +1.6 +0.7 -0.2
GDR -1.5 -0.3 -0.8 +0.4 +0.6
Estonia -0.7 +1.1 +0.3 -0.5
Ukraine +0.5 -0.4 -1.5 +0.4 -0.7 -0.4 +0.0
Krasznoyarsk +1.1 -0.8 -0.2
The observations are intuitively interesting, but it should also be pointed out here that the 
validity of the survey is somewhat dubious. Although respondents may have understood the 
questions posed, responses given in an Eastern European, post-communist context are not 
necessarily functionally equivalent to West European or North American ones. There is 
another predicament in this particular case, and—possibly even more so—as regards the 
surveys particularised further below. Many of the questions posed in the surveys were of such 
a nature that they only a few months or even weeks earlier would have been perceived as 
politically incorrect and risky to the polled. Even after the relaxation of political control, 
some respondents in the sample may have preferred to give non-committal answers in order 
to escape an awkward situation.
Given these reservations, a general observation pertaining to Table 6.4 is that voters of 
different parties do seem to differ with respect to their general political position. Voter left­
right self-placement also seems to have been in line with the normal Western European gist 
already by 1991. The two exceptions are the Russian region of Krasznoyarsk and the Ukraine, 
where the political co-ordinates appear to have been reversed: communist party voters placed 
themselves to the right of the mean population’s right-left position, while voters of most 
reform-oriented parties conversely placed themselves to the left. This inverted self-placement 
was particularly strong for Ukrainian voters for liberal parties, and for Russian supporters of 
the Communist Party. Despite the difference in meaning of the left-right dichotomy, even in 
Russia and the Ukraine one can nevertheless discern differences between political positions of 
voters of different parties.68
The classification by voters’ party family of choice is, however, not altogether clear-cut. 
For example, Wessels and Klingemann categorise the Hungarian Democratic Forum as 
conservative, although it contained a sizeable nationalist wing, as well as factions gravitating 
towards social or Christian democracy. Walesa’s supporters in the presidential elections are 
classified as ‘socialists’, although a label of‘Christian democratic’ or even conservative would 
be equally justified.69 In Czechoslovakia both the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence
67 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 10.
68 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 11.
69 Poland is not, however, included in the computations in Table 6.3 above.
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are classified as liberal, despite their broad coalition character: PAV in particular, as later 
became clear, was supported by a great many nationalist-oriented Slovaks.
The most conspicuous difference in self-placement along the right-left scale was between 
voters of communist parties and those of other parties. This indicates a manifest cleavage 
between communism on the one hand and other ideological positions on the other. It also 
lends credence to the view that the communist parties and their supporters had the clearest 
and most coherent ideological position. A computation of the mean difference on the left­
right scale shows that the communist party voters’ differentiation from voters of other party 
families was strongest in Czechoslovakia and weakest in Hungary. This may simply illustrate 
that the Hungarian Socialist Party (i.e. the largest successor party, led by Imre Pozsgay) could 
point to a rather strong and long-running reform orientation, while the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party had much weaker (or non-existent) pre-1989 reformist credentials and was 
more identified—and self-identified—with the pre-transition system.
The fairly clear differentiation in self-placement between voters for these various parties 
seems to further confirm that there existed not only a broad supply of programmatic political 
positions and a fairly conventional structuring of the party system along the left-right 
dimension, but also of a large variety of political preferences within the electorate. Wessels 
and Klingemann indeed conclude that the supply of parties was ‘not artificially diverse due to 
elite intervention only, but meets with the variety of general political preferences already 
existing during this early period [i.e., in late 1990 and early 1991].’70 The post-communist 
societies certainly appeared much less socio-politically structured than the Western 
democracies, but patterns of alliances were emerging on lines quite similar to the ones 
common in the West, particularly regarding the new programme parties.71 One may speak of 
a small, but clear and growing congruence between political differentiation and social 
interest differentiation.
However, the flat social structure and low level of socio-economic differentiation in 
Eastern and Central Europe meant that citizens’ party preferences to a large degree were 
determined by ‘cultural politics’ rather than by interests related to their individual positions 
in the social structure.72 It has indeed been argued that the political parties which operated in 
the period immediately following the transition may have articulated only theoretical 
interests of social groups that did not even exist at the time.73 Class certainly was a weak 
prognosticator of voting behaviour in all the founding elections, far behind age, education, 
union membership and, in particular, religion. For instance, in the 1989 Hungarian 
elections, class voting was negligible, and although it was slightly higher the next time 
around in March 1990, it was still very low compared to levels observed in Western 
countries. The single best indicator of social status in Hungary—and without doubt 
throughout post-communist Eastern Europe—is educational attainment.74
In all countries in the sample, self-identified members of the working class were in fact 
over-represented among the voters of Christian parties, but underrepresented among voters 
for left-wing parties, i.e. communists and socialists. Quite apart from the obvious paradox in 
this, one may note that the left-wing parties had a problem in not being able to rely on strong 
support among any particular social group. Recall surveys also show that an overwhelming 
majority of former members of the HSWP—i.e. the Hungarian communist party—preferred 
to vote for the opposition. Even of those who had been members as recently as in 1988 a 
larger proportion supported the Democratic Forum than the reformed communist party
70 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 12.
71 Klingemann (1994), 18.
72 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 12-17; the argument is followed in some detail below.
73 Cf. Szaniszkis (1991), 337.
74Cf. Toka (1995), 90.
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(the Socialists), and HSWP members who had handed in their cards before 1988 were 
approximately three times more likely to vote for some of the two liberal parties, the Free 
Democrats (AFD) and the Young Democrats (FIDESZ), than for the Socialist party.
Table 6.5: Recalled 1990 Vote in Hungary by Former Communist Party Membership 75
Never been 
member of 
HSWP
Has been 
member 
earlier
HSWP 
member in 
Oct. 1988 Row total
Hungarian Democratic Forum 27 15 21 26
Alliance of Free Democrats 16 27 15 17
Smallholders Party 9 6 6 8
Socialists 4 10 20 6
Young Democrats (FIDESZ) 7 6 8 7
Christian Democrats 6 4 1 5
Other parties 5 10 9 6
Non-voters 27 24 20 26
TOTAL 83 7 10 100
Throughout Central Europe, union members were more likely to vote for left-wing parties 
than the electorate in general, but Wessels and Klingemann argue that this conceivably is less 
an indication of class awareness than of the integration of union members into the 
communist-era socio-political system. Indeed, during the era of communist hegemony, union 
membership did not tend to be differentiated by class; membership ratios were comparable in 
all social strata as a result of the particular ‘transmission belt’ function that unions had in the 
state socialist systems.
Among other social characteristics for voting behaviour one may point to the lower than 
average support for the reformed communist parties among the young (under 29-year-old) 
voters, and the higher that average support for ecological parties among that group. Voters 
who identified themselves as believers voted for Christian parties to a high degree, and 
distinctly below average for the former communist parties. In conclusion:
Results indicate that there is not yet [at the time of surveys in late 1990 and early to 
mid 1991] an entirely clear relationship between social structure and vote, especially 
not with respect to class. And if a relationship exists, it does not always fulfil the 
expectations derived from Western experience. On the other hand, parties from the 
same party family do have some distinct profiles. The Communist parties gain above- 
average support among the older, higher educated, secularised and unionised workers; 
the Socialist parties from among non-religious voters, union members and non­
workers; the Ecological parties from the young, higher educated and secularised 
voters; the Liberal parties especially from the younger generations and non-religious 
voters; the Christian and religious parties from the older and religious voters; the 
farmers’ and nationalist parties from the less educated, religious voters and workers, 
and the ethnic parties from the non-workers, the more religious and less educated.76
75Tdka (1995b), 84; N (weighted)=877.
76 Wessels and Klingemann (1994), 15.
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Ethnic Fear and Loathing
The chapters above should have indicated that the communist authorities were no models of 
tolerance and multi-cultural liberalism; in fact, discrimination was rife and assimilation of 
minorities attempted at high cost. Did this then reflect popular attitudes? Hard and reliable 
survey data on the subject is hard to find, but as shown in this study, there are plenty of other 
indications that nationalism and xenophobia found a receptive audience. After the transition 
from communism, surveys were made on the subject, which may be seen as indicative also of 
previous attitudes. Table 6.6 summarises the findings on inter-ethnic attitudes charted by the 
Times Mirror East/West polls conducted in Eastern Europe in late 1990 and early 1991. 
Czechoslovakia was at the time of the survey still federation, but it is technically possible to 
separate respondents resident in the two halves of the country. It should be noted, however, 
that the number of missing observations is fairly high, ranging from about one third to more 
than half of the total sample.
Table 6.6: Percentage Viewing Ethnic Groups ‘Mostly’ or ‘Very Unfavourably’77
Poland Czech Lands Slovakia Hungary Germany
Gypsies 93 Gypsies 91 Gypsies 82 Gypsies 59
Jews 33 Jews 12 Jews 17 Jews 11 Jews 24
Germans 46 Germans 20 Germans 20 Germans 3
Czechs 6 Czechs 9
Slovaks 32 Slovaks 24 Slovaks 11
Poles 50
Hungarians 38 Hungarians 46 Romanian
Magyars 38
Romanians 28 Romanians 44
Ukrainians 42 Soviets 31
Byeloruss’ 19
Lithuanians 18
Arabs 60 Turks 46
Table 6.6 appears to indicate that some of the earlier groups have vanished from the top of the 
hate-lists. Throughout the region Jews and Germans appear fairly low in the ranking of 
negative feelings, well below Gypsies, Slavs from the former USSR and non-European 
nationalities. This would appear to reflect the changing ethnic composition of the countries 
in question. Yet sentiments towards ethnic groups are not necessarily dependent on personal 
experience. Attitudes towards Jews were indeed markedly more unfavourable in Poland than 
in Hungary, despite the fact that Hungarian Jewry is many times the size of the Polish one. In 
Czechoslovakia, attitudes towards Jews are about as favourable as in Hungary. Despite the 
particularly strong traditions of popular anti-Semitism in Slovakia, no statistically valid 
difference can be observed between the expressed level of anti-Jewish attitudes in Slovakia on 
the one hand and in the Czech lands on the other. The high number of non-respondents in all
77 Times Mirror Centre for the People & the Press East/West Poll; Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Data provided by courtesy of Prof. Russell Dalton, Politics and Society Dept., 
University of California, Irvine, CA. Figures for Germany: Barany (1992), 45 quoting The 
European ,27—30 September 1991.
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three countries, and particularly in both halves of Czechoslovakia, may indeed to indicate an 
indifference to Jews.78
As Tables 6.7 and 6.8 also indicate, the level of popular anti-Semitism in Central Europe 
is moderate to low in comparison both with negative attitudes towards some other ethnic 
groups, and with the level recorded in other European countries. Yet anti-Semitism exists— 
as illustrated by the fact that one fifth of Poles in 1994 thought Jews have too large an 
influence on the Polish economy, when Jewish ownership is in fact negligible.79
Attitudes towards Germans in Central Europe show a similar pattern, with a markedly 
higher level of anti-German sentiments expressed by Poles than by Czechs and Slovaks, and 
particularly in comparison with Hungarians. In this case, however, the reported attitudes do 
not necessarily, or even mainly, concern only the domestic ethnic German element, but rather 
Germans from abroad.
As regards Hungarians, Slovaks confess to an only slightly more negative attitude towards 
representatives of that ethnicity than Czechs, despite the fact that Czechoslovakia’s ethnic 
Magyar minority almost exclusively resided (and resides) in the Slovakian half of the 
federation. Almost as surprising, given the elite political discourse, is the fact that Hungarians 
in Hungary are more negatively predisposed to Magyars from Romania than to ethnic 
Romanians.
Czech-Slovak attitudes also present an interesting pattern. Attitudes towards ethnic 
Czechs were only marginally more unfavourable in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, and 
expressed feelings towards ethnic Slovaks only slightly more favourable in Slovakia than in 
the other half of the federation. The fact that 24 per cent of respondents in Slovakia were 
unfavourably disposed towards ethnic Slovaks cannot be accounted for strictly by resentments 
felt by Magyars, Czechs and other ethnic minority groups, as they simply do not add up to a 
quarter of the population; if the poll is valid and reliable, at least some ethnic Slovaks 
themselves appear to have had an unfavourable view of the traits of the Slovak ethnic identity. 
Remarkably, in Slovakia dislike of Slovaks appears to have been more widespread than dislike 
of German or Jews; this paradox obviously raises some questions about the reliability of these 
particular findings.
The ethnic group viewed by far most unfavourably is the Gypsies, about whom nine out of 
ten Czech and Slovak respondents, and eight out of ten Hungarian expressed negative 
attitudes. In the Czech lands and Slovakia, two thirds of respondents reported a ‘very 
unfavourable’ attitude towards Gypsies, and in Hungary almost every second. In all three 
cases, only one per cent or less of respondents reported a ‘very favourable’ attitude towards 
Gypsies—i.e. less than the proportion of the ethnic Gypsy component in each country’s 
population— and even those moderately favourable only numbered 5 to 11 per cent of the 
polled. The level of indifference towards the Gypsy ethnicity, as measured by the number of 
‘don’t know’-answers, was also extremely low, with only 3 to 6 per cent of respondents 
refusing or unable to state their attitude.
All in all, with the major exception of animosity towards Gypsies, inter-ethnic relations 
in Central Europe do not seem particularly inflamed. As one point of reference, surveys 
conducted in Germany show an equal or even higher level of resentment of ethnic groups 
deviating from the dominant nationality.
At least in the case of Poland, the findings of the Times/Mirror poll seem to be 
substantiated by the annual surveys conducted by the CBOS institute. The poll which is 
referred to below was conducted some three years later, in September 1994, and although it 
registers somewhat higher anti-Jewish and anti-Ukrainian sentiments, the findings by and
78 Percentage of non-respondents to Q: Feelings towards Jews-. Hungary, 20; Poland, 24; Slovakia, 
32; Czech lands, 35
79 Cf. Table 6.8.
The Politics of Transition 203
large correlate. Gypsies (on whom Poles were not polled by Times/Mirror) were regarded 
with the strongest dislike, and Russians and Serbs at the time also came high on the Poles’ 
hate list—the latter possibly as an effect of the war in the former Yugoslavia which climaxed 
at the time of the 1994 poll. Of the direct neighbours, Czechs and Slovaks were fairly well 
liked, while Lithuanians and Germans received less sympathy. Nevertheless, the CEOS’s 
pollsters note that Germany was the only nation for which Poles felt more affection in 1994 
than a year earlier, adding that although the war-time experience still has a significant 
influence on Poles’ attitudes towards the Western neighbour, ‘nearly two-third are of the 
opinion that war-time wrongdoing should be forgiven’.80
Table 6.7: Question in Poland: ‘How Would You Term Your Attitude Toward Other 
Nations?’81
Fondness Dislike Indifferent No answer
Americans 58 13 25 4
Italians 54 12 27 7
French 51 13 30 6
British 41 20 32 7
Hungarians 41 21 32 6
Swedes 40 17 33 10
Austrians 37 20 32 11
Slovaks 33 27 33 9
Czechs 30 32 33 5
Germans 26 45 26 3
Lithuanians 22 43 27 8
Byelorussians 17 49 25 9
Israelis 17 47 27 9
Bulgarians 16 43 31 10
Russians 16 59 22 3
Serbs 12 51 21 3
Ukrainians 9 66 20 5
Romanians 8 68 17 7
Gypsies 6 75 16 3
80 CBOS Polish Public Opinion, October 1994.
81 CBOS Polish Public Opinion, October 1994. From ‘Stosunek do innych narodow’, ‘Przeszlosc 
i terazniejszosc w kontaktach polsko-niemieckich’. CBOS, September 1994. Random address 
sample of Polish society. N=1219.
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Table 6.8: Question in Poland: 7s the Influence of Representatives of the Following 
Nationalities on the Polish Economy Too Great or Conversely Too Small?’82
They have Neither
no influence too small Difficult
at all Too small nor large Too large to say
Japanese 11 46 23 4 26
French 7 32 31 3 27
Americans 2 31 27 21 19
British 10 28 33 3 26
Germans 1 23 32 25 19
Chinese 25 20 22 1 32
Russians 17 18 28 15 22
Jews 16 15 20 20 29
Notably, the stereotype of Germany as a nation attempting to dominate Poland appears to be 
alive and well in many quarters of the Polish public, although German investment in Poland 
at the time was not particularly plentiful. Most welcome in Poland was Japanese, French, 
British and American capital. Reactions to American influence on the economy bear out a 
certain ambivalence: it is regarded both as too small and too large. The causes behind this 
state of affairs seems to be three-fold: Americans are generally well liked by Poles, the 
presence of American capital generates mixed feelings, and Poles remain ‘hypersensitive to 
anything that may appear as the overbearing influence of a superpower’.83
Party Sympathies and Inter-Ethnic Attitudes
Table 6.9 gives the percentage of supporters of a sample of political parties who express a 
mostly or very unfavourable predisposition to the ethnic groups mentioned in the 
questionnaire. The level of support for the various political parties is at odds with their 
showing in the founding elections; this is simply due to the fact that respondents’ party 
sympathies are not measured against their actual voting behaviour, but through a ‘Sunday 
Question’, i.e. asking them which party the polled would cast their vote for if elections were 
held the following weekend.
The samples, though small to moderate in size, cannot verify the hypothesis that 
xenophobic voters cluster around right-wing parties, although they appear to do so to some 
extent. Supporters of the Slovak National Party were more negatively predisposed than the 
average towards Jews and Germans, and particularly against Hungarians (57 per cent as 
against 46 per cent for the whole sample; this is not included in Table 6.9). In Hungary, the 
Smallholders Party appears to have attracted the highest proportion of supporters with 
negative views of other ethnic groups. The supporters of regionalist and ethnic parties, i.e. the 
Movement for Moravia and the two Hungarian parties in Slovakia, did, however, not express 
significantly more xenophobic views than average. Similarly, supporters of Polish Catholic- 
and nationalist-oriented parties do not appear have been more xenophobic than the sample on 
average.
82 CBOS Polish Public Opinion, October 1994. From ‘Stosunek do innych narodow’, ‘Przeszlosc 
i terazniejszosc w kontaktach polsko-niemieckich’. CBOS, September 1994. Random address 
sample of Polish society. N=1219.
83 CBOS Polish Public Opinion, October 1994.
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The most interesting finding, however, is that the reformed communist parties emerge as 
veritable hotbeds of xenophobia. The supporters of the former ruling parties tended to have 
stronger than average negative feelings about other nationalities: Czechs about Slovaks, 
Slovaks about Hungarians, Poles about Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. This 
punctures the myth of the communist parties’ ability to reinforce socialist internationalism 
and pan-Slavic feelings among their core supporters. But in particular they attracted support 
from citizens holding anti-Semitic and anti-German views. Czech supporters of the reformed 
communist party were three times as likely to be negatively predisposed towards Jews and 
Germans as the population at large, and supporters of that party’s Slovak sister organisation, 
the Party of the Democratic Left, about twice as likely. In Poland, too, supporters of the 
communist party’s main successor party and of its former ally, the Peasants Party, were 
approximately twice as likely to be negatively predisposed towards Jews and Germans as the 
sample average.
Table 6.9: Percentage of Party Supporters Mostly or Very Unfavourably Predisposed 
Towards: 84
Poland
Jews
33
Germans
46
Gypsies Slovaks Czechs N =
Social Dem Party 42 58 43
Peasants Party 49 50 40
Christian Nat Union 25 50 4
Confed Indep Poland 33 58 12
Party X 50 45 44
Czech lands 12 20 91 32 6
Civic Dem Party 8 14 92 38 3 91
Civic Movement 8 19 94 27 3 36
Civic Dem Alliance 0 6 100 24 6 17
Communist Party 37 58 89 32 16 19
Movem for Ind Moravia 14 14 92 37 4 51
Republicans 12 21 92 33 17 24
Slovakia 19 20 91 24 9
Public Against Viol 9 15 91 22 2 45
Christian Dem Movem 12 15 91 31 4 112
Slovak National Party 23 28 91 18 10 79
Party of Dem Left 44 47 87 19 16 32
Hungarian Movement 14 12 90 36 3 58
Hungarian Chr Dem 4 4 89 14 0 28
Hungary 11 3 82 11
Socialist Party 0 3 86 11 36
Smallholders 14 9 79 18 34
Christian Democrats 8 12 79 29 24
HDF 20 2 84 14 80
‘Don’t Know’-answers included in percentages; non-respondents excluded
84 Times Mirror Centre for the People & the Press East/West Poll; Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Data provided by courtesy of Prof. Russell Dalton, Politics and Society Dept., Univer­
sity of California, Irvine, CA. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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This is remarkable, but should come as no surprise given the traditions of xenophobia within 
the former ruling parties that have been amply exemplified in the previous chapters. The 
findings indicate that their long-running anti-Jewish and anti-German posturing indeed had 
strengthened their bases of core support, and that they were widely perceived as trustworthy 
guardians of national values and interests during and after the transition. The foci of 
communist supporter xenophobia also indicates that it is determined by historical factors 
rather than by personal experiences. To put it briefly: communist sympathisers were in the 
early 1990’s still fighting the communal conflicts of the 30’s, 40’s and early 50’s. As noted 
earlier, at the time of the polls—i.e. 1990 and 1991—the vote for the successor parties still 
overwhelmingly came from functionaries of the former ruling regime and from social 
groups threatened by economic and political reform. It logically follows that xenophobic 
attitudes should have widespread within the former nomenklatura and bureaucracy before 
the transition.
The Socialist Party in Hungary was, however, an exception. Its supporters were in fact 
less negatively predisposed than average towards ethnic minorities and foreigners. One can 
only speculate to the reasons for this deviance: the long-running reform inclination and 
strong dominance of liberals within the post-transition party—as the hard-liners of the 
former ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers Party had withdrawn into an own fringe 
formation—may play a role.
The Conservative Issues
Based on the previous exposition, one would expect a relatively clear left-right, or 
conservative-liberal cleavage to emerge in the orientation towards questions of family and 
personal morals. Table 6.10 tracks the attitudes of supporters of a number of parties towards 
a related indicator: pornography; Table 6.11 of another: abortion
Table 6.10: Statement: ‘Nude magazines and sexually explicit movies provide harmless 
entertainment for those who enjoy it\ % 85
Completely Mostly Mostly Completely Don’t
Poland agree agree disagree disagree Know
TOTAL 35.7 41.7 12.7 5.0 4.8
Democratic Union 36 50 5 6 4
Agreement of Centre 33 36 15 10 5
Lib-DemCongress (UPR) 29 48 17 2 4
NSZZ Solidarity 32 46 16 5 2
Social Democratic Party 44 42 7 5 2
Christian-National Union 75 25
Peasants Party 18 50 18 5 10
Peasants Solidarity 15 62 15 4 4
' NSZZ Private Farmer 23 37 30 7 3
Party X 61 23 14 2
Confed Ind’t Poland 58 25 8 8
85 Times Mirror Centre for the People & the Press East/West Poll; Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Data provided by courtesy of Prof. Russell Dalton, Politics and Society Dept., Univer­
sity of California, Irvine, CA. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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Czechoslovakia Completely Mostly Mostly Completely Don’t
Czech lands agree agree disagree disagree Know
TOTAL 33.1 42.0 12.3 6.3 6.3
Civic Democratic Party 44 41 5 4 5
Civic Movement 50 28 6 6 11
Civic Democratic Alliance 41 53 6
Communist Party 26 58 5 5 5
People’s Party 8 33 30 8 19
Cz-Sl Social Democracy 37 37 7 16 2
Mov’t Indep Moravia 16 55 22 6 2
Green Party 30 44 15 7 4
Cz-Sl Socialist Party 38 38 15 8
Republican Party 46 50 4
Czechoslovakia Completely Mostly Mostly Completely Don’t
Slovakia agree agree disagree disagree Know
TOTAL 33.3 41.9 13.4 5.5 5.9
Christian Dem’c Movement 38 38 13 5 6
Public Against Violence 51 24 7 4 13
VPN-Democratic Slovakia 35 49 12 3 3
Party of Democratic Left 28 53 9 6 3
Democratic Party 17 32 28 6 17
Slovak National Party 39 37 10 13 1
Hungarian Movement 17 55 19 5 3
Hungarian Chr Democr 29 46 14 7 4
Agrarian Party 35 47 23 12
Green Party 44 53 3
Completely Mostly Mostly Completely Don’t
Hungary agree agree disagree disagree Know
TOTAL 29.7 35.3 13.5 15.1 6.4
Hung. Democratic Forum 28 27 17 22 5
Christian Democrats 8 25 21 38 8
Smallholders 32 26 3 32 6
Free Democrats 37 38 17 8
Young Democrats 33 43 10 8 5
Socialist Party 36 33 14 17
Attitudes towards pornography and adult-oriented movies should serve as a useful indicator 
of overall libertarian attitudes. The communist authorities were by and large strongly 
opposed to sexually explicit material, which they branded as products of Western decadence. 
This fact, i.e. the identification of anti-pornography measures with the communist political 
system, indeed seems to account for the relatively relaxed attitudes recorded towards nude 
magazines and blue movies. In all three Central European countries, approximately two 
thirds of the polled were prepared to tolerate the circulation of this type of material.
Among the three polled countries, Hungarians expressed the most negative attitudes 
towards the sexually explicit; about 15 per cent of the respondents were totally opposed to it, 
as compared with about 5 per cent in Poland, the Czech lands and Slovakia. This does not,
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however, necessarily indicate a fundamental difference in the levels of libertarianism. 
Hungarians were at the time much more used to nudity in the media than Poles or 
Czechoslovaks. Later opinion polls indeed indicate that the attitude in the three latter 
countries has become more critical.
Attitudes towards pornography appear to correlate fairly strongly with party-political 
preferences. Supporters of the two liberal parties in Hungary, the Free Democrats and the 
Young Democrats, were overwhelmingly in favour of free access to nudity, while supporters 
of the conservative side of the political spectrum were almost as critical. The anti­
pornography stance was particularly strong among supporters of the Christian Democrats. 
Among supporters of the Smallholders Party, a hard-core moral minority of about one third 
is poised against a clear majority of relative libertarians. Table 6.10 thus appears to support 
the argument that the Hungarian party system was more clearly structured along Western­
type ideological lines than were the Polish, Czech and Slovak ones.
In Poland and Czechoslovakia one can identify a tendency among supporters of agrarian 
parties to be less tolerant than the average of sexually explicit material. In the Czech lands, 
moralists tended to be attracted by the People’s Party; in Slovakia, by the Democratic Party. 
In the Czech lands, the three successor parties to the Civic Forum (the Civic Democratic 
Party, the Civic Movement, and the Civic Democratic Alliance), all appear to have attracted 
libertarian voters. But whereas supporters of the communist party’s main successor party in 
Hungary were less tolerant of pornography than the national average, quite the opposite was 
true for Poland and Czechoslovakia. And in those two countries, supporters of what may be 
considered pure right-wing parties—such as the Czechoslovak Republicans, the Slovak 
National Party or Poland’s Christian National Union, Party X or the Confederation for an 
Independent Poland—also express remarkably tolerant attitudes.
Abortion rights is another explosive issue, which in the Western context tends to correlate 
strongly with party-political preferences, general ideological orientation, and religious 
activity. In Central Europe, however, the cleavage is less clear-cut, as Table 6.11 indicates.
Table 6.11: Statement: ‘A woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the early months of 
pregnancy if she wants one\ % 86
Poland
Completely 
agree
Mostly 
agree
Mostly 
disagree
Completely 
disagree
Don’t
Know
TOTAL 40.9 27.7 15.8 10.2 53
Democratic Union 49 29 12 6 5
Agreement of Centre 36 31 15 10 8
Lib-Dem Congress (UPR) 37 31 27 4 2
NSZZ Solidarity 44 23 18 12 3
Social Democratic Party 53 23 12 5 7
Christan National Union 25 25 25 25
Peasants Party 30 38 8 15 10
Peasants Solidarity 31 31 11 11 15
NSZZ Private Farmer 13 30 13 30 13
Party X 52 31 27 4 2
Confederation Ind’t Poland 58 8 33
86 Times Mirror Centre for the People & the Press East/West Poll; Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Data provided by courtesy of Prof. Russell Dalton, Politics and Society Dept., Univer­
sity of California, Irvine, CA. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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Czechoslovakia
Czech lands
Completely 
agree
Mostly 
agree
Mostly 
disagree
Completely 
disagree
Don’t
Know
TOTAL 63.8 18.7 8.1 7.6 1.7
Civic Democratic Party 69 18 7 5 1
Civic Movement 69 14 6 8 2
Civic Democratic Alliance 67 27 7
Communist Party 72 11 17
People’s Party 31 14 26 23 6
Cz-Sl Social Democracy 81 14 6
Movement Ind’t Moravia 61 18 8 14
Green Party 63 26 11
Cz-Sl Socialist Party 69 8 15 8
Republican Party 52 26 4 9 9
Czechoslovakia Completely Mostly Mostly Completely Don’t
Slovakia agree agree disagree disagree Know
TOTAL 54.6 24.7 8.0 52 7.5
Chr Democratic Movement 29 24 10 24 14
Public Against Violence 22 22 33 22
VPN-Democratic Slovakia 65 24 5 2 5
Party of Democratic Left 64 21 14
Democratic Party 75 25
Slovak National Party 56 18 18 74
Hungarian Movement 57 43
Hungarian Chr Democracy 100
Agrarian Party 25 25 25 25
Green Party 56 22 22
Completely Mostly Mostly Completely Don’t
Hungary agree agree disagree disagree Know
TOTAL 53.6 27.5 7.3 8.6 3.0
Hung. Democratic Forum 46 31 7 12 4
Christian Democrats 33 37 12 12 4
Smallholders 35 14 12 32 6
Free Democrats 61 31 4 4
Young Democrats 60 27 4 6 2
Socialist Party 69 17 9 6
After the Soviet Union liberalised its abortion legislation in late 1955, abortion became 
freely available on demand throughout Central and Eastern Europe, to the extent that it was 
routinely used an alternative to contraceptives. Without doubt the liberal official attitude to 
abortion was widely appreciated, but at the same time it was the focus of strong criticism 
from many quarters, particularly the Catholic and other churches. Abortion rates—legal 
abortions and admissions to hospital of women after spontaneous or illegally induced 
terminations of pregnancy—were certainly very high: in 1975-79, 218 per 1,000 live births 
in Poland, 314 in Czechoslovakia, and 501 in Hungary (although 1,221 in 1969-73 when 
abortions were wholly unrestricted). Particularly the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
experienced very low birth rates (in the case of the GDR, well below the natural reproduction
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rate), and by the 1960’s it had become policy to counteract liberal abortion legislation with 
material incentives to encourage births.87 Romania banned abortion altogether in 1966, 
resulting in the doubling of birth rates overnight. Before the ban, Romania had the highest 
abortion rate in the world—more than four per live birth—and the birth rate had dropped 
below the point needed to sustain a growing labour force. This was the main concern 
underlying the ban, but the Ceausescu family’s puritanical streak and romantication of the 
Romanian nation also played in. By the 1980’s, however, birth rates had crept back to the 
level of the early 1960’s due to an increase in the number of illegal abortions.88
Popular attitudes immediately after the transition showed overwhelming support for the 
retention of liberal abortion legislation: two thirds of Polish and eight out of ten Hungarian 
respondents expressed as their opinion that abortion should remain available to women on 
demand. Yet from the very outset of pluralist politics, abortion became a major point of 
contention. In many respects, the cleavage was similar to the one concerning nudity in the 
media: a grouping of libertarian parties poised against Christian and agrarian parties. 
Adherents of the successor parties of the former ruling parties stood on the libertarian side on 
the issue of abortion right.
Poland, with its strong Catholic heritage and politically interventionist Church, is 
particularly interesting in this respect. In the early 1990’s, as many as 800,000 abortions were 
performed yearly in Poland, one of the highest rates in Europe. This was despite an unofficial, 
and then illegal, ban on abortions which Polish doctors introduced in 1989.89 Although 
public support was strong for the existing liberal abortion legislation, in 1993 the 
government drastically tightened the rules so as to allow abortion only when pregnancy was 
the result of incest or rape, or when the woman’s life was in danger. President Lech Walesa 
personally endorsed the new legislation, and pledged to veto any attempt to repeal it while he 
was in office. The government also discouraged the use of contraceptives, and critics of the 
new abortion legislation even argue that many women who are entitled to abortion under the 
tighter rules are nevertheless turned away from public hospitals. A result is that the 
authorities have recorded a ten-fold increase in the number of infanticides from 1992 to 
1995.90
The abortion issue in Poland seems to demonstrate not so much a cleavage between 
different political parties as of one between the political elite and the public. There is no 
doubt that the tightening of Polish abortion legislation resulted from pressure from the 
Catholic Church leadership rather than from broad public demand. The government has 
explained its opposition to abortion by reference to morality and religious ethics, but also 
implicitly by eugenics: conservative and nationalist political forces warn that low birth rates 
threaten their pet nationality with being swamped by other, more reproductive ethnic 
groups.
The Closing Circle
In Chapters 2 and 3, the argument was made that 1920’s and 1930’s fascism in many ways 
came from the left; the radicalisation of conservatism combined the ideas of the traditionalist 
backlash against the Enlightenment and social modernisation with the methods of 
revolutionary socialism. Above, we have pointed to the reverse connection: when communists 
came to power, they tended to ally with and exploit right-wing radicalism, building strong
^Stokes (1993), 272-273.
88 Stokes (1993), 57-58.
89 Hockenos (1993), 242.
90 BBC World Service, News hour, 18 July 1995, 19 hrs GMT.
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state powers, frequently fanning nationalism and xenophobia from above. Despite the strong 
disclaimers from both political extremes, there is such a thing as a ‘Radical Affinity’: 20th 
century political radicals on right and left have been united by their idea of a dictatorship 
supposedly representing a transcendent mass entity, as against the idea of individuals with 
rights within a civic order.91 Migration between the camps occurred on a large scale; in the 
late 40’s many of the generic radicals who earlier had been drawn to rightist-radical and 
proto-fascist formations rallied behind the communists. They were by and large welcomed as 
they had genuine radical credentials, albeit of the wrong hue.
As had been the case in Russia soon after the 1917 Bolshevik coup, the Marxist-Leninist 
state ideology was thoroughly transformed by the influx of an upwardly-mobile element of 
core supporters who lacked a training in communist theory. Some certainly had a 
background in pre-war reformist socialist movements; many of them later became disaffected 
and eventually provided the basis of the liberal-minded intra-party opposition. Those who 
had a background in the pre-war radical right, however, tended to gravitate to the parties’ 
hard line groupings, which through this process were increasingly identified with attempts to 
merge Real Existing Socialism with the pre-communist legacy of etatism, paternalism, 
authoritarianism and nationalism. Socio-economic developments supported this 
development until at least the late 1960’s. During the early years of communist rule, the 
process of secularisation that had started in Central Europe was also halted and even reversed. 
The communist parties exhorted an increasingly anachronistic class war strategy, which 
provided religion and the national heritage with an attractiveness and legitimacy it had 
already begun to lose.
This process continued until the socio-economic modernisation project of the communist 
rulers started to take effect, but then the result was not necessarily increased popular support 
for the dictatorship of the proletariat but rather the development of civil society and demands 
for individual freedoms, pluralism and a consumerist society. In Poland, increased 
autonomous organisation even led to increased influence for the Catholic Church, which due 
to its non-subjugation by the communists in the 1940’ and 1950’s was in place to provide a 
venue for sub-system structuring. At the same time the communist parties or factions thereof 
chose to start advocating a backlash against state socialisms’ own modernising 
accomplishments. Chauvino-communism emerged as the manifestation of the attempt to 
channel residual support for etatism and authoritarianism towards the ruling structures. This 
line of reasoning had two particularly tempting features for the ruling elites: not only did the 
invocations of nationalism and xenophobia find receptive audiences among the population 
segments who wanted to continue fighting the communal and class wars of the pre-war 
period, but the content of chauvino-communism itself legitimised repression on a large scale 
and thus bolstered eroding party authority.
It should, however, be noted that chauvino-communism was not the dominant current in 
the Central European context: only in times of extreme economic and legitimacy crisis did it 
get an upper hand, and even then not for long. This constitutes a clear cleavage with the 
Balkan countries, particularly Romania and Albania. The main strategy of the ruling regimes 
in Central Europe was to bolster popular support through economic growth and an 
increased standard of living. This technocratic orientation was the strongest and most 
consistent in Hungary, but was also intermittently tried out in Poland. Even in 
Czechoslovakia, regime strategy during the two decades of ‘normalisation’ after the 1968 
events combined repression with attempts at providing a stable incomes and a net of social 
security. In all three cases the communists failed, if not in absolute terms then at least in 
comparison with the capitalist market economies in the West.
91 Conquest (1994).
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The ideals of individual freedom voiced by the anti-systemic opposition were powerful, 
but it is hard to envisage that they would have enjoyed the mass appeal they did in the late 
1980’s had it not been for the deepening economic crises in the state socialist economies—or 
at least the perception of such. Not least had the intense politicisation of society resulted in the 
discrediting of politics as such, while socialisation had obscured all real societal antagonisms 
and allowed almost no voluntary association.
During the final days of communism, proto-party formation thus had to take place in an 
environment largely untouched by four decades of social, political and ideological 
developments in the outside world. The post-communist intellectual elites were certainly 
strongly influenced by classical liberalism or neo-liberalism, but popular anti-communism 
was mainly spelled out in terms of residual pre- or proto-modern belief systems. This is 
shown by the relatively strong showings of agrarian, Christian fundamentalist and 
traditionalist conservative parties in all Central European countries save the Czech republic. 
These parties have been widely critical of the materialist West, instead harking back to the 
1930’s idolisation of community, nationhood and religion. With their stress on 
egalitarianism and a strong role for the state, they in fact present a strong leftist streak, while 
their affirmation of community and national particularism is conservative in a truly 
traditionalist sense. They are certainly strongly influenced by the particular experience of the 
era of communist dominance, which they claim to abhor so deeply.
Nevertheless, it need be pointed out again that the surveys cited above do not give support 
to the assumption that voters in Central Europe, at least in 1990-91, on average were 
particularly xenophobic or interventionist in their attitudes. On the contrary, tolerance 
appears to have been more or less on par with levels recorded in the parliamentary 
democracies in the West. At least in Poland and Hungary, this was true even for supporters of 
socio-cultural parties which according to Western usage may be classified as being 
traditional-conservative or even radically rightist.
This brings up another important observation, that supporters of archaic and pre-modern 
views on nation, state and society tended to cluster also around the successor parties of the 
former ruling parties, whose adherents expressed much more nationalist, xenophobic and 
interventionist views than the average. Even if the Central European reformed or non­
reformed communist parties were not particularly successful in the first free elections, they 
managed to attract the support not only of members of communist-era apparat, but also to a 
large extent of old-age pensioners and other individuals and groups who felt threatened by 
the prospect of economic and political reform. The structure of these parties’ electorate, as 
indicated by the survey-type data presented above, reinforces the impression that central 
European voters saw the former ruling parties as—if one may use that terminology—forces 
of reaction. It is hard to escape the conclusion that they at the time were widely discerned as 
guardians of tradition (protecting not only the accomplishments of more than 40 years of 
state socialism, but the entire national heritage against the perceived danger posed by Western 
consumerism and individualism), rather than as vehicles for the implementation of social 
change and modernisation. In Slovakia, the first of the Central European countries where 
formations emanating from the communist-era elite returned to power, they did so under 
explicitly nationalist, interventionist, etatist and crypto-socialist banners.
During the immediate post-transition period, one could some identify Sartorian factors 
at work in the differentiation between moderate and extreme pluralism in the various 
Central European countries.92 In Czechoslovakia and Poland, the timing of the franchise and 
of proportional representation, as well as the low degree of political organisation, 
encouraged a large number of political entrepreneurs to flood the market. In Hungary on
^Sartori (1966) and (1976), Cf. Chapter 2 above.
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the other hand, not only the threshold rule but also the longer period of relatively 
unobstructed proto-party formation dampened multi-partism.
As regards the other two factors which Sartori has identified as influencing the level of 
pluralism—i.e. the number of cleavages and the structure of cleavages—it is, however, 
difficult to point to clear differences between the three Central European countries. All were 
characterised by low social complexity and differentiation, which inhibited interest-oriented 
politics and the formation of political parties which represented existing, as opposed to 
imagined, social group interests. By necessity, meant that cultural politics played a strong role 
in the immediate post-communist years.
By early 1996, the Czech Republic was the only one of the four Central European 
countries where the former communists had not managed to stage a comeback on the 
national political scene. That country was also the only one where post-transition politics for 
years to come remained dominated by programme parties, not socio-cultural formations. 
Particularly when contrasting the two halves of the former Czechoslovak federation, this 
appears to attest to the importance of political culture. Czechs could relate to the pre-war and 
even pre-independence traditions of tolerance, parliamentarism and interest politics, whereas 
Slovak society, with its highly disparate historical experience, turned to communalism, 
separatism and etatism. In terms of socio-political traditions, Poland and Hungary are 
positioned between these two extremes, which is indeed consistent with their relative level of 
socio-economical development at the time of the communist take-over.

Concluding Remarks
For perverse unreason
has its own logical processes
—Joseph Conrad
The main hypothesis underlying this study has been one of a "grand continuity’: that 
conservative and right-radical attitudes have influenced, even permeated Central European 
societies and political parties at least since the outset of independence in 1918, through the era 
of communist hegemony to the introduction of competitive political pluralism in the early 
1990’s.
This conjecture has prompted us to investigate the character of the 20th century Central 
and Eastern European right wing, and the nature of Real Existing Socialism in the so-called 
Soviet Bloc. We have probed for the roots of post-communist right-radicalism not only in the 
inter-war fascist and semi-fascist formations, but also—and particularly—in the post-war 
communist regimes and their attitudes towards the national and religious heritage. In short, 
we have conceptualised the right-wing political culture and tradition so as to include 
elements of the communist-era nomenklatura, and made the argument for a sort of 
augmented continuity in socio-political structures. The approach has in many respects been 
similar to the one applied by many modern students of Russian nationalism and right­
radicalism, who have identified the embryo of the right-radical revival in the nationalist 
undercurrents within the formerly ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
In 1989-90, competitive politics replaced the dominance of the communist parties. The 
former ruling parties were thrown into disarray or even altogether banned from operating. 
The forces that initially stepped in to replace them were broad-based popular fronts, united 
by the common aim of fighting communism. Yet soon after that was accomplished, the 
centrifugal tendencies reasserted themselves and the heterogeneous fronts soon disintegrated 
into a great multitude of parties and factions.
The previous chapter examined politics in Poland, the Czech lands, Slovakia, and 
Hungary at and onwards from the time of the founding elections. Although several exponents 
of more or less extreme right-wing thought were identified, radical-right ideologies were 
found to be relatively weakly articulated and generally lacking natural socio-structural 
constituencies.
The main exceptions were the nationalist parties in Slovakia, which have been able to 
exploit the very tangible and profitable issue of separatism and secession, and later have taken 
a tough stance on the relationship with Hungary and the rights of the country’s substantial 
ethnic Magyar community. Some parties have chosen to openly identify themselves with the 
Slovak nationalist parties of the inter-war era, even with the war-time clericalist, Nazi-puppet 
government of Slovakia. At the same time, the leadership and the activists of the largest 
separatist party is to a significant extent drawn from the ranks of the communist-era 
nomenklatura party and bureaucracy elite.
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The First Czechoslovak Republic has been interpreted in a very different fashion by the 
main post-communist parties in the Czech lands: Bohemian and Moravian national feeling is 
associated with a perceived legacy of tolerance, moderation and liberalism. We have 
identified variations in the levels of state- and nation-building as the dominant explanation 
for this Czech-Slovak cleavage.
In Poland and Hungary, too, parties attempting to connect directly to pre-communist 
right-radical predecessors have fared poorly, with the qualified exception of agrarian and 
denominational-clericalist parties.
A number of truly extreme right-wing parties had emerged throughout the region by the 
founding elections in 1989-91, but support for them among the broad public was marginal. 
The survey data analysed lends credence to the view that the social demand for distinctly 
right-radical parties was limited at the time; not least because many issues typically brought to 
the forefront by parties on the extreme right were also on the agenda of other parties. 
Particularly illustrative is the extent to which voters with stronger than average negative 
feelings about other ethnic groups clustered around the communist parties and their 
successors: this lends additional support to the hypothesis that the former ruling parties enjoy 
convincing nationalist credentials. The only major political issues which right-radicals 
managed to exploit to any larger extent have been immigration and communal tension, but as 
equally restrictive and semi-xenophobic attitudes have been expressed by more mainstream 
parties, this was not translated into stable voter support or organisational growth.
All in all, the analysis of party programmes and election campaigns in the immediate post­
communist era has led us to conclude that the Central European right wing is traditionalist 
rather than radical. With the exception of the Czech lands, where the right after 1989 has 
been dominated by Hayekian free-market neo-liberals, Central European conservatism has 
not undergone a modernisation of the even remotely of the magnitude seen in the West since 
the 1940’s. As Western European conservatism has been transformed into a force for 
individual initiative, free markets and the limitation of state powers, the Central and Eastern 
European variety remains overwhelmingly etatist, collectivist, hierarchical, paternalist and 
authoritarian.
We have pointed out that many of these traits were also high on the agendas of the ruling 
communist parties. Indeed, the communist elite was at least as authoritarian in its attitudes as 
the former ruling strata, and it too understood the role of the state in a bureaucratic manner 
without direct reference to society. There is no doubt that there is an abundance of bearers of 
the radical right among former leaders and supporters of the communist and communist- 
affiliated parties. Given the similar development in other Eastern European countries, in 
Russia, and in break-away republics of the former Soviet Union, one cannot escape the 
impression of a continuity from early 19th-century right-wing radicalism, through 
communism, to post-communist etatist and xenophobic authoritarianism.
* * *
Extensive attention has been devoted in this book to the 1944-49 period, the formative years 
of communist rule in Central Europe. The ultimate success of the communists in their quest 
for power has been attributed to several factors, of which Soviet intervention has been 
identified as decisive. Without the presence of the Red Army and the NKVD/GPU/KGB in 
Warsaw, Prague and Budapest, it is highly unlikely that the communists would have 
triumphed to the extent they did; far stronger communist parties in countries outside the 
Soviet orbit certainly failed to take power. Apart from Soviet-condoned and Soviet-assisted 
harassment of their political opponents, the communists also managed to take advantage of
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the opportunities for patronage created by the dramatic resettlement and redistribution 
programmes implemented after 1945.
Yet we have also pointed internal, structural and tactical factors operating to the 
advantage of the communists, above all the radicalisation of the masses and the communists’ 
successful appeals to ‘generic radicals’. The shattering defeat of the old order during the 
Second World War led to a widespread turn to the left by people seeking a radical change 
from what had failed during Europe’s hour of need, and the upheavals of the war had created 
disillusionment, fatigue and a craving for a fundamental reorganisation of society which 
benefited all radical ideologies, including communism. The crowds which rallied to the 
communist platform thus included not only leftists disillusioned with moderate socialism, 
but radicals of all shapes and forms.
The communist strategy was also to turn, recruit and enrol all but the most discredited 
and stigmatised supporters of pre- and inter-war right-radical movements, as well as lower- 
echelon administrators of earlier right-oriented authoritarian regimes.
Some joined the communist ranks out of ideological conviction. During the war—that 
great clash of ideologies—communism had proven to be a more viable movement than 
fascism in its many local varieties. Although communist leaders went to great lengths to 
portray communism as the very antithesis and mortal enemy of fascism, we have shown how 
left- and right-wing radicalism are in many respects ideological siblings, plebeian movements 
sprung out of the cross-pressures of social modernisation and extolling the same modes of 
political action. The post-war mobility from right to left had indeed been preceded by a 
movement in the reverse direction during the 1920’s and 1930’s, when a many a European 
fascist leader and ideologue was a defector from the socialist camp.
The communist parties were rather open-minded and forgiving of individuals whose 
radicalism had been of the wrong hue but of the right stuff. The courting of the right also had 
practical reasons. Communist hegemony could hardly be maintained, utopian communist 
programmes be implemented, nor the governments retain power for long without building 
and keeping at least some degree of public support—even if they could rely on a powerful 
machinery of draconian repression and the backing of the seemingly omnipotent Soviet 
Union. In order to strengthen popular support, the communists stressed issues that had also 
been pivotal to the 1930’s radical-right and agrarian populism: land reform and social 
justice, a strong state and state intervention, critique of ‘cosmopolitan’ finance capitalism. 
The territorial revisions, confiscations and expulsions had also raised widespread public fears 
of revanchism—particularly German—and the communists made every effort to exploit 
these anxieties. As one slogan used by the Polish communists said: ‘socialism is the guarantee 
of our borders’; this intended to convey the message that Poland had to put up with the 
alliance with the Soviet Union—and with the communists—as a lesser evil than a revival of 
German hegemony. Throughout Eastern and Central Europe, it did not take long for the 
communist parties, or at least factions within them, to find it convenient or even necessary to 
exploit and adopt the residual political legacy.
The paradigmatic explanation of the communist take-over in Central Europe remains 
Seton-Watson’s theory of a gradual evolution from genuine coalitions to facade coalitions 
and ultimately to total communist control. We have accepted it, but only with the reservation 
that the evolutionary theory is more a description of events than of intentions. It has not been 
sufficiently proven that there indeed existed a Soviet blueprint for Eastern Europe, at least not 
before 1947. Moreover, the schedules of the communist take-over in the various countries 
were different, largely determined by Soviet strategic interests and, albeit sometimes 
vacillating, expansionist ambitions.
This brings us to a further observation of a somewhat paradoxical nature. During the 
immediate post-war period—1944 to late 1946—the Soviet leadership treated Poland and
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the Polish communists with a harshness, arrogance and disdain incomparable to anything 
seen outside the borders of the Soviet Union. The need to secure lines of communication to 
Germany was one motive, but one cannot escape the conclusion that historical Russian 
aspirations played an important, even crucial role. Moscow’s annexationist policies along the 
fault-line between the Baltic and Black Seas can hardly be explained without taking into 
account territorial revisionism—particularly if one accepts the claim that Moscow then 
intended to build a bloc of socialist states and thus could count Eastern Poland as safe for 
socialism in any case.
So strong was the Soviet grip on Poland until 1953 that one may indeed view it as 
virtually a Soviet colony. And here comes the paradox: this totally subjugated country was, in 
the final analysis, the one which provided the most of political pluralism during the phase of 
communist rule. In fact, Poland developed into the major problem for the Soviets as soon as 
they loosened their grip. The Hungarian rebellion of 1956 was a direct result of Polish 
attempts at building a Yugoslav-inspired ‘socialism with a national flavour’, and by the mid- 
1960’s Poland had emerged onto the path of diminishing communist party authority and 
emerging autonomous social organisation. As the economy veered from crisis to crisis, the 
communist party was immobilised by increasing internal conflicts between relative 
liberalisers and hard-liners. Increasingly distinctive of the hard-line faction was its appeals to 
national pride and its attempts at presenting itself as the keeper of a national tradition going 
back to the rebellions of the 19th century and the inter-war Endecja philosophy. It mixed 
overt anti-Semitism and anti-German slogans with prudish Russophobia. Chauvino- 
communism also figured in Hungary and, of course, eventually became dominant in all 
Balkans countries. Its content obviously varied, but the significance of chauvino-communism 
was that it no longer sought the foundation and legitimation of communist power in the iron 
laws of materialist theory, but in populist nationalism and strong-man authoritarianism.
* * *
The communists’ gradual adoption of many central tenets of their right-wing opponents did, 
to some extent, incapacitate the scope for autonomous anti-systemic conservatism and right­
radicalism. Yet at the same time the modernisation process created similar effects as in the 
West: backlashes among social strata feeling their positions and values threatened by the rapid 
social transformation. This type of conflict between more and less modern sectors is indeed 
inimical to post-agrarian societies undergoing rapid change.
As outlined in Chapter 5, the communists managed to institute rapid industrialisation, 
urbanisation and rationalisation of agriculture. Already by the 1960’s, industry replaced 
agriculture as the predominant sector. By the 1970’s, the Central and Eastern European 
countries of the Socialist Bloc noted the largest share of industry as a proportion of GDP in 
the world. But while crash industrialisation generated strong economic growth, it remains 
doubtful whether the living standards rose correspondingly. The governments put a 
premium on heavy industry and investment, while the production of consumer goods and 
services was considered a secondary priority. As industrial development reached maturity in 
the 1970’s, overall growth slowed down and government planners proved unable or 
unwilling to shift the emphasis to services, which by then had become the motor of growth in 
the Western market economies.
In communist Central Europe, the preservatist backlash was primarily directed at the 
elites from the outside. Nevertheless, modernisation also created splits within the regimes, 
elements of which feared that the new and more complicated social structure would endanger 
social cohesion, the efficacy of authoritarian rule, and the reach of the state—that is, 
communist rule undermined by its very success at instituting modernisation while failing to
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fully carry it through. The counter-reaction in those quarters—among the ‘hard-liners’— 
was, paradoxically, a revitalisation of archaic ideals, exploitation of national pride and an 
attempted strengthening of collective authority. Chauvino-communism can thus be 
interpreted as a backlash reaction against the successes of socialist modernisation. After the 
communist parties lost power altogether, the ideological affinity between communist hard­
liners and traditionalist or radical right-wingers became even clearer.
A significant portion of Chapter 5 has been devoted to the principal crises of communist 
rule. The low levels of consumption seem to have played a major role in inducing unrest. 
Communism did not bring workers the material well-being to the extent promised or—for 
that matter—provided in the capitalist West. Indeed, the modernisation effort was paid for 
by the working class and by the rural population, which for all practical purposes continued 
to be treated as a class enemy. A more interesting question, however, than the reasons for 
political disaffection is why the outcome varied so dramatically. Why did Hungary erupt 
much more violently than Poland in 1956? Why was there a Prague Spring only in Prague? 
How come there was no Solidarity in Hungary?
We have concluded that ruling elite cohesion was probably decisive both in 1956 and in 
1968. If the highest echelons of the party leadership managed to contain conflicts within its 
own ranks, system stability was greatly enhanced. If, on the other hand, some faction chose to 
appeal to lower party ranks or even to society at large, the conflict was likely to escalate to a 
counter-revolutionary level: whenever the door was opened for moderate reformists, radical 
anti-systemic opponents poured in through it. Once that happened, anti-communism became 
energised by anti-Sovietism and national fervour, a game which the communist parties could 
only lose if played by opposition rules. The latter occurred in Hungary in 1956 and in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the result of both these events was the realisation among the 
communist leadership that if actual unity could not be accomplished, then it was vital to 
preserve at least the pretence of it. The Polish party, which failed at papering over its internal 
cracks and could never decide how to approach the disaffected workers, paid a heavy price for 
this failure already in the 1970’s. Most important from a stability point of view, however, was 
the willingness to take early drastic countermeasures against any perceived anti-systemic 
opposition. The collapse in 1989 followed almost exactly the same pattern as in 1953-56, 
1968, and 1980-81, but then the regimes were incapacitated by the Soviet withdrawal of 
support however prepared they may have been to institute repression.
Why then did Poland become something of an odd man out? It is tempting to refer to 
historical factors: Poland’s history as an early modern-age great power, the traditions of 
insurgency, and the enormous upheavals and suffering that befell Poland during the World 
Wars. But above all one should point to the enormous influence and political independent- 
mindedness of the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Poland is indeed an archetypal counter­
reformation Catholic country with a dualist relationship between religious and secular 
authority. Already by 1956-58, the communists were forced to create a modus vivendi with 
the church, built on the basis of a shared appreciation of Poland’s national uniqueness; 
however differently that concept may have been interpreted. The de facto concordat heralded 
the end of the communists’ aspirations to total hegemony, and punctured their ambitions to 
be absolute masters even in the more narrowly defined political and economic spheres.
The Slovak Catholic Church, on the other hand, has historically been less identified with 
national aspirations and often even been seen as a symbol of historical Magyar oppression. 
Hungary and Bohemia-Moravia are, on their part, typical secularised Catholic or mixed 
Protestant-Catholic societies where the state has upper hand over religion, even though 
church interests occasionally may have independent influence on the citizens.
Hungary too provides interesting features. After the years of deep freeze following 1956, 
the country was steered onto a path of gradual liberalisation and fairly ambitious economic
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reform. The strategy of the paternalistic Kadar regime was to offer relative prosperity in 
return for, if not legitimacy, then at least quiet acquiescence. It de-politicised everyday life 
and was prepared to gradually increase participation to broaden the social and political base 
of the regime. In ‘Goulash communism’, everything could eventually be debated and 
criticised but for the leading role of the party. And although Kadar was put in office by the 
Soviets, the Kadarist wing of the Hungarian communist party was clearly national and 
populist in orientation, stressing the importance of incorporating aspects of the national 
spirit into state ideology.
We have pointed out that many of the post-communist right-radical movements hail back 
to the pre-communist era, but also noted how they have gathered extensive support from 
former communist activists, secret policemen and nomenklatura figures. This does not in 
itself support the hypothesis that right-wing traditions existed submerged within the 
communist establishment; it may simply be the case that former communist sympathisers feel 
attracted by some elements of the right’s programme, such as authoritarianism, etatism or 
nationalism. But at least in the case of Slovakia and Poland, the evidence indicates a stronger 
and more manifest continuity.
Although the communist regimes boasted of having finally crushed nationalism, in fact 
they routinely used it bolster legitimacy. Populist factions of the ruling parties exploited the 
crudest of plebeian traditions and institutionalised chauvinism and anti-Semitism in order to 
fight enemies both inside and outside the ruling parties. Stalinist methods and rhetoric were 
an integral part of the hard-line fare, but simultaneously they attempted to generate support 
by blaming the excesses of Stalinism particularly on Jewish leaders. In the 1940’s and 1950’s, 
‘national communism’ expressed an often liberal-minded reaction against Stalinism and 
foreign hegemony, but by the 1960’s it developed into populist authoritarianism with a 
strong chauvinist streak. If it was Stalinist in method, it was anti-Soviet in essence.
This was nothing new. Within a few years of the October revolution, Marxist-Leninism 
merged with Great Russian nationalism into what is usually called National Bolshevism, a 
bizarre hybrid of Stalinism and chauvinism. Despite the partly unique aspects of the Russian 
experience, Soviet nationalism a la Russe was of intense relevance for Central Europe. What 
the oldest brother did, the younger ones were quick to learn.
The chauvinist stance of the Soviets created parallel and even competing nationalist 
inclinations within the junior communist parties. In many instances—in Yugoslavia, in 
China and even in Romania (a founding member of the Warsaw Pact)—national 
communism eventually took on openly anti-Soviet (or perhaps anti-Russian) features. The 
communist parties’ inability to contain the forces of nationalism was ostensibly one 
important factor in the demise of their hegemony both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union itself. After the break-up of the USSR, nationalism has indeed become the dominant 
force in Russian politics, transcending all other ideologies. Nationalism is a powerful force 
in Central European politics as well, but has nowhere gained the prominence of a Russian- 
style meta-issue.
Modernisation was a, or the, major goal for the communists: they saw themselves as 
determined state-builders, and where nation-building was incomplete, they took on that task 
as well. This raises yet another paradox. The best prospects for political and cultural 
pluralism seem to be found in territories where there is a strong tradition of nationhood and 
statehood, and where society has been secularised.
If this indeed is true, democratic survival in the post-communist countries seems to 
depend upon the extent to which the once ruling communists were actually successful in 
promoting their self-proclaimed modernisation goals. Yet the modernisation which the 
communists accomplished through their breakneck industrialisation, urbanisation and 
collectivisation schemes had unique features. It created an extremely flat socio-economic
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structure with low social complexity and differentiation, and this diffuse cleavage structure 
complicates interest-oriented politics and obstructs the formation of coalitions between 
social groups and political parties. Voting and attitudes may thus, at least in the first stage of 
post-communist transformation, be determined not by interests, but by cultural politics. It is 
indeed in cultural politics that—if one may use the term—the market niche of the Central 
European right still lies; offering collectivism, solidarity, hierarchy, discipline, 
homogenisation and a powerful state. Cultural politics is, incidentally, not only promised by 
the traditionalist and radical right, but also by formations emanating from the power 
structures of the bygone communist era. In this point of traditionalist affinity, the circle of 
fin-de-millennium generic radicalism in Central Europe is closed.
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